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The B r i t i s h Foreign Service and the Question of Tibet 
1904 - 1922 
This t h e s i s deals w i t h the e v o l u t i o n and conduct of B r i t i s h p o l i c y towards 
Tibet from the Younghusband Expedition i n 1904 ( i n i t s e l f the most extreme 
example of the 'forward p o l i c y ' on India's f r o n t i e r s i n t h i s period) t o the 
Washington Conference of 1922 (which c a l l e d f o r a more subtle approach t o 
the d e f i n i t i o n and defence of e s s e n t i a l B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s ) . I t examines the 
i n t e r a c t i o n , i n a complex q u a d r i l a t e r e a l r e l a t i o n s h i p , of the four branches 
of the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n service p r i m a r i l y involved i n Tibetan p o l i c y : the 
Foreign O f f i c e and the Indi a O f f i c e i n London, the Viceroy and the 
Government of India, and the China service based i n Peking. I t seeks t o 
el u c i d a t e the ways i n which B r i t i s h policy-making sought t o accommodate the 
i n t e r e s t s of Indi a w i t h the imperatives of p o l i c y towards other major 
powers, notably Russia, China and Japan. 
Considerable emphasis i s placed upon the problems and c o n t r i b u t i o n s of 
those charged w i t h the implementation of p o l i c y 'on the spot', and the ways 
i n which t h e i r a b i l i t y t o act independently (as Younghusband had done i n 
1904) was eroded by the increasing c o n t r o l of t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s by the 
growing o f f i c i a l bureaucracies i n London, i n a world made smaller by the 
extension of the r a p i d growth of communications. F i n a l l y , the e f f e c t s of 
the new i n t e r n a t i o n a l climate a f t e r the F i r s t World War are evaluated i n 
terms of t h e i r impact upon B r i t a i n ' s Tibetan p o l i c y . 
Since t h i s t h e s i s i s p r i m a r i l y about the e v o l u t i o n of p o l i c y making w i t h i n 
the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n s e r v i c e , i t i s based l a r g e l y on B r i t i s h primary 
sources, both o f f i c i a l and p r i v a t e , and upon the extensive memoir 
l i t e r a t u r e produced by the p a r t i c i p a n t s . I t does not purport t o represent 
or anaylse i n d e t a i l the views of the Tibetans themselves or seek t o pass 
judgement upon the impact of great-power p o l i t i c s upon t h e i r a s p i r a t i o n s , 
though the r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r values and p r i o r i t i e s w i l l be 
apparent. 
Wendy Palace, PHD, U n i v e r s i t y of Durham, 1995. 
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The secret waits f o r the i n s i g h t 
of eyes unclouded by longing; 
Those who are bound by desire 
see only the outward container. 
Lao Tze. 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT. 
In 1904 Tibet was a ' w a i t i n g secret', an i l l defined region of e x o t i c 
r e p u t a t i o n and s t a r k physical and c l i m a t i c c o n t r a s t s of which the B r i t i s h 
Foreign Service knew very l i t t l e . There was great u n c e r t a i n t y about where 
i t s borders began and ended, but a f i r m b e l i e f t h a t they must touch those 
of Russia i n the extreme n o r t h f u e l l e d concern t h a t secret understandings 
must t h e r e f o r e e x i s t between the two nations which might u l t i m a t e l y 
t h r e a t e n the s e c u r i t y of India's borders. 
W r i t i n g about B r i t i s h perceptions of what c o n s t i t u t e d Tibet i n 1904, E r i c 
Telchman, a Senior Consular O f f i c e r i n the China Service, d i v i d e d the 
country I n t o three d i s t i n c t p o l i t i c a l regions which were subject t o varying 
degrees of c o n t r o l by the Dalai Lama's government i n Lhasa, and the Manchu 
government i n Peking.»1 The f i r s t , thought t o be the actual Kingdom of 
Tibet where the Dalai Lama's s p i r i t u a l and temporal w i l l was thought t o be 
uncontested, extended n o r t h as f a r as Kokonor,and east as f a r as the 
ancient Burma f r o n t i e r w i t h China.It included the s t a t e s of Chamdo, Draya, 
and Nyarong which i n 1904 came under the d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of Lhasa. 
The second area, known t o the China Service as East Tibet, and t o the 
Tibetans as Kham, was composed of s t a t e s bordering China i n c l u d i n g 
Tachienlu (Chala), Batang and Litang. These were under d i r e c t Chinese 
c o n t r o l but also included s t a t e s l i k e Derge which had r e c e n t l y f a l l e n under 
the p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e of Lhasa.»2 The nature of Chinese p o l i t i c a l 
c o n t r o l i n t h i s region was extensive but purely nominal as Peking took 
only l i m i t e d i n t e r e s t i n the outer regions of the Empire, having long ago 
handed c o n t r o l of i t s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n there t o the P r o v i n c i a l government of 
Szechuan, whose own i n t e r e s t i n the region had waxed and waned over the 
centuries.»3 I n East Tibet the Dalai Lama's government exercised l i t t l e 
temporal c o n t r o l and h i s s p i r i t u a l influence was challenged by the 
- 13 
abbots of the powerful monasteries of East Tibet who, as members of the 
older Red Hat Sect, resented any i n t e r f e r e n c e from the more r e c e n t l y formed 
Yellow Hat Sect t o which the Dalai Lama belonged.*4 This d i d not a f f e c t 
h i s a b i l i t y t o move f r e e l y i n the region however since he was much loved by 
the l o c a l people and was useful t o the abbots who used h i s r e p u t a t i o n as a 
means of r e i n f o r c i n g t h e i r own c r e d i b i l i t y w i t h the people. Apart from a 
few major c i t i e s and towns and the network of trade routes crossing i t , 
t h i s area was l a r g e l y uninhabited and o f t e n e f f e c t i v e power lay i n the 
hands of l o c a l c h i e f t a i n s and brigands.The t h i r d region,known as Kokonor, 
was a vast and l a r g e l y uninhabitable desert, t h i n l y populated by nomadic 
peoples of mixed Mongolian and Tibetan blood. Like East Tibet i t was 
c o n t r o l l e d by a v a r i e t y of native c h i e f t a n s but the Manchu had t h e i r own 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , or Amban, based i n Slning, who by 1904 could exercise only 
nominal p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e at a time when the once powerful Manchu Dynasty 
was beginlng t o collapse,*5 
The Kingdom of Tibet was known t o be a theocracy w i t h a dual system of 
government, membership of which composed lay and e c c l e s i a t l c a l o f f i c i a l s 
who met together i n a National Assembly or Tsongdu summoned p e r i o d i c a l l y by 
the Dalai Lama. Beyond t h i s l i t t l e was known about the functions of 
government since few westerners had ever v i s i t e d Lhasa i n circumstances 
where they had time or o p p o r t u n i t y f o r study. 
The greater problem f o r the B r i t i s h Foreign Service i n 1904 lay i n 
determining the s t a t u s of Tibet and the system of allegiances t h a t t i e d i t 
t o the other c o u n t r i e s of Central Asia. Few people were aware of Tibet's 
great i m p e r i a l past when, f o r over two centuries, her f i e r c e armies had 
created a vast Empire i n Central Asia. When t h i s ended i n 836AD Tibet had 
become a u n i f i e d , predominatly Buddhist s t a t e , engaging i n a c t i v e r e l a t i o n s 
w i t h the neighbouring Hymalayan States of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim as well 
as w i t h Mongolia, China, and Russia. When Kublai Khan established some 
c o n t r o l i n Tibet i n the second h a l f of the t h i r t e e n t h century he made 
Buddhlsim the predominate r e l i g i o n i n h i s Eastern Mongolian Empire, 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a unique interdependence between the Mongol Emperors and the 
Tibetan r u l e r s . These strong bonds, forged between the Buddhist Churches of 
Tibet and Mongolia at t h i s time, were s t i l l i n place i n 1904, and were 
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not known t o the B r i t i s h . * 7 This Buddhist a l l i a n c e also made i t possible 
f o r Russian B u r i a t s l i k e Agvan D o r j i e v t o e s t a b l i s h contact w i t h the Dalai 
Lama, c r e a t i n g much alarm i n B r i t i s h ranks, where the strong r e l i g i o u s t i e s 
between Russian and Tibetan Buddhists were not f u l l y appreciated, and where 
Do r j l e v ' s n a t i o n a l i t y was considered of greater Importance than h i s 
r e l i g i o n . * 8 The shared r e l i g i o n also made i t easier f o r Japanese Buddhists 
l i k e Kawaguchi Ekai and Nomi Kan t o t r a v e l and study i n T i b e t , a f t e r 1902 
when B r i t a i n had signed an a l l i a n c e w i t h Japan, these t r a v e l l e r s were 
regarded as a p o s i t i v e help t o B r i t i s h Intelligence.»9 Apart from these 
Japanese sources, and those acquired by the Indian pundits who had r i s k e d 
t h e i r l i v e s t o t r a v e l s e c r e t l y i n Tibet between 1865 and 1888, there was 
l i t t l e r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n t o be had about the country, and l i t t l e 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n v e s t i g a t e i t s s t a t u s i n Central Asia. As well as the 
confusion created by Tibet's possible r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia, B r i t a i n ' s 
r i v a l i n the great game of the previous century, there was also 
considerable confusion over the exact nature of Manchu r e l a t i o n s w ith 
Tibet.*10 F i r s t o f f i c i a l contact between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu 
Emperor had been established when the f i f t h Dalai Lama, widely known as the 
'Great F i f t h ' , had accepted an i n v i t a t i o n t o v i s i t Peking I n 1653. The 
v i s i t had been w e l l documented and was known about i n the west l a r g e l y as a 
r e s u l t of researches undertaken by W i l l i a m R o c k h i l l , an American diplomat 
and celebrated Central Asian t r a v e l l e r who had discovered t h a t , d u r i n g the 
v i s i t , the Great F i f t h had been t r e a t e d w i t h the respect usually accorded 
t o the sovereign of an independent s t a t e . t i l At t h i s time the Cho-yon 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the Manchu Emporer and the Dalai Lama was also 
a f f i r m e d . This symbolic r e l a t i o n s h i p was based on a personal understanding 
between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emporer under which the Dalai Lama 
became the Emperor's ' s p i r i t u a l adviser' and the Emperor became the Dalai 
Lama's 'pr o t e c t o r ' , a r o l e which gave him e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l over Tibetan 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y and allowed him t o place Chinese o f f i c i a l s and g a r r i s o n 
Chinese troops i n s i d e Tibet.*12 Since the B r i t i s h knew and understood 
nothing of t h i s arrangement i t was d i f f i c u l t f o r them t o appreciate why the 
Manchu a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t i l l operated Inside Tibet at a time when t h e i r 
c o n t r o l was v i s i b l y weak. 
15 -
On the eve of the B r i t i s h Expedition t o Lhasa th e r e f o r e very l i t t l e was 
known about Tibet t h a t was not based on t r a v e l l e r s ' t a l e s and information 
supplied by spies and missionaries which was o f t e n second or t h i r d hand.*13 
E a r l i e r contacts had been made w i t h the country by the East India Company 
which had administered I n d i a u n t i l 1858 when India came under the 
p r o t e c t i o n of the Crown, and by the B r i t i s h c o n t r o l l e d government of 
Bengal, which f o r mainly comnercial reasons had been anxious t o e s t a b l i s h 
l i n k s w i t h the Lhasa government. I n 1774 Warren Hastings had sent a 
'mission' l e d by George Bogle t o the S i x t h Panchen Lama at Shigatse, the 
second most Important p o l i t i c a l and s p i r i t u a l centre i n the Kingdom of 
Tibet. The aim of the mission had been not only t o develop commercial and 
f r i e n d s h i p l i n k s w i t h the Tibetans, but was also an attempt t o persuade the 
Panchen Lama t o use h i s Influence w i t h the lanchu Emperor, i n order t o allow 
the development of trade between India and the wealthy Chinese province of 
Szechuan, where s t o r i e s of mineral wealth and vast gold f i e l d s had excited 
the imagination and whetted the app e t i t e of East India Company Traders. 
Bogle spent s i x months at the Panchen Lama's Court at Tashilhunpo at a 
time when Tibet was r u l e d by a Regent f o l l o w i n g the death of the previous 
Dalai Lama, and while the new i n c a r n a t i o n was s t i l l w a i t i n g t o be found. 
I n the absence of a Dalai Lama the Panchen Lama became the highest 
s p i r i t u a l a u t h o r i t y i n Tibet, and as a man already much admired and 
respected f o r h i s s p i r i t u a l q u a l i t i e s , even by the Manchu Emperor h i n e e l f . 
Bogle formed an e n t i r e l y f a l s e impression of h i s s t a t u s during h i s 
r e l a t i v e l y short v i s i t . When he then returned t o India w i t h presents t h a t 
included gold dust, and w i t h promises from the Panchen Lama tha t he would 
be able t o secure guarantees from the Manchu Emperor t h a t he would not 
obstru c t B r i t i s h trade and commercial developments i n Szechuan or Tibet, 
there were high expectations i n India t h a t a f r u i t f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h 
both China and Tibet would result.Although the death of the S i x t h Panchen 
Lama and the discovery of the new Dalai Lama a few months a f t e r Bogle's 
v i s i t made these promises meaningless, the idea t h a t the Panchen Lama 
could help In d i a p e r s i s t e d , and was confirmed by a second mission t o Tibet 
l e d by iSamuel Turner, who stayed w i t h the Seventh Panchen Laaia i n 1783. The 
tendency t o exaggerate the power of the Panchen Lama at the Dalai Lama's 
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expense p e r s i s t e d i n 1904 despite a l l obvious signs t o the contary.*14 
I n the l a s t decade of the eighteenth century a f i e r c e and b i t t e r war 
between Nepal and Tibet had r e s u l t e d i n a Treaty signed i n 1792 i n which 
both sides had asked China t o act as mediator. The Treaty terms included 
an agreement f o r both c o u n t r i e s t o submit f u t u r e disputes t o the Amban at 
Lhasa, and gave China powers t o close Tibetan borders t o f o r e i g n influence 
at a time when the East I n d i a Company was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y a c t i v e i n 
trade on the Indo-Tibetan borders.*15 This move, f u l l y supported inside 
T i b e t , began t o generate f r o n t i e r tensions which i n t e n s i f i e d a f t e r 1858 
when the East I n d i a Company r e l i n q u i s h e d c o n t r o l t o the Government of 
I n d i a , but i n circuastances where the independent government of Bengal was 
s t i l l anxious t o continue t o t r y t o r e t a i n and develop e x i s t i n g commercial 
l i n k s w i t h the country. The annexation of Sikkim by the Indian government 
i n 1890, and the f a i l u r e t o implement Anglo-Chinese trade agreements i n 
1890 and 1893, f u r t h e r exacerbated tensions, making B r i t i s h involvement 
i n c r e a s i n g l y p o l i t i c a l as the Indian government fought t o preserve i t s 
e x i s t i n g commercial gains.*16 
Under the terms of the Chefoo Agreement signed w i t h China i n 1876, the 
Manchu had r e l u c t a n t l y agreed t o issue passports f o r a B r i t i s h overland 
commercial mission t o Lhasa but t h i s had not been followed up u n t i l 1886, 
when a mission was organised under the leadership of Colman l^acaulay, 
p r e v i o u s l y F i n a n c i a l Secretary t o the government of Bengal. The Bengal 
government had sanctioned the venture f o l l o w i n g pressure from B r i t i s h 
t r a d e r s , and on the s t r e n g t h of seemingly r e l i a b l e r e p o r t s of favourable 
t r a d i n g o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n Tibet. When the party f i n a l l y assembled i n 
D a r j e e l i n g there seemed t o be every hope of success. However, on the eve 
of i t s departure i t was suddenly cancelled, London having received 
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t the mission would not be welcome, and i t subsequently 
emerged t h a t the Dalai Lama had ordered h i s troops t o block the entrance t o 
Chumbi Valley, a move which the Chinese were unable t o prevent. In order t o 
save face the Chinese o f f e r e d the Indian government t e r r i t o r y i n Burma, 
confirmed i n the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1886, which would l a t e r create 
great problems f o r the China Service who were required t o monitor and 
p r o t e c t the new Sino-Burmese borderland, an area of dense 
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Jungle and unwelcoming t r i b a l peoples. As w e l l as blocking the Macaulay 
missi o n the T i b e t a n s a l s o r e f u s e d to withdraw t h e i r troops from the area. 
By 1904, with the Chinese s t i l l unable to oust them, i t became apparent to 
the Indian government th a t t h e i r power i n T i b e t was dangerously weak and 
t h a t they r e a l l y had no i n f l u e n c e with the Tibetans who were now openly 
v i o l a t i n g the trade agreements of 1890 and 1893. I t became obvious that 
p o s i t i v e a c t i o n needed to be taken i n order to bring the s i t u a t i o n under 
c o n t r o l . 
The s i t u a t i o n i n E a s t T i b e t was monitored by the China S e r v i c e administered 
by the B r i t i s h Legation i n Peking. L i t t l e was known about the region 
beyond the f a c t t h a t i t was under va r y i n g degrees of Chinese c o n t r o l and 
s u b j e c t to the D a l a i Lama's i n f l u e n c e , but as long as the f r o n t i e r remained 
r e l a t i v e l y s t a b l e they were not p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n how the 
arrangement worked. I n the l a t e 1880's v a r i o u s schemes had been explored 
with the aim of developing trade r o u t e s a c r o s s Tibet to I n d i a . These had 
i n c l u d e d plans to b u i l d a r a i l w a y l i n k i n g I n d i a with the Chinese province 
of Yunnan, and a proposal to take steamships i n t o the upper reaches of the 
Yangtze to the very borders of E a s t T i b e t . Both schemes had to be q u i c k l y 
abandoned however once the dangers and the f u l l c o s t of the ventures had 
been f u l l y e x p l o r e d . • I ? 
During the 1890's the e n t i r e nature of Anglo-Tibetan r e l a t i o n s was 
transformed by the emergence of two powerful men who, i n 1904, dominated 
the p o l i c i e s of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e governments. The f i r s t was Thubten Gyasto, 
who became the T h i r t e e n t h D a l a i Lama i n 1894, and the second was Viscount 
George S a t h a n i e l Curzon, who became the youngest Viceroy of I n d i a 
i n 1899.»18. 
Thubten Gyasto had been the f i r s t D a l a i Lama f o r many ye a r s to a t t a i n h i s 
m a j o r i t y and a t eighteen had s u r v i v e d a pl o t to poison him at a time when 
powerful f a c t i o n s i n s i d e China and T i b e t opposed h i s r i g h t to e x e r c i s e 
temporal r u l e over T i b e t . He q u i c k l y became a dangerous t h r e a t to the 
powerful f o r c e s surrounding him because he had a p o l i t i c a l mind and had 
a l r e a d y been made aware of western diplomatic p r a c t i c e as a r e s u l t of h i s 
involvement with Aghvan D o r j l e v , h i s t u t o r f o r part of h i s childhood. 
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and now a t r u s t e d f r i e n d . T h i s made him a t h r e a t not only to China, but 
a l s o to I n d i a , s i n c e i n previous y e a r s the D a l a i Lama had played a 
negative r o l e i n Tibetan government , Tibet having been r u l e d by Regents 
who, unable to combine t h e i r p o l i t i c a l power with the s p i r i t u a l powers of 
the D a l a i Lama's, had allowed r e a l c o n t r o l i n the country to be divided 
between the t h r e e great monasteries of Ganden, Sera, and Drepung, which had 
fought each other f o r p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n Lhasa.»19 R e l i g i o u s l i n k s 
between the Ifinth Panchen Lama and the D a l a i Lama were p o t e n t i a l l y very 
s t r o n g s i n c e the former acted a s s p i r i t u a l a d v i s o r to the l a t t e r , and i n 
t h i s period they were made even stronger by the f a c t that the Panchen Lama 
was only four y e a r s younger than the D a l a i Lama. True f r i e n d s h i p between 
them was prevented however by the very d i f f e r e n t nature of t h e i r 
c h a r a c t e r s , the Panchen Lama being l e s s worldly, a f a c t confirmed i n 1902 
when he t r a v e l l e d to Lhasa to r e c e i v e the D a l a i Lama's b l e s s i n g . Thubten 
Gyasto's a r r i v a l had given great hope to those who b e l i e v e d that Tibet 
might once again become an independent sovereign s t a t e f r e e from a l l 
Chinese i n f l u e n c e , a f a c t w e l l appreciated by Curzon who r e a l i s e d that i t 
might now be p o s s i b l e to deal d i r e c t l y with the Tibetan r u l e r without 
having to c o n s u l t the Chinese. He had come to I n d i a convinced of the need 
to promote c o n t a c t s with T i b e t f o r p o l i t i c a l and commercial reasons. For 
him, a l r e a d y an acknowledged expert on C e n t r a l A s i a , T i b e t ' s s t r a t e g i c 
p o s i t i o n i n the Hymalayas made i t v i t a l l y important f o r B r i t a i n to 
e s t a b l i s h formal c o n t a c t s with the Tibetans, e s p e c i a l l y as he had become 
convinced that R u s s i a had an understanding with T i b e t which might threaten 
I n d i a n s e c u r i t y . I n the b e l i e f t h a t the D a l a i Lama was e x c e r c i s i n g f u l l 
p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n Lhasa, he r e s o l v e d to w r i t e d i r e c t l y to him, and on 
11th August 1900 sent a personal l e t t e r which was returned unopened s i x 
months l a t e r . I n June 1901, t h i s time employing the s e r v i c e s of the 
Bhutanese spy Ugyen K a z i , he sent a second l e t t e r which was a l s o returned 
unopened on the grounds t h a t the messenger had been unable to f i n d an 
o f f i c i a l r e l i a b l e enough to c a r r y i t on to Lhasa. I t was impossible to say 
whether Ugyen was t e l l i n g the t r u t h or had simply l o s t h i s nerve, but with 
the R u s s i a n s advancing f u r t h e r i n t o C e n t r a l A s i a , and i n the knowledge that 
the Chinese could do nothing to c o n t r o l Tibetan aggression, Curzon decided 
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t h a t a mission to Lhasa was the only e f f e c t i v e means of e s t a b l i s h i n g 
contact with the D a l a i Lama. I t was a g a i n s t t h i s background that the 
Younghusband E x p e d i t i o n s e t out i n 1903. 
2. THE BATURE OF THE PRQBLEH 
S i r John Jordan d e s c r i b e d T i b e t a s a 'running sore' i n Anglo-Chinese 
r e l a t i o n s and u n t i l the Younghusband Expedit i o n entered Lhasa i n 1904, 
the Foreign S e r v i c e i n London and China had tended to place the country 
I n the wider context of r e l a t i o n s with China.*20 In I n d i a t h i s had not 
been the case and here T i b e t was regarded as part of a wider s t r a t e g y 
which aimed at loose a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l over the Indian borderlands 
i n c l u d i n g Burma, Assam, and the Hymalayan S t a t e s of Sikkim, Bhutan, and 
Nepal.The idea behind t h i s was to provide commercial gains f o r I n d i a by 
developing trade i n these a r e a s and a l s o to o f f e r an e f f e c t i v e b u f f e r 
a g a i n s t any i n v a s i o n of the Indian subcontinent by Russia. 
The Younghusband E x p e d i t i o n was e s s e n t i a l l y the b r a i n c h i l d of George 
Curzon, but i t a l s o had powerful backing from a number of vested 
i n t e r e s t s i n I n d i a , and a s c o n f l i c t began to develop between supporters 
of t h i s Curzonian forward p o l i c y and s u c c e s s i v e governments i n London 
with l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n becoming Involved i n t h i s remote part of the 
world, the i s s u e i t s e l f became p a r t of a wider debate between the 
Government of I n d i a , the I n d i a O f f i c e , and the Foreign O f f i c e , over the 
c o n t r o l of I n d i a n f r o n t i e r p o l i c y . 
The Younghusband E x p e d i t i o n i t s e l f acted as a c a t a l y s t f o r change wit h i n 
the Foreign S e r v i c e , provoking alarm i n London, and i n i t i a t i n g a period 
of r i v a l r y between the China S e r v i c e and the I n d i a S e r v i c e which would 
complicate a l l f u t u r e n e g o t i a t i o n s about Ti b e t . I n one sense t h i s 
r i v a l r y was p u r e l y commercial f o r , l i k e the Curzonians, some members of 
the China S e r v i c e were a l s o i n t e r e s t e d i n the p o s s i b i l i t y of developing 
the commercial p o t e n t i a l of Western China, but i n the main, B r i t i s h 
p o l i c y was concentrated on the development of commercial i n t e r e s t s i n 
the Yangtze Basin, and B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r s regarded the e x p l o r a t i o n of 
r e s o u r c e s on the Sino-Tibetan and Slno-Burmese borders as a waste of 
manpower and resources. 
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The main problem which the Younghusband Ex p e d i t i o n would c r e a t e f o r the 
China S e r v i c e had more to do with the d i s r u p t i o n of i t s harmonious 
r e l a t i o n s with the Hanchu government which had been s e v e r e l y s t r a i n e d by 
the Boxer R e b e l l i o n of 1900, and which they had worked hard to r e s t o r e . 
I f they thought about T i b e t i n 1904 t h e r e f o r e , they saw i t as a problem 
a r t i f i c a l l y c r e a t e d by an ambitious Indian government which they di d 
t h e i r best to contain. 
The Foreign O f f i c e i n London had a l s o done i t s utmost to prevent 
Younghusband from s e t t i n g out, p a r t l y because they thought that the 
e x p e d i t i o n would provoke a c r i s i s with the Russians, with whom they were 
s t i l l competing f o r t e r r i t o r y i n C e n t r a l Asia, and with whom they now 
wished to e f f e c t a t r u c e . By 1904 they were t h e r e f o r e at loggerheads 
with I n d i a over the i s s u e , with the I n d i a O f f i c e caught between the two 
a s the e f f e c t i v e organ of c e n t r a l government i n London. 
Bremen Addy portrayed T i b e t as a pawn on the i m p e r i a l chessboard and as 
a h e l p l e s s v i c t i m of the Great Game played out between the major powers 
i n C e n t r a l Asia.»21 I n many r e s p e c t s t h i s a n a l y s i s i s c o r r e c t . 
However, although a v i c t i m of i m p e r i a l p o l i c y , T i b e t exacted her own 
revenge f o r B r i t a i n ' s f a i l u r e to comprehend her e x i s t i n g s t a t u s and 
importance i n C e n t r a l A s i a , and involvement i n T i b e t e v e n t u a l l y became a 
very r e a l t h r e a t to B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e there f o r a number of reasons.The 
c l i m a t e and t e r r a i n made the country qu i t e i n a c c e s s i b l e except to the 
most hardened and determined i n v a s i o n force. Areas of E a s t Tibet had 
been i n f o r m a l l y part of China f o r many years, but the Szechuanese troops 
who t r i e d to move i n t o t e r r i t o r y over which they p r e v i o u s l y e x e r c i s e d 
nominal c o n t r o l found the opposition formidable, and the troops and 
o f f i c i a l s they l e f t stranded i n i s o l a t e d g a r r i s o n s along the main road 
to Lhasa to a d m i n i s t e r and r e t a i n a presence tended to marry Tibetan 
women and become T i b e t a n i s e d . E f f e c t i v e missionary work was a l s o 
hampered by the s t r e n g t h of the Buddhist r e l i g i o n , and even dedicated 
m i s s i o n a r i e s found i t v i r t u a l l y impossible to a c q u i r e converts among the 
Tibetans, with the r e s u l t t h a t one p o s s i b l e avenue of contact between 
Europeans and T i b e t a n s was c l o s e d . Invasion from I n d i a was v i r t u a l l y 
i m possible f o r most of the year s i n c e the few passes i n t o Tibet were 
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blocked by snow, but when i t was p o s s i b l e to use them, a l t i t u d e s i c k n e s s 
and exposure took t h e i r t o l l on those unused to the mountain 
environment, and although the d i f f i c u l t i e s of t r a v e l l i n g i n t o T i b e t were 
one of i t s g r e a t e s t a t t r a c t i o n s , those drawn to t h i s remote wild e r n e s s 
r a r e l y a p p r e c i a t e d the s c a l e of the hardships they would face. 
Involvement i n T i b e t a l s o h i g h l i g h t e d a number of problens which i n the 
long term would have grave i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the very s u r v i v a l of 
B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s m i n South and C e n t r a l A s i a . F i r s t l y , the problem of 
maintaining p r e s t i g e i n remote a r e a s l i k e T i b e t , where c r e d i b i l i t y was 
v i t a l l y important, and where any l o s s of face might have l i f e 
t h r e a t e n i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r those on the spot. Secondly, involvement 
i n T i b e t exaggerated c o n f l i c t s a l r e a d y developing between the 
b u r e a u c r a c i e s i n London and the men on the spot, as i m p e r i a l commitments 
grew, and as the need f o r Foreign O f f i c e e x p e r t s was deemed i n c r e a s i n g l y 
e s s e n t i a l . T h i s process, aided by the r a p i d i n t r o d u c t i o n of speedier 
communications between London and A s i a , allowed telegraph messages to 
r e a c h C a l c u t t a and Peking w i t h i n a day, but was introduced at the 
expense of the men on the spot who now found t h e i s e l v e s i n the same 
dangerous s i t u a t i o n s , but without the a b i l i t y to use t h e i r i n i t i a t i v e 
f o r f e a r of having to r i s k t h e i r c a r e e r and account f o r mistakes f o r 
which, i n the past, g r e a t e r allowances had been made. T h i s had the 
e f f e c t of undermining confidence without providing necessary backup, f o r 
although messages from London might reach C a l c u t t a or Peking w i t h i n a 
day, p a s s i n g them on to remote h i l l posts on the l o r t h E a s t F r o n t i e r 
i n e v i t a b l y took f a r longer, and the gradual e r o s i o n of t r u s t between 
c o l l e a g u e s on the spot and i n London, a l r e a d y exacerbated by t e n s i o n s 
between the S e r v i c e s , had an i n c r e a s i n g l y damaging e f f e c t on the o v e r a l l 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the Empire. 
A t h i r d q u i t e separate problem was c r e a t e d by the need to define the 
boundaries of T i b e t . T h i s provoked a c l a s h of i d e a s between Ea s t and 
West because much of the land, which appeared to the B r i t i s h as 
uninhabited w i l d e r n e s s , was a c t u a l l y d i v i d e d up by t r e a t y understandings 
between China and her neighbours. I n t e r e s t i n the development of an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a f t e r 1918 seemed to make i t imperative that every 
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f r o n t i e r be d e f i n e d and d e l i m i t e d , even though the w i l d e r n e s s which 
greeted the o u t s i d e r was r e a l l y a network of trade routes c o l l e c t i v e l y 
owned by the nomads and herders who moved a c r o s s i t , and who deeply 
r e s e n t e d f o r e i g n i n t r u s i o n s , the whole concept of land ownership being 
e n t i r e l y a l i e n to t h e i r c u l t u r e . The a c t i v i t i e s of the great powers 
were a l s o now c l o s e l y monitored by the burgeoning newspaper industry 
which reported every f a i l u r e and misdemeanour to an i n c r e a s i n g l y 
c r i t i c a l body of world opinion and which, by the begining of the 
t w e n t i e t h century, had begun to question the r a t i o n a l e of imperialism. 
T h i s l e d i n t u r n to the need f o r p o l i t i c i a n s to j u s t i f y t h e i r 
involvement i n T i b e t , l e a d i n g them to define the area geographically and 
p o l i t i c a l l y i n order to e s t a b l i s h ownership. T h i s had the e f f e c t of 
encouraging the Chinese t o do the same, s i n c e a f t e r 1900 China was i n 
danger of being d i v i d e d up i n t o spheres of i n f l u e n c e between the great 
powers,and the Manchu were anxious to e s t a b l i s h themselves as a great 
power i n t h e i r own r i g h t . 
The nature of the problem posed by Tibet was t h e r e f o r e large and 
fundamental i n c r e a t i n g d i v i s i o n between the v a r i o u s branches of the 
B r i t i s h Foreign S e r v i c e , and i n c h a l l e n g i n g the s t r e n g t h of B r i t i s h 
i m p e r i a l i s m as t h e i r r e s o u r c e s became i n c r e a s i n g l y s t r e t c h e d . In the 
f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s I w i l l explore i n d e t a i l the nature of the problem 
which involvement i n T i b e t presented f o r the B r i t i s h and Indian Foreign 
S e r v i c e s a t a time when p o l i t i c a l change and developments i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy were posing i n c r e a s i n g c h a l l e n g e s to the future 
of B r i t i s h power and p r e s t i g e i n Asia. 
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2. Curzon soon a f t e r h i s appointment as Viceroy i n 1998 
i 
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THE YOUIGHUSBAgD EXPEDITIOH: BRITISH FORWARD POLICY 1904-1906 
T h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y chapter examines the changes that took place i n B r i t a i n ' s 
T i b e t a n p o l i c y , both on the f r o n t i e r , and w i t h i n the va r i o u s departments of 
the F o r e i g n S e r v i c e , between September 1904, when the Lhasa Convention was 
signed, and A p r i l 1906 when China's adhesion to i t was s u c c e s s f u l l y 
completed. 
During t h i s p e r i o d accepted v a l u e s and b e l i e f s about the f r o n t i e r were 
challenged, and debates about p o l i c y generated s e r i o u s c o n f l i c t s that were 
to a f f e c t the way i n which fu t u r e p o l i c y was conducted. 
1. THE YOUIGHUSBAID EXPEDITIOU AID THE LHASA COSVENTIOH 
There was a s t r o n g l y held b e l i e f , r e f l e c t e d i n the t e s t i m o n i e s of the men 
who went with Younghusband to Lhasa i n 1904, that they were r e t u r n i n g to 
Ti b e t i n order to complete the work begun by the Government of Bengal 
which, with the support of the Hastings a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , had sought to 
e s t a b l i s h trade and f r i e n d s h i p l i n k s with Tibetans i n the l a t e 18th 
century. T h i s ' f r i e n d l y ' forward p o l i c y had l a t e r been abandoned f o r one of 
'forbearance' a f t e r the l e p a l e s e T r e a t y of 1792 had e f f e c t i v e l y c l o s e d a l l 
doors to the country. *1. A f t e r 1858 the Government of Bengal fought a 
long and f r u i t l e s s b a t t l e with the newly c r e a t e d Indian Government to get 
t h i s p o l i c y r e v e r s e d however the t e n s i o n s generated by the 'Great Game' on 
I n d i a ' s f r o n t i e r s made the s a n c t i o n i n g of any change of p o l i c y u n l i k e l y , 
and the c a n c e l l a t i o n of the Ilacaulay K i s s i o n to Peking on the eve of i t s 
departure i n 1886 f i n a l l y put paid to t h e i r attempts to get the forward 
p o l i c y r e i n s t a t e d . 2 * . For members of the Younghusband Expedition therefore, 
the o f f i c i a l s a n c t i o n i n g of t h e i r venture by the B r i t i s h Government was 
both a triumph and a v i n d i c a t i o n f o r the p o s i t i o n taken by the 
Government of Bengal, a s w e l l a s a s p e c t a c u l a r diplomatic coup f o r t h e i r 
mentor,the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, who had taken o f f i c e i n 1899 determined to 
prevent T i b e t f a l l i n g i n t o R u s s i a n hands. *3. 
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As an acknowledged expert on Asian a f f a i r s with a w e l l thought out plan f o r 
the f r o n t i e r Curzon came to regard the Lhasa Expedition as a personal 
crusade. He looked upon the D a l a i Lama's apparent r e j e c t i o n of h i s 
o v e r t u r e s of f r i e n d s h i p a s a c a l c u l a t e d i n s u l t and was able to convince 
himself f i r s t l y , t hat Chinese c l a i m s to T i b e t were a f i c t i o n , and secondly, 
that the D a l a i Lama hims e l f was i n league with the the Russians. #4 He had 
c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d the team f o r Lhasa, and i t s l e a d e r F r a n c i s Younghusband 
was a l r e a d y w e l l known to him as a f r i e n d . The E x p e d i t i o n members were 
bound to each other by a mutual commitment to h i s p o l i c y and h i s views 
coloured t h e i r perceptions, g i v i n g the E x p e d i t i o n i t s e l f the aura of a 
vendetta. *5, 
Beyond the i n d i r e c t a t t a c k on B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e afforded by the Tibetan 
r e f u s a l to respond to Curzon's l e t t e r s , there were geninune f e a r s i n 
I n d i a about the s a f e t y and s e c u r i t y of the north-east f r o n t i e r , and there 
was s u f f i c e n t hard evidence of Russian i n t r i g u e i n T i b e t to convince them 
tha t f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n was warranted. *6. The d i s c o v e r y i n 1902 of what 
appeared to be a s e c r e t understanding between R u s s i a and China over the 
f u t u r e of T i b e t , and the knowledge that the Chinese could no longer 
i n f l u e n c e or c o n t r o l Tibetan behaviour, f i n a l l y convinced doubters i n 
London of the need to send an E x p e d i t i o n s i n c e there now seemed a r e a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , i n the absence of Chinese c o n t r o l , Tibetans might turn 
d i r e c t l y to R u s s i a f o r f u t u r e support, an option which the l a t t e r might 
f i n d too a t t r a c t i v e to r e s i s t . *7. 
The d e c i s i o n to send the E x p e d i t i o n was f i n a l l y agreed, with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm, by p a r t i e s i n London and I n d i a , when i t was r e a l i s e d 
t h a t the Trade Convention of 1890, s e t up to r e g u l a t e f r o n t i e r trade, was 
simply not being implemented and t h a t a more f o r c e f u l approach was r e q u i r e d 
to s e t t l e the f r o n t i e r . Younghusband's i n i t i a l t a s k was t h e r e f o r e to 
attempt n e g o t i a t i o n s with the T i b e t a n s at Khambajong, the nearest inhabited 
t e r r i t o r y j u s t w i t h i n the Tibetan border. I t was only a f t e r the f a i l u r e to 
r e a c h a settlement at Khambajong that the order to advance i n t o T i b e t was 
i s s u e d , and then only a f t e r f u r t h e r d e l a y s and o b s t r u c t i o n by Tibetans, did 
the p a r t y e v e n t u a l l y secure o f f i c i a l permission to move on to Lhasa i n 
order to e f f e c t a settlement. *Q 
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Many suggestions have been made about the reasons why the Younghusband 
E x p e d i t i o n was s e n t to Lhasa. At one l e v e l i t can c e r t a i n l y be seen as a 
p u n i t i v e i n v a s i o n whose purpose was to show Tibetans that they could not 
simply ignore f r i e n d l y approaches made by B r i t i s h I n d i a . At another l e v e l , 
i t was a m i s s i o n of i n v e s t i g a t i o n , with the aim of d i s c o v e r i n g the true 
f a c t s about R u s s i a n p e n e t r a t i o n i n the region. On yet a t h i r d l e v e l , i t 
r e a l l y was the commercial venture i t purported to be, prompted by I n d i a ' s 
need f o r c a s h and f u e l l e d by t r a v e l l e r s ' t a l e s of r i c h gold d e p o s i t s i n 
T i b e t and beyond, i n the so f a r unexploited regions of South-¥est China. 
There was a l s o a f o u r t h and l e s s t a n g i b l e reason f o r the s a n c t i o n i n g of 
the Expedition, and t h i s had to do with the growing importance given to 
s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r y and the a c q u i s i t i o n of knowledge, and each member of 
the team was i n v o l v e d i n some kind of s c i e n t i f i c or c u l t u r a l activity.»9 
F i n a l l y , the E x p e d i t i o n was an adventure. The j o u r n a l i s t s accompanying 
the group,and the newspapermen cove r i n g the s t o r y a t home, ensured that 
t h e i r r e a d e r s were able to enjoy a ' r i p p i n g yarn' from the r e l a t i v e comfort 
of t h e i r own armchairs. *10 
For a l l these reasons, to s a t i s f y c u r i o s i t y , a l l a y f e a r s , and e s t a b l i s h 
some B r i t i s h c l a i m to T i b e t , the expedition e v e n t u a l l y moved on to Lhasa 
where the u l t i m a t e purpose of the venture f o r Younghusband was to s i g n a 
formal T r e a t y which would bind T i b e t to I n d i a and ensure the s e c u r i t y 
of I n d i a ' s f r o n t i e r i n the long term. 
The Lhasa Convention signed on 7th September 1904, was o s t e n s i b l y a 
commercial document. The Indian Government were anxious to i n c r e a s e t h e i r 
p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e i n T i b e t as much as p o s s i b l e i n order to counter any 
c o n t i n u i n g R u s s i a n involvement which could t h r e a t e n f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y . 
They t h e r e f o r e pushed to get a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e permanently s t a t i o n e d i n 
Lhasa, and when t h i s t a c t i c was opposed i n London, concentrated on 
e s t a b l i s h i n g t r a d i n g marts i n s i d e T i b e t to co-ordinate commercial 
a c t i v i t i e s and monitor p o l i t i c a l events there. *11 
Two such marts were s e t up under the terms of the Convention, at Gyantse, 
near Lhasa, and at Gartok i n Western Tibet.*12 Under A r t i c l e IX of 
the Convention, r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from other powers were prevented from 
having any commercial or p o l i t i c a l d e a l i n g s with Tibet, and although the 
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i n t e n t i o n of t h i s a r t i c l e was to exclude Russia, i t g r e a t l y annoyed the 
Chinese who saw i t as a d i r e c t challenge to what they regarded as t h e i r 
own l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s there, A r t i c l e IX marked the beginning of a 
s o u r i n g of Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s over T i b e t that were to become a major 
i s s u e during the subsequent t a l k s to secure Chinese Adhesion to the 
Convention i n 1905 »13. The a d d i t i o n a l indemnity c l a u s e , p e r s o n a l l y 
negotiated by Younghusband himself, a l s o c r e a t e d an explosion of 
h o s t i l i t y i n London t h a t was followed by a f u l l s c a l e enquiry i n t o h i s 
behaviour,which he and h i s c o l l e a g u e s b i t t e r l y resented, *14 
There was c o n s i d e r a b l e controversy i n London and Peking about the s t a t u s 
of the d e l e g a t e s who signed the Lhasa Convention. The following names 
appeared as s i g n a t o r i e s : Colonel Younghusband ( B r i t i s h Commissioner); 
T i Rimpoche (Representative of the D a l a i Lama); Re p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the 
Three Monastries of Sera, Ganden, and Drepung; and Members of the Tsongdu. 
The s i g n i n g ceremony had taken place i n s i d e the P o t a l a i t s e l f . C o p i e s of the 
document,in E n g l i s h , Chinese and Tibetan, were then sent on to London, 
C a l c u t t a , and Peking,for r a t i f i c a t i o n , The s i g n i n g ceremony l a s t e d 
f o r one and a h a l f hours and afterwards Younghusband made a formal address 
to the T i b e t a n people, s t r e s s i n g f r i e n d s h i p between B r i t a i n and Tibet, *15 
A f t e r the t e n s i o n s surrounding the Convention, the s i g n i n g had been 
e f f e c t e d with remarkable good humour and with accompanying s i g h s of r e l i e f 
a l l round; the E x p e d i t i o n members spent the r e s t of t h e i r time i n the c i t y , 
v i s i t i n g temples and monasteries and b e f r i e n d i n g the l o c a l people, *16, 
Despite the appearance of l e g a l i t y however the Convention was h i g h l y 
unorthodox, and the s t a t u s of the s i g n a t o r i e s questionable. Although 
Younghusband had the a u t h o r i t y to negotiate a b i l a t e r a l t r e a t y with 
the Tibetans, he was h i m s e l f very u n c l e a r about how much f l e x i b i l i t y he 
had been given. *17 The a d d i t i o n a l complication of the approaching winter, 
coupled with pressure from Macdonald, m i l i t a r y head of the expedition, whom 
Younghusband suspected of t r y i n g to s e i z e c o n t r o l , meant that d e c i s i o n s had 
to be taken quickly.»18 The extent to which he acted i n ignorance of 
i n s t r u c t i o n s given remains a matter f o r s p e c u l a t i o n ; however i t i s a f a c t 
t h a t , d e s p i t e the t r a p p i n g s of o f f i c i a l d o m , Younghusband's p o s i t i o n was 
no longer a s secure as i t had once been f o r Curzon himself was now under 
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I n v e s t i g a t i o n , f o l l o w i n g a prolonged and b i t t e r c o n f l i c t with Lord 
Kitchener, l i l i t a r y Advisor to h i s Council, and had l e f t I n d i a before the 
Convention was signed *19. 
As T i b e t a n Regent T i Rimpoche's p o s i t i o n was an extremely d e l i c a t e one. The 
D a l a i Lama had f l e d the c a p i t a l on the eve of the Expedition's a r r i v a l and 
T i Rimpoche had been very r e l u c t a n t to r e c e i v e the o f f i c i a l s e a l which made 
him i n e f f e c t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the outcome of any t a l k s with the B r i t i s h . 
»20 Although he was s t i l l able to maintain some contact with the Dalai 
Lama, communication i n such a mountainous region was e r r a t i c , l e a v i n g 
him i n much the same p o s i t i o n as Younghusband who was experiencing s i m i l a r 
d i f f i c u l t i e s t r y i n g to keep contact with I n d i a . In a d d i t i o n , he was at the 
mercy of powerful monkish f a c t i o n s w i t h i n Lhasa who had t h e i r own d i s p u t e s 
with the D a l a i Lama, and who took t h i s opportunity to a t t a c k T i Rimpoche, 
h i s o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , v o i c i n g t h e i r h o s t i l i t y to the Convention with 
great f o r c e as soon as the e x p e d i t i o n l e f t Lhasa on the morning of 23rd of 
September 1904.*21 
In terms of a c h i e v i n g what i t had s e t out to do, namely e s t a b l i s h i n g an 
agreement with the T i b e t a n s that would keep f o r e i g n powers out of 
T i b e t , the Lhasa Convention c l e a r l y f a i l e d . The Tibetans r e j e c t e d i t , 
and the Manchu Government i n Peking queried i t s l e g a l i t y . The B r i t i s h 
Government was p a r t i c u l a r l y embarrassed by i t , and the indemnity c l a u s e i n 
A r t i c l e IX drew much i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m . *22. The disappearance of the 
D a l a i Lama provided a d d i t i o n a l c o m p l i c a t i o n s and, f a r from s e t t l i n g the 
f r o n t i e r a s intended, the Convention l e f t i t even more disturbed. »23. 
Chinese c r i t i c i s m s of the agreement drew B r i t i s h a t t e n t i o n to the problem 
of Chinese s u z e r a i n t y i n T i b e t , a f a c t o r not p r e v i o u s l y taken i n t o account 
i n t h e i r T i b etan p o l i c y , and helped to c r y s t a l l i s e the two f a c t i o n s w i t h i n 
B r i t i s h ranks, s p l i t between those promoting, and those opposing, a forward 
p o l i c y i n T i b e t . O f f i c i a l l y , the Indian Government resumed i t s p o l i c y of 
forbearance but, w i t h i n i t s ranks, the powerful Curzonian lobby fought on 
with a w e l l o r c h e s t r a t e d campaign i n London and I n d i a that kept the option 
of having a forward p o l i c y very much a l i v e . »24. 
The Lhasa Convention, and the events l e a d i n g up to i t , placed Tibet 
momentarily I n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s p o t l i g h t , f o r c i n g B r i t a i n to define 
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her Tibetan p o l i c y i n a way not p r e v i o u s l y thought necessary. Tibet had 
a l s o captured the p u b l i c imagination and was no longer the r a t h e r nebulous 
geographical r e g i o n i t had been before the expedition had s e t out, and the 
need t o d e l i m i t borders and e s t a b l i s h s t a t u s became an important end i n 
i t s e l f . Although the Indian Government had p r e v i o u s l y made determined 
e f f o r t s to define and explore the area, they had done so as a means of 
determining the Indo-Tlbetan border r a t h e r than a s an attempt to define 
T i b e t ' s border with China, and the co n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t that developed i n 
t h i s border r e g i o n a s a r e s u l t of Chinese attempts to define the nature of 
t h e i r own i n t e r e s t there w i l l be the s u b j e c t of future chapters. The f i r s t 
s t i r r i n g s of Anglo-Chinese t e n s i o n s began to emerge as soon as the 
Convention was signed s i n c e the Treaty l e f t the B r i t i s h with a number of 
loose ends. On the one hand i t removed the h y s t e r i a surrounding the 
Rus s i a n t h r e a t to f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y that had been a major reason f o r the 
despatch of the Expedition, while on the other i t h i g h l i g h t e d a completely 
new s e t of problems posed by the growing menace of Chinese expansion i n 
Ea s t T i b e t . 
2. CHIIESE FORWARD POLICY I I TIBET 1904-6 
Before 1904 B r i t a i n found i t convenient to accept Chinese s u z e r a i n t y over 
T i b e t because i t complemented t h e i r own r e l a t i o n s h i p with t e r r i t o r i e s 
under B r i t i s h c o n t r o l i n other p a r t s of the north-east and north-west 
f r o n t i e r s of I n d i a . Younghusband f o r example l i k e n e d h i s r o l e as Resident 
i n Kashmir to the Amban's r o l e i n Lhasa, often using the term 'Resident' 
to d e s c r i b e the Amban during h i s d i s c u s s i o n s about the Convention i n 
Lhasa. «25. Moreover, one of the reasons why Curzonians f e l t able to 
j u s t i f y the E x p e d i t i o n on moral grounds was because they f e l t that, having 
been unable to c o n t r o l the Tibetans, the Chinese had f o r f e i t e d t h e i r 
s u z e r a i n r i g h t s to the country. T h i s view p e r s i s t e d w i t h i n the Indian 
Government throughout the t a l k s aimed at ga i n i n g Chinese adhesion to the 
Convention,and l e d t o a tendency t o discount what was e s s e n t i a l l y a 
forward p o l i c y conducted by the Chinese on the Sino-Tibetan borders and 
i n s i d e T i b e t throughout the period of the t a l k s between 1904 and 1906, 
even though t h i s a c t i v i t y began to a f f e c t l i f e on the f r o n t i e r . * 2 6 . 
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In 1904 Manchu c l a i m s to T i b e t were based on the Cho-yon r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
a personal understanding between the D a l a i Lama and the Manchu Emporer, 
under which both p a r t i e s agreed to look a f t e r the i n t e r e s t s of the other 
i n s p e c i f i c ways. The D a l a i Lama became the Emperor's s p i r i t u a l a d v i s o r 
and i n r e t u r n , the Emperor undertook the r o l e of patron, looking a f t e r 
T i b e t ' s defence and f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . The Emperor's f a i l u r e to f u l f i l His 
r o l e as patron had l e d the D a l a i Lama to look elsewhere f o r a replacement. 
He turned i n i t i a l l y to R u s s i a , s i n c e h i s l i n k s with Russian Buddhists were 
strong, but a l s o to l e p a l with which, d e s p i t e past wars and mutual 
s u s p i c i o n , T i b e t had a long term understanding. *27 
Few people i n the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n s e r v i c e understood very much about the 
Cho-yon and t h i s ignorance r e s u l t e d i n misunderstandings which the Tibetans 
and the Chinese were able to e x p l o i t both before and a f t e r the Convention 
was signed. China's defeat i n the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5,and t h e i r 
i n a b i l i t y to oust T i b e t a n s from Sikkim, exposed t h e i r weakness to the west 
and upset the status-quo on the north-east f r o n t i e r . *28 
I n the decade before 1904, the Chinese had fought hard to r e t a i n t h e i r 
e x i s t i n g p o s i t i o n i n the region i n an attempt to r e s t o r e t h e i r f l a g g i n g 
p r e s t i g e although they were hard put to do t h i s , e s p e c i a l l y i n East 
T i b e t and on the China-Burma border, Chinese p r e s t i g e there was i n 
f a c t so low a f t e r T i b e t a n s had captured the v i l l a g e of Lingtu on the 
border with Sikkim i n the e a r l y summer of 1886, that when the Chinese 
V i c e r o y of Szechuan sent f o r troops to help him with a l o c a l border 
dispute, the T i b e t a n s were powerful enough to prevent such help 
from coming and were able to put pressure on the Lhasa Amban to r e f u s e the 
request, *29 S i m i l a r l y , on the Burma-Tibet border, Chinese troops had found 
themselves unable to c o n t r o l t r i b a l u p r i s i n g s , and alarming r e p o r t s were 
r e c e i v e d from the B r i t i s h Consul i n Chengtu that d e scribed the ease with 
which the L o l o s were able to i n f l i c t heavy c a s u l t i e s on the Chinese troops 
sent from Szechuan to q u e l l them, a very r e a l i n d i c a t i o n of Chinese 
weakness on the eve of the E x p e d i t i o n i n 1903.*30 
Throughout the slow progress of the E x p e d i t i o n to Lhasa, B r i t a i n and China 
had each played a double game. The B r i t i s h government had sanctioned every 
stage of the Expedition, and had supported the s i g n i n g of the Convention 
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i n c l u d i n g the omissian of any reference t o Chinese suzerainty, and the 
Chinese, f u l l y aware of t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o prevent the expedition moving 
forward, had sought wherever possible t o thwart i t s progress w h i l s t 
remaining outwardly co-operative.*31 Although t o some extent t h i s t a c t i c 
worked t o the advantage of both sides, each having a vested i n t e r e s t 
i n g a i n i n g c o n t r o l of the p o l i t i c a l l y ambitious and 'troublesome' 
Dalai Lama, they were r e a l l y pursuing d i f f e r e n t aims; B r i t a i n wishing t o 
preserve Tibet as an independent b u f f e r s t a t e , and China wanting t o 
r e a f f i r m the Cho-yon and b r i n g the Dalai Lama t o heel. Expedition accounts 
of the Lhasa n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the most part i n d i c a t e an equitable 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the newly appointed Amban, Yu Tai, and Expedition 
members,*32 Younghusband and O'Connor were p a r t i c u l a r l y impressed with h i s 
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n f o l l o w i n g months of f u s t r a t i n g dialogue w i t h ' u n c i v i l i s e d ' 
Tibetans; tending t o view the Expedition i n terms of Anglo-Russian 
r e l a t i o n s , t h e y were o b l i v i o u s t o possible Chinese motives.»33 
Waddell, the e x p e d i t i o n doctor, was more s c e p t i c a l , and h i s expedition 
account accuses the Chinese of a v a r i e t y of h o s t i l e acts not mentioned i n 
other accounts f o r which he was l a t e r c r i t i c i s e d by colleagues. «34. 
Chinese o b s t r u c t i o n took a v a r i e t y of forms. F i r s t l y , they used delaying 
t a c t i c s , changing delegates t o hold up proceedings at Chumbi, and 
t a k i n g an interminable time t o appoint and i n s t a l l Yu Tai as new Amban 
i n Lhasa. *35 Secondly, they gave out misinformation t o both the B r i t i s h 
and the Tibetans, making extravagant and spurious claims f o r the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of the Cho-yon t o the former, and t e l l i n g the l a t t e r t h a t 
Younghusband had been forced t o leave Lhasa h u r r i e d l y a f t e r r e c e i v i n g 
r e p o r t s t h a t the Emperor was t o send a grand army t o oust him. They also 
f a i l e d t o warn the B r i t i s h of a Tibetan attack on them at Gyantse even 
though they knew about t h i s w e l l i n advance. *36 T h i r d l y , they punished 
key Chinese o f f i c a l s who had had any dealings w i t h the B r i t i s h . 
I r o n i c a l l y Yu Tai and h i s secretary were l a t e r both arrested a f t e r being 
accused of c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h B r i t a i n by a l l o w i n g the expedition t o enter 
Lhasa, despite the f a c t t h a t there was l i t t l e they could have done t o 
prevent i t . »37 
Within two mantlis of the s i g n i n g of the Convention the B r i t i s h S i n i s t e r i n 
Peking, S i r Ernest Satow, began t o report strong rumours th a t the Chinese 
were planning t o make Tibet a Province of China. This news marked a t u r n i n g 
p o i n t i n Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s over Tibet and l e d t o a r e a l awakening of 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n the problem t h a t the e x p e d i t i o n had apparently created 
f o r f u t u r e Tibetan p o l i c y . 
In December 1905 c o n f l i c t developed between B r i t i s h and Chinese o f f i c a l s at 
the new trade marts. In Chumbi the Chinese posted proclamations announcing 
t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o pay the Tibetan indemnity which the B r i t i s h Government 
chose t o regard as a d i r e c t challenge t o t h e i r a u t h o r i t y i n the valley.*38 
I n January 1906 Frederick Bailey a r r i v e d as temporary replacement t o 
O'Connor at the Gyantse trade mart and found himself i n open c o n f l i c t w i th 
Mr. Gow, the Chinese o f f i c a l s t a t i o n e d there. Gow t o l d Bailey t h a t i n 
f u t u r e he could not deal d i r e c t l y w i t h Tibetans but must channel a l l 
communications through him. This was an open v i o l a t i o n of the terms of the 
Convention signed w i t h Tibet and led t o an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of c o n f l i c t 
between them. *39 Before 1906 however, these wrangles were discounted by 
the B r i t i s h as minor l o c a l i n c i d e n t s and were not seen as part of a more 
s i n i s t e r programme of wider Chinese expansion. Meanwhile, a second Chinese 
f r o n t continued t o develop i n East Tibet. I n 1905 Feng Chu had taken up the 
newly created post of Assistant Resident or Amban f o r Chamdo i n East Tibet, 
w i t h h i s headquarters at Tachienlu, an important t r a d i n g centre on the East 
Tibetan border. Feng had been appointed w i t h s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n s t o 
c u r t a i l the powers of the n a t i v e r u l e r s i n the region and prepare the way 
f o r a Chinese take over. When he was murdered i n A p r i l 1905, during an 
attempt t o escape from an anti-Chinese r i s i n g at Batang, widespread unrest 
followed which the Chinese were hard put t o suppress.*40 When the native 
Tibetan r i s i n g spread t o the neighouring Chinese provinces of Szechuan and 
Yunnan, Chinese garrisons there were overwhelmed and B r i t i s h consuls i n the 
China Service began t o r e p o r t serious concern f o r the safety of Chao Erh 
Feng, the r e c e n t l y appointed commander of Chinese troops i n East Tibet.*41 
The s i t u a t i o n worsened i n February 1906 when Bailey reported from Gyantse 
t h a t the Chinese had occupied the East Tibetan s t a t e of lyarong, using 
Feng's murder as a p r e t e x t , and t h a t h i s Tibetan sources f u r t h e r suggested 
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t h a t China intended t o use the s t a t e as a base from which t o c o n t r o l the 
area around Lhasa. •»42 
Despite the obvious a c t i v i t y i n East Tibet, the Foreign O f f i c e continued 
t o ignore Chinese i n f i l t r a t i o n mainly because the area was a wilderness, 
l o o s e l y c o n t r o l l e d by l o c a l t r i b a l c h i e f s which had been the subject of 
disputes between China and Tibet f o r centuries, but also because B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s had been t r a d i t i o n a l l y concerned w i t h West Tibet and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r w i t h those areas bordering India.»43 
Chinese forward p o l i c y was a f a c t well before 1904 but i t s nature changed 
as a r e s u l t of the Lhasa Expedition. Before Younghusband set out, the 
Chinese had based a l l t h e i r claims t o Tibet on the Cho-yon; a f t e r the 
Convention was signed i n Lhasa however, they began t o redefine t h e i r claim 
i n western terms, c l a i m i n g sovereignty as w e l l as suzerainty over the 
country.*44 I n a sense t h e r e f o r e the Lhasa Expedition can be seen as a 
d i r e c t stimulus t o Chinese forward p o l i c y f o r i t l e d t o a re-evaluation of 
the Cho-yon by the Chinese, and a r e d e f i n i t i o n of the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n terms 
compatible w i t h western i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. This helped B r i t a i n t o c l a r i f y 
her own a t t i t u d e towards Chinese claims t o Tibet, and from t h i s time 
forward Chinese motives began t o be viewed i n ways t h a t could be e a s i l y 
understood i n B r i t i s h terms, p r e s t i g e and s t a t u s being shared concepts. 
I t a l s o made Chinese claims t o Tibet seem more dangerous and threatening 
t o B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . * 4 5 When the Chinese had f i r s t o f f e r e d t o pay the 
indemnity i n 1904 B r i t i s h f e a r s had been a l e r t e d , although even before 
the L i b e r a l s took o f f i c e i n December 1905, the p o l i c y had been t o allow 
Chinese i n f i l t r a t i o n i n t o Tibet t o go unchecked. The reasons f o r t h i s were 
complex, i n v o l v i n g a need t o play down tensions on the f r o n t i e r i n order t o 
prepare the ground f o r a settlement w i t h Russia which was t o form the basis 
of L i b e r a l p o l i c y i n Central Asia between 1906 and 1907.*46 Beyond t h i s 
there was a s u b t l e r set of reasons f o r i f examined, Chinese, or indeed 
Russian claims t o Tibet were as v a l i d under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law as those put 
forward by the Indian Government, and rath e r than look at the r e l a t i v e 
m e r i t s of those claims i n d e t a i l , i t was easier t o ignore them. Between 
1904 and 1906 t h e r e f o r e t h i s was p r e c i s e l y what happened, making i t 















East Tibet which passed almost unnoticed except i n the rep o r t s from B r i t i s h 
consular o f f i c a l s i n the China Service s t a t i o n e d i n remote posts near the 
East Tibetan borders w i t h China. 
3. BRITISH FRONTIER POLICY 1904-6 
At the beginning of the Chapter I described the way i n which the motives 
behind the despatch of the Lhasa Expedition were i n s p i r e d by Curzon's 
f r o n t i e r p o l i c y and how both the Foreign O f f i c e and the India O f f i c e were 
pushed i n t o accepting i t by the pressure of events. I n t h i s next section 
I w i l l look at the way i n which Curzon's approach t o Tibetan f r o n t i e r 
p o l i c y was continued by h i s successsor Lord Minto i n the period between 
the s i g n i n g of the Lhasa Convention i n September 1904, and the signing of 
the Adhesion Treaty w i t h China i n A p r i l 1906, despite the f a c t t h a t a 
L i b e r a l Government had come t o power i n December 1905 committed t o a p o l i c y 
of non-involvement t o be f r o n t e d by John Morley, the new Secretary of State 
f o r India.«47 
Evidence of a co n t i n u i n g Curzonian approach towards Tibetan p o l i c y and the 
e f f e c t of a sustained campaign mounted by Curzon and h i s supporters i n 
B r i t a i n were t o become even more obvious a f t e r 1906, but i n the period 
under discussion they revealed themselves i n three ways. F i r s t l y , i n the 
cont i n u i n g h o s t i l i t y d i r e c t e d towards the Dalai Lama and the promotion of 
the Panchen Lama as an a l t e r n a t i v e r u l e r . Secondly, i n the attempt t o hold 
Chumbi Valley i n B r i t i s h hands f o r as long as possible and t h i r d l y , i n 
the sustained support f o r e x p l o r a t i o n on the f r o n t i e r . 
Gyatso Thubten, Tibet's T h i r t e e n t h Dalai Lama, posed a p a r t i c u l a r problem 
f o r B r i t a i n and China. Having been the f i r s t Dalai Lama t o survive 
to m a t u r i t y since the seventeenth century, he had acquired a 
c e r t a i n amount of p o l i t i c a l acumen which had been r e i n f o r c e d by contact 
w i t h the Russian B u r i a t D o r j i e v , who had f i r s t introduced him t o western 
ideas and had been h i s t u t o r during h i s formative years.*48 Unlike h i s 
predecessors t h e r e f o r e Gyatso Thubten was b e t t e r equipped t o e x p l o i t the 
s i t u a t i o n i n Tibet's favour and r e p o r t s of h i s i n t r i g u e s , a l t h o u g h 
exaggerated, had some basis i n t r u t h . His non-confrontational approach, 
and h i s sudden disappearance s h o r t l y before the Younghusband Expedition 
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had entered Lhasa, both confused and alarmed h i s opponents, and h i s 
subsequent t r a v e l s on the f r o n t i e r and i n Mongolia during h i s period of 
e x i l e from the c i t y between 1904 and 1909 were c a r e f u l l y monitored by 
western and Chinese observers.»49 The Indian Government were p a r t i c u r l a r l y 
anxious t o be r i d of him and co-operated w i t h the Chinese i n a plan t o 
supplant him w i t h the Panchen Lama, although the l a t t e r was never w i l l i n g 
or able t o take on the rale.*50 
In 1905 a p l o t was hatched by the Curzonian f a c t i o n w i t h i n the Indian 
Service t o i n v i t e the Panchen Lama t o India t o coincide with an o f f i c i a l 
v i s i t by the Prince and Princess of Wales, when he might be presented 
t o the Royal couple as the r u l e r of Tibet.*51 The Panchen Lama had 
been held i n great a f f e c t i o n by the Indian Government since the time of 
Bogle's v i s i t t o Tibet i n 1774 and since t h a t time there had also remained 
genuine confusion about h i s s t a t u s and p o s i t i o n i n the Tibetan hlerachy, 
i n which he seemed equal t o the Dalai Lama i n some respects, having h i s own 
palace and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n at Shigatse, and being described as the Dalai 
Lama's ' s p r i t u a l adviser'. I n view of the special bond t h a t was f e l t t o 
e x i s t between some members of the Indian Service and the Panchen Lama, i t 
became convenient f o r the Indian Government t o assume a higher s t a t u s f o r 
him and q u i t e n a t u r a l , a f t e r discussions w i t h Tibetans themselves, t o 
seehim as a r i v a l r u l e r , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the Dalai Lama had f l e d 
Lhasa i n 1904.»52 Furthermore, when the Panchen Lama accepted Curzon's 
i n v i t a t i o n t o v i s i t I n d i a w i t h apparent enthusiasm and w i l l i n g l y l e f t h i s 
palace at Shigatse, despite the misgivings of many of h i s f o l l o w e r s and 
without seeking the Dalai Lama's permission, these assumptions seemed 
j u s t i f i e d , although i n f a c t , as h i s subsequent behaviour was t o show, fear 
of the B r i t i s h had proved a stronger inducement f o r departure than anything 
else.*53 He l e f t Shigatse, accompanied by h i s f r i e n d O'Connor i n 
October 1905, reaching Rawlpindi i n India a month l a t e r . Once there he 
received a j o y f u l r e c e p t i o n from Indian Buddhists and spent a happy time 
v i s i t i n g various r e l i g i o u s s i t e s which was the o f f i c i a l reason given f o r 
the visit.»54 Whilst I n Rawlpindi he also took part i n a review of B r i t i s h 
and Indian troops,together w i t h the o f f i c i a l representatives of the 
neighbouring Hymalayan States of Bhutan, and l e p a l , causing some amusement 
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when he sent h i s secretary t o look behind the f r o n t ranks of troops, 
apparently u n w i l l i n g t o believe t h a t such a number could be mustered f o r 
parade,*55 I t was also f u r t h e r decided t h a t , during h i s stay, he would be 
granted the honours due t o Indian Ruling Princes and he was accordingly 
given a seventeen gun s a l u t e , making him higher i n rank than the Tsonga 
Penlop, r u l e r of Bhutan, who had only received f i f t e e n , »56 During the 
course of the v i s i t he was f o r m a l l y introduced t o the Prince and Princess 
of Wales as Tibet's o f f i c i a l r epresentative, and on January 10th 1906 he 
was allowed t o pay a p r i v a t e v i s i t t o Calcutta t o meet the new Viceroy, 
Lord Minto, He took the oppor t u n i t y afforded by t h i s v i s i t t o make three 
requests t o the Viceroy t h a t were c l e a r l y aimed at covering himself i n the 
event of r e p r i s a l s from e i t h e r the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Emperor, 
and he made them I n the b e l i e f t h a t they would be accepted, based on 
assurances given him by O'Connor before he set out and while Curzon was 
s t i l l i n India,*57 
His f i r s t request was t h a t he might be given a l e t t e r promising B r i t i s h 
assistance i n the event of h o s t i l e actions from China or Tibet towards 
h i s v i s i t . The second was t h a t , i n the event of any such attack, the 
Government of In d i a would undertake t o supply him w i t h arms w i t h which t o 
defend himself; and the t h i r d asked t h a t B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s at Gyantse might 
coiitinue t h e i r present f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h him, Minto's r e p l y was 
c l e a r l y not what he had been l e d t o expect however, and he was p o l i t e l y 
informed t h a t , since India had already explained t o the Emperor that the 
nature of h i s v i s i t was p r i v a t e , i t was h i g h l y u n l i k e l y t h a t the Chinese 
would proceed t o acts of oppression against him, although i n the event of 
any problems occuring 'the good o f f i c e s of the B r i t i s h government would 
doubtless be exerted on China on h i s behalf',*58 The request f o r arms was 
f i r m l y denied, again w i t h the explanation t h a t an armed attack was so 
u n l i k e l y as t o be not worth discussing. The t h i r d request was accepted and 
the Panchen Lama t o l d t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n s would f o r t h w i t h be issued t o 
Gyantse. C l e a r l y 'disappointed' by the r e p l i e s he received, there was 
l i t t l e he could do or say t o influence events, and h i s decision t o go 
t o I n d i a l a t e r created great problems f o r him. »59 
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Although approved i n p r i n c i p l e by London, Mlnto's guarded r e p l i e s were 
l a t e r modified i n terms even less favourable t o the Panchen Lama, and 
i n a telegram dated 5th February 1906, B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s at Gyantse were 
i n s t r u c t e d t o confine t h e i r communications w i t h him t o 'the narrowest 
possible l i m i t s ' avoiding any a c t i o n which the Chinese Emperor might 
i n t e r p r e t as an i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Tibet. The telegram 
was a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t , despite l i n t o ' s promise t o r e t a i n l i n k s 
between B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s a t Gyantse and the Panchen Lama, London had no 
wish t o became involved i n any dealings w i t h Tibetans t h a t might 
jeopardize t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h China.*60 
The Panchen Lama l e f t I n d i a i n January 1906 a sad and confused man, the 
journey back t o Shigatse proving an adventure i n i t s e l f as Chinese and 
Tibetan o f f i c a l s monitored the progress of the party very carefully.»61 
The v i s i t had caused considerable embarrassment t o the Foreign O f f i c e i n 
London, not only because i t roused o f f i c i a l p r o t e s t from Peking and 
St. Petersburg, but also because i t excerbated the growing tensions 
between the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama i n such a way as t o im p l i c a t e 
B r i t a i n , the Panchen Lama having defended h i s v i s i t t o India on the grounds 
t h a t he had been coerced i n t o l eaving Shigatse by the Indian Government.*62 
White and O'Connor, the two o f f i c e r s i n the Indian service responsible f o r 
organising the d e l i v e r y of the i n v i t a t i o n , were l a t e r o f f i c a l l y reprimanded 
f o r t h e i r p a r t i n the a f f a i r and were c e r t a i n l y h eavily implicated 
i n the o r g a n i s a t i o n of the venture. O'Connor had r e f e r r e d t o the v i s i t i n 
l e t t e r s t o White as 'our l i t t l e plan', and although the i n v i t a t i o n had been 
supposedly d e l i v e r e d without the o f f i c i a l knowledge of the Indian 
Government, they were obviously i n accord w i t h Curzon's wishes. *63 
The whole a f f a i r was Morley's f i r s t i n t r o d u c t i o n t o the Tibetan problem as 
new Secretary of State f o r India and he was dismayed t h a t the India O f fice 
had not been consulted. The i n c i d e n t confirmed h i s growing b e l i e f t h a t the 
Indian Government could not always be t r u s t e d t o take advice from London, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n f r o n t i e r matters and t h a t , even i f the Viceroy was w i l l i n g t o 
obey orders, he could not always c o n t r o l the behaviour of h i s men on the 
spot whose i n i t i a t i v e s could e a s i l y be d e l i v e r e d as a f a i t accompli. »65 




As new Viceroy Hinto v/as t o prove more sympathetic t o independent 
i n i t i a t i v e s from h i s f r o n t i e r s t a f f , but because he was nervous about the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e i r a c t i o n s f o r f r o n t i e r defence, as well as f o r h i s own 
r o l e as Viceroy, he tended t o adhere more c l o s e l y than h i s predecessor t o 
i n s t r u c t i o n s from London, and t h i s was t o have important consequences f o r 
the conduct of f r o n t i e r p o l i c y a f t e r 1905.«65 
The v i s i t u l t i m a t e l y proved an unfortunate blunder f o r a l l concerned f o r 
not only d i d i t f a l l i n i t s o b j e c t i v e of g e t t i n g o f f i c a l support f o r the 
plan t o enhance the s t a t u s of the Panchen Lama by gaining r o y a l as well as 
p o l i t i c a l approval, but i t also succeeded i n degrading him. His unorthodox 
behaviour i n In d i a o f t e n made him appear quaint and naive thus undermining 
h i s c r e d i b i l i t y as a p o t e n t i a l r u l e r of Tibet, as w e l l as placing him i n 
great personal danger.»66 The venture d i d not end i n t o t a l d i s a s t e r f o r 
the Curzonian f a c t i o n however since i t created a number of loose ends which 
kept the Tibetan question on the b o i l . An embarrassing c o n f l i c t between the 
Indian government and the Foreign O f f i c e i n London over r e l a t e d issues l i k e 
the occupation of Chumbi Valley f o r example, provided f r e s h o p p o r t u n i t i e s 
t o question and reassess aspects of B r i t i s h Tibetan p o l i c y t h a t many would 
have p r e f e r r e d t o abandon. 
The occupation of Chumbi Valley was a goal very dear t o the hearts of 
Curzonians, having been urged upon the Indian government by the Bengal 
government since the l a t e 1880's. The Valley was of great s t r a t e g i c 
importance t o In d i a since i t c o n t r o l l e d the passes i n and out of Tibet and, 
q u i t e apart from any wider p o l i t i c a l considerations, i t was v i t a l t o the 
promotion of Indian trade i n the area.*67 A f t e r Younghusband had l e f t 
Lhasa i n September 1904, Chumbi v a l l e y had been administered by the Indian 
Government using a handful of o f f i c i a l s s t a t i o n e d at the trade marts i n 
Yatung, Gartok, and Gyantse. These men were Curzonians, and since they now 
exercised v i r t u a l c o n t r o l of trade i n the Chumbi v a l l e y w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s 
t o behave as commercial agents, t h e i r work was c l e a r l y of a more p o l i t i c a l 
nature and they themselves regarded these minor, i s o l a t e d postings, as 
s i g n i f i c a n t career moves. »68 
Having gained c o n t r o l of the Chumbi Valley the Indian Government fought 
a long b a t t l e t o r e t a i n i t as Indian t e r r i t o r y i n s p i t e of the immense 
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d i f f i c u l t i e s involved. F i r s t l y , there was overt h o s t i l i t y from Chinese 
o f f i c a l s who soon began t o challenge B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t y at the marts, and 
both Bailey and O'Connor, who were s t a t i o n e d at Gyantse during t h i s time, 
were t o experience t h i s h o s t i l i t y at f i r s t hand i n the c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l 
approach adopted by the Chinese o f f i c a l Mr. Gow. *69 
Secondly there was a problem w i t h the Tibetans themselves, and e s p e c i a l l y 
w i t h the Jongpens i n nearby Pharl, who had previously operated t h e i r own 
monopolies and resented B r i t i s h and Chinese attempts t o i n t e r e f e r e with 
t h e i r l u c r a t i v e t r a d i n g practices.«70 This h o s t i l i t y was usually 
manifested i n a t t a c k s on the telegraph l i n e s . Cut l i n e s caused 
considerable inconvenience as w e l l as endangering the l i v e s of B r i t i s h 
personnel by preventing r e g u l a r contact w i t h India.*71 Perhaps the most 
embarrassing problem f o r the Curzonians s t a t i o n e d on the f r o n t i e r however 
was the tension generated by the presence of Chinese Customs o f f i c a l s whose 
r o l e was t o monitor trade f o r the Peking government. O f f i c e r s of the 
Chinese Customs service had been s t a t i o n e d on the f r o n t i e r since 1880 and 
were f o r the most part B r i t i s h or European, a d e l i b e r a t e Chinese p o l i c y t o 
ensure a good working r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s i n India. *72 
Although o f f i c a l l y on good terms, there had been a long h i s t o r y of 
resentment between the employees of the Indian and Chinese Governments, 
and w i t h B r i t i s h c o n t r o l over trade more f i r m l y established, overt 
c o n f l i c t became i n e v i t a b l e . O'Connor at Gyantse, and White at Gartok f o r 
example, experienced p a r t i c u l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s I n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
Paul Henderson, the Chinese Customs o f f i c a l responsible f o r the Tibetan 
f r o n t i e r , since by v i r t u e of h i s p o s i t i o n , Henderson could t r a v e l anywhere 
on the f r o n t i e r without B r i t i s h permission, and O'Connor f r e q u e n t l y 
complained t h a t he 'meddled' i n Tibetan a f f a i r s , behaving i n a high-handed 
and arrogant way towards Tibetans t h a t generally undermined the goodwill 
i t had taken him so long t o create. This i r r i t a t i o n q u i c k l y turned 
t o f u r y when Henderson took i t upon himself, on behalf of h i s Chinese 
employers, t o p u b l i c l y declare the Lhasa Convention invalid.»73 
The t e n s i o n need not necessarily have been such a problem had B r i t i s h trade 
agents l i k e O'Connor been a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e i r l e g a l remit;however, i n a 
s i t u a t i o n where they were seeking t o e s t a b l i s h informal p o l i t i c a l as 
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we l l as commercial c o n t r o l at the marts, t h e i r r o l e s i n e v i t a b l y came i n t o 
c o n f l i c t , and Tibetans were t r e a t e d t o the confusing and no doubt rather 
amusing spectacle, of ' B r i t i s h ' o f f i c a l s i n open disagreement. For the 
Indian Government t h i s c o n f l i c t was serious because i t created a s i t u a t i o n 
t h a t challenged B r i t i s h c r e d i b i l i t y i n an environment where such loss of 
p r e s t i g e could be f a t a l , * 7 4 
As w e l l as encouraging attempts t o r e t a i n Chumbi Valley i n B r i t i s h hands 
f o r as long as possible, Curzonians made r e a l e f f o r t s t o I n i t i a t e a forward 
p o l i c y on the f r o n t i e r . A f t e r the Lhasa Convention was signed, Younghusband 
arranged f o r three p a r t i e s t o r e t u r n t o India by d i f f e r e n t routes. 
The f i r s t aimed t o explore and locate the source of the San-po r i v e r , by 
f o l l o w i n g the Brahmaputra r i v e r i n t o Assam. The second were i n i t i a l l y t o 
f o l l o w the same course but w i t h the separate aim of discovering a d i r e c t 
route t o Gartok i n western Tibet. The t h i r d party were t o take a quite 
d i f f e r e n t route through East Tibet t o Szechuan i n an attempt t o discover a 
d i r e c t overland route t o south-west China which India might l a t e r e x p l o i t 
f o r trade.*75 
In the event only the Gartok p a r t y received permission t o proceed since 
t h e i r mission was more obviously t i e d t o e x i s t i n g t r a d i n g l i n k s , but the 
scale and scope of the missions t h a t f a i l e d reveal the true purpose and 
scope of Curzonian plans f o r the development of t h i s vast area s t r e t c h i n g 
from Assam t o western China.*76 This ambitious forward p o l i c y eventually 
collapsed as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of L i b e r a l non-involvement p o l i c y which 
r e s t r i c t e d f r o n t i e r t r a v e l and made permits i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o 
acquire. Much resentment was caused by the f a c t t h a t the ban was not 
uniformly a p p l i e d since only those t r a v e l l e r s regarded w i t h suspicion by 
the Indian government f a i l e d t o get permits while others, whose c r e d e n t i a l s 
o f t e n seemed f a r s h a d i e r , o f t e n d i d . The Times correspondent David Eraser, 
and the mysterious Dr.Zugmayer of the Bavarian Academy of Science f o r 
example,gained permits denied t o China Consul,Eric Wilton,and t o Charles 
B e l l , a paid employee of the Indian Government. Such decisions seemed 
i r r a t i o n a l but were a t r u e r e f l e c t i o n of the paranoia surrounding the 
problem of assessing who could or could not be t r u s t e d t o maintain B r i t i s h 
s e c u r i t y on the f r o n t i e r at t h i s time.»77 
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The new non-involvement p o l i c y caused resentment not only because 
i t r e s t r i c t e d e x p l o r a t i o n of Tibet and i t s f r o n t i e r s , but more 
im p o r t a n t l y because i t undermined a basic philosophy t h a t had f o r 
years drawn many people t o the In d i a service,and which viewed the 
f r o n t i e r as a s o r t of adventure playground i n which i t was possible t o 
indulge f r e e l y i n the acceptable pleasures of hunting and e x p l o r a t i o n i n 
comparative s a f e t y . I t has been argued t h a t the f r o n t i e r was i n i t s e l f 
a s u b t l e k i n d of forward p o l i c y and the Younghusband expedition was 
simply another way of preparing the area f o r B r i t i s h occupation.»78 
B r i t i s h c l a i n e t o western Tibet were already well developed, and part of 
the reason why Chumbi Valley was so dear t o India was because so much 
time and t r o u b l e had been taken t o explore and record i t s geography 
and fauna as w e l l as the l o c a t i o n of i t s trade routes and passes.*79 
Throughout the d u r a t i o n of the L i b e r a l ban on f r o n t i e r t r a v e l between 1906 
and 1907 however e x p l o r a t i o n continued d i s c r e e t l y , a n d w i t h Minto's f u l l 
knowledge,if not h i s o f f i c i a l sanction. In pursuing t h i s l i n e the Viceroy 
was j e a l o u s l y guarding h i s r i g h t t o c o n t r o l and determine h i s own f r o n t i e r 
p o l i c y i n c r e a s i n g l y i n defiance of d i r e c t i v e s from London. *80 
4. THE CHIIESE ADHESIOB TREATY APRIL 1906 
A f t e r the s i g n i n g of the Lhasa Convention i n September 1904, the Amban 
Yu Tai, who had witnessed the ceremony on behalf of h i s government, 
telegraphed Peking t o record t h a t , i n h i s opinion, the Convention contained 
'nothing subversive of Chinese suzerainty';and B r i t a i n ' s M i n i s t e r i n Peking 
S i r Ernest Satow was accordingly i n s t r u c t e d t o press the Chinese t o sign 
an Adhesion Treaty acknowledging t h e i r acceptance of the Convention as soon 
as possible.*81 U n t i l the time of Younghusband's departure from Lhasa 
on September 23rd 1904, Yu Tai had received no word from Peking t o i n d i c a t e 
t h a t they might have any o b j e c t i o n s t o s i g n i n g an Adhesion agreement, a 
view confirmed by Satow i n a telegram t o London on 27th September, 
c o n t a i n i n g the news from Peking t h a t Tang Shao Y i , a former c u s t o i s 
o f f i c i a l from T i e n t s i n , had been promoted t o the rank of Lieutenant Deputy 
and ordered t o Lhasa w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s 'to i n v e s t i g a t e and conduct a f f a i r s ' 
i n the c i t y . #82 At t h i s stage there seemed every reason t o believe t h a t 
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the Chinese were happy t o s i g n an agreement and Satow was asked t o reassure 
them concerning ' c e r t a i n p o i n t s i n the Convention about which they had 
expressed misgivings', while at the same time h i n t t o them t h a t the B r i t i s h 
government would a l l o w the Convention t o stand w i t h or without Chinese 
adhesion.*83 Despite t h i s promising s t a r t however negoti a t i o n s soon began 
t o go wrong. Younghusband had l e f t Lhasa f o u r days a f t e r Tang's 
appointment as ' o f f i c i a l i n v e s t i g a t o r ' f o r the Peking Government thus 
c a n c e l l i n g out any o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the two men t o meet and sign an Adhesion 
Agreement on the spot. Moreover, i t soon became apparent t h a t the Chinese 
were t o t a l l y unprepared t o accept the Lhasa Convention as i t stood, f o r not 
only d i d i t challenge t h e i r r i g h t s under the Cho-yon r e l a t i o n s h i p t o 
conduct Tibetan f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , but i t also prevented them from enjoying 
exclusive trade w i t h i n Tibet i t s e l f , i n v o l v i n g them i n a serious loss of 
face, and exposing t h e i r weakness t o other f o r e i g n powers who might use the 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o make f r e s h concession demands in s i d e China I t s e l f . In Peking 
even Satow had some sympathy f o r the Chinese predicament.*84 
The Indian government were more content than London t o leave the s i t u a t i o n 
as i t was and t o allow the Convention t o stand without Chinese adhesion 
which they believed would only involve p r o t r a c t e d and d i f f i c u l t 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , harmful t o both Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s and t o long term 
f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y ; a b e l i e f t h a t was l a t e r t o be confirmed by events.»85 
The Foreign O f f i c e were more than a l i t t l e alarmed by the r e p o r t s from 
Satow of the i n c r e a s i n g l y extravagant Chinese claims f o r Tibet and, i n 
a d d i t i o n , were having t o contend w i t h mounting i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i t i c i s m of 
the Younghusband Expedition, the debacle at Guru having been subjected t o 
extensive coverage i n the world's press.»86 As 1904 moved i n t o 1905 
t h e r e f o r e , the need t o secure a Chinese adhesion seemed c r u c i a l . Some f e l t 
i t was s e t t i n g a dangerous precedent t o allow Tibet t o conduct her own 
a f f a i r s without any reference t o Chinese suzerainty,but t h i s view was not 
shared by the Indian government who continued t o believe t h a t Chinese 
adhesion was both undesirable and unecessary. A b i t t e r r i f t then began t o 
develop between London and Calcutta which would eventually lead t o open 
c o n f l i c t d u r i n g the course of p r o t r a c t e d n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the Adhesion 
Treaty. 
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Having l o s t the b a t t l e t o prevent the t a l k s opening, India continued t o 
f i g h t t o salvage as much as possible of what they f e l t were Indian gains 
secured by the Lhasa Convention. Their f i r s t triumph was t o succeed i n 
having the t a l k s held i n Calcutta Instead of Peking as i n i t i a l l y proposed. 
They opened there i n March 1905, cont i n u i n g i n stormy session u n t i l the 
f o l l o w i n g lovember when they broke down, both sides unable t o reach 
agreement over the s t a t u s of Tibet.*87 At f i r s t the Chinese i n s i s t e d that 
t h e i r s uzerainty be recognised. This was not a problem i n i t s e l f , since 
Chinese supervisory r i g h t s i n Tibet had been acknowledged by B r i t a i n under 
various T r e a t i e s since the Treaty of Chefoo i n 1876. The r e a l problem was 
t h a t the exact nature of those r i g h t s had never been c l e a r l y defined, the 
terms 'sovereignty' and 'suzerainty' being used randomly even I n o f f i c a l 
correspondence.«88. By J u l y 1905, months before t a l k s eventually broke down 
al t o g e t h e r , progress was s t i l l blocked over t h i s question w i t h B r i t i s h 
delegates, the Indian Foreign Secretary S. M, Eraser, and Eric Wilton of 
the China Consular Service, d e f i n i n g Chinese r i g h t s as 'suzerain', and the 
Chinese delegate T'ang Shao y i , d e f i n i n g them as 'sovereign'.»89 At t h i s 
p oint the Indian Government decided t o force the issue and ordered Eraser 
t o present T'ang w i t h a d r a f t agreement f o r signature. T'ang's response was 
t o acquire what most people even at the time believed t o be a 'diplomatic 
i l l n e s s ' . He l e f t Calcutta almost immediately, a f t e r p e t i t i o n i n g Peking t o 
be allowed t o r e t u r n t o China, and h i s place was taken by h i s own former 
secretary, Chang Yin Tang. Within days Eraser completed h i s term of 
o f f i c e and was replaced by the new Indian Foreign Secretary, Louis Dane.»90 
Since Chang had renewed the lease on the house being used by the Chinese 
delegation i n Calcutta f o r a f u r t h e r s i x months, i t looked very much as 
though, having acquired t h i s breathing space, the Chinese expected t a l k s t o 
resume as before w i t h the new delegates. On November 14th 1905 therefore, 
three days before f i n a l l y l e a v i n g f o r England, Curzon arranged f o r Chang t o 
be presented w i t h the d r a f t p r e v i o u s l y o f f e r e d t o T'ang f o r signature, and 
when Chang also refused t o sign, t a l k s collapsed.»91 
A l a s t a i r Lamb has argued t h a t , had the p o l i t i c a l climate of 1904-5 
remained and Curzon continued as Viceroy, the matter might have been l e f t 
t h e r e , w i t h the Convention standing without Chinese adhesion.*92 
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Althougli the new L i b e r a l gavernment had a l t e r e d p o l i c y d r a m a t i c a l l y s i n c e 
t a k i n g o f f i c e i n December 1905, the new Viceroy Minto remained i n symipathy 
with the f r o n t i e r p o l i c y of h i s predecessor and was no more w i l l i n g 
than Curzon to e n t e r i n t o d i s c u s s i o n s with China about Ti b e t , l e t alone 
t r e a t with China about t e r r i t o r y bordering I n d i a , and soon a f t e r taking 
o f f i c e , he pressed f o r the internment of the D a l a i Lama and f o r 
indemnity payments to be met i n f u l l by T i b e t , a p o s i t i o n i n d i r e c t 
o p p o s i t i o n to the new p o l i c y . L i b e r a l s however, saw the s e t t l i n g of the 
Tibetan 'problem' i n terms of s e c u r i n g Chinese adhesion to the Convention 
and were prepared to push ahead with t a l k s at whatever cost to t h e i r future 
r e l a t i o n s with the Indian Government, an approach t h a t served only to 
f u r t h e r exacerbate t e n s i o n s between I n d i a and London. «93 
T h i s presented an immediate problem f o r Satow as B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n 
Peking, f o r i t was now f e l t , even by the I n d i a O f f i c e , that the t a l k s 
might have a g r e a t e r chance of s u c c e s s i f they were to be reconvened i n 
China. Satow knew th a t such a move would place an i n t o l e r a b l e burden on 
h i s s t a f f at the Peking Legation and t h a t indeed, 'more might be expected 
of him', than 'he would be able to perform' and, no doubt remembering 
Younghusband's s i m i l a r predicament i n Lhasa as the man on the spot l e f t to 
use h i s i n i t i a t i v e , he i n s i s t e d t h a t he be given l a t i t u d e over dates, as 
w e l l as 'some general i n d i c a t i o n s ' as to 'how f a r His Majesty's Government 
would go i n the way of c o n c e s s i o n s i n order to secure a speedy s o l u t i o n ' to 
the matter. *94 The Indian Government had expressed no f i r m o b j e c t i o n to 
the resumption of t a l k s i n Peking, and t h i s time, there being no mention of 
the s u z e r a i n t y / s o v e r e i g n t y i s s u e that had c o n t r i b u t e d so much to the 
c o l l a p s e of t a l k s at C a l c u t t a , Morley was able to inform Mlnto i n e a r l y 
A p r i l 1906 t h a t a d r a f t t r e a t y might be a n t i c i p a t e d , i f I n d i a were 
agreeable. Minto accepted the new d r a f t on A p r i l 14th, together with 
c e r t a i n m o d i f i c a t i o n s , and the t r e a t y was e v e n t u a l l y signed i n Peking on 
A p r i l 27th, and r a t i f i e d i n London three months l a t e r . *95 
The s u c c e s s of the second round of t a l k s was p a r t l y due to the f a c t that 
they had been held i n Peking and not C a l c u t t a , but they were a l s o a f f e c t e d 
by I n d i a ' s d e c i s i o n to concentrate upon an aspect of the t a l k s over which 
they could e x e r c i s e some control.Throughout the course of the d i s c u s s i o n s , 
9. Youngiusband and F r i e n d s 
F r o n t Eow: Yaunghusband c e n t r e i n b l a c k g r e a t c o a t w i t h Macdonald 
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10. S i r F r a n c i s Younghusband 
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and f o r some time a f t e r they were concluded, a long b a t t l e was waged 
between the Indian government and the Foreign O f f i c e to determine the way 
i n which the Tibetan indemnity should be paid. *96 
During the f i n a l s t a g e s of the n e g o t i a t i o n s leading to the s i g n i n g of the 
Lhasa Convention i n 1904, the payment of the indemnity was the most s e r i o u s 
source of f r i c t i o n between the B r i t i s h and the Tibetans. The Tibetans had 
always i n s i s t e d t h a t they could not a f f o r d to pay i t and were c l e a r l y under 
the impression t h a t the s i t u a t i o n was negotiable. They argued that i n any 
normal bargaining s i t u a t i o n as they understood t h i s to be, i f one party got 
only h a l f the t h i n g s they asked f o r they would be s a t i s f i e d , and that i n 
a s k i n g f o r f u l l payment the B r i t i s h were being unreasonable. During h i s 
time i n Lhasa Younghusband had pursued the question of the indemnity 
o b s e s s i v e l y , r e f u s i n g to r e t r e a t an inch, d e s p i t e attempts by Bhutanese 
r u l e r Tsonga Penlop and o t h e r s to persuade him to compromise. *97 I t was 
d i f f i c u l t f o r him not to see the indemnity i s s u e i n personal terms s i n c e , 
having been the butt of what he f e l t to be q u i t e unnecessary aggression, he 
b e l i e v e d i t only j u s t t h a t the T i b e t a n s be asked to pay f o r the s u f f e r i n g 
endured by the members of h i s E x p e d i t i o n during i t s progress through 
T i b e t . I n h i s mind the payment of the indemnity was l i n k e d to Indian c l a i m s 
to Chumbi, and by making the payments as high as p o s s i b l e , he hoped to 
ensure t h a t the B r i t i s h occupation of the V a l l e y would be an extended 
one.*98 The f i e r c e c r i t i c i s m of h i s behaviour at Lhasa was deeply 
resented, both by h i m s e l f , and by a l l those a s s o c i a t e d with the Expedition, 
being seen as an overt c h a l l e n g e to the t r a d i t i o n a l view that the 'man on 
the spot' might be l e f t to e x e r c i s e h i s i n i t i a t i v e i n such d e l i c a t e 
s i t u a t i o n s . Younghusband l a t e r blamed the pressure generated by the emotive 
campaign waged a g a i n s t the indemnity i n the L i b e r a l p r e s s f o r m o b i l i s i n g 
p u b l i c opinion a g a i n s t him, and f o r exposing c o n f l i c t s between London and 
I n d i a t h a t questioned the wisdom of a l l o w i n g the Viceroy the r i g h t to 
r e t a i n personal c o n t r o l of I n d i a n f r o n t i e r p o l i c y . * 9 9 Matters reached 
a c r i s i s over the indemnity payments when the L i b e r a l s took o f f i c e and i t 
was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t the Chinese had posted proclamations i n Chumbi V a l l e y 
V a l l e y o f f e r i n g to pay the indemnity on T i b e t ' s behalf.»100 I n 
45 -
forwarding t h i s information to London and C a l c u t t a , S i r E r n e s t Satow 
recammended t h a t B r i t a i n should not agree to accept the Chinese o f f e r on 
the grounds t h a t i t was merely the f i r s t stage i n a wider plan seeking to 
gain s o v e r e i g n t y aver T i b e t . The Foreign O f f i c e endorsed Satow's view, as 
they had no wish to f u r t h e r annoy the Indian government who c l e a r l y saw the 
payments as a p u n i t i v e measure a g a i n s t Tibet; and because they b e l i e v e d 
t h a t China would i n any case be unable to meet the c o s t s of the payment i n 
view of the s e v e r e f i n a n c i a l problems being experienced by the t o t t e r i n g 
Manchu a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . The e f f e c t of t h i s B r i t i s h r e f u s a l to accept the 
Chinese o f f e r to pay the indemnity however was to have harmful 
r e p e r c u s s i o n s f o r f u t u r e Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s . * 1 0 1 
The Indian Government continued to i n s i s t that the f u l l cost of the 
indemnity should be met by the Tibetans, and a demand fo r the f i r s t 
payment to be made at Gyantse on January 1st 1906 was sent out. The Chinese 
r e a c t e d immediately to t h i s demand, suggesting t h a t the payment might be 
made a t C a l c u t t a where the Adhesion t a l k s were then being conducted. 
Minto q u i c k l y countered t h i s by arguing that China's o f f e r to pay on 
T i b e t ' s behalf had made t h i s impossible because, under the terms of the 
Lhasa Convention, T i b e t a n s had to pay. At the I n d i a O f f i c e Morley was 
l e s s happy about t h i s response and, while agreeing i n p r i n c i p l e that China 
should not pay the f u l l amount at t h i s stage, he suggested that, as an 
i n c e n t i v e to ensure a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n to the Adhesion t a l k s , they 
might be allowed to pay e v e n t u a l l y . In l a t e r t e l e g r a n s he r e a f f i r m e d 
t h i s view when he s t a t e d t h a t a d i r e c t payment of the indemnity by 
China could not be r e f u s e d once the Adhesion t r e a t y had been signed, and 
by l a t e 1906 the p r i n c i p l e of Chinese payment had been accepted by the 
F o r e i g n O f f i c e *102 
F a l l o w i n g on from t h i s s u c c e s s the Chinese then o f f e r e d to pay the 
indemnity o f f i n three i n s t a l m e n t s , a device which Minto p a r t i c u l a r l y 
d i s t r u s t e d , b e l i e v i n g i t to be aimed at f o r c i n g the r e t u r n of Chumbi 
before a l l payments had been completed. Even Morley h e s i t a t e d before 
a c c e p t i n g t h i s o f f e r but he came to b e l i e v e that u l t i m a t e l y , the advantages 
of occupying Chumbi v a l l e y f o r so long were outweighed by the disadvantages 
of having to enforce the d i r e c t annual payments of 1 lakh f o r s e v e n t y - f i v e 
11. The Amban Yu-t'a: 
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i i fer » * 
12. T i Rimpoche 
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y e a r s under the terms of the e x l s i t i n g agreement with Tibet.»103 When 
the Adhesion T r e a t y was signed t h e r e f o r e B r i t a i n agreed to accept three 
i n s t a l m e n t s of 25 lakh, and i n doing so, completely destroyed any of the 
advantages gained i n T i b e t under the terms of the Lhasa Convention. T h i s 
c r e a t e d great b i t t e r n e s s i n I n d i a , and had the e f f e c t of dangerously 
undermining B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e on the f r o n t i e r at a time when Chinese 
confidence was growing. 
COKCLUSIQlf 
Although Russian forward p o l i c y had been a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r i n prompting 
the despatch of the Younghusband Ex p e d i t i o n i n 1903, i t s importance 
d e c l i n e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t h e r e a f t e r . Anglo-Russian t e n s i o n s c e r t a i n l y 
i n c r e a s e d elsewhere on the f r o n t i e r between 1904 and 1906, but the 
immediate t h r e a t to T i b e t disappeared as soon as Younghusband reported that 
the rumours of a Russian a r s e n a l i n Lhasa were unfounded.»104 The Russian 
t h r e a t l o s t even more impact a f t e r t h e i r h u m i l i a t i n g defeat by the Japanese 
i n 1905, although f e a r s about R u s s i a d i d not e n t i r e l y disappear. Even a f t e r 
1906, when Grey made f r i e n d s h i p with R u s s i a a c e n t r a l plank i n h i s C e n t r a l 
A s i a n p o l i c y , t h e r e was c o n t i n u i n g concern about the p o s s i b l e l i n k s between 
the R u s s i a n T s a r and the D a l a i Lama which were r e f l e c t e d i n o f f i c a l 
correspondence between 1904 and 1909, the year i n which he e v e n t u a l l y 
returned to Lhasa. The p r e v a i l i n g tendency however was to minimise t h i s 
problem i n an e f f o r t to s e c u r e a s u c c e s s f u l outcome to the Anglo-Russian 
t a l k s t h a t were to l e a d to the s i g n i n g of a Convention i n 1907.*105 
The period between 1904 and 1906 was a time of great change and f l u x 
i n T i b e t a n f r o n t i e r p o l i c y . The drama of the Younghusband 'invasion' 
was r e p l a c e d i n Lhasa by a period of confusion as r i v a l monkish f a c t i o n s 
fought f o r c o n t r o l i n the absence of the D a l a i Lama. In East T i b e t s e r i o u s 
f i g h t i n g had broken out when Tibetan monks and tribesmen fought Chinese 
s o l d i e r s , as the f i r s t e f f e c t s of Chinese forward p o l i c y made th e n s e l v e s 
f e l t I n the area. Within the Foreign S e r v i c e a dogged s t r u g g l e had 
developed between the I n d i a n government and the Foreign O f f i c e over c o n t r o l 
of T i b e t a n f r o n t i e r p o l i c y , and a second more i n s i d i o u s challenge was 
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i s s u e d by the Foreign O f f i c e which came i n the form of an a t t a c k on the 
a b i l i t y of f r o n t i e r o f f i c e r s to handle s i t u a t i o n s on the spot. 
Younghusband was one of the f i r s t v i c t i m s of t h i s p o l i c y but there were 
to be many others. The c h a l l e n g e was not as s u c c e s s f u l as i t might have 
been however s i n c e Curzon's s u c c e s s o r s guarded t h e i r r i g h t to d i c t a t e 
f r o n t i e r p o l i c y , and Minto continued to pursue a d i s c r e e t but f i r m l y 
independent l i n e , t u r n i n g a b l i n d eye to f r o n t i e r a c t i v i t y , and g i v i n g 
support to the i n c r e a s i n g l y p o s i t i v e r o l e played by the Curzonian e l i t e who 
had taken p o s t s as f r o n t i e r agents and o f f i c a l s i n s i d e Tibet. 
Before going on to examine the e f f e c t s of the non-involvement p o l i c y on 
f r o n t i e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a f t e r 1906, i t w i l l be h e l p f u l i n the fol l o w i n g two 
ch a p t e r s to look at the way the i n which the Foreign S e r v i c e operated i n 
London, I n d i a , and China, and to show how these three i n s t i t u t i o n s 
i n t e r a c t e d with each other i n shaping and implementing p o l i c y on I n d i a ' s 
north- e a s t e r n f r o n t i e r . 
i o . S i r Edward Grey 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FOREIGI OFFICE AID THE CHIIA SERVICE 1904 -1914 
I n t h i s chapter I w i l l say something about the o r g a n i s a t i o n and the r o l e of 
the F o r e i g n O f f i c e i n London, looking at the way i n which the F a r E a s t e r n 
Department s u p e r v i s e d the running of the B r i t i s h Legation i n Peking. 
I s h a l l then go on to d i s c u s s the nature and o r g a n i s a t i o n of the China 
Consular S e r v i c e and the way i n which that was co-ordinated by the B r i t i s h 
M i n i s t e r i n Peking. The next chapter w i l l d e s c r i b e the r a t h e r more 
complicated procedures Involved i n the running of the I n d i a S e r v i c e , and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r look a t the d e l i c a t e balance of power between the S e c r e t a r y of 
S t a t e f o r I n d i a , who worked from the I n d i a O f f i c e i n London, and the 
V i c e r o y with h i s own c o u n c i l i n I n d i a . 
1. THE FOREIGI OFFICE 
The purpose of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e i n V h i t e h a l l was to organise and conduct 
B r i t i s h F o r e i g n p o l i c y . I n 1782 the growing volume of work had forced the 
formation of a separate Diplomatic S e r v i c e to l i a i s e with f o r e i g n heads of 
s t a t e , and i n 1825, a t h i r d . Consular Department was c r e a t e d to deal 
e x c l u s i v e l y with what were then regarded as l e s s important commercial and 
t r a d i n g matters, i n v o l v i n g the running of Consulates a l l over the world. 
The Consulate i n Peking f o r example was s u p e r v i s e d by members of the 
Consular S e r v i c e , although the B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r there was a member of the 
Diplomatic S e r v i c e . Any d i s c u s s i o n about the nature of the B r i t i s h Foreign 
S e r v i c e between 1904 and 1914 must t h e r e f o r e take i n t o account the very 
d i f f e r e n t f u n c t i o n s of these S e r v i c e s , as w e l l as the t e n s i o n s that 
developed between them. 
During the 1880s, i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s had been transformed by the 
p o l i t i c a l , t e c h n o l o g i c a l , and commercial developments of the 'new 
i m p e r i a l i s m ' , and the expansion a s s o c i a t e d with i t had a profound e f f e c t on 
the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , enhancing i t s p r e s t i g e , yet i n c r e a s i n g the volume of 
work without r a i s i n g s t a f f i n g l e v e l s . A rchaic methods of copying l e t t e r s 
and r e p o r t s by hand and o f t e n i n t r i p l i c a t e f u r t h e r hampered e f f i c e n c y and, 
by 1902, the s i t u a t i o n was so bad t h a t a programme of reform was i n i t i a t e d 
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aimed a t updating the s e r v i c e which culminated i n the Crowe/Hard!nge 
Reforms of 1906. *1 
Two men held the important post of Foreign S e c r e t a r y between 1904 and 1914. 
Lord Lansdowne, an ex Viceroy of I n d i a at the end of a d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
c a r e e r , who s e r v e d between 1900 and 1905; and S i r Edward Grey, a 
c o n s t i t u e n c y MP who managed to combine one of the most p r e s t l g o u s posts i n 
the country with r o u t i n e c o n s t i t u e n c y work, and who served between December 
1905 and 1916. *2. 
When Grey took up h i s appointment the nature of the Job was already 
changing. I n c r e a s i n g paperwork, combined with the almost unendurable burden 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y e v e n t u a l l y took t h e i r t o l l on h i s h e a l t h , but h i s 
a b i l i t y to delegate enabled him to s t e e r the O f f i c e e f f e c t i v e l y through 
the t u r b u l e n t pre-war period,when p r e s s c r i t i c i s m of i t s performance was 
o f t e n s c a t h i n g . »3 
During the p e r i o d of Hardinge's tenure between 1906 and 1910,the post of 
Permanent Undersecretary became a very powerful and p i v o t a l one. Grey 
r e l i e d upon Hardinge to a d v i s e and handle much of the European workload, 
and the smooth running of the O f f i c e depended very much on the harmonious 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t developed between them. »4 When Hardinge l e f t to take up 
the post of Viceroy of I n d i a i n Ifovember 1910 h i s place was taken by S i r 
Arthur l i c o l s o n , another c a r e e r diplomat who had p r e v i o u s l y been Ambassador 
to St Petersburg. Unlike Hardinge, Hicolson was unhappy i n h i s new post and 
begged to be r e l e a s e d w i t h i n eighteen months of t a k i n g o f f i c e . Although he 
s t a y e d on u n t i l 1916 to provide c o n t i n u i t y during the war period, u n l i k e 
h i s predecessor he d i d not a v a i l h i n s e l f of the opportunity to e x p l o i t h i s 
powerful p o s i t i o n , and many j u n i o r c l e r k s l i k e V a n s i t t a r t found him remote 
and unnapproachable.*5. The Senior C l e r k s , who were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the 
smooth running of the departments i n s i d e the Foreign O f f i c e under the 
guidance of A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r i e s , were the acknowledged experts of the 
s e r v i c e s i n c e they o f t e n remained with departments f o r long periods and 
were ab l e to a c q u i r e s p e c i a l i s e d knowledge of a p a r t i c u l a r part of the 
world.This made them i n d l s p e n s i b l e , g i v i n g them a s u p e r i o r s t a t u s w i t h i n 
h i e r a r c h y . I n 1906, when the new reforms threatened t h e i r unique p o s i t i o n 
by encouraging j u n i o r c l e r k s to prepare minutes and comment on the 
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r e p o r t s and memoranda they had copied,Senior C l e r k s opposed t h i s move on 
the grounds t h a t these e x t r a d u t i e s would provide J u n i o r s C l e r k s with 
an opportunity to i n f l u e n c e d e c i s i o n making.Their response was a p e r f e c t 
example of the way i n which entrenched a t t i t u d e s w i t h i n the o f f i c e r e s i s t e d 
change and prevented improvement i n working c o n d i t i o n s . Despite the good 
i n t e n t i o n s t h e r e f o r e , a v a s t p o t e n t i a l was wasted, and the job 
of J u n i o r C l e r k s t a y e d much a s before, most c l e r k s enduring years of d u l l , 
u n c h a llenging work with l i t t l e hope of promotion. By 1914 the e x t r a volume 
of work c r e a t e d by the war was to bring dramatic s h o r t term changes a s 
s p e c i a l wartime departments were formed. *6 
Diplomats h e l d a very s p e c i a l and p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n i n the Foreign 
S e r v i c e . Many were the sons of a r i s t o c r a t s who had achieved t h e i r 
p o s i t i o n through r o y a l or high p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . Although there was 
a t r a d i t i o n of t r a n s f e r between the Foreign O f f i c e and the Diplomatic 
s e r v i c e a t higher l e v e l s lower grades hardly ever t r a n s f e r r e d , and the 
few C l e r k s who came from the Diplomatic S e r v i c e to work i n the Foreign 
O f f i c e found t h a t they were r a r e l y placed i n departments where t h e i r 
o v e r s e a s experience was u s e f u l *7 
Some di p l o m a t i c posts c a r r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l e weight and i n f l u e n c e . The P a r i s 
and Washington Embassies were g e n e r a l l y regarded a s the most p r e s t i g o u s 
postings, while posts i n A f r i c a and A s i a c a r r i e d f a r l e s s weight, with the 
r e s u l t t h a t diplomats i n the remoter embassies and c o n s u l a t e s often f e l t 
v ery i s o l a t e d . I n the past t h i s had had the e f f e c t of al l o w i n g the men who 
occupied these p o s t s a great deal of independence; however, a s developments 
i n communication a f t e r 1880 i n c r e a s e d the speed a t which information could 
be exchanged, t h i s l a r g e l y disappeared.•S C h r i s t e n e d the ' C i n d e r e l l a 
S e r v i c e ' , the Consular Department was g e n e r a l l y considered a f a r l e s s 
glamorous option f o r men embarking on a diplomatic c a r e e r because of i t s 
a s s o c i a t i o n with trade,»9 I n 1903 strenuous e f f o r t s had been made to 
r e c t i f y t h i s image but these had f a i l e d , merely i n c r e a s i n g the co n s u l a r 
workload without enhancing the p r e s t i g e of the s e r v i c e a s a whole. Consuls 
and t h e i r s t a f f s worked i n the most remote and p o l i t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e p a r t s 
of the world and oft e n I n the most a p p a l l i n g and s t r e s s f u l c o n d i t i o n s , yet 
t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n and p o t e n t i a l were often undervalued, *10 
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The reason why the Consular s e r v i c e enjoyed such a poor r e p u t a t i o n can i n 
p a r t be e x p l a i n e d by the way i n which recruitment to a l l three s e r v i c e s 
was conducted. Foreign O f f i c e e n t r a n t s were r e c r u i t e d from the top f i v e 
p u b l i c s c h o o l s . Most were employed before, i n s t e a d of going to 
u n i v e r s i t y , s i n c e academic e x c e l l e n c e was not g e n e r a l l y regarded as an 
e s s e n t i a l p r e - r e q u i s i t e f o r a d i p l o m a t i c career.»11 Although i t was no 
longer the case as i n S a l i s b u r y ' s day, t h a t prospective candidates had to 
cone from f a m i l i e s p e r s o n a l l y known to the Foreign S e c r e t a r y , between 1904 
and 1914 recruitment p a t t e r n s r e s i s t e d a l l attempts to reform them and the 
number of r e c r u i t s from Eton a c t u a l l y i n c r e a s e d at t h i s time.*12 In the 
Diplomatic s e r v i c e standards were a l s o determined very much by personal 
wealth s i n c e many posts were unwaged and c a r r i e d a property q u a l i f i c a t i o n 
of J&400.This meant th a t even wealthy men l i k e Hardinge s t r u g g l e d to a f f o r d 
the kind of s o c i a l expenditure required. »13 
Entrance to the Consular S e r v i c e was often the only option f o r men wishing 
to s e c u r e a c a r e e r i n the F o r e i g n s e r v i c e who d i d not have s u i t a b l e 
f a m i l y connections. In h i s study of the China Consular S e r v i c e , P.D.Coates 
e s t a b l i s h e d a tendency f o r r e c r u i t s to be drawn from the p r o f e s s i o n a l 
and commercial c l a s s e s , most having r e c e i v e d a minor p u b l i c school 
education. A high proportion of the r e c r u i t s accepted a l s o came from 
mis s i o n a r y f a m i l i e s and were a l r e a d y aware of the hardships they might be 
expected to f a c e . These men had a l r e a d y some competence i n the languages of 
the country to which they had a p p l i e d to serve,which gave them an advantage 
s i n c e l i n g u s t i c s k i l l s were considered an important q u a l i f i c a t i o n by the 
s e r v i c e . # 1 4 Competition to e n t e r a l l three s e r v i c e s was very s t i f f and 
many were r e f u s e d entry. S t r i c t adherence to t r a d i t i o n i n the s e l e c t i o n 
p r o c e s s helped to perpetuate the innate snobberies w i t h i n each s e r v i c e , and 
the tendency to promote by age r a t h e r than by merit m i l i t a t e d a g a i n s t 
i n i t i a t i v e . The narrow s o c i a l base from which each s e r v i c e took i t s 
r e c r u i t s a l s o ensured t h a t i t s members shared the same va l u e s and outlook 
which i n i t s e l f produced a f u r t h e r b a r r i e r to change, 
Between 1904 and 1914 the Foreign O f f i c e underwent cons i d e r a b l e i n t e r n a l 
adjustment, a s w e l l as e x p e r i e n c i n g great pressure from outside to adapt to 
the demands of the t w e n t i e t h century. S u c c e s s f u l attempts to reform i t were 
14. H a r r i s o n and s e r v a n t s i n F a k i n g c.1900 15. B e i l b y A l s t o n 
S i r Walter Langley 17, J . D. Gregory 
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r e s t r i c t e d to the improvement of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e procedures designed to cope 
with the i n c r e a s i n g workload, and they f a i l e d to i n f l u e n c e the e l i t i s t 
a t t i t u d e s which remained much as they had been i n the previous century. 
THE CHIITA SERVICE 
The China S e r v i c e was administered i n London by the Far E a s t e r n Department 
of the For e i g n O f f i c e which s u p e r v i s e d the B r i t i s h Legation i n Peking as 
w e l l as l i a i s i n g with the Chinese Legation i n London. 
The c o n s u l a r s e c t i o n of the S e r v i c e was run by a separate Consular 
Department, but i n s i d e China I t s e l f the B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n Peking 
was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r Consular O f f i c e r s i n h i s care.*15 The F a r E a s t e r n 
Department had always enjoyed a c o n s i d e r a b l e measure of freedom w i t h i n 
the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , p a r t l y because i t d e a l t with an area f a r from Europe 
and because B r i t i s h I n t e r e s t s i n China had always been l a r g e l y commercial, 
but a l s o because i t was administered e f f i c e n t l y by a team with proven 
experience. F, A, Campbell, A s s i s t a n t Undersecretary i n charge of the 
Department i n 1904, was a man of wisdom and a b i l i t y who had served under 
S a l i s b u r y and had s t e e r e d the Department through the c r i s i s generated by 
the 1900 Boxer R e b e l l i o n when the eyes of the world had been t r a i n e d on 
China. *16 As Foreign S e c r e t a r y a f t e r December 1905, Grey was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the Department, p a r t l y the r e s u l t of h i s concern 
f o r the maintenance of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , with i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s 
f o r B r i t i s h commercial and naval s e c u r i t y both i n s i d e China and i n the 
P a c i f i c and I n d i a n oceans, and p a r t l y because of h i s i m p l i c i t f a i t h i n 
Campbell and h i s team. *17 
The remoteness of China, and Grey's p r o t e c t i o n , were twin f a c t o r s ensuring 
the Department's c o n t i n u i n g independence which helped to keep i t s a f e 
from the unwelcome a t t e n t i o n s of Hardinge and h i s a s s o c i a t e s whose main 
a r e a of concern i n t h i s p e r i o d was Europe. *18 
As w e l l a s e n j o y i n g an harmonious r e l a t i o n s h i p with Grey i n s i d e the Foreign 
O f f i c e , Campbell a l s o found himself on e x c e l l e n t terms with the B r i t i s h 
M i n i s t e r s i n Peking, E r n e s t Satow and l a t e r John Jordan who both welcomed 
h i s weekly r e p o r t s and l e t t e r s . When Campbell died suddenly from a kidney 
i n f e c t i o n i n December 1911 c o n t i n u i t y was maintained when h i s a s s i s t a n t 
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Walter Langley, was promoted to the post, and took on h i s new r o l e with the 
i n b u i l t advantage of a l r e a d y knowing Jordan because the Far E a s t e r n 
Department had worked c l o s e l y with China, one of the few b e n e f i t s of a 
system which u s u a l l y promoted by s e n i o r i t y r a t h e r than by merit. »19 
Campbell and Langley r a n the F a r E a s t e r n Department with the help of a very 
experienced team which i n c l u d e d B e i l b y Alston, John Duncan Gregory, and 
W i l l i a m G r e n f e l l Max-Muller. A l l three men played key a d v i s o r y r o l e s at 
v a r i o u s times and Max-Muller and A l s t o n both served i n Peking as Charges 
d ' A f f a i r e s during Jordan's leave periods. A l s t o n i n p a r t i c u l a r b e nefited 
from t h i s experience, r i s i n g from Senior C l e r k i n 1914, to become B r i t i s h 
M i n i s t e r i n Peking by 1921, a remarkable achievement by Foreign O f f i c e 
standards. *20 
The B r i t i s h Legation i n Peking was part of a l a r g e r complex of Legations 
t h a t occupied n e a r l y one quarter of the c i t y . The Legation quarter 
had s u r v i v e d the Boxer Siege of 1900 with minimal p h y s i c a l damage, 
although the p s y c h o l o g i c a l e f f e c t s of the s i e g e l i n g e r e d long a f t e r the 
L e g a t i o n s were r e l i e v e d . By 1904 the B r i t i s h Legation had turned i n upon 
i t s e l f , c r e a t i n g a small o a s i s of E n g l i s h n e s s i n what many now f e l t to be 
an a l i e n and h o s t i l e environment. »21 I t was headed by a M i n i s t e r appointed 
from the Diplomatic S e r v i c e who l i v e d r a t h e r grandly, i n a green t i l e d 
Chinese Palace, known as the T i n g h r i , and rented from a Chinese prince. 
His three s e c r e t a r i e s occupied t h r e e detached bungalows w i t h i n the compound 
and the remaining s t a f f , c o n s i s t i n g of a Vice Consul, f i f t e e n student 
i n t e r p r e t e r s , and a marine guard, a l l shared a mess i n each of three large 
o u t b u i l d i n g s *22. 
There was a chapel, a t h e a t r e , and a bowling a l l e y a l s o w i t h i n the 
compound, and a few m i l e s away, a g o l f course and racecourse shared with 
the wider Legation community. I n such a male dominated environment, very 
l i k e the minor p u b l i c s c h o o l s many of the student I n t e r p r e t e r s had only 
r e c e n t l y l e f t , the presence of the M i n i s t e r ' s wife and family were an 
important s t a b i l i s i n g i n f l u e n c e , and during Satow's tenure t h i s female 
i n f l u e n c e was much missed, d e s p i t e the many a t t r a c t i o n s of the s o c i a l l i f e 
s h ared between the Legations.*23 The Post of Chinese S e c r e t a r y was 
an important and p r e s t i g o u s one demanding s p e c i a l language competence i n 
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Chinese, both spoken and w r i t t e n . Most of the d a i l y Legation correspondence 
and t r a n s l a t i o n was i n h i s hands, and i t was a l s o h i s duty to organise and 
care f o r the student i n t e r p r e t e r s who spent two years i n h i s care, »24 
The M i n i s t e r ' s work was p r i m a r i l y diplomatic and much of h i s day was 
spent i n t e r v i e w i n g and c o n s u l t i n g with the Chinese Foreign O f f i c e or Wai-
Wu-pu a s w e l l a s with other Legation heads. During h i s tenure Jordan 
became 'Doyen' or head of the Legation Committee and t h i s kept him 
p a r t i c u l a r l y busy outside the Legation compound making the burden of 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the d a i l y running of a f f a i r s f a l l even more 
h e a v i l y on h i s s t a f f , »25 
Student i n t e r p r e t e r s were r e c r u i t e d from B r i t a i n to serve two year 
a p p r e n t i c e s h i p s a t the Legation during which time they were expected to 
l e a r n Chinese, S i n c e competition f o r p l a c e s was intense, those s e l e c t e d 
were u s u a l l y very g r a t e f u l to get accepted. At the end of t h e i r two year 
t r a i n i n g p e r i o d they s a t an examination which, i f they passed, would 
determine t h e i r f u t u r e c a r e e r with the S e r v i c e . During t h e i r time i n Peking 
they enjoyed a r e l a x e d and r a t h e r sporty l i f e . I n the summer they rented 
d i s u s e d Chinese temples i n the h i l l s , where they w i l e d away t h e i r time 
l e a r n i n g Chinese with t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l t u t o r s and g e n e r a l l y enjoying 
themselves. However, the Legation experience was no preparation f o r the 
l i f e t o come and i t was a b i t t e r standing joke w i t h i n the s e r v i c e that out 
of every four r e c r u i t s , one went mad, one became an a l c o h o l i c , one died, 
and one was promoted to Vice-Consul.*26 During Jordan's tenure a s Doyen 
from February 1911 B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e was pronounced, the p o s i t i o n providing 
an opportunity to f o s t e r s t r o n g e r l i n k s with emerging Chinese l e a d e r s and 
e s p e c i a l l y with Yuan S h i h Kai, who became Pr e s i d e n t a f t e r the Manchu 
c o l l a p s e i n 1911 and to whom Jordan formed a s p e c i a l attachment, »27 
During t h i s time d i p l o m a t i c p r a c t i c e changed d r a m a t i c a l l y a s the Wal Wu pu 
was r e o r g a n i s e d and renamed the Wai Chaio Pu. Many i n t e r v i e w s now began to 
be conducted a t reasonable hours and often i n E n g l i s h , a s t a r k c o n t r a s t to 
Manchu days when the time a l l o t t e d to the d i s c u s s i o n of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s 
o f t e n Involved the M i n i s t e r i n t a l k s that began a t two i n the morning.»28 
The Chinese Legation i n London operated from r a t h e r d i l a p i d a t e d premises i n 
Po r t l a n d P l a c e . I t had been s e t up as a concession to western diplomatic 
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t a s t e s i n 1S95, and I t s e x o t i c occupants i n i t i a l l y proved r a t h e r a shock t o 
many di p l o m a t i c v i s i t o r s who found the accommodation unexpectedly dim and 
d i r t y . One dismayed v i s i t o r even a r r i v e d t o f i n d the Chinese M i n i s t e r 
smoking opium. A f t e r 1911 the s i t u a t i o n changed as western educated 
diplomats more attuned t o B r i t i s h d iplomatic p r a c t i c e were posted t o 
London, and Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s began t o be established on a more 
comfortable, i f not always harmonious footing.»29 
Between 1904 and 1914 two men held the post of B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n Peking 
both of whom had broken w i t h previous t r a d i t i o n by being middle class and 
having t r a n s f e r r e d from the Consular t o the Diplomatic Service some years 
e a r l i e r . T r a n s f e r s of t h i s k i n d happened r a r e l y and are an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t 
i n China, where commercial advancement was v i t a l , experience and expertise 
were valued more than s t a t u s and f a m i l y connections. 
S i r Ernest Satow, B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r between 1900 and 1906, was an 
I n t e l l e c t u a l w i t h considerable l i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y who had already enjoyed 
a dlstlngushed career i n Japan which was t o prove invaluable i n 
strengthening Anglo-Japanese co-operation i n China i n t h i s period. 
S i r John Jordan, B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r between 1906 and 1921, had previously 
served i n the Peking Legation as an a s s i s t a n t secretary before becoming 
Consul-General i n Seoul and took o f f i c e w i t h a w e l l developed understanding 
of o r i e n t a l diplomacy and a healthy respect f o r Japanese efficency.*30 
Both men were unimpressed by the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e standards of the 
China Service and sought t o Improve conditions. Jordan i n p a r t i c u l a r 
was very concerned about the hardships experienced by h i s Consuls, and 
although t o many j u n i o r s t a f f he could seem a harsh taskmaster, demanding 
comprehensive annual r e p o r t , and b e r a t i n g them f o r slackness; h i s 
concern was genuine and based upon h i s own e a r l y g r u e l l i n g experiences 
i n the Service. »31 Years without leave had t e s t e d h i s endurance and 
were t o leave a legacy f o r l a t e r years,and he o f t e n experienced bouts of 
i l l n e s s and s u f f e r e d constant f a t i g u e t h a t was t o lead t o a complete 
breakdown i n 1915 and an enforced period of retirement.*32 Jordan was a 
great champion of c e n t r a l i s a t i o n and believed t h a t operating posts i n the 
remoter regions of China was a waste of manpower and resources. This makes 
h i s support f o r the opening and maintenance of a post at Tachienlu on the 
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border v / l t l i East Tibet i n 1913 a l l the more I n t r i g u i n g , s i n c e f o r him, i t 
represented a dramatic s h i f t i n p o l i c y . *33 
For much of the period between 1904 and 1914 there was concern about the 
c a l i b r e of the candidates coming forward and both M i n i s t e r s noted a decline 
i n l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s which Jordan t r i e d t o improve by sending h i s student 
i n t e r p r e t e r s t o a missionary school i n Peking. This proved unsuccessful i n 
the long term, since the Chinese vocabulary taught by missionaries f o r use 
i n the f i e l d was q u i t e i n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r diplomatic purposes and the scheme 
was abandoned. A f t e r 1911 the problem began t o solve i t s e l f as western 
educated Chinese diplomats were w i l l i n g t o use English and i t no longer 
became necessary f o r new r e c r u i t s t o aspire t o the l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s 
a t t a i n e d by Satow and Jordan, Few t w e n t i e t h century entrants managed 
t o l e a r n enough w r i t t e n Chinese t o read i t w e l l , and f u r t h e r attempts t o 
enhance the p r e s t i g e of the Service by reforming the examination system 
before 1914 met w i t h s i m i l a r f a i l u r e . Examination r e s u l t s f o r the China 
Service produced only j u s t enough candidates t o f i l l vacancies and r e c r u i t s 
continued t o be drawn from the same narrow middle class e l i t e as before, 
most coming t o China as t h e i r second or t h i r d choice.*34 
U n t i l Tachienlu was opened i n 1913, three posts had served as bases from 
which events i n Tibet were monitored. Two of the posts, at Tengyueh and 
Yunnanfu, were s i t u a t e d near the Burma border i n the Chinese province of 
Yunnan. The t h i r d at Chengtu i n the Chinese province of Szechuan, was 
o r i g i n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d t o monitor French a c t i v i t y i n the region as well as 
t o gain r e a d i e r access t o the Viceroy of Szechuan who was a powerful and 
independent r u l e r i n h i s own r i g h t , Szechuan being one of the remotest 
and wealthest provinces i n the loosely c o n t r o l l e d Chinese Empire. *35 
The Consulate at Chengtu had been opened i n 1902 by S i r Alexander Hosie, 
Consul-General at the t r e a t y p o r t of Chungking. The Chinese d i d not 
l i k e f o r e i g n Consulates operating outside t r e a t y ports,and i t had 
t h e r e f o r e been agreed t h a t , while Hosie should l i v e i n Chengtu, he would 
continue t o operate the o f f i c i a l Consulate from Chungking. In 1903 a 
s i m i l a r arrangejnent was made f o r the French Consul, and an u n o f f i c i a l 
French Consulate was set up i n Chengtu. Compared t o Chungking, a damp, 
misty and r a t i n f e s t e d c i t y b u i l t on a rocky promontory overlooking the 
illgt^lllli!!! 
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busy Yangtze r i v e r , Chengtu was paradise. Cosmopolitan and soph i s t i c a t e d , 
i t was the c a p i t a l c i t y of Szechuan and by a l l accounts a very b e a u t i f u l 
place. #36 The journey t o Chengtu by r i v e r from Chungking was extremely 
hazardous however, and Consuls posted t o Chengtu were r e l u c t a n t t o submit 
t h e i r wives t o such danger w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t wives r a r e l y accompanied 
t h e i r husbands,making the pos t i n g a dubious pleasure. Campbell and Goffe, 
who held posts as Consuls i n Chengtu i n 1904 and 1907, both l e f t wives 
behind, and t h e i r l o n e l i n e s s may have influenced Goffe's successor Fox,who 
i n 1908 decided t o b r i n g h i s w i f e , but who begged t o leave when i l l health 
forced her t o r e t u r n w i t h i n weeks of t h e i r a r r i v a l . »37 
Although Twyman, who became Chengtu Consul i n 1909 was a widower,he also 
found himself unable t o cope w i t h the s t r a i n s imposed by the posting and he 
returned t o B r i t a i n w i t h i n a year a f t e r s u f f e r i n g a complete nervous 
breakdown.»38 Wilkinson, h i s replacement,lasted longer. Although wifeless 
and f u l l of complaints about poor housing c o n d i t i o n s , he stuck the posting 
w i t h the able assistance of Er i c Teichman, both men l i v i n g through the 
chaotic and dangerous r e v o l u t i o n a r y disturbances of 1911 and 1912 t h a t 
f o l l o w e d the collapse of "the Manchu Dynasty, when most Europeans chose t o 
leave the area. Although h i s bravery earned him a commendation from Jordan, 
Wilkinson could also be o f f i c i o u s and pe t t y , i n 1911 arranging f o r the 
kidnap and d e p o r t a t i o n of an Englishwoman who had married a Chinese because 
he f e l t t h a t her behaviour was immoral and harmful t o B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . He 
was subsequently condemmed by Jordan and Hosie f o r t h i s act, but h i s 
conduct i n both s i t u a t i o n s r e f l e c t s a l l t h a t was good and bad about the 
B r i t i s h presence i n t h i s remote part of China. *39 
Between 1904 and 1914 the China Service remained much as i t had always 
been despite the v a l i a n t e f f o r t s t o reform i t . There was always strong 
r e s i s t a n c e t o any attempt made t o improve standards from w i t h i n , and the 
service continued t o f u n c t i o n as a holding operation f o r the promotion 
of B r i t i s h commercial i n t e r e s t s i n China. During h i s tenure the respect 
Jordan enjoyed w i t h i n the Far Eastern Department, and the t r u s t placed i n 
him by Grey, enabled him t o exercise h i s i n i t i a t i v e and judgement f r e e l y . 
This unusual degree of independence, and the way he used i t t o 
promote h i s p o l i c y i n East Tibet w i l l be the subject of l a t e r chapters. 
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C H A F ' T E R T H R E E 
THE IBDIA OFFICE AID THE GOVERIMEgT OF I5DIA 1904 - 1914 
The I n d i a O f f i c e and the Government of India were created by the 1858 
Government of In d i a Act under which the assets and fun c t i o n s of the East 
I n d i a Company were t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Crown. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the 
two separate a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s soon became a d i f f i c u l t and complex one. 
In t h i s Chapter I w i l l describe the organisation of each i n s t i t u t i o n 
between 1904-1914, w i t h p a r t i c u l a r reference t o the s e n s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
t h a t developed between the Secretary of State at the India O f f i c e and the 
Viceroy i n India, before f i n a l l y looking a t the way i n which the Indian 
Service operated i n s i d e Tibet i t s e l f . 
2. THE IIDIA OFFICE 1904 - 1914 
Although confined t o the supervision of purely Indian a f f a i r s , the India 
O f f i c e ran a huge and diverse a d m i n i s t r a t i o n which was e f f e c t i v e l y , a 
government i n i t s own r i g h t , w i t h i t s own War O f f i c e , Home O f f i c e , and 
Board of Trade, as w e l l as a v a r i e t y of other smaller departments handling 
s p e c i a l i s t s aspects of Indian p o l i c y . 
Funded from Indian revenues, i t cost the B r i t i s h taxpayer nothing and, 
unless i t needed t o r a i s e revenue f o r s p e c i f i c p r o j e c t s , i t escaped the 
a t t e n t i o n of the B r i t i s h Treasury. The O f f i c e i t s e l f was s i t u a t e d close t o 
the Foreign O f f i c e i n Whitehall, i t s a f f a i r s conducted from a vast 
l a b y r i n t h of long dark c o r r i d o r s and i t s business so complex th a t Arthur 
Godley, who worked there as Permanent Undersecretary f o r twenty-six years 
claimed t h a t , even w i t h h i s ' b a r r i s t e r ' s mind', i t had taken him ten years 
t o understand the nature of the job, and another si x t e e n 'to f e e l at ease 
w i t h i f *1 
For over s i x t y years f o l l o w i n g i t s c r e a t i o n the India O f f i c e remained under 
the c o n t r o l of the Secretary of State f o r India and h i s Council. 
This important Crown Post was usu a l l y given t o a serving p o l i t i c i a n and 
most appointees had never set f o o t i n India, I n order t o conduct Indian 
a f f a i r s , the India O f f i c e worked c l o s e l y w i t h Foreign O f f i c e Departments 
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w i t h whom i t shared some r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g a commitment t o 
provide copies of correspondence and Information.*2 This r e l a t i o n s h i p was 
gr a d u a l l y weakened during the nineteenth and e a r l y t w e n t i e t h centuries as 
more and more t e r r i t o r y was l o s t t o India i n disputes w i t h other powers. 
This meant th a t by 1904 they were d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Afghanistan, l e p a l , the Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia, 
Slkkim, and Bhutan, and had an Informal I n t e r e s t i n Tibet and Assam. 
Relations between the In d i a O f f i c e and the Government of India were of t e n 
mercurial. Operating s i x thousand miles apart, there was tremendous scope 
f o r f r i c t i o n between the Secretary of State i n London, and the Viceroy i n 
India . Developments i n cable communication, plus the Increased amount of 
paperwork Involved i n the p r o v i s i o n of biannual r e p o r t s f o r Parliament 
brought Calcutta c l o s e r t o London, but at the cost of a d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n 
the q u a l i t y of the r e l a t i o n s h i p , and i n i t i a t i v e s by men on the spot were 
i n c r e a s i n g l y challenged. *3. Like the Foreign O f f i c e , the India O f f i c e was 
s e l f s u f f i c i e n t , having i t s own career s t r u c t u r e and mores. While the 
Indian C i v i l Service (ICS) a t t r a c t e d the cream of the public schools, posts 
i n s i d e the London O f f i c e were less keenly contested and d i d not tend t o 
a t t r a c t the adventurous. At higher l e v e l s , vacancies were o f t e n f i l l e d by 
r e t i r e d ICS men who had spent t h e i r working l i f e i n India, and t h i s l i m i t e d 
promotion prospects f o r young en t r a n t s which f u r t h e r deterred them from 
seeking a career i n London. There was also l i t t l e Interchange between the 
Ind i a O f f i c e and the ICS f o r , while comparatively j u n i o r ICS s t a f f might, 
by v i r t u e of t h e i r Indian experience, prove very useful t o London, the 
s i t u a t i o n d i d not work i n reverse, as India O f f i c e c l e r k s needed t o f i r s t 
l e a r n the language, l e g a l code, and customs of the Province t o which they 
were assigned before they could even begin t o understand the work i n India; 
a process t h a t could take many years. 
The post of Secretary of State f o r India was a very arduous and exacting 
one and f u l l of hidden pressures. Responsible f o r the conduct of Indian 
a f f a i r s I n London, the Secretary of State was expected t o monitor events 
i n s i d e India w i t h the help of a small Advisory Council without d i s r u p t i n g 
the work of the Indian Government,*4 I n p r a c t i c e , the l i m i t e d experience 
of both Viceroy and M i n i s t e r u s u a l l y ensured t h a t each tended t o stay i n 
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t h e i r separate corners, r e l y i n g on t r u s t e d advisors amongst t h e i r 
i n d i v i d u a l s t a f f s ; but where there were c o n f l i c t s between them, these were 
exacerbated by mutual inexperience. In a d d i t i o n t o h i s other d u t i e s the 
Secretary of State was also responsible t o Parliament and was required t o 
r e p o r t r e g u l a r l y t o the House of Commons on Indian matters. Where, as i n 
Morley's case, the postholder was also a s i t t i n g MP, t h i s could be a 
c r i p p l i n g a d d i t i o n t o the workload.*5 Between 1904 and 1914 the post of 
Secretary of State was held by three men. St.John Brodrick (1902-1905), 
John Morley (1905-1910), and Lord Crewe (1910-1914).*6 
As w i t h the Foreign O f f i c e the Permanent o f f i c e holders were able t o 
develop areas of e x p e r t i s e denied t h e i r Parliamentary counterparts whose 
term at the O f f i c e only averaged a year t o eighteen months. Of a l l the 
permanent posts, t h a t of Permanent Undersecretary was the most exacting 
because the work involved a c t i n g as mediator i n the developing power 
s t r u g g l e f o r c o n t r o l of p o l i c y between the Viceroy i n India , and the 
Secretary of State i n London.*7 Three men held the post between 1904 and 
1914. The f i r s t , Arthur Godley served f o r twenty-six years from 1883 u n t i l 
1909, Godley had come t o the O f f i c e w i t h no previous diplomatic experience 
and had acquired the p o s i t i o n through f a m i l y connections. Between 1904 and 
1909 he served two Viceroys and two Secretaries of State. He developed a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y close, but not always harmonious r e l a t i o n s h i p , w i t h John 
Morley, who was Secretary of State between 1906 and 1910, and he became 
h e a v i l y embroiled i n the power s t r u g g l e between Morley and Mlnto. Godley 
found himself outclassed i n h i s dealings w i t h Morley, f o r although the two 
men shared a common i n t e l l e c t u a l and p o l i t i c a l background, they grew more 
and more estranged as c o n f l i c t escalated between them, and Godley grew very 
r e s e n t f u l about the way i n which he f e l t Morley was d e l i b e r a t l y r e j e c t i n g 
h i s advice. He e v e n t u a l l y l e f t the O f f i c e i n 1909 a sad and embittered man 
having endured years of s t r e s s , serving i n a v i t a l l y important r o l e t h a t 
brought l i t t l e fame or p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n . *8 
His place was taken by h i s own P r i v a t e Secretary Raymond Rit c h i e . 
Related t o the n o v e l i s t W i l l i a m Thackeray, R i t c h i e had l i t e r a r y ambitions 
of h i s own and h i s w r i t t e n r e p o r t s were regarded as models of excellence by 
colleagues. His appointment set a precedent since i t was the f i r s t time 
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t h a t a man had been appointed t o such a high p o s i t i o n from w i t h i n the 
ser v i c e , and h i s e a r l y death i n 1912 was much r e g r e t t e d by those who had 
worked w i t h him. »9 R i t c h i e ' s place was taken i n 1912 by Thomas Holderness 
a r e t i r e d Indian C i v i l Service man w i t h considerable Indian experience. 
Immediately before becoming Permanent Undersecretary, Holderness had been 
Revenue Secretary and l i k e R i t c h i e , was appointed from w i t h i n the 
Office.*10 
I n 1899, the a r r i v a l of George Curzon as Viceroy destroyed an understanding 
between the Indi a O f f i c e and the Government of India about the way i n which 
Indian f r o n t i e r p o l i c y should be organised which was t o lead t o a serious 
s t r u g g l e f o r c o n t r o l between Calcutta and London a f f e c t i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between successive Viceroys and Secretaries of State. I n order t o 
appreciate the nature of t h i s s t r u g g l e i t i s necessary t o understand the 
way i n which the Government of India worked, and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o examine 
the r o l e played by the Viceroy. 
2. THE VICEROY AID THE GOVERBMEIT OF IHPIA 
The Government of India was responsible f o r a vast land mass roughly the 
si z e of Europe, and f o r the welfare of i t s people. By 1904 the novelty 
of a d m i n i s t e r i n g In d i a had began t o p a l l as many began t o appreciate 
the scale and expense of the commitment. Between 1895 and 1906 a ser i e s 
of widescale famines prompted the s e t t i n g up of a Royal Commission whose 
recommendations included the b u i l d i n g of extensive i r r i g a t i o n schemes, and 
a vast network of ra i l w a y s across India t o enable food and water supplies 
t o reach famine s t r i c k e n areas q u i c k l y . Under the terms of the 1858 Act the 
Indian Government were expected t o fund such p r o j e c t s and Curzon i n 
p a r t i c u l a r r e s i s t e d a l l attempts t o make India pay f o r i n l t a t l v e s emanating 
from London; a b a t t l e continued by successive Viceroys a f t e r h i s departure 
from In d i a i n 1905.•!! 
The f u r t h e r problem of how t o a f f o r d f r o n t i e r defence, which had proved a 
great f i n a n c i a l burden t o the Indian Government as wel l as a d r a i n on 
m i l i t a r y resources, d i d not disappear w i t h the o f f i c i a l ending of the 
•Great Game' r i v a l r y w i t h the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Ifew enemies 
emerged, and f e a r s formed about Chinese, and even Japanese 
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encroachment on the f r o n t i e r . * 1 2 By 1890 a t h i r d , more i n s i d i o u s t h r e a t 
t o Indian revenue surfaced i n the attempt by b i g business i n t e r e s t s i n 
London and In d i a t o persuade the Indian Government t o fund extensive road, 
bridge, and r a i l w a y b u i l d i n g p r o j e c t s t o encourage commercial development 
i n the sub-continent. Schemes t o develop the tea and timber i n d u s t r i e s , f o r 
example, required the s e t t i n g up of semi-permanent m l i t a r y posts t o 
monitor t r i b a l a c t i v i t y and pr o t e c t businesses f o r which the Indian 
Government would not only be f i n a n c i a l l y , but also p o l i t i c a l l y l i a b l e , i n 
the event of f r o n t i e r disturbances. *13 
The vague character of the 1858 Government of Indi a Act allowed the 
Indian Government t o r e t a i n much of the independence i t had enjoyed 
under the East India Company as well as many of i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s , which 
by 1904 had become s e r i o u s l y i n e f f i c i e n t . During h i s period as Viceroy, 
Curzon's passion f o r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n led him t o attempt a complete reform 
of the Indian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as well as an updating of r o u t i n e o f f i c e 
procedures, and between 1899 and 1905 he reorganised the system of 
r e p o r t i n g and t r i e d , less s u c c e s s f u l l y , t o improve the q u a l i t y of 
recruitment. *14 
Between 1904 and 1914 three Viceroys held o f f i c e . Lord Curzon;(1899-1905) 
Lord Minto; (1905-1910), and Lord Hardinge; (1910-1916), The very nature of 
the Viceroy's r o l e i n I n d i a created i t s own p e c u l i a r tensions. Some 
Provinces enjoyed v i r t u a l independence, while others came under d i r e c t 
Indian government c o n t r o l , and t h i s created s p e c i a l problems f o r the 
c e n t r a l Indian A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y as improvements i n global 
communications brought I n d i a closer t o London, There was also heated debate 
about the r o l e of the Viceroy w i t h i n the B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n i t s e l f ; some 
arguing t h a t he was the agent of the B r i t i s h Government i n India, while 
others suggested t h a t as 'Emperor' of India he was responsible only t o the 
King. *15 
The Viceroys r u l e d w i t h the a i d of a Council composed of f i v e members and 
since the M i l i t a r y and Legal Members of t h a t c o u n c i l were l i m i t e d only t o 
those f u n c t i o n s defined by t h e i r t i t l e , and the Public Works member 
was u s u a l l y preoccupied w i t h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the many new railway, 
road and i r r i g a t i o n p r o j e c t s , t h i s l e f t only two council members who were 
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a v a i l a b l e on a f u l l time basis t o cope w i t h the remaining extensive 
workload which, i n B r i t a i n , occupied h a l f the Cabinet. 
T r a d i t i o n a l p r a c t i c e had always been t o defer t o the man on the spot, and 
the e f f e c t of t h i s p o l i c y had been t o encourage Viceroys t o behave as 
Independent sovereigns I n I n d i a , o f t e n hosting elaborate courts i n order t o 
r e i n f o r c e t h e i r s tatus. The need f o r t h i s was understandable, and arguably 
also p r a c t i c a l i n view of the loss of confidence t h a t had been engendered, 
f i r s t l y by the Indian Mutiny of 1857, and secondly, by the burgeoning 
independence s t r u g g l e t h a t had begun t o develop a f t e r 1900 *16 Curzon's 
court was p a r t i c u l a r l y o s t e n t a t i o u s and generated much c r l t l s m i n B r i t a i n 
f o r i t s extravagence, Mlnto was more r e s t r a i n e d , but the tendency towards 
o s t e n t a t i o n was reintroduced by Hardlnge, and the lengthy and c o s t l y 
preparations f o r the Dehll Durbar i n 1911 again drew adverse comment. »17 
In the hot summer months the Viceregal a d m i n i s t r a t i o n moved t o Simla 
l e a v i n g only a skeleton s t a f f i n Calcutta. Perched some s i x and a h a l f 
thousand f e e t above sea l e v e l , and only f i f t y miles from the Hymalayan 
f o o t h i l l s , Simla took on the atmosphere of a holiday camp during the season 
as the f a m i l i e s of Indian Government employees enjoyed the h e t l c s o c i a l 
l i f e t h a t Curzon and h i s wif e Mary detested. During the Simla season they 
occupied a bungalow nearer the mountains which successive Viceroys also 
used as a r e t r e a t from the claustrophobic i n e r t i a of the Simla O f f i c e s and 
the emotional demands of the f r i v o l o u s s o c i a l scene.*18 
As w e l l as p r e s i d i n g over a c e n t r a l government i n Calcutta and Simla, the 
Viceroy was r e q u i r e d t o supervise the Independent P r o v i n c i a l governments 
of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and the s i x hundred P r i n c e l y States t h a t 
covered one t h i r d of the subcontinent.*19 Most Indian Princes were 
w i l l i n g t o accommodate a B r i t i s h Resident at t h e i r court i n r e t u r n f o r 
m i l i t a r y a i d i n times of p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s , and were encouraged t o v i s i t 
B r i t a i n as o f t e n as possible, despite the f a c t t h a t the r o y a l treatment 
these e x o t i c v i s i t o r s received i n B r i t a i n could be counter productive and 
o f t e n created problems f o r the Viceroy on t h e i r r e t u r n t o India.*20 
Links were also c u l t i v a t e d w i t h f r o n t i e r Chiefs and Rulers during the 
Viceregal Tours i n the s p r i n g and autumn of each year, and the close 
f r i e n d s h i p s formed during these t o u r s was o f t e n rewarded by l o y a l t y 
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t o the Government during periods of f r o n t i e r tension. 
The Viceroys had complete c o n t r o l over f r o n t i e r p o l i c y f o r p r a c t i c a l 
reasons. S i t u a t i o n s on the f r o n t i e r could develop very r a p i d l y and demanded 
an immediate response t o avert possible c r i s i s . Following Curzon's 
i n t i a t i v e i n Tibet however, the B r i t i s h Government attempted t o challenge 
Viceregal c o n t r o l of f r o n t i e r p o l i c y which i t was f e l t had now got out of 
hand. This exacerbated c o n f l i c t between the Viceroy and Secretary of State 
already created by the f a i l u r e of the 1858 Act t o e f f e c t i v e l y define t h e i r 
r espective r o l e s . P a r t i c u l a r problems arose i n s i t u a t i o n s where Indian 
s e c u r i t y seemed threatened by possible invasions from Russia or China, and 
i n the next s e c t i o n I am going t o examine i n more d e t a i l the nature of the 
c o n f l i c t s between respective Viceroys and t h e i r Secretaries of State, and 
the i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a t t h i s had f o r the formation of Tibetan p o l i c y . 
3. RELATIONS BETWEEH THE VICEROY AID THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
St.John Brodrick became Secretary of State i n October 1903 'with serious 
misgivings' about the post. He had previously worked at the War O f f i c e , 
a w e l l e stablished Department where h i s r o l e was cl e a r cut, and he 
found i t a sharp c o n t r a s t t o the r e c e n t l y created India O f f i c e . 
His misgivings might have been considered i n i t i a l l y misplaced however,since 
he was t o have as h i s Viceroy George Curzon, an o l d boyhood f r i e n d w i t h 
whom he shared a common s o c i a l , educational, and p o l i t i c a l bond. »21 There 
was no necessity f o r the very personal antagonism t h a t developed between 
them, yet the i l l - d e f i n e d nature of t h e i r r o l e s , combined w i t h Curzon's 
r u t h l e s s p o l i t i c a l ambition and h i s obsession w i t h Tibet, ended t h e i r 
f r i e n d s h i p and drove a wedge between t h e i r respective departments.*22 
From the s t a r t there was some d i s t r u s t on both sides, Curzon acknowledged 
t h a t he f e l t threatened by h i s Secretary of State whom he believed, q u i t e 
c o r r e c t l y , t o have easier access t o a much higher and broader range of 
exp e r t i s e than was a v a i l a b l e t o him i n India. David D i l k s has suggested 
t h a t Curzon was d e l i b e r a t e l y kept ignorant of Parliamentary and press 
o p i n i o n during h i s V i c e r o y a l t y , however t h i s may have been p a r t l y h i s own 
f a u l t , since the very arrogance t h a t made him so s e l f r e l i a n t , also 
prevented him seeking or accepting advice or inform a t i o n from others. 
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In a d d i t i o n , the burden of o f f i c e , together w i t h h i s obssesive i n t e r e s t i n 
the new science of o f f i c e management, kept him he a v i l y Immersed i n a sea 
of paperwork f o r much of h i s time i n India. *23 Brodrick meanwhile 
resented Curzon's a t t i t u d e towards him and f e l t t h a t he was regarded i n 
Ind i a as no more than a r a t h e r u n p r o f i t a b l e servant of the Indian 
Government. *24 
As Viceroy Curzon was w e l l equipped t o e x p l o i t any a v a i l a b l e opportunity 
t o take an independent l i n e , and the decision t o press ahead w i t h the 
Younghusband Expedition i n the face of high l e v e l opposition during 1903 
brought him i n t o d i r e c t c o n f l i c t w i t h Brodrick f o r , while as Viceroy he was 
q u i t e a t l i b e r t y t o Implement h i s own f r o n t i e r p o l i c y , he chose t o do so on 
t h i s occasion without any attempt t o respond t o advice from London. In 
adopting t h i s high-handed approach he overstepped the mark, breaking the 
t r a d i t i o n a l gentleman's agreement between previous Viceroys and the India 
O f f i c e , and r a i s i n g Issues t h a t would create problems f o r h i s successors. 
When Mlnto t r i e d t o continue Curzon's Tibetan p o l i c y a f t e r 1905 f o r 
example, he found himself Immediately f a c i n g f o r c e f u l opposition from h i s 
Secretary of State, John Morley.»25 
Much has been w r i t t e n about the b a t t l e between Morley and Mlnto 
between 1905 and 1910. That the c o n f l i c t was b i t t e r and oft e n p e t t y i s 
undeniable, and even a cursory study of the weekly correspondence between 
them confirms a fundamental clash of outlook. However,the more personal 
aspects have sometimes been exaggerated and the tensions between them 
had more t o do w i t h the nature of t h e i r respective r o l e s than w i t h any 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l background. Speedier communication, 
and i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t served only t o Inflame the debate over the 
conduct of f r o n t i e r p o l i c y t h a t had f i r s t surfaced during the 
Brodrlck/Curzon period. 
Morley had p r e v i o u s l y met Minto while on holiday i n Ottowa i n 1904 when the 
l a t t e r was Governor-General of Canada. This f i r s t meeting had been b r i e f 
but e q u i t a b l e , and had allowed each t o form an Impression which Influenced 
t h e i r view of the other when they f i n a l l y began t o work together a f t e r 
1905. Morley described Minto as a perfe c t example of 'a gentleman of the 
ol d r u l i n g class', although h i s own r a d i c a l background made t h i s r a t h e r a 
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dubious compliment; and Minto saw Morley as a ' l i t t l e Englander' because of 
h i s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Gladstonian Liberalism. »26 Minto i n i t i a l l y feared 
t h a t h i s new Secretary of State might t r y t o apply Gladstonian p r i n c i p l e s 
t o Indian a f f a i r s but these f e a r s were unfounded and Morley compromised h i s 
r a d i c a l i s m on many occasions, being f a r more concerned t o prevent the 
development of l i n k s between the new Labour Party, who had begun t o take a 
keen i n t e r e s t i n I n d i a , and the leaders of the developing Indian 
independence movement.#27 As a man renowned f o r h i s i n t e l l e c t u a l and 
p o l i t i c a l a b i l i t y , Morley at f i r s t appeared the more able of the two, yet 
he was already w e l l past h i s p o l i t i c a l prime when he came t o the India 
O f f i c e , and despite a more prosaic career as a s o l d i e r and bureaucrat, 
Minto had the greater experience of high o f f i c e , a f a c t o r t h a t evened, yet 
deepened the contest between them, *28 
The problem of who c o n t r o l l e d Indian f r o n t i e r p o l i c y was an issue t h a t 
q u i c k l y d i v i d e d them. By 1905 B r i t a i n was heavily, but r e l u c t a n t l y , 
involved i n Tibetan a f f a i r s and had a w e l l defined p o l i c y of non-
involvement. Soon a f t e r t a k i n g o f f i c e Morley began t o a c t i v e l y intervene i n 
f r o n t i e r p o l i c y on a r e g u l a r basis and t o openly s t a t e h i s long held b e l i e f 
t h a t I n d i a should be governed from the India O f f i c e , w i t h the Viceroy and 
h i s Council a c t i n g simply as agents f o r the B r i t i s h government i n 
London.*29 This unwarranted i n t e r f e r e n c e generated great anxiety w i t h i n 
I n d i a amongst P r o v i n c i a l Indian Governors, as w e l l as w i t h Minto and h i s 
Council, who a l l regarded such outside, and i l l - i n f o r m e d meddling, i n the 
complex and p o l i t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e a f f a i r s of India , as dangerous i n normal 
times, but as p o s i t i v e l y s u i c i d a l i n the period of heightened tension and 
t e r r o r i s m which they experienced as the independence movement gained 
s t r e n g t h . Many i n B r i t a i n a l so had sympathy w i t h t h i s view, and by 1910, 
the i n t e r f e r e n c e was so overt t h a t an a r t i c l e i n 'The Times' newspaper 
condemmed Minto f o r a l l o w i n g Morley t o ' f i l l the vacuum he created by h i s 
weakness' i n opposing him, and i n the July of t h a t year Edward Montagu,then 
Under Secretary of State f o r I n d i a , r e f e r r e d t o Minto i n the House of 
Commons as an 'agent of the I n d i a O f f i c e Policy'.*30 These accusations 
were perhaps a l i t t l e u n f a i r since Minto's response t o Morley's 
i n t e r f e r e n c e was not t o t a l l y negative, and i n f a c t he played a r a t h e r 
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s k i l f u l game, adopting a d e l i b e r a t e l y non-confrontational approach i n a 
successful attempt t o d e f l e c t c r i t i c a l s c r u t i n y which would allow him t o 
continue an independent l i n e . Between 1907 and 1910, both sides employed 
spies t o i n f o r m and r e p o r t upon the a c t i v i t i e s of the other, Minto engaging 
i n correspondence w i t h Morley's colleagues,and even securing the services 
of h i s own p r i v a t e secretary, Morley a q u i r i n g , what he l a t e r described as 
'backstairs i n f o r m a t i o n ' , from o f f i c e r s and c i v i l servants who v i s i t e d him 
at the Ind i a O f f i c e during leave from India. Described by Stephen Koss as 
a 'French f a r c e ' , these behind the scenes manoeuvres had a more serious 
side, i n d i c a t i n g the lengths t o which both sides were prepared t o go i n 
order t o promote t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r view i n the widening party p o l i t i c a l 
debate about the f u t u r e of the B r i t i s h Empire.»31 
Although t h e i r tenure was dominated by problems a r i s i n g from i n t e r n a l 
Indian a f f a i r s , the conduct and c o n t r o l of f r o n t i e r p o l i c y was an 
Important source of contention. Mlnto, as Curzon before him, regarded the 
maintenance of a s t a b l e f r o n t i e r as v i t a l t o the s a f e t y of India and 
l i k e Curzon, he f e l t t h a t the promotion of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h f r o n t i e r c h i e f s 
was an e x c e l l e n t way t o deter Invasion and i n f i l t r a t i o n . Morley 
was h i g h l y c r i t i c a l of what he condemmed as, t h i s ' t r a d i t i o n a l Viceregal 
approach t o the f r o n t i e r ' and l i k e many L i b e r a l s i n Government, he was 
prepared t o search out and destroy what he considered t o be any trace of 
t h i s Curzonlan approach i n Mlnto's p o l i c y . Minto's r e a c t i o n t o these 
I n t r u s i o n s was measured, and he continued t o f o l l o w s t r a t e g i e s t h a t enabled 
him t o keep a d i s c r e e t p o l i t i c a l presence i n s i d e Tibet, w h i l s t o f f i c a l l y 
supporting the non-involvement p o l i c y . To t h i s end he upheld f r o n t i e r 
i n l t a t l v e s whenever possible, and c o l l e c t e d data about Tibetan 
infringements of the Lhasa Convention which he stored f o r f u t u r e use.*32 
Correspondence between Morley and Minto i n February 1908 however, reveals 
t h a t Morley d i d have some sympathy w i t h the need t o provide e f f e c t i v e 
f r o n t i e r defence which he saw as important, but u l t i m a t e l y unaffordable 
without huge subsidies from B r i t a i n . *33 This f i n a n c i a l problem was well 
appreciated by a l l Viceroys, and Curzon and Minto i n p a r t i c u l a r made great 
e f f o r t s t o promote and develop trade and commerce across the f r o n t i e r 
wherever possible i n an e f f o r t t o r a i s e revenue f o r f r o n t i e r defence. 
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Eventually Morley was able t o win the b a t t l e f o r the c o n t r o l of Indian 
f r o n t i e r p o l i c y , not because Minto was weak or inep t , but because the 
economic, p o l i t i c a l , and i n t e l l e c t u a l climate of opinion between 1905 and 
1910 began t o go w i t h him. Although Curzon continued t o head a strong 
o p p o s i t i o n w i t h i n Parliament, by 1910, the focus of public and p o l i t i c a l 
a t t e n t i o n was concentrated on B r i t i s h domestic and European p o l i c y , 
e s p e c i a l l y as the naval r i v a l r y w i t h Germany gained s t r e n g t h i n the years 
before 1914. 
The p a r t n e r s h i p between Crewe and Hardlnge was always a f a r more c o n t r o l l e d 
and sedate a f f a i r . This was p r i m a r i l y because, although p o l i t i c a l l y i n 
oppo s i t i o n , Hardinge a Conservative, and Crewe a L i b e r a l , both men were 
experienced career diplomats who had known each other f o r more than f o r t y 
years.•34 Beneath the outward accord however, deep d i v i s i o n s developed over 
the conduct of f r o n t i e r p o l i c y t h a t were never openly addressed but 
which created considerable f r i c t i o n between them. Like Minto, Hardinge had 
nourished childhood dreams of becoming Viceroy and of f o l l o w i n g h i s 
grandfather's d i s t i n g l s h e d career i n India. *35 His appointment had 
aroused much controversy w i t h supporters of Lord Kitchener, the favoured 
candidate f o r the post, and Hardinge came t o Ind i a determined t o prove 
himself. *36 Upon a r r i v a l there i n November 1910 however, he was r a t h e r 
disappointed t o discover t h a t r e a l i t y d i d not match h i s dreams and, 
a f t e r a successful d i p l o m a t i c career culminating i n an Ambassadorship 
St. Petersburg, and a Permanent Undersecretaryship at the Foreign O f f i c e , 
he was dismayed t o f i n d himself q u i t e unable t o e s t a b l i s h a dialogue w i t h 
the t r i b a l c h i e f s and Indian princes w i t h whom he was required t o 
associate. Finding himself out of h i s depth, he appointed Henry McHahon to 
take on these n e g o t i a t i o n s , while he devoted h i s e a r l y years i n India t o 
the extensive preparations f o r the Delhi Durbar, and the c o n t r o v e r s i a l 
t r a n s f e r of the c a p i t a l from Calcutta t o Delhi which took place i n 1911.*37 
Crewe took over at the I n d i a O f f i c e i n the f i r s t week of Hovember 1910 
w i t h i n days of Hardinge's a r r i v a l i n India. He had previously held high 
o f f i c e as Viceroy of I r e l a n d , and had come t o the In d i a O f f i c e from the 
C o l o n i a l O f f i c e where he had held the post of Secretary of State f o r the 
Colonies and had reputedly run a 'calm and e f f i c i e n t ' organsiation. »38 
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This experience gave him a much f u l l e r understanding of the nature of the 
Viceroy's p o s i t i o n than any of h i s predecessors. I n a d d i t i o n t o h i s r o l e 
as Secretary of State f o r In d i a he continued t o act as L i b e r a l leader i n 
the House of Lords, but he was no longer a young man, and the extra s t r a i n 
i nvolved damaged h i s health. I n lovember 1911 he collapsed during a s o c i a l 
occasion w i t h what many believed t o be a stroke, and h i s place was taken by 
Morley during the s i x months i t took him t o recover. Morley's b r i e f r e t u r n 
t o p u b l i c l i f e was an excuse f o r Curzon t o r a i s e Indian a f f a i r s i n 
Parliament once again and at t h i s time there was much debate about the 
issues t h a t had been allowed t o lapse since Morley had l e f t the India 
O f f i c e i n 1910. •39 On Crewe's r e t u r n however the force of the attack 
subsided, and although the dispute over c o n t r o l of f r o n t i e r p o l i c y 
continued w i t h greater f o r c e , i t d i d so less p u b l i c l y as Crewe and 
Hardlnge found theneelves forced t o deal w i t h the grave f r o n t i e r c r i s i s 
generated by the collapse of the Manchu dynasty i n 1911. *40 
I n February 1910, some months before Hardlnge and Crewe had taken o f f i c e , 
the Chinese had invaded Tibet and occupied Lhasa. During July and August 
of t h a t year, Charles B e l l , the P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Slkkim, had reported 
inc r e a s i n g Chinese a c t i v i t y on the f r o n t i e r near the borders w i t h Assam and 
Burma. Although alarming, these r e p o r t s had simply been noted by the India 
O f f i c e who, under Morley's d i r e c t i o n , were s t i l l s t i c k i n g c l o s e l y t o the 
non-involvement p o l i c y . *41 Continuing r e p o r t s of Chinese I n f i l t r a t i o n 
i n the Assam Hymalayas, and growing unease about the s i t u a t i o n however 
eve n t u a l l y convinced Hardinge t h a t the Chinese were now a r e a l t h r e a t t o 
s e c u r i t y and i n June 1911 he introduced a new t r i b a l p o l i c y f o r the Assam 
area aimed a t the c o n t r o l of f r o n t i e r t r i b e s , which McMahon co-ordinated 
and which Crewe i n t i a l l y agreed t o sanction only as an informal and 
temporary arrangement.*42 By September 1911 the non-Involvement p o l i c y 
was o f f i c i a l l y abandoned, f o l l o w i n g news of an i n c i d e n t t h a t had taken 
place i n Assam during the previous March i n which a B r i t i s h O f f i c e r had 
been a l l e g e d l y attacked and murdered by Abor tribesman while conducting an 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the f r o n t i e r disturbances.•43 I n response t o f u r i o u s 
p u b l i c outcry i n London, Hardinge announced the launch of a se r i e s of 
p u n i t i v e expeditions i n t o the t r i b a l f r o n t i e r areas w i t h the aim of 
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b r i n g i n g the c u l p r i t s t o j u s t i c e and r e s t o r i n g B r i t i s h p restige. 
To r e i n f o r c e B r i t i s h c r e d i b i l i t y , he then set up a number of semi-permanent 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e posts along the Hymalayan f o o t h i l l s from which i t was 
possible t o moniter f u r t h e r disturbances, and t h i s led t o the c r e a t i o n of 
formal a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s t r i c t s , a p o l i c y which went ahead despite Crewe's 
continued o p p o s i t i o n , f o r c i n g a f u l l re-assessment of f r o n t i e r p o l i c y t o 
s e t t l e the matter. This complex and confused s i t u a t i o n , and i t s 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Tibetan f r o n t i e r p o l i c y w i l l be examined f u l l y i n a l a t e r 
chapter. ^44 
U n t i l now I have concentrated upon the o f f i c i a l p o l i c i e s pursued by the 
Ind i a O f f i c e i n Whitehall and the Indian Government i n India, but now, i n 
t h i s f i n a l s e c t i o n , I s h a l l describe the way i n which f r o n t i e r p o l i c y was 
implemented on the f r o n t i e r i t s e l f and i n p a r t i c u l a r , look at the work of 
the p o l i t i c a l department responsible f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of p o l i c y 
on the spot. 
4. THE POLITICAL DEPARTMEIT U IBPIA 
The men appointed t o administer the f r o n t i e r came from the prestigous 
P o l i t i c a l Department, and were known as 'The P o l i t i c a l s ' . The P o l i t i c a l s 
enjoyed a freedom and s t a t u s denied t o others, since they came under 
the d i r e c t j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Viceroy himself.^45 A post w i t h 'The 
P o l i t i c a l s ' o f f e r e d a f a s c i n a t i n g a l t e r n a t i v e t o a b o r i n g l y predictable 
career i n other Departments f o r the adventurous young man w i l l i n g t o take a 
gamble. The lucky few appointed served as P o l i t i c a l Agents i n the various 
Indian States; as A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O f f i c e r s on the l o r t h East, and Iforth Vest 
f r o n t i e r s ; and as Consular O f f i c i a l s on the Indian borders and i n Persia. 
Although the ITorth-Vest f r o n t i e r was considered more glamorous, i t was also 
f a r more dangerous, and a f t e r the Younghusband Expedition reached Lhasa 
i n 1904, the a t t r a c t i o n s of the remoter and more e x o t i c North-East f r o n t i e r 
and Tibet f i r e d the imagination. Posts on the f r o n t i e r o f f e r e d adventure 
without obvious danger, as w e l l as the excitement of the unknown since much 
of i t was s t i l l unexplored, and i t soon a t t r a c t e d the cream of the service, 
and young men from good f a m i l i e s , w i t h the r i g h t connections, competed 
eagerly f o r places.^46 
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There were f o u r possible routes i n t o the P o l i t i c a l s . The f i r s t was through 
the army. Two t h i r d s of a l l r e c r u i t s entered the service i n t h i s way and 
young army O f f i c e r s l i k e Frederick Bailey were drawn t o the f r o n t i e r as an 
a n t i d o t e t o the claustrophobic and anonymous army barrack l i f e . »47 
A second more obvious route was by way of the Indian C i v i l Service, and the 
m a j o r i t y not r e c r u i t e d from the army came t h i s way. The P o l i t i c a l s o f f e r e d 
men l i k e Charles B e l l an o p p o r t u n i t y t o escape both the 
climate of the Plains, which had ruined h i s h e a l t h by the time he was 
t h i r t y , and an o f f i c e p osting at Simla which could e a s i l y have destroyed 
h i s sanity.#48 A t h i r d route was v i a the Indian Medical Corps, where men 
of high c a l i b r e competed f o r postings which o f f e r e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
s u b s t a n t i a l career enhancement, e i t h e r by becoming surgeon t o a wealthy 
and g r a t e f u l Mahrajah or a l t e r n a t i v e l y , by opting f o r the excitement and 
Independence of a f r o n t i e r post, which might involve i n t e l l i g e n c e 
work f o r the Indian Government. Once on the f r o n t i e r these men enjoyed a 
p a r t i c u l a r p r e s t i g e earning along w i t h medical missionaries, the 
g r a t i t u d e of Tibetans who came t o value western medical care. During the 
Younghusband Expedition f o r example. Dr. Waddell and h i s medical team had 
t r e a t e d Tibetan prisoners who were so g r a t e f u l t h a t they had remained w i t h 
the p a r t y throughout the t r i p t o Lhasa, making i t much easier f o r doctors 
l a t e r appointed t o the trade marts at Gyantse and Yatung t o t r e a t the s i c k 
without hindrance.*49 I n 1908 a dispensary was also allowed t o remain 
i n the Chumbl Valley a f t e r the B r i t i s h g a r r i s o n withdrew i n order t o t r e a t 
the l o c a l population, an i n d i c a t i o n of the goodwill they had earned, and an 
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r medical workers t o monitor the s i t u a t i o n i n Chumbl a f t e r 
the B r i t i s h had l e f t . »50 F i n a l l y , engineers and surveyors from the 
Public Works and Engineers Department could sometimes t r a n s f e r t o the 
P o l i t i c a l s i n order t o b u i l d the t r a n s p o r t and cable systems badly needed 
by the B r i t i s h on the f r o n t i e r . Claude White came t o the service by t h i s 
r oute, by h i s own admission s a c r i f i c i n g a promising engineering career i n 
order t o take on the d i f f i c u l t task of becoming the P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n 
Sikkim between 1889 and 1908, »51 Members of the separate native Indian 
C i v i l Service and army worked alongside B r i t i s h personnel, sharing the work 
i n remote posts as c l e r k s and a s s i s t a n t s although, l i k e the Indian pundits 
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before them,their names were r a r e l y recorded i n o f f i c i a l correspondence.^52 
With few exceptions, B r i t i s h appointees t o the P o l i t i c a l s came from 
p u b l i c schools some of which, l i k e C l i f t o n and Winchester, s p e c i a l i s e d i n 
educating men f o r service i n India. The reasons f o r t h i s were at once 
p r a c t i c a l and emotional. Snobbery d i c t a t e d the p u b l i c school, but there 
were also p r a c t i c a l reasons, since the language c u r r i c u l u m at these 
schools ensured t h a t a candidate's a p t i t u d e f o r language l e a r n i n g had 
already been t e s t e d before he came out.^53 Many r e c r u i t s came from Indian 
army f a m i l i e s who had sent t h e i r sons i n t o the Indian army or the 
I.C.S t o escape a career i n trade, although i r o n i c a l l y , many who went 
on t o j o i n the P o l i t i c a l s l ooking f o r adventure, found t h a t the greater 
part of t h e i r work involved, o f f i c i a l l y at l e a s t , the promotion and 
supervi s i o n of f r o n t i e r trade. Most ' P o l i t i c a l s ' embraced the Rugby ethos 
of 'muscular C h r i s t i a n i t y ' and revered General Gordon as the archetypal 
C h r i s t i a n hero, f e e l i n g l i k e him t h a t they were going t o serve on the 
f r o n t i e r i n order t o b a t t l e f o r God, monarch, and country. They therefore 
developed a great an t i p a t h y towards Gladstonian L i b e r a l s l i k e Morley whom 
they f e l t had denigrated t h e i r hero and s a c r i f i c e d t h e i r values i n the 
name of non-Involvement ^54 I n a d d i t i o n t o a sense of purpose and 
belonging, the ' P o l i t i c a l s ' o f f e r e d young men the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
storybook adventure, f o r not only was i t possible t o experience the 
freedom of the the h i l l s but also, included i n the package, was the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of becoming an explorer and discoverer of untold treasures 
upon which l a s t i n g and l u c r a t i v e r e p u t a t i o n s might be b u i l t . •SS 
The f r o n t i e r also provided o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r personal p u r s u i t s and 
although f o r most t h i s i n v a r i a b l y meant some form of sport, many engaged 
i n more e s o t e r i c s c i e n t i f i c and c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . Younghusband f o r 
example found t h a t the f r o n t i e r provided the mystical experiences on which 
he was able t o base the remainder of h i s l i f e , while O'Connor c o l l e c t e d 
f o l k t a l e s , Waddell researched Tibetan Lamalsm, and Bailey began t o 
discover and c o l l e c t plants.•SS Social Darwinism encouraged the study of 
other c u l t u r e s , and l i n g u i s t i c s became a popular preoccupation as 
t r a v e l l e r s g r a d u a l l y made contact w i t h t r i b e s i n the Forth-East f r o n t i e r . 
Most t r a v e l books of the period contain a chapter about language, 
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e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the discovery t h a t contrary t o e a r l i e r rumours, most 
t r i b e s were f r i e n d l y and w i l l i n g t o trade w i t h Europeans. *57 
Under the terms of the Lhasa Convention, two new Trade marts had been 
es t a b l i s h e d at Gyantse and Yatung, and together w i t h Gartok i n West Tibet, 
they formed a complex of Posts from which P o l i t i c a l s attempted t o advance 
Indian i n t e r e s t s I n the country. The men appointed t o these t r a d i n g centres 
faced danger, hardship, and great f r u s t r a t i o n since having fought so hard 
t o gain these prestigous posts, they found themselves running t r a d i n g 
s t a t i o n s as v i a b l e economic concerns, and u s u a l l y i n competition w i t h 
Chinese, Hepalese, Tibetan and t r i b a l t r a d e r s , i n conditions where t h e i r 
inexperience made them seem clumsy and f o o l i s h . Some were able t o r i s e 
above t h i s t o form powerful f r i e n d s h i p s w i t h Tibetan leaders, as well as 
w i t h the r u l e r s of the neighbouring Hymalayan kingdons of Nepal, Bhutan, 
and Slkklm however t h e i r bad experience w i t h the Chinese, and the absence 
of support from t h e i r own government, l e f t many of them vulnerable t o 
physical and verbal attack.*58 A f t e r 1908 the great tragedy f o r t h i s 
group, most of whom had been supporters of Curzon and members of the 
Younghusband Expedition,was that,having been placed i n t h i s precarious 
p o s i t i o n , t h e y were then abandoned t o a dangerous and unpredictable f a t e , 
f o l l o w i n g the adoption of the L i b e r a l non-involvement p o l i c y i n 1905 and 
the b i t t e r h u m i l i a t i o n of the withdrawal from Chumbi i n February 1908. The 
r e v i v a l of a k i n d of forward p o l i c y during 1911, and the opening of the 
Simla Talks i n 1912,however, kept the P o l i t i c a l s involved w i t h f r o n t i e r 
matters throughout the d i f f i c u l t and dangerous period between the departure 
of the Yonghusband Expedition i n September 1904, and the outbreak of the 
F i r s t World War i n September 1914. 
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O H A F T E R F O U R 
THE FEOITIEE EXPEKIESCE 1906 - 1908 
Between the s i g n i n g of the Adhesion Treaty i n 1906, and the evacuation 
of Chumbl Valley I n 1908, a kin d of B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n survived i n 
Western Tibet. This Chapter describes the e f f o r t s of Curzonlans t o r e t a i n 
an i n f l u e n c e i n the country, despite Whitehall's p o l i c y of non-Involvement, 
and the extent t o which they were helped i n t h i s by Minto*s Indian 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I t i s p r i m a r i l y about the people who l i v e d and worked on 
the f r o n t i e r a t t h i s time, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , about the way i n which the 
P o l i t i c a l s coped w i t h the harsh conditions, as we l l as w i t h what they 
saw as increasing Chinese i n t e r f e r e n c e . 
The Chapter i s d i v i d e d i n t o three parts,the f i r s t looking at the way i n 
which formal attempts t o s e t t l e the f r o n t i e r by t r e a t y succeeded or 
f a i l e d i n t h e i r aim; the second examining the way i n which the 
P o l i t i c a l s coped w i t h h o s t i l i t y from the Chinese, the Tibetans, and 
from the Foreign O f f i c e i n London; and the t h i r d and f i n a l p a r t , l o o k i n g 
at the completely d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n f a c i n g the men of the China 
Service i n East Tibet who had t o cope f i r s t l y , w i t h Chao Erh Feng's 
campaign t h a t was t o culminate i n a f u l l scale Chinese invasion of Tibet i n 
1910, and secondly, w i t h the q u i t e seprate problem created by the presence 
of the e x i l e d Dalai Lama,who between 1906 and 1909, traversed the 
f r o n t i e r s of East Tibet and Western China i n an attempt t o gain a l l i e s 
f o r h i s country. 
I n t h i s chapter I w i l l e x p l a i n and describe the way i n which p o l i c y was 
implemented by governments i n India, London, and Peking, but I w i l l also 
look more c l o s e l y a t diplom a t i c p r a c t i c e on the spot, examining s p e c i f i c 
i n c i d e n t s i n d e t a i l i n order t o i l l u s t r a t e p a r t i c u l a r points. I n e v i t a b l y 
t h i s w i l l make the chapter d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y long, but hopefully i t 
w i l l s t i l l prove i n t e r e s t i n g and i l l u m i n a t i n g enough t o hold the readers 
a t t e n t i o n . 
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FORMAL ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE FRONTIER: 
<1) THE AIGLO-RUSSIAg COHVEITIOB. 
Grey became Foreign Secretary on 11th December 1905 convinced t h a t an 
agreement w i t h Russia over Central Asia would complement the Anglo-French 
Entente of 1904.^1 I t was decided t h a t Persia, Afghanistan,and Tibet, the 
the three areas of c o n f l i c t i n Central Asia between B r i t a i n and Russia, 
should each form the subject of a separate t r e a t y which could then be 
combined f o r r a t i f i c a t i o n . Since i t was f e l t by both sides t h a t Tibet might 
be the easiest issue t o s e t t l e f i r s t , t a l k s about the country began i n St. 
Petersburg on 7 t h June 1906, between the Russian M i n i s t e r Aleksander 
P e t r o v i t c h Izvolsky, and the B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r , S i r Arthur 5icolson.^2 
I n i t i a l optimism was q u i c k l y d i s p e l l e d by a c o o l i n g i n Anglo-Russian 
r e l a t i o n s during 1906, the r e s u l t of two minor diplomatic c r i s e s which 
meant t h a t the t a l k s f a i l e d t o make headway.^3 By the end of the year 
however, Hicolson began t o detect a change of heart on the Russian side, 
and on August 31st 1907, the separate Treaty about Tibet was signed. ^4 
Although i n the context of the agreement t a l k s on Tibet were r e l a t i v e l y 
uncomplicated, they d i d involve some b i t t e r disputes about a number of 
r e l a t e d minor issues which were part of the legacy of the 'Great Game' 
r i v a l r y of the previous century. ^5 The Russians were very perturbed about 
c o n t i n u i n g B r i t i s h occupation of Chumbi Valley, and Izvolsky openly 
' s c e p t i c a l ' of B r i t i s h promises t o adhere t o the Treaty conditions Imposed 
I n 1904, and 1906, which had promised a withdrawal of B r i t i s h garrisons 
f o l l o w i n g payment of the indemnity. When l i c o l s o n began t o suggest t h a t 
Chumbi was not a s u i t a b l e subject f o r discussions, Isvolsky therefore 
pressed f o r a r e d e f i n i t i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y , h i n t i n g 'obscurely' t h a t , i f 
B r i t i s h occupation of the Chumbi Valley continued, Russia might be 
' e n t i t l e d t o concessions'.•& Anglo-Russian wrangles over Chumbi are 
i n d i c a t i v e of the c o n t i n u i n g climate of suspicion t h a t surrounded t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p at t h i s p o i n t i n the t a l k s which were not helped by Russian 
awareness of the h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e being adopted by the Indian government, 
who had apposed the Idea t h a t t a l k s about Tibet should take place i n 
Russia.^7 
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B r i t i s h attempts t o introduce a clause i n t o the proposed Treaty banning 
s c i e n t i f i c missions t o Tibet created such f r i c t i o n t h a t at one stage 
i t jeopardized the very s u r v i v a l of the t a l k s . Morley had already secured 
Parliamentary sanction f o r the p r i n c i p l e of a ban on t r a v e l i n the 
i n t e r e s t s of f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y . However he f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t a s i m i l a r ban 
should be a p p l i e d t o Russian t r a v e l l e r s , and a l l the more so since there 
had already been some controversy over t h i s very issue w i t h the Lhasa 
a u t h o r i t i e s . * 8 I n J u l y 1906 the Russians had suggested t h a t the ban might 
apply f o r no longer than f i v e years, and Izvolsky had expressed concern 
about the e f f e c t of a l l o w i n g i t t o go ahead at a l l at t h a t time since he 
f e l t i t would i n e v i t a b l y antagonise powerful f a c t i o n s inside Russia which 
would place him p o l i t i c a l l y i n a very awkward po s i t i o n . * 9 
Although l i c o l s o n went t o great lengths t o reassure him that the reason 
f o r the ban was n e i t h e r t o thwart Russian s c i e n t i s t s , nor t o accuse 
the Russian Government of i n t r i g u e s w i t h Tibet, but was merely t o r u l e 
out any p o s s i b i l i t y of u p s e t t i n g the a u t h o r i t i e s i n Lhasa by r i s k i n g 
i n c i d e n t s on the f r o n t i e r s t i l l u n s e t t l e d a f t e r the Younghusband 
Expedition, Izvolsky remained unconvinced. He suggested as a compromise 
t h a t the clause banning t r a v e l might simply not be 'formally stated'. »10 
As a f e l l o w diplomat l i c o l s o n had some sympathy f o r Izvolsky's postion.He 
managed t o persuade Grey t o abandon attempts t o include the ban i n the 
f i n a l agreement on the grounds t h a t i t would be impossible t o get the 
Russian government t o include i t as a formal clause.*11 Eventually, as an 
a l t e r n a t i v e course, both p a r t i e s agreed t o approach China as Tibet's 
suzerain i n order t o ask her t o intervene and ban f o r e i g n t r a v e l i n s ide 
Tibet. When Jordan put t h i s t o the Wal Wu Pu on 22nd August 1907 however, 
the Chinese response was u n h e l p f u l . Claiming t o be much 'perplexed' by the 
request, they explained t o him t h a t i t was also q u i t e inappropriate, since 
i t was already w e l l known t h a t the Emperor d i d not allow any unauthorised 
t r a v e l w i t h i n the Empire.«12 I n the absence of Chinese support i t was 
mutually agreed between B r i t a i n and Russia t h a t a three year ban on t r a v e l 
be imposed and t h a t a f t e r t h a t , a review of the s i t u a t i o n should take 
place.»13 As Grey was l a t e r t o observe, attempts t o ban t r a v e l permanently 
would have run i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s as i t was q u i t e impossible t o determine 
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whether Russian s c i e n t i s t s were spying and, as Izvolsky had o f t e n 
pointed out, i f the Russians had r e a l l y wanted t o create f r i c t i o n on the 
f r o n t i e r there were f a r easier ways of doing so than by mounting expensive 
s c i e n t i f i c missions.^14 I n the end the problens experienced by the Indian 
government when they t r i e d t o prevent the famous Swedish explorer Sven 
Hedin from t r a v e l l i n g on the f r o n t i e r , convinced a l l sides t h a t u l t i m a t e l y , 
the ban was unenforceable.•IS 
A t h i r d p o i n t of c o n f l i c t over the routes t h a t Russian traders and 
t r a v e l l e r s might l e g i t i m a t e l y use threatened the success of the Anglo-
Russian t a l k s and convinced both sides of the need t o define Tibet and i t s 
borders. The problem of d e f i n i n g Tibet had f i r s t been raised by Izvolsky 
when t a l k s began i n June 1906. Previous B r i t i s h t r e a t i e s r e l a t i n g t o 
the country had contained no references t o l i m i t s or boundaries and, 
although a small p a r t of the Indo-Tlbetan border had been defined as a 
r e s u l t of e a r l i e r f r i c t i o n w i t h Sikkim,and there was a f a i r l y c l e a r idea 
about where the Indo-Tibetan border was i n t h a t part of the Hymalayas, the 
northern border of Tibet was an acknowledged wilderness, •le 
East Tibet was also a complete mystery and i t s s t a t u s was now f u r t h e r 
confused by Chinese claims t h a t the t e r r i t o r y was t o form part of a new 
Chinese Province t o be known as Sikang.^17 
Since i t was known i n London t h a t the Indian government were s t i l l 
u n w i l l i n g t o accept any d e f i n i t i o n of Tibet based on Chinese suzerainty, 
which Curzon had e a r l i e r described as a ' c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f i c t i o n ' , and t h a t 
i t would be impossible t o get them t o change t h e i r minds without c r e a t i n g 
f u r t h e r tensions which might i n h i b i t the success of the agreement, the 
Foreign O f f i c e f e l t very r e l u c t a n t t o press f o r a d e f i n i t i o n from China. 
I t was also believed t h a t , i n view of t h e i r recent a t t i t u d e such a request 
might encourage the Chinese t o make even more extravagant claims f o r 
sovereignty i n the region.•IS When Izvolsky r a i s e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
d e f i n i t i o n of Tibet t h e r e f o r e , there was very l i t t l e B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n 
t r y i n g t o s e t t l e the matter w i t h reference t o China, and the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
asking the Tibetans themselves d i d not seem t o occur t o anybody as an 
option.•IQ 
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Having f a i l e d t o get a d e f i n i t i o n i n the summer of 1906, Izvolsky allowed 
some months t o elapse before r a i s i n g the subject again i n January 1907. 
On t h i s occasion however he acknowledged t h a t , although he f e l t t h a t a 
d e f i n i t i o n was needed, he also accepted t h a t i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o 
produce one, since the Chinese had no c l e a r or 'positive'ideas on the 
subject.*20 I n February 1907, i n an e f f o r t t o solve the problem, Nlcolson 
included i n a note t o the Russians a d e f i n i t i o n of Tibet based upon 
i n f o r m a t i o n supplied by the Indian government which included Upper Tsaidam 
and T a h j l , both areas, which at the time, were being d i r e c t l y administered 
by the Chinese. This d e f i n i t i o n was o v e r t l y contentious and, as 
Izvolsky commented, was a 'considerable e x t e n t i o n ' of the l i m i t s 
p r e v i o u s l y understood t o have been part of Tibet. He therefore requested 
time t o study the maps. *21 Uncertain of how t o proceed i n the l i g h t of 
Indian proposals, both governments agreed once again t o consult with China. 
The Chinese response was no more h e l p f u l than before, and Jordan was 
informed i n no unce r t a i n terms by Liang Tun-yen of the Wal Wu Pu, tha t 
China found 'no necessity t o define Tibet since there had been no change 
made t o her limits'.»22 Faced by t h i s obvious stalemate, neither Jordan 
nor Kolikov, the Russian M i n i s t e r i n Peking, f e l t able t o r a i s e the matter 
f o r a t h i r d time, and i n the end the Treaty was concluded without the issue 
being s e t t l e d . Like the Younghusband Expedition, the attempts t o define 
Tibet had the e f f e c t of incr e a s i n g Chinese i n t e r e s t i n the area, since the 
very f a c t t h a t the issue had been rais e d at a l l forced them t o assess t h e i r 
own d e f i n i t i o n , and i n the process see the p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r greater 
t e r r i t o r i a l gain. Attempts t o define Tibet t h e r e f o r e created a new problem 
f o r Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s , while at the same time f a i l i n g t o solve the 
p o s i t i o n f o r B r i t a i n and Russia. *23 
There i s no mention of Mongolia i n the f i n a l t r e a t y , yet f o r a while 
discussions about Mongolia threatened t o widen the scope of t a l k s . Iflcolson 
was w e l l aware t h a t f o r Russia, Mongolia and Tibet were l i n k e d issues 
and t h a t Russian i n t e r e s t i n the Dalai Lama was p a r t l y a by-product of 
t h e i r Mongolian policy.»24 At f i r s t they had wanted him t o r e t u r n as soon 
passible t o Lhasa i n order t o help them r e t a i n t h e i r e x i s t i n g influence 
over t h e i r Mongolian subjects. However, by November 1906, they had changed 
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t h e i r minds and appeared happy f o r him t o remain at Kumbum Monastery where 
they f e l t b e t t e r able t o enjoy the f r i n g e b e n e f i t s of h i s close contact 
w i t h the Mongolian Princes.^25 On 9th July 1906 Russia made a f i r s t 
attempt t o l i n k Mongolian and Tibetan a f f a i r s t o the Anglo-Russian t a l k s 
when M. Poklevsky, the Russian M i n i s t e r i n London, c a l l e d on Hardinge at 
the Foreign O f f i c e . A f t e r p r e l i m i n a r y p l e a s a n t r i e s he asked Hardlnge what 
he thought about Russian p o l i c y i n Mongolia. Hardinge's r e p l y was guarded, 
and a f t e r f i r s t s t a t i n g t h a t , i n h i s opinion, the m i l i t a r y party i n Russia 
were promoting a forward p o l i c y i n Mongolia, a charge th a t Poklevsky 
q u i c k l y denied, he went on t o put forward h i s b e l i e f t h a t Japanese agents 
i n s i d e Mongolia were encouraging the Chinese t o ' t i g h t e n t h e i r c o n t r o l ' as 
a means of fending o f f Russian a c t i v i t y i n the area, a suggestion th a t 
Poklevsky allowed t o stand without comment. ^ 26 I n January 1907 Izvolsky r e -
introduced the subject of Mongolia during the course of f u r t h e r discussions 
i n St. Petersburg, asking i f B r i t a i n might be w i l l i n g t o discuss the matter 
a f t e r agreements on Tibet had been s e t t l e d . On t h i s occasion, and i n t h i s 
context, l i c o l s o n f e l t q u i t e unable t o r e p l y arguing t h a t since t h i s was a 
'new idea' r a i s e d unexpectedly, he would need time t o consult with Grey. 
Izv o l s k y immediately withdrew the question, e x p l a i n i n g t h a t i t was 'merely 
a suggestion' and need not be ra i s e d o f f i c a l l y . ^ 2 7 I n a subsequent 
i n t e r v i e w w i t h Blcolson on the f o l l o w i n g day however, he again requested 
t h a t Mongolia be made a matter f o r formal discussions.•28 
For Mlnto, a r e c o g n i t i o n of Russian i n t e r e s t s i n Mongolia was not a great 
p r i c e t o pay f o r a mutual r e c o g n i t i o n of B r i t i s h r i g h t s i n Tibet. Grey 
was less e n t h u s i a s t i c about the idea, b e l i e v i n g t h a t any attempts t o widen 
the t a l k s by i n c l u d i n g Mongolia was not only unwise, but possibly even 
dangerous, since i t might f u r t h e r antagonise the Chinese and make i t 
more d i f f i c u l t t o e x t r i c a t e B r i t a i n from Tibetan a f f a i r s . The most th a t he 
was w i l l i n g t o o f f e r Russia t h e r e f o r e were vague 'diplomatic assurances' 
t h a t B r i t a i n would approach the Chinese respecting Russian t e r r i t o r y on the 
Mongolian border, and would also t r y t o persuade t h e i r Japanese a l l i e s t o 
do the same.^29 Meanwhile, at the India O f f i c e , Morley put a f u r t h e r 
convincing argument against l i n k i n g Mongolian and Tibetan a f f a i r s by 
suggesting t h a t any concessions made t o Russia i n Mongolia might not 
80 -
necessarily guarantee a r e c i p r o c a l arrangement f o r B r i t a i n i n Tibet, since 
by s i g n i n g the Adhesion Treaty w i t h China i n 1906, B r i t a i n had f o r f e i t e d 
a l l r i g h t s t o move f r e e l y n o r t h of the Hymalayas.•SO 
On the afternoon of 18th January 1907 events took an i n t e r e s t i n g t u r n 
when l i c o l s o n received a v i s i t from I c h i r o Montono, the Japanese M i n i s t e r 
i n St. Petersburg,who expressed concern about the slow progress of t a l k s 
t a k i n g place w i t h between Japan and Russia at the time. He spoke about 
unwelcome Russian i n t e r e s t i n Japanese a c t i v i t i e s i n Mongolia and 
explained t o Ifi c o l s o n t h a t , although he 'understood' Izvolsky's 
' apprehensiveness' about the matter, i n f a c t h i s fears were misplaced and 
t h a t there was r e a l l y nothing f o r Russia t o worry about. In t r a n s m i t t i n g 
t h i s message he also managed t o i n s u l t Izvolsky by suggesting t h a t he was 
over r e a c t i n g t o the s i t u a t i o n by adopting an 'unprofessional' approach 
t h a t c l e a r l y showed t h a t he d i d not have ' s u f f i c e n t strength of character' 
t o r i s e above the f a l s e rumours being fed t o him, and t h a t he was therefore 
c r e a t i n g an a r t i f l c a l c r i s i s which the world's press had e x p l o i t e d t o the 
detriment of the Japanese.•SI l i c o l s o n defended Izvolsky,arguing t h a t i n 
h i s view h i s colleague's a t t i t u d e was understandable,and the matter was 
d i s c r e e t l y dropped. The Japanese were c l e a r l y unhappy about the s i t u a t i o n 
and i n March 1907. Baron Komura, Japan's Ambassador i n London, c a l l e d on 
Hardlnge i n order t o deny rumours t h a t Mongolia was t o feature i n the 
Russo-Japanese t a l k s ^32 
The Mongolian issue was e v e n t u a l l y resolved between B r i t a i n and Russia 
when Hardinge informed Poklevsky t h a t B r i t a i n would be 'unable t o r e s t r i c t ' 
or ' i n t e r f e r e ' w i t h what were e s s e n t i a l l y p r i v a t e Chinese concerns i n the 
country, As B r i t a i n ' s a l l y i n Asia however Japanese Involvement 
i n Mongolia, and B r i t a i n ' s i n a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l or discover the f u l l extent 
of her i n t e r e s t , proved a con t i n u i n g source of embarrassment, as w e l l as 
another loose end t h a t would create complications f o r f u t u r e Anglo-Japanese 
r e l a t i o n s and i n t u r n have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Tibetan Policy, *33 
A f u r t h e r issue t h a t hovered on the edge of the t a l k s but which u l t i m a t e l y 
remained unsolved, was the problem of trade on the f r o n t i e r . On 12th 
February 1907 Nicolson had presented Izvolsky w i t h a d r a f t Convention, 
together w i t h agreed changes t o p o i n t s which the Russians had raised 
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about trade. He was concerned t h a t some agreement be reached on 
the issue since there was already a we l l - e s t a b l i s h e d and l u c r a t i v e trade 
between Russia and Tibet, and although only one large Russian caravan 
crossed i n t o Tibetan t e r r i t o r y annually, many smaller t r a d e r s operated 
i n the Tibetan border area whose sa f e t y needed t o be guaranteed. 
Micolson Immediately took the view t h a t the problem was 'of no immediate 
moment' since the Chinese were supposedly r e g u l a t i n g trade on Russian 
goods i n the area. Izvolsky was not convinced t h a t Russian i n t e r e s t s 
were safe however and drew h i s colleague's a t t e n t i o n t o a recent a r t i c l e 
i n a B r i t i s h j o u r n a l i n which reference had been made t o 'towns' and a 
'rail w a y l i n e ' being opened up i n Tibet, t h i s time by the B r i t i s h 
themselves. I f i c o l s o n saw the obvious reference t o the new trade marts which 
he was able t o j u s t i f y , but dismissed the ra i l w a y as 'rumour', but Grey 
then forbade any f u r t h e r discussion about trade, w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t there 
was no attempt t o define i t f u r t h e r i n the f i n a l Treaty.»34 B r i t i s h 
r e f u s a l t o discuss the or g a n i s a t i o n of trade, which at the time was an 
I n t e g r a l part of the economic and s o c i a l l i f e of the f r o n t i e r , as well as 
an important source of revenue f o r Tibet and her neighbours i n c l u d i n g 
Russia and In d i a , was t o have important p o l i t i c a l consequences, generating 
p e t t y f u t u r e c o n f l i c t s t h a t might otherwise have been avoided. 
The problem posed by the presence of Russian Buddhists and t h e i r need t o 
r e t a i n physical and s p i r i t u a l l i n k s w i t h the Dalai Lama was p r i m a r i l y a 
r e l i g i o u s issue t h a t f o r a time became p o l i t i c a l . Russia claimed special 
i n t e r e s t s t a t u s i n Tibet because of the ' s p i r i t u a l needs' of her Buddhist 
su b j e c t s and tended t o l i n k t h i s i n importance w i t h the ' p o l i t i c a l 
claims' t h a t B r i t a i n was making there. Since 1904 however, the Dalai Lama 
had l i v e d , not always harmoniously, i n Mongolia, as the guest of various 
princes and lamas, and by November 1906 the Russians had f e l t i t i n t h e i r 
best I n t e r e s t s t o keep him there. Once i t was r e a l i s e d t h a t the he had 
no immediate plans t o r e t u r n t o Tibet, and c e r t a i n l y not before the 
Anglo-Russian t r e a t y had been signed, i t was easier t o come t o some 
arrangement t h a t might include p r o v i s i o n f o r Russian Buddhists t o v i s i t 
Lhasa. The f i r s t d r a f t of the t r e a t y t h e r e f o r e contained a reference t o the 
' s p i r i t u a l concerns' of Russia f o r Tibet, together w i t h the granting of 
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e x t r a p r i v i l e g e s f o r Russian Buddhists which included the r i g h t t o 
t r a v e l on the f r o n t i e r on ' r e l i g i o u s business'. ^35 Although both sides 
e v e n t u a l l y accepted the proposal, which seemed at l a s t t o have put an end 
t o the daBiaglng c o n f l i c t t h a t had previously surrounded the movement of 
of Russian p i l g r i m s on the f r o n t i e r , i t s acceptance d i d not altogether 
remove B r i t i s h suspicions, as re a c t i o n s t o any news of the presence of the 
Russian B u r l a t D o r j l e v on the f r o n t i e r were t o prove.•Se 
I n a d d i t i o n t o these p e r i p h e r a l problems there was great controversey 
w i t h i n B r i t i s h c i r c l e s about the wisdom of i n c l u d i n g Tibet i n any 
agreement w i t h Russia. I n Peking f o r example, Jordan f e l t t h a t any 
Anglo-Russian Agreement would u l t i m a t e l y prove i n j u r i o u s t o B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s i n Tibet, since i t would a u t o m a t i c a l l y strengthen Chinese power 
i n the country.^37 Meanwhile i n India, Minto was equally distressed 
about the venue f o r the t a l k s , regarding In d i a and not Russia as the more 
ap p r o r i a t e l o c a t i o n f o r discussions about Tibet which he saw as an Indian 
f r o n t i e r problem; and despite the f a c t t h a t Morley d i d not agree, he 
continued t o t r y t o impede the progress of the t a l k s on every possible 
pretext.•SS The strong support f o r some agreement w i t h Russia on Tibet 
came from London. At the Ind i a O f f i c e , Morley saw i n the t a l k s an id e a l 
excuse t o remove the l a s t vestiges of Curzonian forward p o l i c y and d i d h i s 
utmost t o encourage and promote them wherever possible; and at the Foreign 
O f f i c e , Grey considered an Anglo-Russian Agreement i n Tibet t o be a way of 
p r e v e n t i n g . f u r t h e r Russian advances i n the d i r e c t i o n of the Indian 
f r o n t i e r , ^ 3 9 , Although the Anglo-Russian Convention succeeded t o a great 
extent i n achieving what i t had set out t o do, namely t o s e t t l e Anglo-
Russian r i v a l r y i n Central Asia, the course of the discussions had also 
drawn a t t e n t i o n t o a whole range of other issues t h a t were not solved by 
the t r e a t y and,as A l a s t a i r Lamb has argued,it gave Russia a r i g h t t o 
in v o l v e h e r s e l f i n any c o n f l i c t on the f r o n t i e r between B r i t a i n and Tibet 
which would e f f e c t i v e l y block any f u r t h e r B r i t i s h progress there,^40 
I t a l s o had the powerful a d d i t i o n a l e f f e c t of increasing Chinese power i n 
Tibet as w e l l as encouraging Japanese forward p o l i c y elsewhere i n Asia. The 
Convention, e v e n t u a l l y signed i n St, Petersburg on 31st August 1907,dealt a 
severe blow t o the ambitions of the Curzonian f a c t i o n . However, i t d i d not 
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succeed I n t o t a l l y d e stroying t h e i r plans t o develop the f r o n t i e r , at least 
u n t i l the Chinese invasion of Lhasa i n February 1910, and Indian o f f i c e r s 
continued t o implement p o l i c y as though the Chinese Adhesion Treaty of 
1906, and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,had never been signed. 
(11) TRADE REGULATIONS 1908 
On 27th A p r i l 1906 Frederick O'Connor,on leave from the frontier,addressed 
a long,impassioned, and uncommissioned re p o r t on trade issues i n Tibet from 
h i s h o t e l i n London t o h i s employers.»41 I n t h i s u n s o l i c i t e d report he 
begged them t o remember the v i t a l part played by trade i n t h e i r o r i g i n a l 
plans f o r T i b e t , and urged them t o consider various recommendations t o 
improve the e x i s l t i n g s i t u a t i o n . His reconunendations included plans t o open 
a new trade mart i n South-East Tibet, and the b u i l d i n g of a road l i n k i n g 
Chumbi Va l l e y t o Indi a . His ideas were not innovatory but had formed p a r t 
of a wider campaign f o r development i n Tibet which O'Connor and f e l l o w 
Curzonlans had f e l t were I m p l i c i t i n the terms of the Lhasa Convention.*42 
I n the event the r e p o r t was simply 'noted', since by t h i s time trade was no 
longer regarded by the Foreign O f f i c e as an important issue and o f f l c a l 
p o l i c y was d i r e c t e d towards e x t r i c a t i n g B r i t a i n from Tibetan a f f a i r s . 
For Trade Agents on the spot, and the businessmen who desired the 
development of t r a d i n g l i n k s f o r commercial and economic purposes however, 
trade remained a v i t a l issue, and the need t o t i d y the loose ends l e f t by 
the Trade Regulations of 1893, was f o r them a top p r i o r i t y . These 
Regulations had aimed t o e s t a b l i s h trade marts i n Tibet, and o r i g i n a l l y 
Phari had been selected as a s u i t a b l e base from which a network of t r a d i n g 
s t a t i o n s could be opened up across the country. Tibetans already had a tax 
o f f i c e a t Pharl and i t s p o s i t i o n j u s t i n s i de Tibet, at the head of Chumbi 
Valley, made i t seem an i d e a l s i t e f o r a B r i t i s h Mart.»43 However, the 
s t r e n g t h of the opp o s i t i o n coming from both the Phari Jongpen, and the 
Chinese who also s t a t i o n e d t r a d i n g agents i n the town, had forced the 
Indian government t o reconsider, and ev e n t u a l l y Yatung had been agreed as a 
s u i t a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s i t e , although i t s u n s u i t a b i l i t y was already 
acknowledged, and was speedily confirmed by the B r i t i s h trade agent's f i r s t 
r e p o r t soon a f t e r i t opened i n May 1894.*44 
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Having agreed t o the establishment of a mart, and having yielded over 
connected issues l i k e the p a r i t y of s t a t u s between B r i t i s h , Indian, and 
Tibetan t r a d e r s using i t , i t was expected t h a t the Chinese might also prove 
f l e x i b l e about the tea and wool trade t o be conducted there. This was not 
t o be, and i n an e f f o r t t o calm tensions, James Hart of the Chinese Customs 
Service, who represented China i n the 1893 trade r e g u l a t i o n t a l k s , was 
successful i n securing approval f o r a clause i n the t r e a t y a l l o w i n g f o r a 
review of the s i t u a t i o n a f t e r f i v e years; a suggestion which defused the 
the s i t u a t i o n at the time but had the e f f e c t of blocking f u r t h e r important 
discussions about the o r g a n i s a t i o n of trade u n t i l 1899. *45 The Trade 
Regulations had taken three years t o negotiate and were eventually signed 
on 5 t h December 1893. I t was hoped t h a t they would herald a new era f o r 
Indo-Tibetan trade as w e l l as f o r Anglo-Chinese co-operation on the 
f r o n t i e r , but t h i s was t o prove a vain hope as soon a f t e r signing, the 
s i t u a t i o n r a p i d l y d e t e r i o r a t e d , and n e i t h e r White, as P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n 
Sikkim, nor the Chinese, were able t o c o n t r o l the tensions as Tibetans 
ignored and f l o u t e d the Treaty, c r e a t i n g a s i t u a t i o n t h a t was t o lead t o 
the despatch of the Younghusband Expedition i n 1903.«46 
By l a t e 1904, and throughout 1905, c i t y syndicates and Indian traders 
pressed f o r a r e v i v a l of the trade t a l k s . Their i n t e r e s t had been f u r t h e r 
s t i m u l a t e d by the discovery of gold and other precious metals on the 
f r o n t i e r , c o n f i r m e d i n Trade Reports on Szechuan and East Tibet compiled by 
Alexander Hosie a f t e r 1904.»47 Since the 1880's i n d i v i d u a l s had been sent 
out by p r i v a t e companies i n B r i t a i n and India t o excavate and explore 
possible trade routes across Tibet i n order t o b r i n g Chinese and Tibetan 
wealth t o I n d i a , and during the Younghusband Expedition, Waddell had 
compiled a very comprehensive r e p o r t i n which he had c i t e d the precise 
l o c a t i o n of a number of gold mines i n Tibet i t s e l f , together w i t h the 
t a n t a l i z i n g i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t they were underworked.*48 O'Connor's report 
from London had also confirmed t h i s , going on t o s t r e s s the importance of 
opening trade marts across Tibet i n order t o tap the hidden resources of 
the region f o r the b e n e f i t of India.*49 
A l l these r e p o r t s , together w i t h e n t h u s i a t i c proposals f o r the development 
of the tea and wool trade i n s i d e Tibet, were suppressed by the Foreign 
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O f f i c e who were u n w i l l i n g t o accept the degree of Involvement such 
development would necessitate. The Indian government however, mindful 
of the revenue i m p l i c a t i o n s i f such trade were encouraged, continued t o 
d i s p l a y considerable i n t e r e s t i n the proposals, and throughout the t a l k s 
c a l l e d t o renegotiate a new trade t r e a t y between 1904 and 1906, they 
continued t o advance the cause of trade development at every a v a i l a b l e 
opportunity.*50 
As w e l l as a keen i n t e r e s t i n gold there was a growing preoccupation w i t h 
tea, and i n p a r t i c u l a r w i t h the idea of challenging the Chinese monopoly 
i n b r i c k tea which Tibetans drank i n great q u a n t i t i e s . For many years 
Indian Tea co3iipanies l i k e the Cess Tea Company Limited, had been 
experimenting w i t h methods of b r i c k tea production, and i n 1906 had sent 
t h e i r Commisioner, Mr Hutchinson, t o Szechuan i n order t o study the process 
at f i r s t hand.»51 Campbell at Chumbi, and Bailey at Gyantse, had both been 
a c t i v e l y involved i n the promotion of Indian tea and were not averse 
t o using devious and s o p h i s t i c a t e d means t o persuade the Tibetans t o accept 
i t , o f t e n d i s g u i s i n g i t as b r i c k tea t o make i t more palatable. *52 
The development of the tea trade was also becoming v i t a l l y Important t o a 
number of very powerful vested i n t e r e s t s i n B r i t a i n and, by the summer of 
1906, the Indian government f e l t themselves pressured enough t o draw up a 
l i s t of p r o v i s i o n a l p o i n t s t h a t might be considered i n a formal review of 
the 1893 Trade Regulations. 
As a r e s u l t of t h i s p o s i t i v e a c t i o n , t a l k s were reconvened and delegates 
assembled i n Simla on 24th August 1907 t o begin the review. Much t o B r i t i s h 
c o nsternation however, Chang Yin-tang, a man already d i s l i k e d f o r h i s 
h o s t i l i t y t o B r i t i s h trade agents at the marts, was appointed as Chinese 
re p r e s e n t a t i v e t o the reconvened t a l k s on the grounds t h a t he was already 
w e l l known t o the B r i t i s h . The Indian Foreign Secretary, Louis Dane, and 
E r i c Wilton, of the China Consular Service, represented B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , 
and O'Connor was r e c a l l e d from Gyantse e s p e c i a l l y t o advise the Tibetan 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e Tsarong Shape. *53 From the outset, i t was obvious t h a t 
discussions were not going t o be r e s r i c t e d t o trade, and attempts were 
q u i c k l y made by Chang t o use them as a means of t y i n g up the loose ends 
from the previous t r e a t i e s w i t h B r i t a i n i n 1904 and 1906. China was 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious t o e s t a b l i s h a p o l i t i c a l c l a i m t o Tibet t h a t would be 
recognised by B r i t a i n , and was matched i n t h i s desire by the strength 
of Grey's need t o disentangle B r i t a i n from her e x i s t i n g Tibetan t i e s . 
I n t h i s sense trade i t s e l f became a p o l i t i c a l issue and f o r India also 
an economic one, since she saw a need t o develop f r o n t i e r trade as a means 
of r a i s i n g revenue f o r her f l a g g i n g economy q u i t e separate from any forward 
p o l i c y planned f o r Tibet by the Curzonian f a c t i o n . Minto used the 
review as a weapon i n h i s campaign t o r e t a i n a B r i t i s h presence i n Chumbi, 
and Grey used i t as a way of e x t r a c t i n g promises of co-operation from the 
Chinese over the s t i l l u n s e t t l e d and contentious issue of the Indemnity 
payments. *54 Morley adopted a s i m i l a r approach t o the one he had taken 
over the Anglo-Russian t a l k s , and was determined t h a t these negotiations 
would mark an end t o Curzonian i n f l u e n c e on the f r o n t i e r r e f l e c t e d i n 
O'Connor's r e p o r t of 1906. He also f e l t t h a t , i n the Indian Foreign 
Secretary, Louis Dane, he had found the man best able t o help him achieve 
t h i s aim. *55 
The question of the s t a t u s of the Tibetan delegate was one of the f i r s t 
problems t o develop i n t o a major p o i n t of c o n f l i c t . The Chinese had been 
extremely r e l u c t a n t t o accept Tsarong as a f u l l y accredited delegate, 
and although both Dane and Wilton were f o r c e f u l i n defending h i s st a t u s , i n 
the end, and as always i n t h e i r dealings w i t h the Chinese at t h i s time, 
B r i t a i n conceded ground and agreed a 'comproid.se' e n t i r e l y s u i t e d t o 
Chinese plans t o upgrade t h e i r claims on Tibet. Tsarong therefore became 
Tibet's ' f u l l y authorised r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o act under the d i r e c t i o n of 
Chang' and, as Parshotam Mehra has argued, was l i t t l e more than 'Chang's 
puppet' f o r the d u r a t i o n of the t a l k s . *56 
The trade t a l k s were q u i c k l y t i e d t o the issue of the Indemnity payments, 
which China wanted t o make on Tibet's behalf, and the date t o be set f o r 
the evacuation of Chumbi. Minto d e l i b e r a t e l y used t h i s issue as a way of 
p r o t e c t i n g what he saw as Indian gains made by the Lhasa Convention, 
and t o t h i s end he t o l d Morley i n December 1906, t h a t he wanted the second 
instalment paid by the Tibetan delegate at Gyantse, i n s t r i c t accordance 
w i t h the t e r n s set by the Lhasa Convention.»57 Although not keen t o press 
the p o i n t , Horley d i d so on t h i s occasion, w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t Minto got 
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hi e wish, and subsequently used t h i s v i c t o r y t o persuade Grey t o issue 
formal complaints t o Peking about the behaviour of Chinese o f f i c i a l s i n 
Tibet and i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h a t of Chang Yin-tang, the Chinese delegate t o 
the trade t a l k s who had r e c e n t l y been appointed Chinese High Commissioner 
f o r Tibet. *58 Chinese responses t o these formal complaints were 
p r e d i c t a b l y non-committal, p o s s i b l y because they were unable t o c o n t r o l 
Chang's a c t i v i t i e s themselves. I t was t h e r e f o r e more than a year before 
Jordan could r e p o r t any p o s i t i v e proposals from the Chinese side, and i t 
was not u n t i l December 1907 t h a t they announced t h a t they were ready t o go 
ahead w i t h the f i n a l indemnity payment on Tibet's behalf,and were anxious 
f o r the preparations f o r a B r i t i s h withdrawal from Chumbi to go ahead as 
soon as t h i s f i n a l payment had been made. *59 Minto once again seized the 
o p p o r t u n i t y a f f o r d e d by these discussions t o r a i s e f u r t h e r strong 
o b j e c t i o n s t o Chang's behaviour, warning London t h a t the s i t u a t i o n on the 
f r o n t i e r was d e t e r i o r a t i n g t o a point where c o n d i t i o n s would soon be as 
d i f f i c u l t as those experienced immediately p r i o r t o the despatch of the 
Younghusband Expedition i n 1903.*60 Further e s c a l a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t was 
only prevented by the payment of the f i n a l instalment of the indemnity by 
Chang at Gyantse on 21st January, over three weeks l a t e r than agreed, and 
then only a f t e r an a b o r t i v e l a s t minute attempt t o pay i t i n person i n 
Calcutta.*61 On t h i s occasion the Chinese had given i n t o B r i t i s h 
d i p l o m a t i c pressure and had f a i l e d t o support Chang, an obvious i n d i c a t i o n 
t o a government less obssessed w i t h the need t o withdraw from Tibet t h a t 
they might have taken f a r more from the t a l k s than they d i d , and a f u r t h e r 
source of exasperation t o the Indian government, who f e l t cheated out of 
concessions they might have gained from the t a l k s t h a t might have enabled 
them t o ensure the s a f e t y of t h e i r f r o n t i e r o f f i c e r s and the developing 
commercial i n t e r e s t s i n the region. In February 1908, when Indian troops 
f i n a l l y withdrew from Chumbi t h e r e f o r e , i t seemed t o many i n India t h a t 
they took w i t h them a l a s t o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e t a i n and extend the gains made 
under the Lhasa Convention which had been seen as a triumph f o r Curzonlan 
forward p o l i c y l e a v i n g a legacy of b i t t e r n e s s t h a t would create problems 
f o r t h e i r f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s w i t h London. «62 
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A f t e r the evacuation, the t a l k s became involved w i t h wider p o l i t i c a l 
issues, and i t was over s i x months before they were f i n a l l y concluded,on 
20th August 1908. The Indian government were p a r t i c u l a r l y annoyed by the 
way i n which the t a l k s had been conducted,as we l l as w i t h the terms which, 
l i k e the Anglo-Eussian Convention of 1907, had seemed t o them t o 
give even greater power t o China at India's expense.*63 In t h e i r 
view the t a l k s were a d i s a s t e r , r e s u l t i n g i n the dismantling of t h e i r 
f u t u r e plans f o r the development of Indo-Tibetan trade, as well as f a i l i n g 
t o r e gulate e x i s t i n g trade. A f t e r they were signed t h e i r fears were 
confirmed as trade r e l a t i o n s d e t e r i o r a t e d yet f u r t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 
1908, when Henderson was replaced as Chinese Custom's O f f i c e r f o r the 
f r o n t i e r by Mr. Chueng, one of Chang's supporters, who immediately began t o 
harass and obstruct Indian traders.*64 Despite t h e i r protests, India d i d 
derive some b e n e f i t s from the 1908 Trade Regulations, since they enabled 
many of the i r r i t a t i n g minor d a i l y c o n f l i c t s , t h a t arose as a r e s u l t of 
misunderstandings between o f f i c i a l s at the trade marts, t o be sorted out by 
recourse t o the t r e a t y . The l i m i t s of Gyantse mart were defined, and the 
telegraph t o I n d i a was completed, a l l o w i n g speedier communication w i t h 
I n d i a and ensuring t h a t troops could be q u i c k l y summoned t o defend B r i t i s h 
personnel i n the event of a sudden c r i s i s . However, i n terms of the gains 
they had expected t o make, these b e n e f i t s seemed meagre indeed, leaving the 
P o l i t i c a l s s t i l l powerless t o e i t h e r administer e x i s t i n g trade, or develop 
commercial i n i t i a t i v e s . With Chinese i n t e r f e r e n c e increasing r a p i d l y and 
d r a m a t i c a l l y soon a f t e r the r e g u l a t i o n s were signed, and w i t h B r i t i s h 
p r e s t i g e at such a low ebb, the personal s a f t e y of t h e i r s t a f f now became 
an issue of very r e a l concern t o the Indian government. »65 
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2. LIFE 01 THE FRONTIER: WEST TIBET 
(1) WHITE AID THE AFFAIR OF THE BQUIDARY PILLARS 
While others t r i e d t o solve what they saw as problems created by the Lhasa 
Convention, the P o l i t i c a l s who l i v e d and worked at the trade marts inside 
T i b e t , s t r u g g l e d w i t h the d a l l y business of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the face of 
inc r e a s i n g psychological and p o l i t i c a l pressure, and i n the growing 
awareness t h a t t h e i r government could give them l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l help i n 
the absence of support from London. The p o l i t i c a l tensions t h a t had 
generated c o n f l i c t before the Convention was signed s t i l l remained 
unsolved, and i n an attempt t o s e t t l e the west Tibetan f r o n t i e r , Claude 
White, P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim, wrote t o Curzon at the end of 1904 
about the c o n t i n u i n g f r i c t i o n created by the absence of boundary p i l l a r s 
along the f r o n t i e r , suggesting t h a t p i l l a r s might now be erected along the 
boundary above Giangong i n accordance w i t h the Lhasa Convention and the 
e a r l i e r Sikkim Agreement of 1890.*66 
Curzon responded w i t h a request f o r more information, expressing 
p a r t i c u l a r concern about e f f e c t s on grazing r i g h t s and the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of o p p o s i t i o n from the a u t h o r i t i e s i n Lhasa. A f t e r o f f i c a l e n quiries made 
d i r e c t l y t o Lhasa by O'Connor had ascertained t h a t there was no obj e c t i o n 
e i t h e r from the Lhasa a u t h o r i t i e s , or from men of the Lachin Valley where 
the p i l l a r s were t o be erected, White f e l t f u r t h e r emboldened t o suggest t o 
In d i a t h a t they I n v i t e the Tibetans t o send representatives t o meet him at 
the e r e c t i o n s i t e . At t h i s stage, w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of embarrassing 
i n c i d e n t s thus avoided, the s i t u a t i o n looked q u i t e hopeful and a speedy 
settlement of t h i s troublesome border area seemed assured. A l l was not as 
i t seemed however, and on 28th August 1905 O'Connor received a v i s i t from 
the Gyantse Jongpen who came w i t h a message from Lhasa which sta t e d t h a t , 
due t o the lateness of the request, i t would now be impossible t o supply 
delegates before the r a i n s and t h a t any meeting would t h e r e f o r e have t o be 
postponed u n t i l the f o l l o w i n g spring.*67 I n view of O'Connor's news, and 
since there was no urgent need t o erect the p i l l a r s before winter, White 
was content t o accept the Tibetan decision, and the matter was thus 
deferred u n t i l March 1906, when i t was once again r a i s e d by Minto, t h i s 
time i n response t o the need t o remind the Tibetans of t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s 
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under the Lhasa Convention and the Trade Regulations of 1893, which 
r e q u i r e d a c l e a r demarcation of the border.*68 Minto's support f o r the 
e r e c t i o n of the boundary p i l l a r s was t o lead him i n t o a d i r e c t 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h Morley during the course of 1906, and was i n i t s e l f a 
f o r e t a s t e of the c o n f l i c t t h a t was t o develop between the India O f f i c e and 
the Indian government over f r o n t i e r p o l i c y between 1906 and 1908. In June 
1906 Morley r e p l i e d c a u s t i c a l l y t o Minto's requests f o r boundary p i l l a r s by 
asking him t o supply evidence t h a t p r a c t i c a l problems had been created by 
t h e i r absence and requesting d e t a i l s of White's communications w i t h Lhasa 
on the subject, Minto r e p l i e d i n s i m i l a r vein observing t h a t , i f the India 
O f f i c e d i d not t h i n k i t important t h a t Tibetans observe A r t i c l e One of the 
Lhasa Convention r e q u i r i n g the e r e c t i o n of p i l l a r s , t h e n so be i t . * 6 9 This 
brought a s t r o n g l y worded response from Morley, containing a c l e a r p o l i c y 
statement t h a t would f i n a l l y end discussion, and s e t t i n g the tone of f u t u r e 
correspondence about the f r o n t i e r which i n time was t o seal the f a t e of 
those working there between 1906 and the evacuation of Chumbi i n February 
1908. Morley's p o l i c y statement supported the ' j u d i c i o u s a c t i o n ' of the 
previous government and f u r t h e r added t h a t , 'since no p r a c t i c a l 
inconvenience has been caused by the absence of p i l l a r s ' , he was therefore 
of the opinion t h a t , p r o v i d i n g the Tibetans observed A r t i c l e One of the 
Lhasa Convention by not i n f r i n g i n g i t , i t was 'neither necessary nor 
expedient t o r a i s e the question of e r e c t i n g p i l l a r s ' . The statement ended 
w i t h a warning t o Minto t h a t he should now be aware t h a t o f f i c a l p o l i c y 
towards Tibet was t o 'avoid a l l necessary causes of controversy w i t h the 
Lhasa Government'and,after r e c e i v i n g t h i s message, Minto never again 
exposed himself i n t h i s way t o open c a s t i g a t i o n but continued t o support 
Curzonian i n t i a t i v e s less o b s t r u s i v e l y . »70 
During the f o l l o w i n g October White was forced t o r e l i n q u i s h h i s post as 
P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim, by now a sad and embittered man. A f t e r 1904 he 
had been w e l l aware t h a t he could never again count on the support of h i s 
government i n disputes w i t h Lhasa, and a f t e r 1906, he remained persona non 
grata i n o f f i c a l c i r c l e s a f t e r h i s part i n the ' p l o t ' t o b r i n g the Panchen 
Lama t o I n d i a was revealed. Although not always a t a c t f u l man, White had 
served h i s government w e l l i n a d i f f i c u l t and challenging post and had 
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s a c r i f i c e d a promising engineering career t o work w i t h the ' P o l i t i c a l s ' . 
His experience was t o t y p i f y the treatment meted out t o many of those 
involved w i t h the Younghusband Expedition who, handpicked by Curzon f o r 
t h e i r s p e c i a l t a l e n t s , were subsequently s a c r i f i c e d t o the t w i s t s and turns 
of the new government p o l i c y . * 7 1 
(11) CHAUG YII-TAgG AHD CHIIESE FORWARD POLICY 
I n 1906 the Chinese sent a Cantonese c a l l e d Chang Yin-tang t o the f r o n t i e r 
o s t e n s i b l y t o head a 'Trade Mission' but i n r e a l i t y t o Implement t h e i r 
new forward p o l i c y and i n the process t o issue a d i r e c t challenge t o the 
p r e s t i g e of the Indian government and t h e i r men on the spot.»72 
Chang had pr e v i o u s l y acted as Tang Shao Yl's locum tenens during the 
Adhesion t a l k s and was already known t o be a tough negotiator. His 
appointment, announced i n a telegram t o Minto from the B r i t i s h Charge 
d ' A f f a i r e s I n Peking on 15th June 1906, was greeted i n India w i t h some 
apprehension, and the telegrams passing between Minto and Morley t h a t 
r e f e r r i n g t o h i s appointment, r e f l e c t s i m i l a r concern at the India 
Office.#73 The o r i g i n a l telegram t o India announcing Chang's a r r i v a l had 
contained news t h a t he would be embarking on a journey t o Tibet i n order t o 
'arrange the opening of trade marts there' and i t asked them t o provide 
t r a n s p o r t and f a c i l i t i e s f o r h i s party, and also t o arrange an i n t e r v i e w 
between Chang and the Indian Foreign Secretary, Louis Dane. This simple 
request created great problems f o r the Indian government. F i r s t l y , i f they 
allowed Chang's pa r t y t o use the q u i c k i e s t and easiest Shipki route t h a t 
entered Tibet from Simla, they might be s e t t i n g a dangerous precedent f o r 
the f u t u r e , a view s t r o n g l y supported by Morley at the India Office.*74 
Secondly, the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r any discussion about trade w i t h Chang would 
i n e v i t a b l y endanger Anglo-Tibetan r e l a t i o n s at the marts, since the Chinese 
would almost c e r t a i n l y wish t o exclude the Tibetans from any t a l k s . With 
t h i s i n mind t h e r e f o r e , Morley supported Minto's proposal t o supply Chang 
w i t h both t r a n s p o r t and permission t o use the Shipki route, but under the 
s t r i c t understanding t h a t t h i s was t o be a 'special occaision' and only i f 
Mr. Calvart, Assistant Commisioner at Kulu, might be allowed u n r e s t r i c t e d 
t r a v e l on the on the f r o n t i e r as a concession f o r t h i s favour. +75 
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Morley f e l t t h a t Chang might be allowed t o open trade discussions w i t h 
I n d i a , but only on the c l e a r understanding t h a t the Indian government 
would enter i n t o no commitments w i t h China without c o n s u l t i n g London.»76 
The panic created by the announcement of Chang's appointment i s I n i t s e l f 
i n d i c a t i v e of the high degree of u n c e r t a i n t y and tension on the f r o n t i e r 
at t h i s time, despite the recent s i g n i n g of the Adhesion Treaty 
w i t h China, and also because of i t f o r , under t h i s Treaty,Anglo-Chinese 
f r o n t i e r r e l a t i o n s now had t o be redefined and reassessed. 
The i n t e r v i e w between Chang and Dane took place as arranged i n Simla on 
25th June 1906. #77 Chang began by informing Dane t h a t he had been promoted 
High Commisioner f o r T i b e t , w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o v i s i t Gartok i n West Tibet 
before going on t o Lhasa i n order t o examine 'trade conditions' there. The 
i n t e r v i e w then continued w i t h a discussion about the r e l a t i v e merits of 
journ e y i n g t o Gartok. Dane explained t h a t , not only was the Gartok road 
'unsuitable' f o r a High Chinese O f f i c a l , being merely a path across the 
f r o n t i e r normally used by Indian t r a d e r s , but t h a t i t would also be 
'undesirable' t o e s t a b l i s h a precedent f o r i t s o f f i c a l use by Chinese 
d i g n a t o r i e s . He explained t h a t , although Gartok enjoyed a good t r a d i n g 
r e p u t a t i o n , i t s t r a d i n g f i g u r e s were based on takings from the Annual Fair 
which, being the f i n a l f a i r of the season, always d i d well and was not 
th e r e f o r e a r e l i a b l e y e a r l y i n d i c a t o r of t r a d i n g l e v e l s i n the region. He 
al s o t o l d Chang t h a t Gartok's importance as a s o c i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
centre depended on the f a c t t h a t i t was a base f o r the Tibetan Garpons, 
t r a d i t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of Tibetan a u t h o r i t y i n West Tibet, who were 
now not nearly as important as they had once been. *78 When Dane 
then continued t o e x p l a i n t h a t the Gartok region was also important 
t o the Indian government f o r purely r e l i g i o u s reasons, since i t 
held Lake Manasowar, sacred t o Indian Hindus, Chang appeared q u i t e w i l l i n g 
t o drop the idea of going there a l t o g e t h e r although, as Dane noted 'from 
one or two remarks' he subsequently made, he was anxious not t o appear 
t o have f a i l e d i n h i s s t a t e d i n t e n t i o n t o open a mart i n the area. 
Having now apparently abandoned the idea of going t o Gartok, Chang began 
t o press Dane on the wider subject of f r o n t i e r trade, the o f f i c a l reason 
f o r h i s appointment. He asked Dane about the a d v i s a b i l i t y of i n s t a l l i n g 
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a Chinese resi d e n t at Gartok, a move which the l a t t e r was quick t o r e j e c t , 
e x p l a i n i n g the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n the c o l l e c t i o n of dues as the 
town was spread over several routes, and l o c a l Tibetans were already 
organised t o c o l l e c t what could be c o l l e c t e d . Chang pe r s i s t e d w i t h t h i s 
request however, seeking Dane's help w i t h the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of trade i n 
the area, and repeating t h i s 'several times', i n s i s t i n g t h a t a high degree 
of co-operation was now possible since the Adhesion Treaty between B r i t a i n 
and China had been signed and n e g o t i a t i o n s were complete. *79 
What was the t r u e purpose of Chang's v i s i t ? His mission had much t o do 
w i t h trade, since the development and c o n t r o l of trade on the f r o n t i e r 
meant r e a l p o l i t i c a l power i n an area whose c u l t u r e was, t o a large extent, 
based upon i t . However, he was also very anxious t o e s t a b l i s h h i s own 
c r e d e n t i a l s w i t h the Indian government i n order t o t e s t t h e i r a t t i t u d e s 
i n the wake of the Adhesion t r e a t y , and Dane p a r t i c u l a r l y noticed t h a t he 
seemed 'anxious t o avoid the p o s s i b i l i t y of any f a i l u r e t o carry out the 
o b l i g a t i o n of opening the mart', yet was w i l l i n g t o drop the idea 
a l t o g e t h e r when pressed. The i n t e n t i o n t o go on t o Lhasa was barely 
mentioned and was not r a i s e d as an item f o r discussion by e i t h e r side, yet 
i t seemed t h a t plans t o go there were well thought out, and Chang a c t u a l l y 
mentioned t h a t he was prepared t o wait i n Simla f o r companions i f the 
Gartok plan f e l l through. I t i s possible of course t h a t the Chinese 
had allowed him a great deal of f l e x i b i l i t y i n h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h 
Dane. His announced i n t e n t i o n t o go t o Gartok f o r example, was almost 
c e r t a i n l y a red h e r r i n g designed t o d i v e r t i n t e r e s t from h i s i n t e n t i o n 
t o t r a v e l on t o Lhasa, the t r u e purpose of h i s v i s i t . * 8 0 During the 
course of the i n t e r v i e w , Chang behaved w i t h almost abject h u m i l i t y , an 
a t t i t u d e p o s s i b l y calucated t o convince Dane t h a t he was not a t h r e a t t o 
Indian i n t e r e s t s , yet h i s subsequent behaviour on the f r o n t i e r q u i c k l y 
d i s p e l l e d t h i s e a r l i e r impression, and he showed himself capable of being 
rude and overbearing w i t h anyone he considered an i n f e r i o r , yet t o t a l l y 
charming w i t h those he wanted t o impress. C l e a r l y he knew ex a c t l y what he 
was doing and had received extensive b r i e f i n g f o r h i s r o l e . Jordan f e l t 
i n i t i a l l y t h a t he was merely a t o o l of Tang Shao Y i , whom he believed t o 
be the r e a l d r i v i n g f o r c e behind the new Chinese forward p o l i c y i n Tibet. 
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However, he came t o f e e l as the p o l i c y developed, t h a t Chang was o f t e n 
a c t i n g alone, and sometimes appeared t o be q u i t e out of c o n t r o l »81 
Chang's a r r i v a l on the f r o n t i e r created p a r t i c u l a r problems f o r the 
P o l i t i c a l s at the trade marts, and i n the next s e c t i o n I w i l l examine these 
problems i n more d e t a i l . 
< l i l ) CHAIG'S OFFEISIVE IH CHUMBI 
In J u l y 1906 Walter Campbell, Assistant P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r at Chumbi, was 
'summoned' t o Simla t o meet Chang Yin-tang as China's newly appointed 
High Commissioner f o r Tibet. Campbell was a very experienced o f f i c e r 
seconded from the China Consular Service, and been h i g h l y recommended by 
Ernest Satow as someone w i t h a superior knowledge of the Chinese language 
and d i p l o m a t i c p r a c t i c e which i t was f e l t would make him p a r t i c u l a r l y 
s u i t a b l e f o r the r o l e he was t o play i n Chumbi. Despite h i s previous 
experience however, Campbell was t o f i n d himself t o t a l l y i l l equipped t o 
face the problems created by Chang's a r r i v a l since, as he l a t e r explained, 
the man t o whom he had been introduced i n India was completely u n l i k e the 
opponent he was t o face i n Chumbi. *82 The r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t developed 
between the two men, which I s h a l l now examine i n some d e t a i l , provides a 
valuable i n s i g h t i n t o the way i n which diplomacy was conducted on the spot. 
Although both men acted i n what they believed t o be the best i n t e r e s t s of 
t h e i r respective governments, t h e i r behaviour endangered the f r a g i l e 
s t a b i l i t y of the f r o n t i e r , and each found himself out of h i s depth i n the 
absence of support and s u p e r v i s i o n from h i s government. Campbell had 
already discussed the arrangements f o r Chang's a r r i v a l at Chumbi 'some 
weeks' before w i t h Mr.Sung, the l o c a l Pon Pon at Pipitpang.*83 
From the beginning, perceptions about the importance of the v i s i t d i f f e r e d . 
Campbell's r e f u s a l t o accept Mr.Sung's suggestion t h a t he 'chieh' or 
welcome Chang, by r i d i n g out t o greet him on the road i n accordance w i t h 
t r a d i t i o n a l Chinese custom, was at odds w i t h the B r i t i s h p r a c t i c e of paying 
an o f f i c i a l courtesy c a l l soon a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l and t h i s misunderstanding 
was t o a f f e c t t h e i r f i r s t encounter,quickly souring r e l a t i o n s between them. 
Campbell believed, q u i t e c o r r e c t l y , t h a t Chang's s t a t u s as High 
Commissioner f o r Tibet issued a d i r e c t challenge t o B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t y on 
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the f r o n t i e r . A l l h i s subsequent actions and utterances were therefore 
based on t h i s premise, and he was supported i n t h i s view by Charles B e l l , 
h i s s uperior o f f i c e r , as w e l l as by Minto. Whitehall was less supportive 
of t h i s a t t i t u d e however, and l a t e r accused him of adopting an i n f l e x i b l e 
and pedantic approach t h a t played r i g h t i n t o Chang's hands, causing B r i t i s h 
p r e s t i g e i n the area t o suffer.*84 
When Campbell had f i r s t spoken t o Sung n e i t h e r had any idea where Chang 
would be sta y i n g , and Campbell t h e r e f o r e o f f e r e d a dak bungalow which Sung 
i n s t a n t l y rejected.»85 When i t soon became apparent t h a t the Yamen at 
Plpitpang was being completely r e f u r b i s h e d f o r Chang's b e n e f i t , the 
inappropriatness of Campbell's o f f e r became obvious although,whether Sung 
himself had i n l t a l l y expected t o have t o go t o such lengths i n order t o 
prepare f o r the v i s i t i s uncertain. What i s c e r t a i n however i s t h a t when 
Campbell rode over from h i s headquarters i n Chumbi t o 'inspect' the Yamen, 
h i s o f f e r t o provide a p a i r of red candles t o match the red t a b l e c l o t h , 
as h i s sole c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the decor, was taken by the Pon Pon as a 
d e l i b e r a t e I n s u l t . E t i q u e t t e was f u r t h e r confused during the course of a 
subsequent conversation w i t h Sung over tea i n what was t o become Chang's 
bedroom, when the Pon Pon l e t s l i p t h a t he too would not be r i d i n g 
out t o 'chieh' Chang since he was very busy w i t h the f i n a l preparations f o r 
h i s stay. Obviously the importance of the 'chieh', so heavily stressed 
before was, l i k e other aspects of Chinese diplomacy, very f l e x i b l e . * 8 6 
As there was s t i l l no d e f i n i t e i n f o r m a t i o n as t o the exact date and time of 
Chang's a r r i v a l , Campbell rode out t o Yatung t o take tea w i t h Annie Taylor, 
a B r i t i s h missionary who l i v e d there.»87 During h i s v i s i t Campbell was 
i n v i t e d by the l o c a l Chinese Tsungli or general t o j o i n a dinner party 
i n Yatung t h a t evening, an o f f e r which he g r a t e f u l l y accepted. U n t i l t h i s 
time Campbell's r e l a t i o n s w i t h l o c a l Chinese o f f i c a l s had been relaxed and 
f a i r l y I nformal, and any suggestion t h a t they might have been involved i n a 
d e l i b e r a t e attempt t o embarrass him seems u n l i k e l y . From the moment of 
Chang's a r r i v a l however, Campbell's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Chinese began 
t o go wrong. During dinner t h a t evening a messenger a r r i v e d t o say 
t h a t Chang had already passed through Yatung and was now en route f o r 
P i p i t a n g and the Tsungli announced h i s immediate i n t e n t i o n of r i d i n g out 
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t o welcome him i n the h i l l s above the town. This i n f o r m a t i o n subsequently 
proved t o be i n c o r r e c t and Campbell heard the f o l l o w i n g day t h a t Chang had 
not yet a r r i v e d at Yatung but t h a t when he d i d , he was planning t o stay 
there f o r an u n s p e c i f i e d period of time. This unexpected change of schedule 
gave Campbell considerable cause f o r concern f i r s t l y , because he was 
unsure of Chang's motives f o r v i s i t i n g the town and secondly, and more 
im p o r t a n t l y , because he feared t h a t the High Commissioner might be 
i n t e n d i n g t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h the running of the trade mart and h i s own 
a u t h o r i t y there. I n view of the previously u n r e l i a b l e Information supplied 
about Chang's movements, he wisely decided t o await h i s a r r i v a l i n Pipitang 
i n order t o avoid the p o s s i b i l i t y of g i v i n g any o f f i c a l sanction t o a v i s i t 
t o Yatung.»88 Since Campbell had received no word from B e l l and was 
t h e r e f o r e a c t i n g e n t i r e l y on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e t h i s was a very t e s t i n g 
time f o r him. 
On Monday 24th September he rode over t o P i p i t a n g , having f i n a l l y 
received word t h a t Chang would s h o r t l y be a r r i v i n g there. In order t o 
ensure t h a t he had timed h i s v i s i t p r e c i s e l y t o allow Chang time t o unpack 
and prepare himself, he sent a peon ahead t o give warning of h i s a r r i v a l . 
At 2.30pm the peon reported the sound of c e l e b r a t o r y f i r e c r a c k e r s and, 
a f t e r what he judged t o be an a p p r o r i a t e i n t e r v a l , h e rode up t o the Yamen, 
once again sending the peon ahead w i t h h i s c a l l i n g card as a precaution. 
There was no s i g n of any o f f i c a l r eception f o r him on a r r i v a l and Campbell, 
i n f u l l dress uniform f o r the occasion, was now unsure of how t o proceed. 
Matters then grew worse when a servant e v e n t u a l l y appeared and he was 
i n v i t e d t o enter the Yamen by a side door instead of by the middle door,in 
accordance w i t h the accepted Chinese custom when r e c e i v i n g Important 
o f f i c a l guests. At t h i s p o i n t Campbell chose t o be i n s u l t e d and was 
subsequently accused by the Foreign O f f i c e of over-reacting t o the 
s i t u a t i o n . * 8 9 However, he was anxious t o behave c o r r e c t l y i n a very 
d e l i c a t e s i t u a t i o n , a n d i n the absence of guidance from h i s superiors, and 
he had t o t h i n k q u i c k l y as Chang was c l e a r l y f l o u t i n g established custom. 
Had he agreed t o enter by the side door i n f u l l dress uniform, not only 
would he have looked r i d i c u l o u s , but he would also have demonstrated t o 
both Chinese and Tibetans t h a t he was prepared t o bend t o Chang, at t h i s 
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stage a very dangerous precedent t o set. While he waited outside the Yamen, 
nursing h i s anger and un c e r t a i n of what t o do next, a message came from 
Chang t o say t h a t he was not at home and at t h a t p o i n t Campbell decided t o 
withdraw as f a r as he was able w i t h d i g n i t y , and maintaining 'a s t i f f 
demeanour' appropriate t o the occasion. He then returned t o Chumbi 
v i l l a g e i n order t o compose himself and await f u r t h e r developments 
which were not slow t o present thenselves. At Chumbi v i l l a g e the Tibetan 
headman admitted t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o B r i t i s h orders, he had supplied Chang's 
men w i t h grass f o r t h e i r ponies. He explained t h a t he had done t h i s because 
Chang was 'a powerful o f f i c a l ' and because he was not prepared t o disobey 
orders from the Chinese unless the B r i t i s h were w i l l i n g t o protect him 
from t h e i r wrath. Campbell was forced t o concede t h a t he was unable 
t o do t h i s as he had only f i v e men a v a i l a b l e f o r p o l i c e duty, a l l of whom 
were occupied elsewhere. The Tibetan view of the s t a t e of play i s very 
r e v e a l i n g since i t c l e a r l y shows how l i t t l e c o n t r o l the B r i t i s h r e a l l y 
had i n Chumbi, and a f t e r t h i s conversation the s i t u a t i o n r a p i d l y 
d e t e r i o r a t e d f o r Campbell. 
On the f o l l o w i n g morning he rode i n t o the nearby town of Phema i n order t o 
supervise the i n s t a l l a t i o n of a guard f o r the stores there. He then 
rode on t o Yatung where he discovered t h a t two Tibetan houses, used as 
stores by the B r i t i s h , had been 'broken i n t o ' and used t o house the 
Chinese servants i n Chang's party. As Campbell had q u i t e improperly 
regarded these houses as B r i t i s h property, he lodged a 'sort of formal 
p r o t e s t ' w i t h Henderson of the Chinese Custone Service who was then 
on s p e c i a l attachment t o the Chang Mission.*90 Although B r i t i s h , 
Henderson was f i r s t and foremost an employee of the Chinese government, 
and t o Campbell's dismay, he responded by informing him tha t the houses 
were i n f a c t the property of the Chinese Customs Service and, since 
Campbell had no desire t o challenge him or engage i n debate over the issue, 
the conversation then turned t o other matters.He l a t e r claimed however th a t 
Henderson had even 'apologised' f o r what he described as Chang's e a r l i e r 
'mistake' at P i p i t a n g i n o f f e r i n g the side door,and he also sensed 
t h a t Henderson seemed 'weary' of the Chinese, and was p a r t i c u l a r l y upset by 
the High Commissioner's 'impossible ideas'. As a B r i t i s h subject working 
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f o r the Chinese, Henderson was i n the unenviable p o s i t i o n of being a 
servant w i t h two masters. On the one hand he had t o exp l a i n t o Campbell 
t h a t Chang had been i n v i t e d by the Lhasa a u t h o r i t i e s t o i n v e s t i g a t e Tibetan 
complaints t h a t they had been i n t i m i d a t e d by Indian government o f f i c a l s i n 
Chumbi, while on the other, he had t o e x p l a i n Campbell's apparent 
discourtesy t o Chang. Matters grew worse on the f o l l o w i n g day when 
Henderson c a l l e d t o see Campbell t o lodge a formal complaint from Chang 
t h a t he had prevented s u p p l i e s of food and fodder being sent t o the 
P i p i t a n g Yamen, Campbell s t r o n g l y denied t h i s charge,but sensing t h a t 
Henderson had 'understood at once' what was going on, he allowed the 
conversation t o d r i f t onto other t o p i c s and r e l a t i o n s between them seemed 
c o r d i a l . However, at 4 p.m. on the same day, Campbell came across Henderson 
standing beside the telegraph pole i n the town looking'very worried'having 
apparently j u s t received a telegraph report t h a t Campbell's men had 
arr e s t e d and mistreated Chinese and Tibetan s o l d i e r s and tha t Chang was now 
accusing Campbell of p l a y i n g a 'double game'. Although t h i s s t o r y turned 
out t o be a gross exaggeration of the events at Phema, where the men 
involved were i n f a c t Tibetan s o l d i e r s out of uniform arrested by mistake 
f o l l o w i n g Chinese complaints about t h e i r behaviour, reactions t o t h i s 
i n c i d e n t reveal the v o l a t i l e nature of the s i t u a t i o n . 
By the f o l l o w i n g morning when he rode out t o meet h i s superior o f f i c e r 
Charles B e l l , who was en route t o Chumbi, Campbell was at the end of h i s 
t e t h e r and q u i t e confused by what he f e l t t o be Chang's unpredictable 
behaviour. Having received c o n f l i c t i n g r e p o r t s from Campbell and the 
Chinese, B e l l had been anxious t o i n v e s t i g a t e the events of the l a s t few 
days f o r himself, and was p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about Campbell's 
s i t u a t i o n . Chang's behaviour was miraculously transformed as soon as B e l l 
a r r i v e d and, as he explained t o him p r i v a t e l y , he had not regarded 
Campbell's v i s i t t o the Yamen as o f f i c a l , since he was expecting B e l l 
himself as senior O f f i c i a l and equal i n rank, t o make the f i r s t ' o f f i c a l ' 
v i s i t . He went on t o accuse Campbell of conducting himself i n a 'strange 
and unseemly manner' by c r e a t i n g an 'embarreassing scene' outside h i s Yamen 
i n f u l l view of the Tibetans.*91 Campbell was now forced t o defend himself, 
and he vehemently denied Chang's charges suggesting t h a t , since he had only 
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j u s t informed Henderson t h a t B e l l was coming t o Chumbi, i t was hardly 
possible t h a t Chang could have been expecting him and was therefore 
d e l i b e r a t e l y e x p l o i t i n g the s i t u a t i o n t o embarrass him. Although he was 
able t o convince B e l l t h a t Chang was l y i n g , Campbell was obliged t o present 
a d e t a i l e d r e p o r t t o the Indian government i n which he was forced t o defend 
and j u s t i f y h i s own behaviour. In i t s e l f t h i s was a h u m i l i a t i n g excercise, 
since i t was c l e a r t o him t h a t the High Commissioner's i n t e n t i o n s were t o 
undermine B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e which he had done h i s upmost t o p r o t e c t and 
f o s t e r . 
I have chosen t o examine t h i s i n c i d e n t i n such d e t a i l because i n many 
ways i t encapsulates the k i n d of problenB experienced by the those 
charged w i t h running the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Tibet. The considerable 
confusion over p o l i c y created a general atmosphere of uncertainty, 
p r o v i d i n g ample o p p o r t u n i t y f o r I n d i v i d u a l manoeuvre on a l l sides. Chang's 
desire t o e s t a b l i s h Chinese sovereignty, and Campbell's need t o r e i n f o r c e 
B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t y , created a d m i n i s t r a t i v e confusions which the Tibetans 
were able t o e f f e c t i v e l y e x p l o i t i n order t o preserve t h e i r economy and 
defend t h e i r way of l i f e . Although Campbell was s t r o n g l y supported by B e l l 
and subsequently by Minto, Morley and Grey were less anxious t o condone 
the wider i m p l i c a t i o n s t h a t h i s dispute w i t h Chang had involved. They 
t h e r e f o r e issued orders t h a t he behave i n a a ' c o n c i l i a t o r y manner' towards 
h i s r i v a l , an i n s t r u c t i o n which, i n i t s e l f , i mplied c r i t i c i s m of h i s 
conduct. *93 Although Chang was also e v e n t u a l l y rebuked by the Wai Wu Pu 
f o r t h i s and f o r subsequent I n c i d e n t s at Gyantse, h i s career was not 
a f f e c t e d , and he l a t e r received promotion t o the Wai Wu Pu, going on t o 
represent China as delegate t o the Trade Regulation t a l k s of 1908. Campbell 
received no such promotion,and although he remained i n the service, 
r e t u r n i n g t o China s h o r t l y a f t e r the i n c i d e n t , h i s treatment i s yet another 
reminder of the dangers of becoming involved i n a p o l i c y not supported by 
London. »94 
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( I v ) CHAgG kID GYAITSE 
On 23rd January 1906 Bailey became a c t i n g trade agent at Gyantse 
while O'Connor took h i s f i r s t leave f o r eleven years. Although the post 
was a very l o n e l y and i s o l a t e d one, Bailey found solace i n hunting and 
sport and q u i c k l y s e t t l e d i n t o the r o u t i n e of the trade nart. When Chang 
a r r i v e d on the f r o n t i e r i n the summer of 1906 however, t h i s cosy l i f e s t y l e 
q u i c k l y changed and he soon found himself i n c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s Chinese 
counterpart Mr. Gow, a man w i t h whom he had previously enjoyed a reasonably 
amicable working r e l a t i o n s h i p . * 9 5 The f i r s t problem arose over Gow's 
stat u s . I n a r e p o r t t o the Indian Government on 5th December 1906, Bailey 
had s t a t e d t h a t Gow had t o l d him ' p r i v a t e l y ' t h a t he had r e c e n t l y been 
promoted t o Sub-Prefect and t h a t h i s f u l l t i t l e was now 'Chinese 
Commissioner i n Charge of the Chinese Trade and Diplomatic Agency'. Gow had 
also t o l d Bailey t h a t he had received t h i s appointment from Chang himself 
who had then l a t e r informed Peking. *96 I f accurate t h i s made Gow the 
superior o f f i c i a l at Gyantse, but Bailey was not unduly worried at t h i s 
stage because he knew t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n had never been o f f i c i a l l y 
confirmed by Peking, and t h a t I n d i a had no word of the appointment. He was 
nevertheless now faced w i t h the problem of how t o respond t o Gow, who had 
become very aggressive since h i s 'promotion'. I n what was q u i t e a t e s t of 
courage and endurance f o r an inexperienced young o f f i c e r on h i s f i r s t 
p o sting. Bailey managed t o prevent any e s c a l a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t by the 
simple t a c t i c of i g n o r i n g Gow's i n c r e a s i n g l y b i z a r r e behaviour as f a r as he 
was able.*97 The most immediate problem f a c i n g him was t h a t the 
ambiguities present i n terms of the Adhesion Treaty w i t h China now made i t 
d i f f i c u l t t o hold any dialogue w i t h Gow without c r e a t i n g f u r t h e r 
misunderstandings. The Chinese believed t h a t i n s i g n i n g the t r e a t y they 
had resumed suzerain r i g h t s t o Tibet, which f o r them revoked the r i g h t s 
given t o B r i t a i n t o administer trade under the terms of the Lhasa 
Convention. I n the l i g h t of t h i s assumption no matter what Bailey d i d , Gow 
could now accuse him of i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h the ' i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s ' of Tibet 
and t h e r e f o r e undermining Chinese c o n t r o l of her suzerain s t a t e . 
On one occasion f o r example, he accused Bailey of exacting supplies under 
'duress' simply because he had not posted o f f i c e r s t o supervise the trade 
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routes.*98 B a i l e y managed t o survive t h i s and other i n s u l t s by ig n o r i n g 
the malicious tone of Gow's correspondence,and responding p o l i t e l y t o h i s 
communications. Although at times he f e l t t h a t Gow's behaviour was 
'impossible', he must have been comforted by the knowledge t h a t t h i s was 
not h i s permanent post, and t h a t he would soon be handing back t o 
O'Connor.#99 
O'Connor's r e t u r n from leave i n November 1906 coincided w i t h Chang's 
f i r s t v i s i t t o Gyantse. As permanent o f f i c e r O'Connor's a r r i v a l 
i n e v i t a b l y escalated the tension i n Gyantse, and i n h i s autobiography, he 
described how he responded t o the new s i t u a t i o n i n i t i a l l y by r e f u s i n g 
t o communicate w i t h Gow u n t i l he had apologised t o Bailey. •lOO 
O'Connor's tone w i t h Gow and h i s subsequent behaviour at Gyantse were l a t e r 
s t r o n g l y condemned i n London. U n t i l h i s r e t u r n , he had been regarded as one 
of the great experts on Tibetan a f f a i r s , and he had therefore not expected 
t o have t o give ground t o a person whom he regarded as simply a minor 
o f f i c i a l w i t h delusions of grandeur.»101 He was astute enough t o r e a l i s e 
however t h a t , since government p o l i c y had changed f o l l o w i n g Curzon's 
departure i n November 1905, he could no longer expect the same l e v e l of 
support from Simla t h a t he had pr e v i o u s l y enjoyed, a f a c t which had been 
confirmed f o r him during the course of 'several in t e r v i e w s ' w i t h Morley 
d u r i n g h i s leave i n London i n which he had been t o l d t h a t the B r i t i s h 
government had no i n t e n t i o n of i n v o l v i n g thenselves i n any 'undesirable 
o b l i g a t i o n s ' i n Tibet.»102 As w i t h Campbell t h i s lack of support enabled 
Chang and Gow t o e x p l o i t O'Connor's v u l n e r a b i l t y i n a s e r i e s of i n c i d e n t s 
i n which he was powerless t o defend himself and which, during the f i r s t 
months of 1907, was t o lead t o open warfare between them *103 Like Bailey 
he soon found himself involved i n a s e r i e s of p e t t y c o n f l i c t s w i t h Gow who 
had grown i n confidence since Chang's v i s i t , and which, i n the 
claustrophobic atmosphere of the trade mart, q u i c k l y escalated out of 
c o n t r o l . B r i t i s h observers i n London and Peking were less sympathetic t o 
h i s p l i g h t and were c l e a r l y embarrassed by what they judged t o be h i s gross 
ov e r r e a c t i o n t o events. Jordan, who was forced t o deal w i t h formal Chinese 
complaints about O'Connor's behaviour, f e l t t h a t he was more than a l i t t l e 
t o blame f o r what he described as 'a storm i n a teacup' and commented 
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wryly, t h a t i t would be some time before trade at the mart could pay the 
telegraph b i l l t h a t the f r i c t i o n i n Gyantse had caused. This view was 
h e a v i l y based on i n f o r m a t i o n received from Henderson however, who f o r 
reasons of h i s own, tended t o minimise Gow's obstructions. »104 
By March 1907, there was deadlock at Gyantse, w i t h O'Connor's pleas f o r 
d i r e c t a c t i o n against Gow matching Gow's complaints t o Peking. Although 
he had the support of the Indian government t h i s was of no immediate help 
t o him although u l t i m a t e l y p r o t r a c t e d discussions between India, London, 
and Peking, d i d e v e n t u a l l y lead t o Gow's r e c a l l i n July 1907.*105 This 
triumph was s h o r t l i v e d however as by August 1907, O'Connor himself was 
c a l l e d away t o act as Advisor on Tibetan A f f a i r s during the Trade 
Regulation t a l k s i n Simla i n 1908; an obvious,and t h i n l y disguised attempt 
t o remove him a l t o g e t h e r from the scene which Chang was l a t e r able t o 
s u c c e s s f u l l y e x p l o i t as a sacking, arguing t h a t B r i t a i n had been forced t o 
r e c a l l one of t h e i r most experienced o f f i c e r s t o f i l l a r e l a t i v e l y minor 
p o s i t i o n as a Conference Advisor, an accusation confirmed by the f a c t t h a t 
O'Connor never returned t o Tibet. Like Chang, Gow was also rewarded f o r 
h i s services i n Tibet and was l a t e r promoted t o a prestigous post as 
D i r e c t o r of Railways i n Mukden. »106 
O'Connor was perhaps one of the saddest v l c t i a s of the non-involvement 
p o l i c y since he had been placed i n an impossible p o s i t i o n at Gyantse. For 
him t h i s had been an important career posting, and l i k e White, he l a t e r 
became very b i t t e r about h i s treatment. Although he never returned t o 
T i b e t , he continued a warm correspondence w i t h the Panchen Lama f o r many 
years a f t e r he l e f t and t h i s helped t o keep him i n touch w i t h events 
there.*107 
What Jordan, Grey, and Morley saw as O'Connor's overreaction at Gyantse 
produced q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t response from India. Hinto and B e l l had 
supported him as best they could throughout h i s ordeal,and although the 
support given by Minto had been of necessity more guarded, O'Connor's 
p l i g h t had convinced him of the need t o maintain an Indian presence at the 
Trade marts, not only t o safeguard the l u c r a t i v e trade t h a t had been 
c a r e f u l l y b u i l t up, but also as a means of monitoring Chinese encroachments 
which he f e l t might u l t i m a t e l y pose a t h r e a t t o Indian security.*108 
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( I v ) THE ATTACK Dg BELL 
I t i s impossible t o discuss r e l a t i o n s h i p s on the f r o n t i e r between 1906 and 
1908 without reference t o Charles B e l l who, as P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n 
Sikkim, was u l t i m a t e l y responsible f o r the d a i l y conduct of B r i t i s h 
f r o n t i e r p o l i c y . As the senior o f f i c i a l B e l l enjoyed greater respect 
from Chang than Campbell, Bailey, or O'Connor, but he was t o experience 
d i f f e r e n t kinds of pressure from another quarter and h i s experiences 
throw some l i g h t on the s u b t l e and pervasive influence t h a t Minto was able 
t o exert as Viceroy on Tibetan p o l i c y during these years. B e l l i n i t i a l l y 
took up an appointment as Acting P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim i n A p r i l 
1906 while White was on an o f f i c i a l v i s i t t o Bhutan.»109 He had been on 
the f r o n t i e r since 1900 and, as a veteran of the Younghusband Expedition, 
he shared w i t h O'Connor, White, and Bailey, a v i s i o n of a commercially 
developed f r o n t i e r which would serve India as a b a r r i e r against invasion, 
as w e l l as being a source of p r e s t i g e . Although only t h i r t y , he had acted 
as f a t h e r p r o t e c t o r t o Campbell, rushing t o h i s a i d during the c o n f l i c t 
w i t h Chang i n September 1906, and despite h i s own suspicions of Chang's 
motives, he managed t o r e t a i n c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h the him throughout 
t h i s d i f f i c u l t and v o l a t i l e period.*110 
By 1906 he was an acknowledged a u t h o r i t y on Tibet and the decision t o send 
him t o Sikkim as White's Assistant had been a c a r e f u l l y c a l c u l a t e d one. 
Grey regarded him as the i d e a l man f o r the d e l i c a t e task of f r o n t i n g the 
the non-involvment p o l i c y , although w i t h h i n d s i g h t he seems an odd choice 
i n view of h i s support f o r Curzonlan p o l i c i e s which he made no attempt t o 
conceal. This honeymoon perio d was p r e d i c t a b l y s h o r t l i v e d , and i t was not 
long before he f e l l f o u l of the Foreign O f f i c e . I n lovember 1906, only two 
months a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l , and without seeking permission from h i s 
superiors. B e l l organised what he described as 'informal t a l k s ' w i t h 
C h a n g . t i l l Although he claimed t h a t he had made i t c l e a r t o Chang th a t he 
had no powers of r a t i f i c a t i o n , the two men discussed a range of s e n s i t i v e 
issues r e l a t i n g t o the trade marts, i n c l u d i n g the r e s i t i n g of the bazaar 
and the b u i l d i n g of the new Agency Headquarters at Gyantse, as w e l l as 
wider t o p i c s , l i k e the possible r e l o c a t i o n of the Yatung mart t o Phema, and 
the handing over of dak bungalows t o the Chinese. In the closed world of 
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the trade mart a l l these seemingly p e t t y Issues had created great c o n f l i c t 
and badly needed t o be s e t t l e d i n the i n t e r e s t s of f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y . The 
Indian government were very concerned however t h a t the t a l k s had been 
conducted f i r s t l y , without c o n s u l t i n g O'Connor, as trade agent f o r 
Gyantse, and secondly without mentioning them t o any of the Tibetan 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s at the mart.*112 Since the t a l k s were unauthorised, and 
had included i n discussions the p o s s i b l i t y of handing over Indian property 
t o the Chinese, they had set a dangerous precedent e s p e c i a l l y i n view of 
Chinese forward p o l i c y . Minto was also embarrassed by the f a c t t h a t , 
although B e l l had claimed t o have made i t c l e a r t o Chang t h a t the t a l k s 
were u n o f f i c a l , Chang had declared himself empowered t o make decisions 
without reference t o Peking, and indeed seemed anxious t o formalise 
agreements on the spot. As London were quick t o point out, by doing t h i s he 
had c l e a r l y o u t w i t t e d B e l l , a c t i n g as senior partner throughout, despite 
the f a c t t h a t B e l l had i n i t i a t e d the t a l k s . Beyond t h i s obvious blow t o 
p r e s t i g e however, i t was d i f f i c u l t t o see what actual harm had been done, 
and B e l l himself was very pleased w i t h the outcome, f e e l i n g very aggrieved 
t h a t he had been both c r i t i c i s e d by London, and admonished by h i s own 
government, f o r simply using h i s i n i t i a t i v e . * 1 1 3 He reacted t o t h i s 
o f f i c i a l h o s t i l i t y by g i v i n g increasing support t o O'Connor's demand f o r 
d i r e c t m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n against Gow at Gyantse, and f o r a while, 
Morley and Minto were daggers drawn over the issue. This b a t t l e continued 
u n t i l the evacuation of Chumbi Valley i n February 1908, when Minto's 
argument f o r an increase i n trade agency escorts t o p r o t e c t those of h i s 
s t a f f s t i l l working on the f r o n t i e r became impossible f o r Morley t o 
r e s i s t . * 1 1 4 
B e l l ' s approach nearly always received Minto's t a c i t , and sometimes q u i t e 
open support, and t h i s was most obvious i n matters i n v o l v i n g the Panchen 
Lama. Like others i n the Indian government, B e l l believed t h a t one of 
Chang's key d i r e c t i v e s was t o i s o l a t e the Panchen Lama by weakening h i s 
t i e s w i t h I n d i a and w i t h the Dalai Lama; a process much helped by the 
l a t t e r ' s absence, and by the apparent lack of coherent government i n 
Lhasa.*115 The Dalai Lama was s t i l l d i s t r u s t e d by the Indian government and 
the ' p l o t ' t o present the Panchen Lama as an a l t e r n a t i v e r u l e r during h i s 
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v i s i t t o I n d i a i n 1905 had been an overt attempt t o unseat him. #116 
There was also confusion about Chinese motives, and the Panchen Lama 
continued t o f e a r r e p r i s a l s from the Emperor as w e l l as from the Dalai Lama 
f o r the v i s i t long a f t e r h i s r e t u r n , making him anxious t o placate both, 
while s t i l l keen t o r e t a i n h i s f r i e n d l y l i n k s w i t h India. To t h i s end 
he had expressed a strong desire t o receive v i s i t s from h i s B r i t i s h f r i e n d s 
and so, despite Morley's ban on f r o n t i e r t r a v e l , and a f t e r repeated 
requests. B e l l was e v e n t u a l l y able t o obtain permission t o v i s i t him at 
Tashilhunpo i n October 1906.#117 I t has been suggested t h a t Minto gave t h i s 
permission because he f e l t sympathy f o r the Panchen Lama's p l i g h t and f o r 
h i s p art i n causing it.»118 However, h i s support f o r B e l l was also very 
t y p i c a l of h i s general response t o i n t i a t i v e s from f r o n t i e r o f f i c e r s . 
He had p r e v i o u s l y supported t h e i r demands f o r a c t i o n against Tibetan 
infringements of the Lhasa Convention and had pressed f o r f u l l payment 
of the imdemnity by Tibet, despite the f a c t t h a t t h i s had antagonised 
Morley, who was prepared t o give l i t t l e support t o f r o n t i e r i n i t i a t i v e s f o r 
f e a r of p e r c i p i t a t i n g a c r i s i s . B e l l ' s argument f o r v i s i t i n g the Panchen 
Lama was based on the f a c t t h a t Henderson, whom he described as 'a European 
i n Chinese employ', was able t o t r a v e l q u i t e f r e e l y on the f r o n t i e r , 
whereas Indian employees could not,although they too had important 
l e g i t i m a t e business there, and t h a t t h i s c o n s t i t u t e d a dangerous loss of 
face f o r the Indian government who were supposed t o be administering the 
region. This convincing argument helped t o sway Morley and enabled B e l l t o 
v i s i t the Panchen Lama twice during l a t e 1906. Although on both occasions 
t h e i r conversations concentrated on the Panchen Lama's fears of Chinese 
r e p r i s a l s f o r h i s Indian v i s i t , B e l l was able t o e s t a b l i s h a meaningful 
dialogue w i t h him, managing t o also convince h i s many Tibetan supporters 
t h a t I n d i a intended only f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Tibet, a minor diplomatic coup 
which more than compensated f o r h i s previous bad showing w i t h Chang i n 
Chumbi.»119 
B e l l ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o Tibetan p o l i c y was a very p o s i t i v e one. His 
knowledge of the Tibetan language and c u l t u r e , together w i t h h i s powerful 
p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n as P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim, enabled him t o move 
q u i c k l y and e f f e c t i v e l y t o defuse much of the tension w i t h the Chinese 
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which, i n the c l a u s t r o p h i b i c c o n d i t i o n s of the marts, had i n e v i t a b l y become 
personal and p e t t y . Unlike O'Connor and Campbell, who became very 
depressed and confused as a r e s u l t of the constant pressure. B e l l was able 
t o be more dispassionate and t h i s helped him t o maintain c o r d i a l contact 
w i t h the mercurial Chang who saw him as an equal. With Minto's support, 
B e l l was able t o survive both Morley's censure and r e j e c t i o n by the Foreign 
O f f i c e which threatened t o render him v i r t u a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e , and i n s p i t e 
of the f a c t t h a t h i s Curzonian outlook was o f f i c i a l l y out of favour, he 
managed t o r e t a i n h i s s t a t u s as Tibetan expert t o a much greater extent 
than any of h i s colleagues. This was because he tended t o understand and 
sympathise w i t h the Tibetans more than they d i d , and also because h i s 
p o s i t i o n gave him a s t a t u s denied t o them,as w e l l as a much wider grasp of 
the f r o n t i e r s i t u a t i o n than they could possibly hope t o acquire. 
<vi) THE TIBETAg PESSPECTIVE 
Between 1906 and 1908 the leaderless Tibetans put up a good f i g h t against 
B r i t i s h and Chinese attempts t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e i r t r a d i n g 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and the Torowas and the Jongpens of Chumbi Valley i n 
p a r t i c u l a r fought hard t o r e t a i n the monopoly of trade they had b u i l t up 
a f t e r 1902.»120 
I n May 1905 White had i n v e s t i g a t e d complaints made by Campbell about the 
aggressive conduct of the Jongpens at Pharl, whom he had accused of 
imposing taxes on B r i t i s h trade passing through the town. On t h i s 
occasion B r i t i s h complaints had not been supported i n London since, as 
Grey argued, the Jongpen were not a c t u a l l y i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h Indian trade as 
such, and t h a t on balance i t was best t o leave t h i n g s as they were.*121 
This o f f i c a l a t t i t u d e was l a t e r r e - i n f o r c e d by the Indian Government when 
Dane played down problems between B r i t i s h and Tibetan o f f i c a l s at Gartok 
d u r i n g h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h Chang i n June 1906.*122 Despite such o f f i c i a l 
attempts t o defuse the s i t u a t i o n however, Tibetans continued t o 'obstruct' 
Indian trade t o Gartok as before, and by 1908 r e p o r t s from Gyantse 
confirmed t h a t the s i t u a t i o n was no easier despite t h i s f l e x i b l e approach 
t o t r a d i n g matters. *123 
107 
The Tibetan view i s not d i f f i c u l t t o understand since trade was l i f e t o 
the f r o n t i e r , and as the new trade marts were not s i t e d on key t r a d i n g 
routes, tensions were e a s i l y generated when goods t r a v e l l i n g on routes not 
passing through the marts escaped the s c r u t i n y of B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s . 
The P o l i t i c a l s w e l l appreciated t h i s f a c t , and f o r t h i s reason they pressed 
f o r a r e l o c a t i o n of the marts t o more s u i t a b l e s i t e s at every a v a i l a b l e 
opportunity. *124 
One of the major problems a f f e c t i n g the smooth running of the marts from 
the B r i t i s h p o i n t of view was the fear of the Chinese t h a t many Tibetans 
f e l t . There had been a long h i s t o r y of c o n f l i c t over trade i n Chumbi and, 
l i k e the Bhutanese and lepalese, the Chinese were t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l s . * 1 2 5 
B e l l ' s r e p o r t s are f u l l of references t o 'alarming rumours' i n the bazaars 
of Chumbi about an imminent Chinese invasion of Lhasa, and the Chinese 
began t o produce et h n i c newspapers which they used t o promote themselves as 
powerful r u l e r s , running a v i r u l e n t a n t i - B r i t i s h campaign, and i s s u i n g 
t h r e a t s of r e p r i s a l s against any Tibetans who helped the B r i t i s h . Some 
re p o r t s even a l l e g e d t h a t Chang had arranged f o r Tibetan leaders at Gartok 
t o assemble the l o c a l people together i n order t o 'threaten' them i n t o 
making f a l s e p e t i t i o n s against B r i t i s h trade agents.#126 
In a d d i t i o n t o overt Chinese appo s i t i o n t o B r i t i s h c o n t r o l at the trade 
marts, there was genuine confusion on a l l sides about the l e v y i n g of r i g h t s 
and d u t i e s , and misunderstandings about the r i g h t s gained by China 
f o l l o w i n g the s i g n i n g of the Adhesion t r e a t y i n 1906.»127 Soon a f t e r 
the s i g n i n g Henderson had informed O'Connor t h a t Chang believed the 
Treaty had r e s t o r e d suzerain r i g h t s t o China, and t h i s issue had formed 
the subject of many of the p r o t r a c t e d debates between Chang and Bell.«128 
Tibetans were s i m i l a r l y confused about the content of the t r e a t i e s and, 
as the Jongpens of Chumbi and Gyantse explained t o Campbell and O'Connor 
on many occasions, they f e l t t h a t , i n the circumstances, i t was i n t h e i r 
best i n t e r e s t s t o placate both sides f o r fear of offending the other. 
Those Tibetans l i k e the Phari Jongpens who had prospered as a r e s u l t of the 
Chinese and B r i t i s h presence i n Chumbi, d i d not h e s i t a t e t o e x p l o i t the 
s i t u a t i o n at every a v a i l a b l e opportunity, but i n general Tibetans had much 
t o f e a r , e s p e c i a l l y from the Chinese who were prepared t o take p u n i t i v e 
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a c t i o n against a people they had always considered i n f e r i o r , and whom they 
t r e a t e d l i k e c h i l d r e n . Tibetan o f f i c a l s i n Lhasa were punished i f they 
were discovered t o have been too h e l p f u l t o the B r i t i s h , while others were 
rewarded i f they were found t o have obstructed them. For the Tibetan people 
t h e r e f o r e the message was q u i t e c l e a r ; China regarded the B r i t i s h as an 
enemy presence i n Tibet which they were expected t o r e s i s t i f they wished 
t o preserve t h e i r way of l i f e . * 1 2 9 
At f i r s t Tibetans had ignored the Lhasa Convention i n t h e i r dealings w i t h 
the B r i t i s h as they had ignored previous t r e a t i e s w i t h them, since t o a 
large extent t h e i r way of l i f e was d i c t a t e d by c l i m a t i c conditions r a t h e r 
than by any man made laws. However, although they e i t h e r ignored or 
quibbled over aspects of the Convention, Tibetan A u t h o r i t i e s i n Lhasa, and 
o f f i c a l s a t l o c a l l e v e l , were w e l l aware of i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s . The Garpons 
at Gartok f o r example, knew t h a t Indian t r a d e r s were not permitted t o 
t r a v e l beyond the trade marts and f u r t h e r i n t o Tibet, as the case of Shadi 
La i l l u s t r a t e s , and when T i Rimpoche received B r i t i s h complaints about 
Tibetan infringements of the Convention at Lhasa, he was quick t o point out 
t h a t B r i t a i n also had o b l i g a t i o n s t o f u l f i l l . * 1 3 0 Many Tibetans were 
completely unaffected by the new r e g u l a t i o n s and f o r the most part were 
able t o t o l e r a t e B r i t i s h and Chinese o f f i c i a l d o m because they operated away 
from t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l t r a d i n g centres, much as they had always been able 
t o t o l e r a t e the token Chinese garrisons located along the f r o n t i e r , where 
s o l d i e r s , r a r e l y paid, and i s o l a t e d from t h e i r peers, had gradually become 
Tibenanlsed.*131 The need t o survive the harsh f r o n t i e r climate i n any 
case overroad a l l other considerations, and as winter blocked passes f o r 
months, a l l trade ceased and any f o r e i g n presence seemed i r r e l e v a n t . * 1 3 1 
V / ' i ' 9 6' . 
T s a l d a m 
l,'*'swamp ^ " ^ ^ 
LANCHOW 
Ka n s u 
Ml L E S 
ho t.. J Y E K U N D P ^ 
N A N G C H E N "^Q. 
D E - G E 
• G O N C H E N - J 
K A N T Z E 
% D A W U C HA M DO • B E Y U 
7 C H E N G T U CHANTUr o • 
T A C H I E N L U 
Y A C H O W • B A T A N G • L I T A N G I H O W A 
M A R K A M 
G A R T O K 
S H I U D E 
^ G O M P A 
H S I A N G C H E N G 
( S A N G P I L I N G " ) 
K O N G 
E N K O N G 
* . \ 
A t V N T Z E 
R I M A 
» D l Y A y 
••.:^ | 100* 
109 -
3. Qg THE FROHTIER: EAST TIBET 
( i ) THE SITUATIQg I g EAST TIBET 
The f r o n t i e r i n East Tibet bordered the Chinese Provinces of Szechuan and 
Yunnan and was e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t i n character t o the West Tibetan f r o n t i e r 
w i t h I n d i a , being subject t o greater Chinese influence and c o n t r o l . I t was 
peopled by a v a r i e t y of t r i b a l groupings, many of whom were not Tibetan, 
and l i v e d a nomadic, or semi-nomadic l i f e as t r a d e r s and herders. From 
the 1880's B r i t i s h commercial companies had made e f f o r t s t o i n v e s t i g a t e the 
t r a d i n g p o t e n t i a l of the area, and were p a r t i c u l a r y i n t e r e s t e d i n i t s gold 
and mineral resources. I n a d d i t i o n there was much s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t 
i n the c u l t u r a l l i f e and language of the various t r i b e s who l i v e d there 
and many attempts were made t o woo them.»132 Although not completely cut 
o f f from a l l communication w i t h West Tibet, the P o l i t i c a l s saw t h i s area 
as q u i t e separate from the r e s t of Tibet, p r i m a r i l y because the eastern 
f r o n t i e r was s t a f f e d by men of the China Consular Service and there was 
l i t t l e d i r e c t communication between them. *133 
From the time of Feng's murder i n 1905, u n t i l a f t e r the Chinese invasion i n 
1910, East Tibet was dominated by the p o l i c i e s of the Szechuan government 
and by the p e r s o n a l i t y of Chao Erh Feng, Commander of the Chinese forces 
i n East Tibet. Chao had been personally appointed by the Szechuan Viceroy 
Hsi Liang i n 1905 i n order t o undertake the ' p a c i f i c a t i o n ' of the 
East Tibetan Marches, a scheme very dear t o the p r o v i n c i a l government i n 
Szechuan f o r many years, but only sanctioned by Peking a f t e r the murder of 
t h e i r Amban.»134 The terms of Chao's appointment and the nature of h i s j o b 
meant t h a t he was able t o issue a d i r e c t challenge t o the Lama r u l e r s of 
East Tibet who,in the absence of the Dalai Lama, were i n a weaker p o s i t i o n 
than they might have been, h i s s p i r i t u a l i n fluence having given t h e i r 
p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l c r e d i b i l i t y . At f i r s t Chao had enjoyed the approval of 
those missionaries working i n the area who welcomed t h i s challenge t o 
p r i e s t l y a u t h o r i t y as an a i d t o t h e i r missionary work.*135 This view was 
not shared by J. H. Edgar of the China Inland Mission at Batang. In a 
lengthy r e p o r t commisioned by Jordan, he described the s i t u a t i o n i n East 
Tibet i n r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t t e rns. As a man w i t h many years of experience of 
the f r o n t i e r , Edgar was extremely s c e p t i c a l about the p a c i f i c a t i o n 
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programme which Chao was ordered t o implement, and h i s report d e t a i l i n g 
Chao's progress i n East Tibet stressed the foolhardiness of the venture i n 
a land of 'barren steppes' and 'dangerous passes', amongst a population of 
'nomads, t r a d e r s ' , a n d ' o f f i c a l soldiers'many of whom were ' w i l d and 
unruly',and given t o 'chronic bickering'.The region was i n f a c t so lonely 
t h a t Chinese o f f i c a l s and s o l d i e r s there regarded i t as a banishment and 
were replaced every three years i n order t o preserve t h e i r sanity. Edgar 
also found i t i n c r e d i b l e t h a t Chao might be expected t o operate i n such an 
i n h o s p i t a b l e area when there were 'eminently more s u i t a b l e places' much 
clo s e r t o Chengtu, and he f u r t h e r observed t h a t , i n a place where 'anyone 
aquainted w i t h the h i s t o r i e s of Chinese border towns would understand how 
e a s i l y the Chinese were absorbed by the n a t i v e t r i b e s of the area.'*136 
Jordan and Grey were already w e l l aware of the i m p l i c a t i o n s of Chao's 
venture from Consular r e p o r t s received from Chengtu. In February 1906 f o r 
example, Goffe, then Acting Consul-General i n the c i t y , had reported a 
conversation he had w i t h Chao on the subject of the l a t t e r ' s plan t o b u i l d 
a r a i l w a y across East Tibet t o India , I t had been immediately obvious t o 
Goffe t h a t t h i s was an i l l planned scheme t h a t d i d not have e x p l i c i t 
approval from Peking and suggested t h a t the proposal had not gone beyond 
P r o v i n c i a l Government l e v e l . »137 Furthermore, evidence from e d i c t s and 
memoranda issued by Peking at the time and subsequently studied by Suchita 
Ghosh, reveal t h a t the Peking government was less than e n t h u s i a s t i c about 
the c o l o n i s a t i o n programme which the Szechuan government was promoting and 
which Chao was attempting t o implement, because f o r them i t s ambitious aim 
of transforming the c u l t u r e of the f r o n t i e r by importing Chinese farmers 
from neighbouring Provinces t o c u l t i v a t e and s e t t l e the land, was 
e s s e n t i a l l y a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the very programme t h a t had generated the 
anti-Chinese r i o t s of 1905 which had led t o Feng's murder.*138 Whatever 
res e r v a t i o n s Peking might have had about the wisdom of Chao's venture, h i s 
f o r c e f u l p e r s o n a l i t y and the myths surrounding him made a b i g impact on the 
East Tibetan f r o n t i e r , enabling him t o q u i c k l y gain a r e p u t a t i o n as a 
powerful m i l i t a r y commander. 
With i n f i v e years he had created an army of veterans numbering some 6,000 
men who,according t o A l a s t a l r Lamb, brought China greater power on the 
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f r o n t i e r than she had enjoyed since the 1790's.*139 In January 1906 
Chao launched an a t t a c k on the monastery of Sanp i l i n g i n the d i s t r i c t of 
Hsian Ch'eng which was then a stronghold of Lama opposition. A f t e r a 
l e n g t h l y seige l a s t i n g s i x months the monastery f e l l , and Chao had over two 
thousand monks murdered and the b u i l d i n g destroyed.*140 This spectacular 
v i c t o r y enabled him t o begin t o implement the f i r s t of many reforms t h a t 
were t o have a huge Impact on the f r o n t i e r and which were i n i t i a l l y q u i t e 
popular w i t h o r d i n a r y Tibetans, who received the b e n e f i t s of an education 
and medical care f o r the f i r s t time as well as Chinese p r o t e c t i o n against 
the monks and t r i b a l c h i e f s , whose harsh and repressive methods they 
had o f t e n deeply resented.»141 
Chao's greatest acheivements were m i l i t a r y ones and h i s most spectacular 
successes were a l l i n Tibetan s t a t e s l i k e Derge and Nyarong, which had 
pre v i o u s l y been under Chinese c o n t r o l , and where the l o c a l population 
had f e l t oppressed by the Lhasa a u t h o r i t i e s . His forces entered Derge i n 
1908 on the p r e t e x t of s e t t l i n g a domestic dispute between members of i t s 
r u l i n g f a m i l y . The Chinese occupation of t h i s , the l a r g e s t and wealthiest 
of the Tibetan c o n t r o l l e d s t a t e s of East Tibet, passed without i n c i d e n t 
but g r e a t l y alarmed the Lhasa a u t h o r i t i e s and by the end of t h a t year, 
Chao seemed poised t o take the neighboring s t a t e s of gyarong and Chamdo, 
the l a t t e r a s t r a t e g i c area c o n t r o l l i n g the main road t o Lhasa, and a 
f u r t h e r i n d i c a t i o n t o them t h a t h i s u l t i m a t e goal was an invasion of t h e i r 
c i t y . «142 
B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e s towards events i n East Tibet were not as well formed as 
those i n West Tibet. Jordan's China Service were less concerned w i t h t h i s 
area which had always been a region where Chinese c o n t r o l came and went. 
They t h e r e f o r e accepted Chao's invasion as a temporary phenomenon and, 
although they followed h i s progress as best they could, t h e i r main concern 
was i n monitoring the movements of the Dalai Lama as he progressed across 
the remote f r o n t i e r r e g i o n l i k e a mediaeval monarch w i t h h i s vast 
r e t i n u e of f o l l o w e r s . *143 
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( i i ) THE DALAI LAMA AID THE CHIIA SERVICE 
Between 1906 and h i s a r r i v a l i n Peking i n September 1908, the Dalai Lama 
created s p e c i a l problems f o r both B r i t a i n and China. In a document probably 
w r i t t e n i n 1912, soon a f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n which toppled the Manchu 
dynasty. Yuan Shih Kai traced the e v o l u t i o n of Chinese a t t i t u d e s towards 
the Dalai Lama a f t e r 1904, c i t i n g what he described as h i s 'march across 
Chinese t e r r i t o r y ' i n t h i s period as a time of p a r t i c u l a r anxiety f o r the 
Chinese government,»144 Although obviously a biased account, i t i s never 
the less r e v e a l i n g since, as a member of the Wai Wu Pu at the time. Yuan 
was w e l l aware of the k i n d of problens h i s presence created. F i r s t l y , he 
t r a v e l l e d w i t h a huge r e t i n u e of devoted f o l l o w e r s who 'preyed on the 
country l i k e a swarm of l o c u s t s ' , proving a huge d r a i n on the resources of 
those chosen as hosts f o r h i s extensive, and o f t e n u n s o l i c i t e d visits.»145 
Secondly, the Chinese feared the Dalai Lama's p o l i t i c a l influence since he 
was regarded 'w i t h veneration and awe by large sections of the Chinese 
people' who were t h e r e f o r e I n c l i n e d t o t r e a t him w i t h 'great clemency'. 
They also blamed him f o r the embarrassing disturbances i n East Tibet which 
had r e s u l t e d i n the deaths of Feng and a number of French missionaries and 
Catholic p r i e s t s during 1905, f o r which c o s t l y r e p a r a t i o n had t o be paid t o 
the French government,»145 Moreover h i s ' i n t r i g u i n g ' w i t h Dorjiev was held 
t o have been i n d i r e c t l y responsible f o r the despatch of the Younghusband 
Expedition which had necessitated the payment of an expensive indemnity on 
T i b e t ' s behalf. Their annoyance at having t o make repar a t i o n f o r what they 
considered t o be the Dalai Lama's 'misdeeds' was however tempered on t h i s 
occasion by the s a t i s f a c t i o n of knowing t h a t t h e i r c l a i m on Tibet now had 
greater moral and l e g a l force.»146 
For B r i t a i n the Dalai Lama presented a d i f f e r e n t set of problems. Both 
Jordan and Grey regarded him as an i r r e l e v a n t nuisance, and were alarmed 
by h i s behaviour which had upset the Chinese and Indian Governments and 
continued t o t h r e a t e n the f u t u r e s t a b i l i t y of Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s . *147 
Since February 1905, the Tibetan government had expressed anxiety about h i s 
r e t u r n , b u t u n t i l 1908 the Dalai Lama had always i n s i s t e d t h a t he would 
not r e t u r n t o Lhasa u n t i l a f t e r he had completed what he descibed as h i s , 
'tour of the holy places i n Asia', and although t h i s was p a r t l y an 
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o f f i c a l face saving excuse, he used h i s 'tour' as a means of c u l t i v a t i n g 
f o r e i g n r e p resentatives and encouraging sympathy f o r the Tibetan cause. 
As he was w i l l i n g t o see almost anyone, i n c l u d i n g the press, and was 
q u i t e unable t o determine which of the Europeans he received were 
empowered t o t r e a t w i t h him, many diplomats feared t h a t he might 
u n w i t t i n g l y give out secret and s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n t o whoever happened 
t o gain an audience w i t h him. »148 Jordan i n p a r t i c u l a r was keen 
t o ensure t h a t h i s behaviour d i d not jeopardize the completion of the Trade 
Regulation t a l k s and he t h e r e f o r e resolved t o have as l i t t l e t o do w i t h him 
as possible.*149 
Although the s i t u a t i o n seemed more or less under c o n t r o l , a f u r t h e r problem 
emerged once i t became known t h a t the Chinese Emperor had issued an e d i c t 
c a l l i n g the Dalai Lama t o Peking. There had been many rumours t h a t the 
Chinese intended t o do t h i s , as w e l l as a great deal of speculation about 
t h e i r motives, and when they f i n a l l y issued the e d i c t Jordan experienced 
great d i f f i c u l t y i n g e t t i n g accurate i n f o r m a t i o n about Tibetan reactions. 
Reports from the f r o n t i e r were t a k i n g s i x t o e i g h t weeks to reach him, 
and events moved so q u i c k l y t h a t they were o f t e n reported i n the press 
before news reached Peking since many j o u r n a l i s t s had attached themselves 
t o the Dalai Lama's party.«150 That the Dalai Lama intended t o obey the 
e d i c t was at f i r s t by no means c e r t a i n . Various unsubstantiated reports 
t h a t he intended t o r e t u r n t o Lhasa i n response t o pleas from h i s Church 
were q u i c k l y discounted however since by t h i s time,both the Dalai Lama and 
h i s f e l l o w Tibetans were w e l l aware t h a t Chao's v i c t o r i e s i n East Tibet had 
made i t dangerous f o r him t o r e t u r n t o Lhasa without Chinese permission as 
i n order t o do so he needed t o cross captured t e r r i t o r y . He must also have 
known t h a t he was u n l i k e l y t o get any backing from f o r e i g n powers since a l l 
those he had approached had been f r i e n d l y , but l i k e Jordan, anxious not t o 
get involved.«151 The Wai Wu Pu had o f f i c i a l l y informed Jordan i n May 1908 
t h a t the ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' of the Dalai Lama r e t u r n i n g t o Lhasa was 'under 
con s i d e r a t i o n ' , and i n August B r i t i s h support f o r h i s p l i g h t had gone as 
f a r as a l l o w i n g Jordan t o issue a statement saying t h a t h i s government 'did 
not desire t o prevent the Dalai Lama r e t u r n i n g t o Tibet'. However t h i s was 
only a f t e r i t had f i r s t been agreed w i t h Russia p r i v a t e l y t h a t , should he 
- 114 -
approach e i t h e r country f o r help, t h e i r response would be non-commltal. 
Unable to get support from any q u a r t e r the D a l a i Lama was t h e r e f o r e forced 
to obey the Emperor's summons, and on the morning of 30th September he 
a r r i v e d i n Peking by t r a i n , very u n c e r t a i n about the f a t e awaiting him. 
I n many ways the period between 1906 and 1908 was a defeat f o r the 
Curzonians s i n c e i t l e d u l t i m a t e l y to the withdrawal of Indian troops from 
Chumbi, an event which e f f e c t i v e l y put paid to the a s p i r a t i o n s embodied i n 
O'Connor's London report of A p r i l 1906. However, as 1909 dawned, there were 
s t i l l Curzonians at the trade marts who were a c t i v e l y promoting the type of 
commercial developments t h a t had formed the second s t r a n d i n t h e i r planned 
forward p o l i c y and who, with the support of the Viceroy and powerful vested 
b u s i n e s s i n t e r e s t s i n London and I n d i a , had not completely abandoned a l l 
hope of s u c c e s s . 
The D a l a i Lama's a r r i v a l i n Peking marked the ending of a phase i n Anglo-
Chinese p o l i c y on T i b e t . From the moment he was c a r r i e d from h i s t r a i n he 
became a v i r t u a l p r i s o n e r of the Chinese who from t h i s time on, t r i e d to 
use him as a pawn i n t h e i r plan to 'reclaim' T i b e t t h a t was to lead to the 
eventual occupation of Lhasa i n 1910. The c i r c u n K t a n c e s leading to t h i s 




HQLDIHG ON; THE SURVIVAL OF CURZQIIAg POLICY U TIBET 
1908 - 1910 
T h i s chapter looks at the s i t u a t i o n on the f r o n t i e r during the f i n a l y e ars 
of Minto's V i c e r o y a l t y and a t the way i n which the l o s s of p r e s t i g e , 
f o l l o w i n g the the withdrawal from Chumbi,combined with growing Chinese 
confidence, and the D a l a i Lama's 'escape' to I n d i a , c r e a t e d s p e c i a l 
problems f o r the I n d i a n government both i n s i d e and outside Tibet, and f o r 
the p o l i c y makers i n London, 
I . CHIgESE FQRVARD POLICY AID EAST TIBET. 
The a c t i o n t h a t appeared to B r i t i s h observers to culminate i n an i n v a s i o n 
of Lhasa i n February 1910 was i n f a c t part of a much wider campaign aimed 
a t the s u b j u g a t i o n of an a r e a t h a t was to become part of the new Chinese 
Province of S i k a n g . f l According to Chinese sources the occupation of the 
T i b e t a n c a p i t a l had not been i n t e g r a l to t h i s campaign but had been bought 
about e n t i r e l y by the r e a c t i o n a r y a t t i t u d e adopted by the D a l a i Lama when 
he had opposed a l l t h e i r attempts to modernise h i s country. As M i n i s t e r s 
of the ¥ai Vu Pu e x p l a i n e d to Jordan, China had o b l i g a t i o n s under the 
Adhesion Treaty they had signed with B r i t a i n to ensure that Tibet was 
bought under manageable control,»2 
B r i t i s h o b servers took a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t view of the events however, and 
they began to see the e s c a l a t i n g campaigns i n E a s t T i b e t as a p o t e n t i a l 
t h r e a t to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s on the f r o n t i e r , e s p e c i a l l y i n the l i g h t of 
accumulating evidence of Chinese a c t i v i t y near the Indian border which the 
I n d i a n government monitored with i n c r e a s i n g alarm, »3 
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The campaign to 'modernise' the area that became known to the Chinese as 
Sikang had begun t e n t a t i v e l y i n 1904 when Feng Chuan was appointed 
A s s i s t a n t Amban f o r the region. A programme of reform based on the 
c o l o n i s a t i o n of Batang by Chinese peasant farmers mainly from Szechuan 
was to culminate i n the whole of E a s t T i b e t coming under d i r e c t Chinese 
c o n t r o l by 1911.*4 The nature and progress of t h i s campaign was 
i n f l u e n c e d by t h r e e f a c t o r s . F i r s t l y , by the d e c i s i o n to appoint the 
b r o t h e r s Chao Erh-feng and Chao Erh-hsuin as Border Commissioner and 
V i c e r o y of the r e g i o n r e s p e c t i v e l y . Both were men of s t a t u r e who r a i s e d 
the p r o f i l e of the campaign by t h e i r involvement.-SS Secondly, by the 
e s c a l a t i o n of the d i s t u r b a n c e s generated by Tibetan r e s i s t a n c e to the 
m i l i t a r y campaign i n E a s t T i b e t , and i n p a r t i c u l a r , the resentment 
surrounding the Chinese occupation of the Tibetan S t a t e of Derge i n 
December 1908.t6 And f i n a l l y , by what the Chinese regarded as the 
unreasonable a t t i t u d e of the D a l a i Lama, who would not co-operate with the 
Chinese plans f o r h i s country.*? 
Chao Erh-feng used the occupation of Derge as a precedent to extend h i s 
c o n t r o l and i n f l u e n c e to other p a r t s of T i b e t , and he resigned h i s post as 
Border Commissioner i n order to give himself the freedom to concentrate on 
the m i l i t a r y a s p e c t s of what,for him, had become a personal campaign of 
conquest. Between March and June 1909 h i s armies took c o n t r o l of a vast 
a r e a of E a s t T i b e t t h a t included the s t a t e s of Chamdo, Chaya, and Markham. 
I n t a k i n g t h i s course he had d e l i b e r a t e l y cut himself away from the main 
campaign by then poised to take Lhasa which f o r him was now secondary to 
h i s r e a l o b j e c t i v e which l a y i n the conquest of E a s t Tibet and the c r e a t i o n 
of the new Chinese Province of Sikang.»8 The three b a t t a l l i o n s of the 
modern Szechuan army which entered Lhasa on 12th February 1910 were 
t h e r e f o r e not l e d by Chao a s o r i g i n a l l y planned, but by a young and 
ambitious General c a l l e d Chung Ying who was to p l a y a major r o l e i n the 
events t h a t followed.*9 
Before going on to examine B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n s to Chinese forward p o l i c y and 
i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with R u s s i a and Japan, I want to look 
at the r o l e played by the D a l a i Lama, and the e f f e c t h i s behaviour was to 
have on Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s and f r o n t i e r s t a b i l i t y . 
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2. THE DALAI LAMA I I PEKIIG AID IIDIA. 
Jordan was among the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the diplomatic community who 
assembled a t Peking r a i l w a y s t a t i o n to greet the D a l a i Lama when he a r r i v e d 
there on the morning of 30th September 1908 and noted that h i s r e c e p t i o n 
was unimpressive.*10 Although the d e t a i l s of e t i q u e t t e had been adhered 
to, and the Chinese had gone to great lengths to ensure that t h e i r guest 
was t r e a t e d with the c o u r t e s y and r e s p e c t shown to h i s previous i n c a r n a t i o n 
who had v i s i t e d the c i t y i n 1653,the Great F i f t h had not a r r i v e d by t r a i n , 
and the r e c e p t i o n i n the c o n f i n e s of the s t a t i o n platform might ther e f o r e 
have appeared prefunctory. Jordan might have been more impressed had he 
been allowed to accompany the D a l a i Lama as he was c a r r i e d i n s t a t e to the 
Yellow Temple t h a t had been e s p e c i a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d f o r the Great F i f t h j u s t 
o u t side the S o r t h Gate of the c i t y . * l l There was considerable confusion 
amongst western diplomats about the treatment given to the D a l a i Lama 
throughout h i s s t a y i n Peking t h a t was rooted i n t h e i r ignorance of the 
Cho-yon, and although the v a r i o u s d i s p u t e s about e t i q u e t t e where known to 
the Legations, the s u b t l e t i e s of the arguments were not f u l l y appreciated. 
Jordan i n p a r t i c u l a r was l e f t with the d i s t i n c t impression that the Dalai 
Lama was a weak and r a t h e r p a t h e t i c pawn i n Chinese hands, and he 
d i s m i s s e d him a s a man of l i t t l e importance.*12 However, although the 
D a l a i Lama's p o s i t i o n was not a strong one, and i n one sense he was a 
v i r t u a l p r i s i o n e r i n Peking, h i s i n f l u e n c e was such that i n i t i a l l y at l e a s t 
the Chinese went to great lengths to please him, and t h e i r 'guest' s t a t e d 
p u b i c l y t h a t he was 'overwhelmed by the benevolence of h i s reception'.»13 
Despite outward appearences however, t e n s i o n s q u i c k l y developed as the 
Chinese r e a l i s e d t h a t t h e i r guest was n e i t h e r impressed nor i n t i m i d a t e d by 
the grandeur of t h e i r court and they soon began to take s t e p s to put him 
f i r m l y i n h i s place. Within f i v e days of h i s f i r s t audience with the 
Emperor on October 14th, the Wai Wu Pu i s s u e d a note to the Legations 
g i v i n g p r e c i s e i n s t r u c t i o n s about the nature of t h e i r future contact with 
him. Jordan saw i n t h i s a r a t h e r obvious attempt to reduce the D a l a i 
Lama's i n t e r c o u r s e with f o r e i g n governments, and f e l t t h i s to be a r a t h e r 
unnecessary, and even clumsy move, i n view of the f a c t t h a t there appeared 
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to be nothing to be gained by antagonising someone who seemed to be already 
powerless. I n t a k i n g t h i s view however he f a i l e d to appreciate the true 
depth of Chinese concerns t h a t the D a l a i Lama might be able to i n f l u e n c e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l opinion, and h i s i n a b i l i t y to understand the nature of the 
D a l a i Lama's s t a t u s a f f e c t e d h i s whole approach to what he described as the 
'Tibetan Problem' i n f u t u r e years.»14 
Unaware of i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s , the Legations allowed the note to pass 
unchallenged, agreeing to the Chinese terms f o r contact with the D a l a i 
Lama, and i n the process s e a l i n g h i s f a t e and the f a t e of h i s country by 
g i v i n g the Chinese s u f f i c i e n t confidence to i s s u e a d i r e c t challenge to 
h i s s t a t u s as r u l e r i n the form of a Decree,dated 4th lovember 1908. By 
simply adding four c h a r a c t e r s to the D a l a i Lama's o f f i c i a l Chinese t i t l e , 
they awarded themselves s o v e r e i g n t y over T i b e t , d e p r i v i n g him of h i s 
temporal powers, and p l a c i n g him i n an i n f e r i o r p o s i t i o n to that of the 
Lhasa Amban,by t a k i n g away h i s r i g h t to n ^ m o r i a l i s e the throne d i r e c t . * 1 5 
A l l h i s subsequent attempts to r e v e r s e t h i s d e c i s i o n were r e j e c t e d by the 
court, together with r e q u e s t s t h a t a Tibetan d e l e g a t i o n might be l e f t i n 
Peking to r e t a i n d i r e c t l i n k s with the court a f t e r h i s r e t u r n to Tibet. 
The f i n a l i n s u l t was d e l i v e r e d when the P r o v i n c i a l government i n Szechuan 
were ordered to provide him with a small annual increment, making him i n 
e f f e c t a paid employee of the Chinese Empire. 
With the s i t u a t i o n s t i l l unresolved,the D a l a i Lama and h i s party l e f t 
Peking by t r a i n on 21st December, having agreed a route to Kumbum i n 
Kansu where where he would s t a y and await Chinese permission to r e t u r n to 
Lhasa, a p r o v i s i o n a l date f o r t h i s having been s e t f o r the f o l l o w i n g 
May. 
Although the Chinese were obviously wary of t r e a t i n g t h e i r guest with 
anything other than the utmost r e s p e c t at the s t a r t of h i s v i s i t they had 
become much bolder i n t h e i r d e a l i n g s with him once they discovered tha t , 
although the world's p r e s s were sympathetic to h i s s i t u a t i o n , f o r e i g n 
governments were u n w i l l i n g to help i n any p o s i t i v e way. Jordan had been 
p a r t i c u l a r l y r e l u c t a n t to get involved f o r f e a r of j e o p a r d i z i n g t r e a t y 
undertakings with China and R u s s i a , and had r e f u s e d a l l i n v i t a t i o n s to 
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meet the D a l a i Lama i n f o r m a l l y , e v e n t u a l l y s e e i n g him f o r the s h o r t e s t 
p o s s i b l e time a t a very formal interview. Unlike many of h i s 
contemporaries,who were q u i t e c a p t i v a t e d by the Tibetan r u l e r , Jordan 
was d i s t i n c t l y unimpressed, d e s c r i b i n g him a s ' d e l i c a t e work' and f i n d i n g 
him a p o s i t i v e t h r e a t to harmonious Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s . * 1 7 
Jordan's a t t i t u d e undoubtedly went a long way toward f i n a l l y convincing 
the D a l a i Lama th a t the B r i t i s h government would never give any p r a c t i c a l 
help to Tibet.However,less formal c o n t a c t s made with O'Connor i n Peking, 
who was there as e s c o r t to the Mahraj Kumar of Sikkim, convinced him that 
the Indian government might prove more sympathetic to h i s plight.*18 
The D a l a i Lama f i n a l l y returned to Lhasa on Christmas Day 1909, over s i x 
months l a t e r than planned. He had used the breathing space afforded by 
t h i s delay i n order to c o l l e c t as much information as p o s s i b l e about 
Chinese movements i n s i d e T i b e t and gain as much sympathy and support as 
p o s s i b l e from Ru s s i a , I n doing t h i s he had abandoned the i t i n e r a r y agreed 
with the Chinese, causing some concern to both B r i t i s h and Chinese 
governments, v/ho found t h e r s e l v e s q u i t e unable to monitor h i s movements.»19 
Meanwhile,in the absence of the D a l a i Lama,the i n t e r i m government i n Lhasa 
had begun to adopt a pro-Indian stance and were worried by t h e i r r u l e r ' s 
attempts to approach R u s s i a which c r e a t e d obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r them 
i n t h e i r d e a l i n g s with I n d i a . R u l e r s of the Hymalayan s t a t e s of l e p a l , 
Sikkim, and Bhutan a l s o found themselves u n w i t t i n g l y drawn i n t o t h i s new 
c o n f l i c t as the T i b e t a n s i n c r e a s i n g l y sought t h e i r views on the new 
s i t u a t i o n , and a l s o because they had p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of t h e i r own 
which a f f e c t e d t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with China, I n d i a , and B r i t a i n , 
The r e l i e f a t the D a l a i Lama's r e t u r n to Lhasa was soon o f f s e t by the 
t r o u b l e t h a t followed a s soon as he a r r i v e d . Apparently confident of 
R u s s i a n support, he launched a v i t r i o l i c campaign a g a i n s t the Chinese 
Amban L i e n Yu,accusing him of p l o t t i n g a g a i n s t the Tibetan people by 
d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f u s i n g to pass on messages to the Emperor a t t a c k i n g the 
l e g a l i t y of the November Decree.*20 As w e l l as a s i g n of h i s p o l i t i c a l 
a s t u t e n e s s , the D a l a i Lama's a c t i o n s were d e l i b e r a t e l y designed to 
show h i s own people t h a t he was once again i n c o n t r o l i n Lhasa. 
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They were a l s o intended to demonstrate to the Chinese that he would not 
accept t h e i r r u l i n g , and would show western powers that he was well aware 
t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n s were suspect under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law.*21 
The i l l e g a l l i t y of the Chinese a c t i o n s was confirmed by what was g e n e r a l l y 
p e r c e i v e d i n I n d i a to be L i e n Yu's h y s t e r i c a l o v e r r e a c t i o n to the 
s i t u a t i o n , g r a p h i c a l l y recorded i n lengthy r e p o r t s to the Indian goverment 
from B e l l and h i s agents a t the trade marts.»22 The nature of the Tibetan 
appeals f o r help, and i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e i r use of what, to western ears, 
seemed naive and r a t h e r d i s t r e s s i n g metaphors d e s c r i b i n g Chinese t h r e a t s , 
e n l i s t e d the sympathies of the Indian government who responded, though 
c a u t i o u s as always i n framing t h e i r o f f i c i a l response.*23 Minto was 
i n i t i a l l y anxious t h a t any d i r e c t approach to the Chinese on the s u b j e c t 
might r i s k the d e l i c a t e f r o n t i e r s t a t u s quo b u t , l i k e Morley, he e v e n t u a l l y 
came t o favour approaching the Chinese on the grounds th a t the problem 
needed to be s o r t e d out q u i c k l y . Grey was a l s o w i l l i n g to support t h i s 
view a f t e r seeking advice from Jordan i n Peking.#24 By 9th February 1910, 
only three days before Chinese troops entered Lhasa, a l l s e c t i o n s of the 
B r i t i s h F oreign S e r v i c e were u n i t e d i n favouring a d i r e c t appeal to the 
Chinese, i f only to e s t a b l i s h the t r u e nature of t h e i r plans f o r Tibet and 
how these might a f f e c t B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s . * 2 5 The s i t u a t i o n was suddenly 
and d r a m a t i c a l l y a f f e c t e d a t t h i s point by the D a l a i Lama's d e c i s i o n to 
f l e e Lhasa i n the e a r l y morning of 12th February, only hours before the 
Chinese i n v a s i o n f o r c e entered h i s c i t y . * 2 6 He subsequently explained to 
B e l l i n I n d i a t h a t he had taken the d e c i s i o n to leave Lhasa because he 
b e l i e v e d t h a t the Chinese would e x p l o i t him as a puppet r u l e r , and because 
he had come to b e l i e v e t h a t the Emperor had now broken e a r l i e r promises 
made to him p r i v a t e l y i n Peking, t h a t he would be able him to r e t a i n h i s 
temporal powers, d e s p i t e the lovember Decree.»27 His f e a r s were confirmed 
by the behaviour of the Chinese i n v a d e r s who gave chase as soon as they 
d i s c o v e r e d he was missing, and who i s s u e d rewards f o r the death or capture 
of h i s M i n i s t e r s . The s i z e of the f o r c e sent to r e t r i e v e him a l s o seemed to 
suggest that Chinese i n t e n t i o n s were to take over the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the 
c i t y and use both him, and h i s government, f o r t h e i r own ends. Chinese 
troops soon overtook and ambushed the D a l a i Lama's p a r t y at Kangma, where 
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a p i t c h e d b a t t l e took place, during which ten Chinese s o l d i e r s were k i l l e d , 
but the D a l a i Lama hims e l f evaded capture.*28 When he reached Phari on 
19th February, l o t s were c a s t and Gnatong s e l e c t e d as h i s next d e s t i n a t i o n . 
On the f o l l o w i n g day h i s party was reported to have entered the Chumbi 
V a l l e y , reaching the trade mart at Yatung l a t e r t h a t day with an e s c o r t of 
one hundred men.*29 At Yatung he l e f t a message with B r i t i s h trade agent 
David MacDonald announcing h i s i n t e n t i o n to t r a v e l to I n d i a i n order to 
'negotiate' with the Indian government.*30 
To B r i t i s h eyes the s i t u a t i o n seemed v o l a t i l e . F i r s t r e p o r t s of the D a l a i 
Lama's f l i g h t had reached Minto v i a trade r e p o r t s from the B r i t i s h agents 
at Yatung and Gyantse, and news of the b a t t l e a t Kangma alarmed him. He 
ordered MacDonald to give no p o s i t i v e help to the D a l a i Lama f o r f e a r that 
the s i t u a t i o n might e s c a l a t e f u r t h e r and p o s s i b l y i nvolve the Indian 
government i n c o n f l i c t with the Chinese, MacDonald was to o f f e r temporary 
overnight accommodation i n the agency dak bungalows,but only on the s t r i c t 
understanding t h a t they were not to be regarded a s p l a c e s of sanctuary, 
from the Chinese,*31 I n the absence of r e l i a b l e information, most r e p o r t s 
being second or even t h i r d hand, h i s c a u t i o n was understandable, and even 
more so i n view of the c o n t i n u i n g confusion about the nature and scope of 
Chinese movements i n the area, B r i t i s h agents were themselves unsure about 
the a t t i t u d e s of l o c a l Chinese o f f i c a l s who seemed to be e n t i r e l y out of 
touch with the campaign,»32 There were a l s o f e a r s that the s i t u a t i o n 
might a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t r e l a t i o n s with the Hymalayan S t a t e s of Bhutan, 
Sikkim, and l e p a l , each of which had separate agreements with both Tibet 
and China. Even before the D a l a i Lama a r r i v e d i n Yatung, Indian government 
p o l i c y was t h e r e f o r e s t i l l unformulated. 
On 22nd February Minto r e c e i v e d an account of events surrounding the 
D a l a i Lama's s t a y at Yatung from MacDonald. The v i s i t had c r e a t e d great 
problems f o r him s i n c e h i s guest had r e f u s e d to r e c e i v e a Chinese 
d e l e g a t i o n which had apparently been sent to ' d i s c u s s * h i s s i t u a t i o n . 
F i n d i n g h i m s e l f compromised, MacDonald was forced to support the D a l a i Lama 
and r e j e c t Chinese r e q u e s t s to see him, and h i s i n t e g r i t y was f u r t h e r 
t e s t e d by r e p o r t s t h a t a Chinese army of some three hundred men was at 
t h a t moment en-route f o r nearby P h a r i , and t h a t the s i t u a t i o n f o r the D a l a i 
- 122 -
Lama was l o o k i n g p r e c a r i o u s . I n s o l v i n g t h i s d e l i c a t e problem by a l l o w i n g 
the Tibetan p a r t y to s l i p q u i e t l y away from the mart, MacDonald cre a t e d 
even more problems f o r h i s government, as the e f f e c t of t h i s d e c i s i o n was 
to encourage h i s guest to b e l i e v e that he might f i n d sanctuary i n India.*33 
I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t the D a l a i Lama's contact with O'Connor i n Peking might 
a l s o have l e d him to t h i s c onclusion, and as Minto did not condemn 
MacDonald f o r h i s a c t i o n i n t e l l i n g the Tibetans to escape, i t i s p o s s i b l e 
t h a t he too had supported the plan f o r him to come to India, d e s p i t e the 
f a c t t h a t i t would c r e a t e t e n s i o n s with both the Chinese, and with Grey; 
yet another s i g n t h a t he was d i s c r e e t l y promoting Curzonian forward p o l i c y 
i n d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n to London.*37 
I n Peking meanwhile, the problem of how and when to approach the Chinese 
about the s i t u a t i o n i n T i b e t remained one of great concern to the B r i t i s h 
Charge d ' A f f a i r e s F r i e d r i c h Max-Muller who had r e p l a c e d Jordan during the 
l a t t e r ' s leave of absence. »34 Max-Muller had suggested t h a t , i n view of the 
events a t Yatung, the time was not yet r i p e f o r an o f f i c i a l approach to 
Peking, and t h a t i n s t e a d a l e s s d i r e c t attempt should be made to c l a r i f y 
the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n v i s a v i s t h e i r t r e a t i e s with both Rus s i a and 
China.»35 Morley f e l t t h a t one option might be to t a c t f u l l y e x p l a i n to 
China t h a t B r i t a i n could not be i n d i f f e r e n t to events on the f r o n t i e r and 
t h a t t h e r e f o r e , the nature and s c a l e of Chinese a c t i v i t y i n Tibet must be 
explained, s i n c e i t appeared to contravene e x i s t i n g t r e a t y agreements 
between B r i t a i n and China, He was e s p e c i a l l y keen moreover to ensure that 
any attempt made by the Chinese to take p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l i n Lhasa must be 
a c t i v e l y opposed by B r i t a i n , i n s p i t e of the non-involvement p o l i c y , s i n c e 
i t r e p resented a s e r i o u s t h r e a t to the s e t t l e d f r o n t i e r which had been the 
long term goal of B r i t i s h p o l i c y , * 3 6 Before Max-Nuller could approach the 
Wai Wu Pu with these o b s e r v a t i o n s however, matters were d r a m a t i c a l l y 
a l t e r e d by the announcement of a new Imperial Decree from Peking denouncing 
the D a l a i Lama, and s t r i p p i n g him of h i s powers and t i t l e s , * 3 7 
The Chinese f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r L i a n g Tu-yen had always denied knowledge of a 
Chinese i n v a s i o n , arguing t h a t Chinese troops were merely a c t i n g i n 
accordance with the T r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s r e q u i r i n g them to ' p o l i c e ' the 
Lhasa a r e a e f f e c t i v e l y , and although he admitted t h a t he had known about 
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t h e Decree, he t o l d Max-Muller t h a t he had simply 'forgotten' to mention i t 
to him, #38 Despite the f u r o r e occasioned by the Decree, Minto b e l i e v e d the 
D a l a i Lama's s p i r i t u a l r o l e to be quite unaffected, and he pressed ahead 
with a plan to i n v i t e him to I n d i a a s s p i r i t u a l l e a d e r of the Tibetan 
people, sending B e l l to D a r j e e l i n g to meet and welcome him. »39 
The D a l a i Lama's f l i g h t had d r a m a t i c a l l y a l t e r e d the f r o n t i e r s i t u a t i o n 
by c r e a t i n g an obvious vacuum i n Lhasa that could not be ignored. I t a l s o 
had wider p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r India, because on t h i s occasion 
he had not disappeared i n t o the h i n t e r l a n d s of Mongolia, but had chosen 
I n d i a a s a refuge, and i n so doing had involved B r i t a i n i n unavoidable 
c o n f l i c t with the Chinese which i n tu r n could not help but have 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s with Sepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim.#40 
B e l l was i n Bhutan n e g o t i a t i n g a Treaty when the Chinese i n v a s i o n of Lhasa 
took place, and he d i d not hear about the i n v a s i o n , or about the D a l a i 
Lama's dramatic f l i g h t u n t i l a few days l a t e r when he was urgently c a l l e d 
to D a r j e e l i n g . H i s f i r s t meeting with him, i n a D a r j e e l i n g hotel room, was 
unremarkable, and the 'squat f i g u r e ' before him, about whom he had heard so 
much, di d not look much l i k e a 'King*. In the months that followed t h i s 
i mpression a l t e r e d and soon a deep and long l a s t i n g f r i e n d s h i p developed 
between them t h a t was to have long term consequences f o r Anglo-Tibetan 
relations.»41 B e l l f e l t t h a t Morley's non-involvement p o l i c y had helped 
the promotion of China's forward p o l i c y , and as P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim 
r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a vast a r e a covering Bhutan, Sikkim, and Tibet, he both 
r e s e n t e d and f e a r e d the prospect of a permanent Chinese presence there. 
His e a r l i e r f r i e n d s h i p with the Panchen Lama had made him i n i t i a l l y 
s u s p i c i o u s of the D a l a i Lama's motives, but as t h e i r f r i e n d s h i p grew he 
became i n c r e a s i n g l y exasperated by h i s own government's Tibetan p o l i c y , 
b e l i e v i n g t h a t T i b e t ' s i n t e r e s t s were being ignored.»42 
He supported the D a l a i Lama's a n a y l s i s of events,agreeing that the problem 
was much wider than T i b e t and accepting t h a t the Chinese planned to c l a i m 
feudatory r i g h t s i n Bhutan and I e p a l . * 4 3 He a l s o knew that, although the 
D a l a i Lama's i n f l u e n c e was e x t e n s i v e i n Mongolia and S i b e r i a , as well as 
i n s i d e China i t s e l f , i t was not s u f f i c i e n t l y powerful to convince the 
reforming elements w i t h i n the Manchu Court to r e v e r s e t h e i r p o l i c y . 
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For these reasons, he was very worried about Chinese behaviour i n Tibet, 
f e a r i n g that i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with the Hymalayan 
S t a t e s were discounted i n London where everything was s t i l l being s a c i f i c e d 
to the p u r s u i t of non-involvement,*44 
Three months a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l i n D a r j e e l l n g , B e l l was t o l d to inform the 
D a l a i Lama th a t the I n d i a n government could not intervene between Tibet 
and China, He experienced c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t y i n g e t t i n g t h i s message 
a c r o s s because h i s f r i e n d simply re f u s e d to accept the d e c i s i o n , and 
continued to p r e s s f o r B r i t i s h help,*45 I n support of t h i s cause a number 
of Buddhist p r o t e s t s were organised by the D a l a i Lama's supporters and 
s ympathisers i n D a r j e e l i n g and although,as B e l l observed, the p r o t e s t s 
themselves had l i t t l e immediate e f f e c t on wider p u b l i c opinion i n I n d i a , 
they d i d l e a d to c o n s i d e r a b l e p u b l i c s p e c u l a t i o n about Chinese motives 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a s , i n the past,the Chinese themselves had complained about the 
type of f o r e i g n aggression they now appeared to be i n f l i c t i n g on Tibet. 
The e x o t i c presence of the D a l a i Lama and h i s e x t e n s i v e and growing r e t i n u e 
i n D a r j e e l i n g kept the i s s u e very much to the fore, c r e a t i n g concern f o r 
the s a f e t y of trade and commerce i n the area, as w e l l as g i v i n g the world's 
p r e s s ample opportunity to p u b l i c l y d i s s e c t B r i t a i n ' s r o l e . Had the Dalai 
Lama not come to I n d i a , Chinese a c t i v i t y i n these remote mountain regions 
would not have e x c i t e d n e a r l y so much a t t e n t i o n and the opinions of men 
l i k e B e l l , who had openly warned of the dangerous consequences involved i n 
i g n o r i n g Chinese forward p o l i c y , would have gone unheeded.*46 
B e l l continued to v i s i t the D a l a i Lama almost every week during the course 
of 1910, and although he knew t h a t there was l i t t l e he could do p o l i t i c a l l y 
to help T i b e t , he was able to a c q u i r e a sound understanding of Tibetan 
a t t i t u d e s and customs which proved i n v a l u a b l e to h i s government and 
enhanced h i s personal standing as the acknowledged expert on Tibet, a 
p o s i t i o n p r e v i o u s l y h e l d by Younghusband. *47 
Minto had d u t i f u l l y complied with Morley's i n s t r u c t i o n s not to intervene i n 
T i b e t a n a f f a i r s and had continued to t r e a t the D a l a i Lama as a p r i v a t e 
guest of the I n d i a n government. In a way the Decree deposing him had helped 
i n t h i s , s i n c e i t was now p o s s i b l e to welcome the D a l a i Lama as a v i s i t i n g 
s p i r i t u a l leader, and the whole i s s u e about what the Chinese could or 
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couldn't do i n T i b e t could be ignored.»48 Fe a r s t h a t the f l i g h t might 
provoke a response i n Sepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan were uppermost i n Minto's 
mind, outweighing concern he might otherwise have had f o r the D a l a i Lama's 
personal predicament. He was not b l i n d to the obvious f a c t t h a t , by 1910, 
t h e r e were at l e a s t two thousand Chinese troops i n T i b e t , and he could now 
accept the D a l a i Lama's argument th a t they were not merely there to guard 
t h e i r T i betan i n t e r e s t s . * 4 9 Comprehensive r e p o r t s from trade agents i n 
Gyantse and Yatung serv e d only to r e i n f o r c e h i s f e a r s and confirm h i s 
opinion t h a t something needed to be done to prevent the Chinese moving 
even c l o s e r to the I n d i a n f r o n t i e r . He a l s o knew t h a t B e l l possessed 
c o p i e s of the correspondence between the D a l a i Lama and those of h i s 
m i n i s t e r s s t i l l i n Lhasa confirming Tibetan a l l e g a t i o n s that the Chinese 
had put a p r i c e on the heads of m i n i s t e r s who had f l e d to I n d i a to be with 
t h e i r leader,and he b e l i e v e d t h a t the D a l a i Lama and h i s f o l l o w e r s should 
be given some p o l i t i c a l support; f i r s t l y , because t h e i r l i v e s were i n 
danger, but a l s o because, i f he returned to power i n T i b e t , I n d i a would 
again be d e a l i n g with him a s l e a d e r of the Tibetan government. »50 P a r t l y 
with t h i s i n mind he had c o l l e c t e d a s u b s t a n t i a l body of evidence r e l a t i n g 
to Chinese infringements of t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s which he was prepared to use 
to promote the D a l a i Lama's case i f necessary. His sense of urgency was 
f u r t h e r a l e r t e d by r e p o r t s coming from h i s m i l i t a r y a d v i s o r s of a f u r t h e r 
b u i l d up of troops i n the Assam Hymalayas and of renewed a c t i v i t y a t the 
Chinese g a r r i s o n i n Yatung, both of which he f e l t c o n s t i t u t e d a s e r i o u s 
menace to I n d i a n s e c u r i t y which could no longer be ignored. He t h e r e f o r e 
suggested to Morley t h a t the Chinese be asked, not only to reduce the s i z e 
of t h e i r g a r r i s o n a t Yatung, but t h a t they r e c a l l t h e i r Lhasa Amban L i e n 
Yu, whose unpopular p o l i c i e s and a t t i t u d e s he b e l i e v e d had provoked the 
D a l a i Lama's f l i g h t . * 5 1 Morley however had come to f e e l that the 'feeble 
r u l e of the D a l a i Lama' would be b e t t e r r e p l a c e d by a stronger Chinese 
c o n t r o l l e d government i n Lhasa, and was l e s s e n t h u s i a s t i c about g i v i n g 
support to the D a l a i Lama's r e t u r n . He asked Minto to monitor the f r o n t i e r 
s i t u a t i o n c l o s e l y , and encourage h i s guest to l i e low. In accordance with 
the s p i r i t of t h i s request, and i n an attempt to keep him occupied, Minto 
t h e r e f o r e i n v i t e d the D a l a i Lama to C a l c u t t a f o r a p r i v a t e audience.»52 
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The D a l a i Lama's v i s i t to C a l c u t t a on 14th March 1910 followed much the 
same p a t t e r n as t h a t of the Panchen Lama i n 1905. Lady Minto's d i a r y 
r e c a l l e d the o c c a s i o n a s a sad parody of the Panchen Lama's e a r l i e r 
i n t e r v i e w , the v i s i t o r making a s e r i e s of requests f o r support, which her 
husband p o l i t e l y but f i r m l y r e j e c t e d . • S S Even t h i s o f f l e a l rebuff did not 
d e f l a t e the D a l a i Lama however, and upon r e t u r n i n g to D a r j e e l i n g , he 
continued to bombard B e l l with demands th a t a B r i t i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e be 
sent to Lhasa to plead h i s case with the Chinese. On 18th A p r i l he asked 
the B r i t i s h to i n t e r v e n e d i r e c t l y to stop Chinese aggression i n h i s country 
and, when t h i s f a i l e d , he r e s o r t e d to begging f o r any kind of help. 
Younghusband's account of t h i s period comments wryly on the s p e c t a c l e of 
the D a l a i Lama begging f o r a f u r t h e r i n t e r v i e w with the Viceroy, when only 
a decade e a r l i e r t h e i r r o l e s had been reversed.*54 The more sympathetic 
a t t i t u d e adopted by B e l l and Minto towards the D a l a i Lama at t h i s time i s 
i n i t s e l f a r e f l e c t i o n of the changing a t t i t u d e of the I n d i a s e r v i c e 
towards T i b e t a n problens, f o s t e r e d by B e l l ' s burgeoning f r i e n d s h i p with the 
T i b e t a n Leader. T h i s new approach was not adopted by the men of the China 
s e r v i c e however, and Jordan i n p a r t i c u l a r continued to regard the D a l a i 
Lama a s a b a r r i e r to s u c c e s s f u l Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s , an a t t i t u d e t h a t 
was to have s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r future B r i t i s h d e a l i n g s with T i b e t . 
Having examined the r o l e played by the D a l a i Lama and the way i n which h i s 
f l i g h t to I n d i a acted as a c a t a l y s t i n f r o n t i e r r e l a t i o n s , r e v e a l i n g the 
i n d e c i s i o n and u n c e r t a i n t y of f r o n t i e r diplomacy,as well as the 
u n w i l l i n g n e s s to accept Chinese forward p o l i c y a s a t h r e a t i n London, 
I want to go on i n the next s e c t i o n to look a t the e f f e c t s of t h i s p o l i c y 
on the f r o n t i e r i t s e l f , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r the i m p l i c a t i o n s i t had f o r the 
men on the spot and f o r the I n d i a n government. 
3. THE MQRTH EAST FROITIER 
Between 1908 and 1910 there was a general perception amongst B r i t i s h 
personnel l i v i n g and working on the f r o n t i e r t h a t the non-involvement 
p o l i c y had s e r v e d only to i n c r e a s e Chinese i n f l u e n c e there to a point where 
i t t h r eatened I n d i a n s e c u r i t y , f e a r s exacerbated by the developing 
- 127 
Chinese i n t e r e s t i n the Hymalayan S t a t e s and i n the Assam Hymalayas. 
O'Connor was p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned about the l o s s of Chumbi V a l l e y which 
he had regarded as 'an a r e a of p e c u l i a r s i g n i f i c a n c e and importance', s i n c e 
i t now provided the Chinese with an easy a c c e s s to I n d i a . The V a l l e y , 
bounded on e i t h e r s i d e by Sikkim and Bhutan, enabled the Chinese to r e t a i n 
s i z e a b l e g a r r i s o n s w i t h i n one hundred m i l e s of the Indian border from which 
they might send out troops and o f f i c a l s to 'worry' B r i t i s h agents, and 
' i n t r i g u e ' with the r u l e r s of the Hymalayan S t a t e s , whose r e l a t i o n s with 
the B r i t i s h were s t i l l tenuous and i l l - d e f i n e d . * 5 5 O'Connor's f e a r s were 
supported by Wilton, who a l s o agreed that B r i t i s h f r o n t i e r p o l i c y ought to 
be prepared t o f a c e the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the Chinese might use t h i s a s a 
convenient base from which to launch an a t t a c k on India.*56 
The P o l i t i c a l s were not the only people able to a p p r e c i a t e t h i s p o t e n t i a l 
Chinese t h r e a t however, and r e p o r t s by the China Inland missionary R i d l e y 
French i n Kansu, r e v e a l e d widespread f e a r amongst B r i t i s h m i s s i o n a r i e s 
working on the f r o n t i e r t h a t Chinese p r e s t i g e had been gained at B r i t i s h 
expense. Although Jordan was quick to d i s a s s o c i a t e himself from t h i s 
extreme viev/, he too was concerned about the l a c k of a Consular presence i n 
the region.*57 The s i t u a t i o n was becoming so dangerous i n f a c t that even 
f o r e i g n observers l i k e the Swedish e x p l o r e r Sven Hedin, who had himself 
s u f f e r e d the e f f e c t s of the non-involvement p o l i c y , f e l t that t h i s s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s looked very ominous f o r f u t u r e B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s on the 
frontier.»58 
I n Simla, concern turned to widespread alarm as the months passed, and i n a 
c o n f i d e n t i a l r e p o r t w r i t t e n i n Sovember 1910, at the c l o s e of Minto's 
V i c e r o y a l t y , I n d i a n F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y Harcourt B u t l e r described the 
d e t e r i o r a t i n g f r o n t i e r s i t u a t i o n i n great d e t a i l , s t r e s s i n g the Chinese 
advance a s a p o s i t i v e t h r e a t to Indian s e c u r i t y . His report recommended an 
urgent r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of the army on the f r o n t i e r s i n c e , as he pointed out, 
the t e r r i t o r y there was l i t t l e more than a wilderness, with 'nothing to 
speak of between Sepal and C a l c u t t a ' . L i k e B e l l , Harcourt B u t l e r was 
convinced of the need to e s t a b l i s h formal t r e a t y t i e s with Bhutan, and to 
s t r e n g t h e n e x i s t i n g l i n k s between I n d i a and the other Hymalayan S t a t e s i n 
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order to avoid a r e p e t i t i o n of the events of 1903, when the main t h r e a t to 
Ind i a n s e c u r i t y had appeared to come from Russia,*59 
There were three main f a c t o r s i n f r o n t i e r p o l i c y between lovember 1908 and 
November 1910 which I b e l i e v e to be important and which I w i l l now examine 
i n d e t a i l . F i r s t l y , the d i r e c t t h r e a t to Indian s e c u r i t y posed by apparent 
Chinese i n t e r e s t s i n the Hymalayan S t a t e s . Secondly, the e f f e c t s of the 
i n c r e a s e i n Chinese p r e s t i g e and i n f l u e n c e on B r i t i s h trade and commercial 
development. And t h i r d l y , the re-emergence of what many b e l i e v e d to be an 
unhealthy R u s s i a n i n t e r e s t i n the f r o n t i e r made i n August by the Kozlov 
E x p e d i t i o n , and the t h r e a t which t h i s seemed to pose f o r the fut u r e of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention a s we l l a s to the maintenance of the Anglo-
Japanese A l l i a n c e . 
4. I I D I A I POLICY AID THE HYMALAYAI STATES 
B r i t i s h r e l a t i o n s with the Hymalayan S t a t e s of l e p a l , Sikkim, and Bhutan 
had never been adequately defined by t r e a t y , d e s p i t e the f a c t that they 
were regarded by I n d i a a s important a s p e c t s of t h e i r north-east f r o n t i e r 
p o l i c y , p r o v i d i n g a b u f f e r beyond I n d i a ' s f r o n t i e r , and a f f o r d i n g 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r commercial and i n d u s t r i a l development and the s a f e 
expansion of B r i t i s h i n f l u e n c e i n the area. As Chinese forward p o l i c y 
began to a f f e c t these s t a t e s , B r i t i s h f e a r s f o r the s a f e t y of the f r o n t i e r 
r e s u r f a c e d , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r the appointment of Chang Yin-tang a s High 
Commisioner f o r the f r o n t i e r , whose o b s t r u c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s i n Tibet have 
been d e s c r i b e d i n Chapter Four.*60 
Nepal was a l r e a d y h e a v i l y o b l i g a t e d to China under the t r e a t y of 1792, 
signed a f t e r her h u m i l i a t i n g defeat a t Tibetan hands, that r e q u i r e d her to 
send a t r i b u t e to Peking every f i v e years, and, although she always denied 
th a t t h i s made her a v a s s a l of the Chinese, the Indian government 
were concerned t h a t , i f the Chinese made any formal c l a i m s f o r s u z e r a i n t y , 
the Nepalese f e a r of China a s the more powerful s t a t e would o v e r r i d e 
any informal commitments made to them. T h i s concern i n c r e a s e d a s Chinese 
i n f l u e n c e developed,and t e n s i o n s were not eased by Chang's announcement 
t h a t he proposed to make a ' f r i e n d l y ' v i s i t to Katmandu i n 1907,*61 
The Nepalese meanwhile had t h e i r own reasons f o r r e s i s t i n g China's 
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a t t e n t i o n s since,under the terms of the 1792 Treaty,Sepal had agreed to 
come to T i b e t ' s a i d i n the event of a f o r e i g n i n v a s i o n . The Sepalese, 
professed to take t h i s o b l i g a t i o n very s e r i o u s l y , and although they had 
f a i l e d to provide m i l i t a r y support during the Younghusband 'invasion', 
o f f e r i n g only mediation s e r v i c e s , they had maintained strong l i n k s with 
T i b e t through t h e i r o f f l e a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Lhasa, and enjoyed a t h r i v i n g 
f r o n t i e r trade with them which they could i l l a f f o r d to jeopardize. «62 In 
c o n t r a s t , Sepalese l i n k s with B r i t a i n were informal. I n A p r i l 1908 the 
Sepalese Prime M i n i s t e r Chandra Shamsher Jang had v i s i t e d England 
accompanied by Colonel Manners-Smith, the B r i t i s h Resident at Katmandu, 
whom he regarded a s a personal f r i e n d , and Sepalese Gurkhas had already 
made themselves q u i t e i n d i s p e n s a b l e to the depleted Indian army charged 
with the t a s k of guarding the v a s t Indian f r o n t i e r . »63 
Wilton, seconded from the China S e r v i c e i n 1907 to a c t a s a d v i s o r to the 
1908 Trade Regulation t a l k s i n I n d i a , had w r i t t e n a s u b s t a n t i v e report on 
the S o r t h - E a s t f r o n t i e r i n tha t year, and had concluded that Sepal had 
every reason 'to show China emnity'. By 1910 however, the s i t u a t i o n had 
changed,and Harcourt B u t l e r was r e p o r t i n g i n c r e a s i n g Chinese pressure and 
a d e t e r i o r a t i n g s i t u a t i o n i n the are a a s Chinese t h r e a t s to the 
Sep a l e s e / T i b e t a n trade were p u t t i n g Chandra Shamsher Jang i n danger of 
l o s i n g the support of h i s people. B u t l e r advised t h e r e f o r e t h a t I n d i a 
should 'consult him f r e e l y ' l e s t 'he take offence'and s i n c e h i s l o y a l t y to 
B r i t a i n was being s e v e r e l y t e s t e d by these events.*64 
R e l a t i o n s with the B r i t i s h p r otected s t a t e of Sikkim were s t i l l extremely 
d e l i c a t e i n 1907.During h i s tenure a s P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim, Claude 
Whltehad experienced great problems i n h i s d e a l i n g s with the r u l i n g Rajah 
and h i s Tibetan Rani.*65The Rani was openly h o s t i l e towards h i s government 
and f i e r c e l y opposed h i s programme of 'reform' f o r her adopted country. 
The i n t r o d u c t i o n of a number of Sepalese c o l o n i s t s whom he had i n v i t e d to 
work the p o t e n t i a l l y a r a b l e land i n Sikkim had involved e x t e n s i v e f e l l i n g 
of the f o r e s t s and, together with the ambitious mining, bridge b u i l d i n g 
and road b u i l d i n g schemes he introduced,had generated much popular i l l -
f e e l i n g because they i n t e r f e r e d with the t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n s of farming 
and g r a z i n g , being based on a popular western misconception that 
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land which was not s e t t l e d was not used.*66 When B e l l took over i n 1908 
the s i t u a t i o n remained tense, and despite the f a c t t h a t , i n B e l l ' s opinion, 
Sikkim's r u l e r remained a 'mere puppet' i n B r i t i s h hands, the Rani's overt 
h o s t i l i t y was an obvious danger t h a t could not be e n t i r e l y ignored.»67 In 
the event B e l l ' s f e a r s proved unfounded because, as Wilton had discovered 
d u r i n g a t r i p t o Gantok i n 1906, Sikkim had r e s i s t e d Chang's attempts t o 
enter i n t o secret t a l k s w i t h him j u s t as f i r m l y as they had e a r l i e r 
r e s i s t e d B r i t i s h reforms.fes However,because no Chinese l i v e d there, and 
because they had no feudatory r i g h t s of any kind i n Sikkim, Harcourt B u t l e r 
was able t o conclude i n 1910 t h a t the country was not under t h r e a t from 
China. *69 
Relations w i t h Bhutan were less s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . I n 1907 Wilton had 
described the country as 'a small poor s t a t e w i t h a dwindling population of 
some 350,000' most of whom were 'ignorant and backward' and i s o l a t e d from 
other p a r t s of the region by 'poor t r a n s p o r t a t i o n l i n k s ' . »70 
Tsonga Penlop, who had become Maharajah i n 1907, had previously v i s i t e d 
B r i t a i n i n 1905, and l i k e the Hepalese Resident had made himself a v a i l a b l e 
t o the B r i t i s h as a mediator during the Younghusband Expedition and i n the 
d i f f i c u l t p e r i o d of n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the Tibetans t h a t followed. Unlike 
the Rani i n Sikkim, Tsonga Penlop was an e n t h u s i a s t i c supporter of B r i t i s h 
plans t o improve and update h i s country, and he gave f u l l support t o 
White's programme of reform i n Bhutan. Seizing the opportunity t h i s 
g o o d w i l l afforded. B e l l had t h e r e f o r e l e d n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a f r i e n d s h i p 
t r e a t y w i t h Bhutan i n 1909, a t r e a t y which Harcourt B u t l e r and Eric Wilton 
had been foremost i n promoting, and which was intended t o cement e x i s t i n g 
t i e s w i t h Bhutan and b r i n g them under formal B r i t i s h protection.»71 This 
was a l l the more urgent since the Chinese t h r e a t t o Bhutan was stronger 
than t h a t of any other Hymalayan s t a t e and was pressed f a r more vigorously. 
Bhutan's p o s i t i o n close t o Chumbi Valley made her p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable 
t o Chinese at t a c k . Bhutanese t r a d e r s had always been aggressive i n t h e i r 
dealings w i t h Tibetans, and there was a h i s t o r y of f r o n t i e r i n c i d e n t s which 
China had been f r e q u e n t l y c a l l e d upon t o help resolve.*72 
I n h i s r e p o r t on the North-East f r o n t i e r i n 1907 Wilton had established 
t h a t Chang had threatened t o send an army i n t o Bhutan t o r e a f f i r m Chinese 
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r i g h t s , and B e l l liad i n t e r c e p t e d documents passed t o him by the B r i t i s h 
agent Ugyen Kazi i n which the Chinese appeared t o assume t h a t they had 
suzerain r i g h t s there.»73 By A p r i l 1908 alarming r e p o r t s also began t o 
reach the Indian government t h a t a Chinese o f f i c a l known as Ma Chi Fu 
was en route t o Bhutan w i t h a 'small army' of about twenty Chinese 
soldiers.#74 Although Chang's 'army' and Ma's 'invasionary force', proved 
t o be f u r t h e r examples of w i l d rumours possibly perpetuated by the 
Chinese theaselves, they served t o f u r t h e r h i g h l i g h t the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of 
the area a f t e r the B r i t i s h withdrawal from Chumbi.and by 1910 B r i t i s h trade 
agents, w i t h the support of Harcourt B u t l e r , began t o press even more 
s t r o n g l y f o r a road t h a t would d i r e c t l y l i n k Bhutan t o India, and f o r 
' l o c a l experts* t o advise them on how they might best respond t o f u t u r e 
Chinese interference.*75 
As w e l l as the problems i n the Hymalayan States, the s i t u a t i o n i n Assam 
became i n c r e a s i n g l y tense f o r the Indian government as a r e s u l t of 
Chao Erh-feng's a c t i v i t y i n the region. From 1909 B e l l ' s r e p o r t s were 
s t a r t i n g t o demonstrate an a p p r e c i a t i o n of the extent of t h i s a c t i v i t y as 
we l l as the nature of the t h r e a t i t posed t o the s e c u r i t y of t h a t part of 
the f r o n t i e r . * 7 6 
5. THE TIBETAI TRADE MARTS 
A f t e r the withdrawal from Chumbi and the conclusion of the Trade 
Regulations i n 1908, B r i t i s h Trade Agents working on the f r o n t i e r were l e f t 
i n an i n v i d i o u s p o s i t i o n . Although the Indian government was able t o 
support them and Chinese o f f i c a l s were w i l l i n g t o t o l e r a t e t h e i r continuing 
presence, a c o n f l i c t soon developed between London and India, the former 
s t i l l anxious t o l i m i t a l l f r o n t i e r involvement, and the l a t t e r keen t o 
press f o r more adequate p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e i r employees and f o r the valuable 
trade they were promoting. As Chinese p r e s t i g e grew and B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e 
diminished a f t e r 1908, the s i t u a t i o n f o r the P o l i t i c a l s became 
pr o g r e s s i v e l y hazardous.*77 
I n February 1908 Trade Reports from the marts at Yatung, Gyantse, and 
Gartok, contained graphic accounts of d i r e c t i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h Indian 
trade by Chinese and Tibetan o f f i c a l s which B r i t i s h trade agents 
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found themselves powerless t o prevent.»78 The Indian government was 
w i l l i n g t o accept t h a t a t Gyantse, the volume of trade alone was not 
s u f f i c e n t t o j u s t i f y the r e t e n t i o n of a B r i t i s h agent;however, much time 
and e f f o r t had already been expended i n s o r t i n g out the Trade Regulations, 
and such trade as there was i n tea and wool was valuable t o them. 
I n a d d i t i o n , powerful vested i n t e r e s t s i n London and India favoured the 
r e t e n t i o n of B r i t i s h Trade Agents at the marts t o protect t h e i r stock and 
t h e i r traders.»79 
At Gartok a s o r t of compromise had been achieved w i t h the appointment of 
a n a t i v e o f f i c e r . Trade i n West Tibet was f l o u r i s h i n g and the 
i n t e r f e r e n c e of l o c a l Tibetan o f f i c a l s d i d not present such a p o s i t i v e 
t h r e a t t o Indian trade as i t d i d elsewhere,the l e v y i n g of what the 
B r i t i s h r e f e r r e d t o as ' i l l e g a l ' l o c a l dues, being r e a l l y a symptom of 
l o c a l Tibetan confidence r a t h e r than a manifestation of greater Chinese 
control.#80 The s i t u a t i o n a t Yatung and Gyantse was more v o l a t i l e . 
At Yatung the B r i t i s h Trade Agent, David MacDonald, was subjected t o 
almost d a i l y verbal abuse as h i s a u t h o r i t y at the mart was o v e r t l y 
challenged, and at Gyantse, the s i t u a t i o n looked equally ominous. 
With the t h r e a t t o the personal s a f e t y of h i s o f f i c e r s growing, Minto 
began t o demand stronger m i l i t a r y escorts a t the marts instead of 
agreeing t o the immediate withdrawal suggested by London. He d i d 
t h i s f o r three reasons. F i r s t l y , because he knew t h a t the Chinese were 
already w i l l i n g t o accept escorts of up t o f i f t y men at each mart which, 
though inadequate by Indian standards, was l a r g e r than the e x i s t i n g 
escort. Secondly, because the Chinese considered what they described as 
the 'lawlessness' at the marts t o be a temporary phenomenon and the r e s u l t 
of f a l s e Tibetan confidence t h a t would q u i c k l y evaporate as the r e a l i t y of 
Chinese c o n t r o l became accepted.#81 And f i n a l l y , because he f e l t t h a t 
unless the roads and t r a c k s leading t o the marts were made safe, Indo-
Tibetan trade would cease almost e n t i r e l y as had been the case i n Chumbi, 
where Tibetan t r a d e r s had feared Chinese r e p r i s a l s f o r t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o 
co-operate w i t h the B r i t i s h d uring the occupation of the Valley.•82 When 
Morley agreed t o support Minto, Grey was f i n a l l y persuaded t h a t unless 
protected, the trade marts were p o t e n t i a l l y vulnerable t a r g e t s f o r Chinese 
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and Tibetan aggression and would t h e r e f o r e u l t i m a t e l y pose a t h r e a t t o 
B r i t i s h s e c u r i t y . For I n d i a the issue of trade was s u f f i c i e n t l y important 
i n i t s e l f t o j u s t i f y the r i s k s involved i n p r o t e c t i n g i t , even i n the face 
of o p p o s i t i o n from London, and a d d i t i o n a l pressure from tea companies i n 
In d i a and London e v e n t u a l l y persuaded Morley t o re-open t a l k s on the 
f r o n t i e r tea trade,deferred since 1893, on the grounds t h a t the 1908 Trade 
Regulations had completely f a i l e d t o s e t t l e the issue.*83 ProblenB over 
the trade had come t o a head i n February 1909 when Chinese o f f i c i a l s at 
Yatung had seized, and returned t o India, four cases of Indian tea t h a t had 
a r r i v e d a t the mart f o r sale.*84 By 1910 the s i t u a t i o n had d e t e r i o r a t e d t o 
such an extent t h a t Grey s e r i o u s l y considered r a i s i n g the matter d i r e c t l y 
w i t h the Chinese. However, the s i t u a t i o n was complicated by the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n t r y i n g t o convince the Chinese t o do something 
about improving trade when they were keenly promoting t h e i r own product 
i n s i d e Tibet. *85 By June 1910 t h e r e f o r e Grey decided t h a t a b e t t e r 
approach might be t o l i n k the question of tea w i t h the wider issue of 
l e v y i n g a general trade t a r i f f , i n order t o secure agreements w i t h the 
Chinese which would ensure t h a t there could be no f u r t h e r ' i n c i d e n t s ' 
concerning trade disputes on the f r o n t i e r which might threaten the safety 
of Indian government employees. He also f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t t h i s 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o co-operate on B r i t a i n ' s part could be presented as a 
bargaining t o o l i n f u t u r e dealings w i t h the Chinese on other issues 
connected both t o Tibet, and t o the Hymalayan States.*86 
The l i n k t h a t developed between the tea question and wider p o l i t i c a l 
issues i n Anglo-Chinese t a l k s a l so s u i t e d Minto who, thwarted i n h i s 
attempts t o introduce O'Connor as a trade delegate t o the t a l k s , was 
subsequently able t o e x p l o i t the s i t u a t i o n by i n s i s t i n g t h a t a general 
s o l u t i o n be found t o other n i g g l i n g trade issues, l i k e the Tibetan 
monopolies over c e r t a i n aspects of trade which were preventing the smooth 
development of India's commercial ventures i n Tibet.»87 
Trade thus became an important p o l i t i c a l reason f o r the maintenance of a 
B r i t i s h presence on the f r o n t i e r , j u s t as trade i n t r a d i t i o n a l commodities 
l i k e wool and tea became v i t a l l y important t o the t o t t e r i n g Indian econony. 
The p e r s i s t a n t i n t e r e s t i n trade, as w e l l as the development of the mining 
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and t o u r i s t p o t e n t i a l of the r e l a t i v e l y safe north-east f r o n t i e r , also 
continued t o provide a r e a l i n c e n t i v e f o r the continuance of B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s i n Tibet a t a time when p o l i t i c a l withdrawal was being advocated 
i n London. •SS 
The problem of p r o v i d i n g e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n f o r Indian government 
employees at the trade marts became more acute between 1908 and the summer 
of 1910. As tensions escalated, and as an insurance against sudden 
outbreaks of violence against h i s men, Minto proposed, and Morley 
sanctioned, a sizeable b u i l d up of Indian troops on the f r o n t i e r which 
became a source of major concern, not only t o China, but also t o the 
Russians and Japanese who monitored the s i t u a t i o n closely.*89 By the 
summer of 1910 the tens i o n was t o some extent d i f f u s e d by the w i l l i n g n e s s 
of the Chinese government t o provide w r i t t e n guarantees t o prote c t the 
trade marts, and i n August 1910 Morley ordered Minto t o organise the 
disbanding of t h i s f r o n t i e r force. For the moment at leas t the fear of 
d i r e c t c o n f l i c t between B r i t a i n and China seemed t o have been averted,*90 
6. THE KQZLQV EXPEDITIQH AID THE PROBLEM QF KOKQIQR 
The Kozlov 'Mongolian Expedition' of 1907-10 re-opened the whole subject of 
s c i e n t i f i c mission which had been neatly shelved by the ' l o t e s ' attached t o 
the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Grey had been we l l aware at the time 
of s i g n i n g t h a t t h i s would not be the end of the matter as the l o t e s were 
r e a l l y a compromise, adopted as much t o a l l a y Morley's anxiety about 
f r o n t i e r involvements than as a r e a l attempt t o solve the problem, which now 
resurfaced w i t h i n months of t h e i r e x p i r y on 31st August 1910.»91 
The Kozlov Expedition focused a t t e n t i o n once again on the need t o define 
and record the boundaries of Tibet, exposing the p o t e n t i a l f r a g i l i t y of the 
Anglo-Russian settlement. Colonel Kozlov already enjoyed a considerable 
r e p u t a t i o n i n B r i t a i n as an experienced Central Asian t r a v e l l e r and had 
been a member of two previous expeditions t o the area i n 1886, and i n 1889. 
He had subsequently l e d h i s own exp e d i t i o n t o Mongolia i n 1900,and while 
there he had explored p a r t s of Eastern Tibet. His previous Mongolian 
Expedition had already aroused B r i t i s h concern, and when news of h i s second 
Expedition reached London and India i n 1906,there was a reawakening of o l d 
concerns. By 1908, a year a f t e r the Mission had a c t u a l l y l e f t 
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S t . P e t e r s b u r g , B r i t i s h a n x i e t y about i t s progress increased when r e l i a b l e 
r e p o r t s reached them t h a t Kozlov had a l t e r e d course and was moving i n a 
d i r e c t i o n not published i n h i s i t i n e r a r y . T h e Expedition had been the 
subject of w i l d and inaccurate press speculation which served t o f u r t h e r 
complicate the issue, but i t s s t a t u s and aims had been o f f i c a l l y sanctioned 
by the Tsar himself who had also helped t o fund i t , and the d e t a i l e d 
i t i n e r a r y published i n the press had i n i t i a l l y helped t o calm fears of 
i n t r i g u e which,in the past,had aroused suspicions i n the case of less 
p u b l i c i s e d missions.*92 The declared purpose of the Expedition was t o 
undertake'geographical,ethnographical,and p h y s i o l o g i c a l researches i n t o the 
more inaccessible regions of Mongolia'. I t was t o consist of t h i r t e e n 
s c i e n t i s t s , i n c l u d i n g b o t a n i s t s and topographers, and was t o take three 
years t o complete; l e a v i n g Moscow on 24th November 1907, and r e t u r n i n g 
there i n December 1910. I t was t o be s p i l t i n t o three 'periods'. The f i r s t , 
c h r i s t e n e d the 'Mongolian', would explore the Alashan area of South 
Mongolia between lovember 1907 and e a r l y autumn 1908. The second, or 
'Kokonor' period, begining i n autumn 1908,and ending i n s p r i n g 1909, would 
explore the Kokonor region of Bast Tibet and would include a study of the 
sacred Kokonor lake. The t h i r d and f i n a l period, known as the 'Szechuan' 
would explore the region around Sung-pan-t'ing from s p r i n g 1909, a f t e r 
which time the p a r t y would make t h e i r way back t o Moscow. 
The venture created a number of problems f o r Grey, F i r s t l y , he was anxious 
t h a t as most of the Expedition members held army rank, there might be more 
t o the mission than i t s s t a t e d aim of s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Secondly, 
i t was already known t h a t Kozlov had gone out of h i s way t o meet and t a l k 
w i t h the Dalai Lama dur i n g h i s p e r i o d of e x i l e at Urga. T h i r d l y , and of 
most concern t o Grey, was h i s plan t o explore the s t i l l undefined Kokonor 
wilderness which Iz v o l s k y had agreed t h a t Kozlov would not enter when the 
matter had been r a i s e d during the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the Convention i n 
1907.*93 
To some extent the involvement of m i l i t a r y personnel i n such an expedition 
could be e a s i l y explained since, as Izvolsky t o l d Grey, most o f f i c a l posts 
i n Russia were f i l l e d by m i l i t a r y personnel and t h a t the B r i t i s h were i n no 
p o s i t i o n t o complain, since the Younghusband Expedition had also been 
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dominated by men of m i l i t a r y rank. Kozlov's unscheduled v i s i t t o the Dalai 
Lama presented both sides w i t h greater p r o b l e i s however,particularly i n 
view of r e p o r t s from the B r i t i s h missionary French-Ridley, based i n Sining, 
who claimed t h a t Kozlov was already 'very f r i e n d l y ' w i t h the Dalai Lama, 
having met him 'at l e a s t t w e n t y - f i v e times' i n Urga during 1907. French-
Ridley also reported t h a t he had himself e n t e r t a i n e d Kozlov at Sining and 
had been very impressed by h i s f l u e n t Mongolian which allowed him t o move 
f r e e l y around Kansu without o b s t r u c t i o n from Chinese o f f i c a l s . He also 
believed t h a t the presence of B u r i a t s i n the Kozlov p a r t y had helped t o 
increase h i s c r e d i b i l i t y w i t h the Dalai Lama and h i s followers,*94 
I n a second, even more alarming r e p o r t , t h e missionary described the way 
i n which Kozlov had l e f t the main p a r t y and had taken a special detour i n 
order t o see the Dalai Lama at Kumbum. On t h i s occasion he had stayed f o r 
several days,enjoying 'a s e r i e s of in t e r v i e w s ' w i t h the Dalai Lama which 
French-Ridley found p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s t r e s s i n g , s i n c e i t was obvious t h a t the 
Russian was now p r o v i d i n g much needed support and f r i e n d s h i p t o the Dalai 
Lama at a time when he was f e e l i n g r e l a t i v e l y i s o l a t e d , having out-stayed 
h i s welcome at Kumbum and having q u a r r e l l e d w i t h the Abbot. Ridley French 
f u r t h e r suggested t h a t t h e i r new found intimacy might even 
lead t o a f o s t e r i n g of unhealthy l i n k s between Russia and Tibet, although 
he was quick t o discount the rumours t h a t D o r j i e v had been w i t h the 
Kozlov party.*95 Jordan was keen t o disassociate himself from some of the 
more o v e r t l y p o l i t i c a l comments i n the French-Ridley re p o r t s , the tone and 
content of which reveal a d i s t i n c t l y Curzonian approach t o f r o n t i e r 
p o l i t i c s , but these views were shared by many other missionaries who worked 
i n the remoter p a r t s of the f r o n t i e r , many of whom f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t the 
f r u i t s of the Younghusband Expedition had been wasted by the 
non-involvement p o l i c y t h a t had harmed B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e , making t h e i r work 
even more d i f f i c u l t and dangerous than i t might otherwise have been.*96 
I n August 1909 the War O f f i c e i n London addressed a communication t o the 
Foreign O f f i c e on the subject of Kozlov's presence i n Kokonor which 
contained an a r t i c l e from the Russian newspaper 'Russki I n v a l i d ' d escribing 
the work of the Kokonor period. The War O f f i c e was mainly worried about 
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the possible e f f e c t t h a t the Expedition might have on the l o c a l population, 
who regarded the Kokonor lake as sacred,and who were already r e f e r r i n g t o 
those members of the Russian p a r t y who had s a i l e d on the lake and survived 
as 'magicians'.*97 Although f o r the most part a barren wilderness 
i n h a b i t e d by h o s t i l e tribes,many of whom were not Tibetan i n o r i g i n , the 
area had s t r a t e g i c and possible commercial value f o r B r i t a i n , and the War 
O f f i c e were anxious t o avoid any 'i n c i d e n t s ' amongst the v o l a t i l e l o c a l 
p o p u l a t i o n as a r e s u l t of the Russian presence there. The f i r s t s t i r r i n g s 
of the f i e r c e debate about Kokonor t h a t would d i v i d e the B r i t i s h during the 
Simla t a l k s of 1912 began t o emerge at t h i s time as i t became obvious t o 
a l l concerned t h a t the region needed t o be accurately defined e i t h e r as 
p a r t of Tib e t or pa r t ofChina, and i s i n I t s e l f an i n d i c a t i o n of the way i n 
which western diplomatic p r a c t i c e had begun t o a f f e c t even the remotest 
regions of the world which had h i t h e r t o comfortably survived without the 
need t o f o r m a l l y belong t o any organised s t a t e or country. 
The Kozlov Expedition had been the subject of great diplomatic and press 
a t t e n t i o n , but i t was not the only s c i e n t i f i c e x p e d i t i o n i n the area at the 
time. Rumours and counter rumours about other ventures helped t o r a i s e the 
l e v e l of suspicion between Russia and B r i t a i n which disturbed the d e l i c a t e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between them du r i n g and a f t e r the s i g n i n g of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention. The Kozlov issue also r a i s e d the whole question of the way i n 
which f u t u r e d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s should be conducted on the f r o n t i e r and 
and what might be considered by both sides t o be an acceptable l e v e l of 
i n t e r e s t i n the area. Jordan and Grey were both agreed t h a t the Expedition 
had strayed i n t o Tibetan t e r r i t o r y during i t s e x p l o r a t i o n of Kokonor and i n 
doing so had contravened the terms of the Convention however, they both 
they both f e l t t h a t there was nothing t o be gained by pursuing t h i s point 
since no formal t e r r i t o r i a l claims t o the region had subsequently been made 
by Russia. The matter was t h e r e f o r e d i s c r e e t l y dropped a f t e r a b r i e f 
exchange of correspondence w i t h St. Petersburg, i n which the Russians 
confirmed t h a t the purpose of the Expedition had been purely s c i e n t i f i c . # 9 8 
The commercial p o s s i b i l i t e s of Kokonor had already been e x p l o i t e d by 
American companies who had agents posted i n key v i l l a g e s and towns 
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throughout the region from which they organised the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of the 
raw product t o C a l i f o r n i a . For B r i t a i n the p o s s i b l l t i e s of developing 
trade i n Kokonor were outweighed at t h i s time by the need t o ensure th a t an 
area of such an s t r a t e g i c importance should not be allowed t o f a l l 
e x c l u s i v e l y i n t o Russian or Chinese hands and the area was not f o r g o t t e n . 
I n 1911, and again i n 1917, t h e r e f o r e steps were taken by the B r i t i s h t o 
f u r t h e r explore and chart i t . # 9 9 
COCTCLUSIQIS 
The pe r i o d between September 1908 and November 1910 was a time of tension 
and f r u s t r a t i o n f o r the P o l i t i c a l s working on the f r o n t i e r when B r i t i s h 
p r e s t i g e appeared t o have reached an a l l time low,and when ensuring t h e i r 
personal s a f e t y became a r e a l problem f o r the Indian Government. P o l i t i c a l 
events i n s i d e China, and i n p a r t i c u l a r the Chinese forward campaign being 
conducted by the Chao brothers from Szechuan, were i n t e r p r e t e d by both the 
B r i t i s h and Indian governments as a t h r e a t t o t h e i r plans f o r the Hymalayan 
States, as w e l l as a p o t e n t i a l danger t o the s e c u r i t y of the Indian 
f r o n t i e r . 
B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Tibet began t o change as soon as i t became obvious t h a t 
the non-Involvement p o l i c y could not be continued i n the face of t h i s overt 
Chinese advance and the obvious f r a g i l i t y of the Anglo-Russian Convention, 
exposed by the events surrounding the Kozlov Expedition, and by p e r s i s t i n g 
rumours of c o n t i n u i n g l i n k s between the Dalai Lama and Russia. The need t o 
take stock and decide what f u t u r e B r i t i s h Tibetan p o l i c y was r e a l l y t o be 
about became a matter of some urgency as the Chinese advanced f u r t h e r i n t o 
the Assam Hymalayas. 
I n the next Chapter I w i l l examine the way i n which these problems were 
addressed by a change i n B r i t i s h f r o n t i e r p o l i c y a f t e r Morley's and Minto's 
departure i n 1910, and by the p o s i t i v e attempt t o define the boundaries of 
Tib e t . 
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CHA.F>TER S I X 
REVOLOTIQI AID REPUBLIC: THE ROAD TO SIMLA 
.OCTOBER 1910 - OCTOBER 1913 
During lovember 1910 Lord Hardlnge and Lord Crewe replaced Mlnto 
and Morley r e s p e c t i v e l y as Viceroy and Secretary of State f o r 
I n d i a . * 1 As both were men w i t h considerable experience of high 
o f f i c e , i t was a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t t h e i r p o l i t i c a l m a t u r i t y would 
lead t o a peaceful c o n t i n u a t i o n of the s t a t u s quo i n Tibetan p o l i c y 
and an avoidance of the c o n f l i c t s t h a t had helped t o prevent 
e f f e c t i v e dec!sion-making during the Minto/Morley a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 
W i t h i n months of t h e i r t a k i n g o f f i c e however, Indian f r o n t i e r p o l i c y 
had been completely a l t e r e d as London began t o accept t h a t Chinese 
forward p o l i c y was becoming a r e a l t h r e a t t o Tibetan s e c u r i t y which 
they could no longer ignore, and as r e v o l u t i o n a r y events i n s i d e China 
s t a r t e d t o d i r e c t l y a f f e c t the f r o n t i e r . 
I n t h i s Chapter I w i l l f i r s t l y examine the events surrounding the 
dec i s i o n t o abandon the non-involvement p o l i c y . Secondly, discuss the 
nature of the changes t o the f r o n t i e r bought about by the Revolution 
of 1911 and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Anglo-Tibetan p o l i c y ; before f i n a l l y 
l o o k i n g at the way i n which the c o n f l i c t t h a t developed between the 
B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e and the new Chinese Republican Government 
l e d d i r e c t l y t o the opening of the T r i p a r t i t e Talks at Simla at which 
I n d i a , China, and Tibet came together t o t r y t o solve the problem of 
d e l i m i t i n g the f r o n t i e r and e s t a b l i s h i n g c l e a r boundaries f o r Tibet. 
S Z E C j H U A N 
(0 
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1. CHIIESE IIFILTRATION I I ASSAM 
One of the main reasons behind the d e c i s i o n t o abandon the non-involvement 
p o l i c y was the r e s u l t of the e s c a l a t i o n i n Chinese a c t i v i t y i n areas close 
t o the Indian border i n Assam and Tawang, both remote t r i b a l regions of the 
Hymalayas about which l i t t l e was known.*2 
The Chinese invasion of Lhasa i n February 1910 had made i t t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
possible f o r them t o launch an a t t a c k on Assam and Central Tibet,using 
the c i t y as a base. I t was already known t h a t they had planned t o occupy 
Lhasa as part of t h e i r scheme t o create the new Chinese Province of Sikang 
and between February 1910, and the outbreak of r e v o l u t i o n i n s ide China i n 
October 1911, Indian concerns were mainly centred on what they saw as the 
dangerous i m p l i c a t i o n s of Chinese campaigns i n Assam and on the Burma 
f r o n t i e r , b o t h remote areas w i t h undefined borders t h a t were p a r t i c u l a r l y 
vulnerable t o attack.*3 
The extent t o which t h i s was a co-ordinated invasion campaign, as many 
believed, was h i g h l y questionable however, since various f a c t i o n s w i t h i n 
China i n the dying years of the Manchu dynasty appeared t o be p u l l i n g 
against each other. I n Lhasa f o r example, Amban Lien Yu was operating i n 
a way which seemed t o be t o t a l l y at odds w i t h the i n s t r u c t i o n s issued t o 
him by the Central Government i n Peking, and the i n c r e a s i n g l y powerful 
P r o v i n c i a l governments of Yunnan and Szechuan were already behaving l i k e 
independent states.*4 F i n a l l y w i t h i n Peking i t s e l f , the newly created 
Board f o r Tibetan and Mongolian A f f a i r s and the Wai Wu Pu operated i n 
apparent ignorance of each other's existence.*5 
Despite some awareness of these i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s , based on information 
received from the Chinese Legation i n London, Indian observers continued 
t o b e l ieve i n the wider co-ordinated invasion plan seemingly confirmed by 
the appearance of Chinese troops so close t o the Indian and Burmese 
borders.*6 
Between September 1910 and March 1911 these fears increased as Chao Erh-
feng's forces moved i n t o Zayaul and Pome, two t r a c t s of t r i b a l land i n the 
Assam Hymalayas under info r m a l B r i t i s h c o n t r o l . U n t i l the time of t h e i r 
i n v a s i o n t h i s wilderness region had a t t r a c t e d l i t t l e B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t but 
both areas were of v i t a l s t r a t e g i c importance t o Chao: f i r s t l y , because 
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they provided him w i t h a s h o r t e r supply route between Szechuan and Lhasa; 
and secondly, because they contained f e r t i l e land and a climate f o r r i c e 
growing which o f f e r e d him a possible s i t e on which t o e s t a b l i s h a Chinese 
settlement. By August 1911 Chao's army had s e t t l e d i n Zayaul, e s t a b l i s h i n g 
a g a r r i s o n at Chikang near Rlma, the main a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centre i n the 
region, and d i s t u r b i n g l y close t o the Indian border.«7 
When Hardlnge and Crewe took o f f i c e i n November 1910 there were therefore 
two q u i t e separate areas of concern a r i s i n g from Chinese a c t i v i t i e s on the 
f r o n t i e r t h a t were t o lead t o an abandonment of the non-involvement p o l i c y . 
The f i r s t was the s i t u a t i o n t h a t had developed i n the Assam Hymalayas as a 
r e s u l t of Chao's campaigns, and the second was the tension generated by the 
c o n f l i c t w i t h the P r o v i n c i a l government of Yunnan over what B r i t a i n had 
come t o regard as her t e r r i t o r y i n Burma t h a t came t o a head during 1910, 
i n what became known as the Pienma C r i s i s . 
I n l a t e 1910 the Indian government had no r e l i a b l e i nformation about the 
Assam Hymalayas or the extent of Tibetan influence amongst the t r i b e s who 
l i v e d there. Various t r a v e l l e r ' s r e p o r t s had seemed t o i n d i c a t e extensive 
Tibetan i n f l u e n c e i n neighbouring Tawang, and i n June 1908 Minto had 
authorised some l i m i t e d e x p l o r a t i o n of the area f o r the purpose of mapping 
and surveying the t e r r i t o r y . He had been f u l l y supported i n t h i s by S i r 
Lancelot Hare, Lieutenant Governor of East Bengal and Assam, who together 
w i t h Noel Williamson, the P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r at Sadiya, believed t h a t the 
area should be brought under d i r e c t B r i t i s h control,»8 The reasons f o r 
t h i s i n t e r e s t were not e n t i r e l y p o l i t i c a l as great pressure had been put 
upon them by B r i t i s h owned tea and timber companies i n Assam who had a 
large f i n a n c i a l stake i n the area and who expected t h e i r investments t o be 
protected. Having experienced s i m i l a r probleiK as P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n 
Sikkim, B e l l a l so s t r o n g l y supported the idea t h a t h i s government should 
explore the h i l l country f u r t h e r i n order t o make contact w i t h the t r i b e s 
who l i v e d there w i t h a view t o persuading them t o accept B r i t i s h p r o t e c t i o n 
and, i f necessary, imposing t r e a t i e s on them which could be l e g a l l y 
defended i n the event of f u t u r e Chinese or Tibetan'aggression'.*9 B e l l had 
proposed the c r e a t i o n of two f r o n t i e r d i s t r i c t s t o be d i r e c t l y supervised 
by B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s responsible t o the Indian government. 
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Hare was prepared t o go even f u r t h e r , recommending t h a t f u l l B r i t i s h 
sovereignty be esta b l i s h e d over the whole Lohit Valley, and i n h i s l a s t 
weeks as Viceroy Mlnto had agreed t o consider an advance, suggesting i n 
October 1910, t h a t the best s o l u t i o n t o what he described as the 'Assam 
problem', would be t o 'gain a b u f f e r ' by 'extending the outer l i n e towards 
Tibet'.*10 
Like Morley.his predecessor,Crewe f e l t very uneasy about the s i t u a t i o n i n 
Assam but was r e l u c t a n t t o agree any departure from the non-involvement 
p o l i c y before c o n s u l t i n g w i t h h i s new Viceroy. Hardinge had already 
discussed the s i t u a t i o n w i t h Hare soon a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l i n India but he 
too was cautious about launching an advance, although he d i d accept t h a t 
p u n i t i v e missions were a p o s s i b i l i t y i n the event of proven attacks on 
B r i t i s h subjects i n the area. Whilst acknowledging the need t o c o l l e c t 
i n f o r m a t i o n and maintain f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the t r i b e s , i f only f o r 
commercial reasons, he was nevertheless u n w i l l i n g t o sanction any a c t i v i t y 
on the f r o n t i e r which might i n v o l v e India i n long term p o l i t i c a l or 
f i n a n c i a l commitments there. He regarded Chinese i n f i l t r a t i o n as a 
worrying new development, and con t i n u i n g r e p o r t s t h a t the Chinese had been 
i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h trade i n the region forced him t o the conclusion t h a t some 
B r i t i s h a c t i o n was necessary. •» 11 
The Chinese occupation of Pome and Zayaul had meanwhile posed a serious 
t h r e a t t o f r o n t i e r s t a b i l i t y . The people of Pome were of mixed Tibetan 
blood but had preserved t h e i r independence, mainly because the region was 
too remote t o a t t r a c t the a t t e n t i o n s of the Lhasa government. Pome had 
f i e r c e l y r e s i s t e d the Chinese occupation, and i n l a t e 1910 they had 
murdered a Chinese o f f i c a l s t a t i o n e d there and r e p e l l e d a p u n i t i v e mission 
sent against them by the Chinese government. Despite f u r t h e r successive 
attempts t o subdue them during the course of 1911, the people of Pome had 
held out, and t h e i r successful resistance marked the beginning of a 
h u m i l i a t i n g Chinese withdrawal from the area.*12 
The combined e f f e c t s of the events i n Zayaul and Pome, and Chinese attempts 
t o woo the l o c a l Assam t r i b e s l i k e the Hishmi, M i r i , and Abor, were but 
minor i r r i t a t i o n s compared t o the h y s t e r i a engendered by the murder of 
l o e l Williamson, the B r i t i s h P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r at Sadiya,during an 
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e x p l o r a t o r y mission i n the Assam h i l l s i n March 1911.•13 W l l l i a i s o n , an 
ambitious young o f f i c e r , and a strong promoter of B r i t i s h forward p o l i c y i n 
the Assam f o o t h i l l s , had requested and received permission f o r a mission t o 
explore the region.His murder, a l l e g e d l y by members of the Abor t r i b e , 
provoked f u r i o u s p u b l i c outcry i n B r i t a i n and l e d t o demands f o r revenge 
t h a t were q u i t e impossible f o r the B r i t i s h government t o ignore, since not 
only had a white o f f i c e r been murdered, but the whole weakness of Indian 
f r o n t i e r p o l i c y had been exposed. During the months t h a t followed, 
consistent r e p o r t s of Chinese i n f i l t r a t i o n i n the area seemed only t o f u e l 
s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t the Chinese themselves were involved and t h a t the murder 
I t s e l f was p a r t of a much wider plan t o threaten B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s 
there.*14 Events i n the Assam Hymalayas however were only p a r t l y 
responsible f o r changes i n B r i t i s h f r o n t i e r p o l i c y during 1911. A s i t u a t i o n 
developed at Pienma, a v i l l a g e on the borders of Burma, that was t o lead t o 
a complete r e - e v a l u a t i o n of the non-involvement p o l i c y , and was d i r e c t l y 
r e l a t e d t o Tibetan p o l i c y because the problem of e s t a b l i s h i n g a c l e a r Sino-
Burmese border a f f e c t e d the whole Indian f r o n t i e r , and the area was seen as 
p a r t of a whole. The problem on t h i s border had o r i g i n a t e d i n 1886 when 
B r i t a i n had annexed pa r t of Burma, i n c l u d i n g w i t h i n the new borders a part 
of the ancient kingdom of Mandalay, which the Chinese had always regarded 
as one of t h e i r t r i b u t a r y s t a t e s . Tensions came t o a head i n the spring 
of 1910 when Chinese forces were rumoured t o have occupied Pienma, now j u s t 
i n s i d e the new disputed border. In July 1910 a Chinese o f f i c i a l w i t h a 
m i l i t a r y escort was reported t o have established what was described as a 
' c u l t u r a l centre' i n the v i l l a g e which included three schools. These 
rumours were subsequently i n v e s t i g a t e d by Archibald Rose, the B r i t i s h 
Consul-General at Tengyeuh, who reported f i n d i n g what he described as a 
modern army of Yunnanese troops s t a t i o n e d there. At t h i s point the 
Governer General of Burma, S i r Harvey Adamson, became very anxious about 
the s i t u a t i o n , and sanctioned h i s own e x p e d i t i o n of i n v e s t i g a t i o n under 
the leadership of W.F.Hertz. However, when Hertz and h i s party a r r i v e d 
at Pienma i n January 1911, he discovered t h a t Rose's rep o r t s had been 
gr o s s l y exaggerated, and t h a t i n f a c t there was only one school there 
s t a f f e d by an e l d e r l y schoolmaster whom he ordered back t o Yunnan.»15 
Mao ISO. 
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At t h i s p o i n t Hardinge became very uncertain about Adamson's obvious 
overreaction t o the s i t u a t i o n and he ordered the r e c a l l of Hertz. The 
Chinese then responded t o what they described as an invasion of t h e i r 
t e r r i t o r y , by b o y c o t t i n g B r i t i s h trade t o the area and lodging an o f f i c a l 
p r o t e s t w i t h the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e , Within a month of Hertz's 
departure however they had re-occupied Pienma and Adamson was once again 
requesting permission t o send Hertz back.*16 
The i n c i d e n t had created a poor impression of B r i t i s h competence and was 
very damaging t o p r e s t i g e , and the India O f f i c e , the Peking Legation, and 
the Foreign O f f i c e were a l l u n i t e d i n opposing Hertz's return.Adamson was 
th e r e f o r e forced t o al l o w the matter t o drop. Pienma had not only 
threatened t o create a grave c r i s i s f o r Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s , but had 
exposed t o the world the Indeclslveness of Indian f r o n t i e r p o l i c y , and i n 
the process r e f l e c t e d badly on the Indian a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , which now became 
the b u t t of mny Foreign O f f i c e jokes. As a r e s u l t of t h i s Incident, which 
Jordan condemmed as a dangerous and h u m i l i a t i n g waste of government 
resources, Grey forbade any s i m i l a r attempts t o send B r i t i s h expeditions 
I n t o areas where they were unable t o c o n t r o l the t e r r i t o r y they had 
occupied. »17 
The Pienma f i a s c o and the Williamson murder, together w i t h the t h r e a t s of 
Chinese I n f i l t r a t i o n i n t o t e r r i t o r i e s bordering India , a l l played a part i n 
promoting the P o l i c y Review commissioned by Hardinge and presented t o Crewe 
i n September 1911. I t s recommendations were o s t e n s i b l y based upon a need 
t o punish and c o n t r o l the Abors, deemed o f f l c a l l y responsible f o r 
Williamson's death, but they were also designed t o f r u s t r a t e what many were 
now convinced was a w e l l orchestrated Chinese campaign t o take the 
f r o n t i e r . Although many of the new proposals had o r i g i n a l l y been put 
forward by Hinto s h o r t l y before he l e f t o f f i c e i n l a t e 1910,and were based 
on the idea t h a t the h i l l country should be subject t o a system of informal 
c o n t r o l , the new p o l i c y represented a r e a l change of heart on the part of 
the B r i t i s h government, which had f o r c e f u l l y promoted non-involvement 
since 1905. I t was not as r a d i c a l as many i n India would have l i k e d 
however, since the Idea was merely t o stake out B r i t i s h clalES t o t r i b a l 
t e r r i t o r y i n the event of Chinese I n f i l t r a t i o n , and was not an attempt t o 
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create an extended permanent northern boundary f o r India. Grey 
p a r t i c u l a r l y d i s l i k e d the concept of a ' t r i b a l f r o n t i e r ' which he f e l t 
could only increase the p o s s i b i l i t y of f u r t h e r embarrassing i n c i d e n t s l i i e 
Pienma, and he had no desire t o annex t e r r i t o r y t h a t might prove impossible 
t o control.*19 
Having agreed the new p o l i c y , Grey was now faced w i t h the problem of how 
and when t o launch i t i n order t o minimise any damage t o Anglo-Chinese 
r e l a t i o n s . He favoured informing the Chinese d i r e c t l y , but f e l t i t wiser 
not t o inform e i t h e r the Lhasa government, or the Dalai Lama i n India, on 
the grounds t h a t i t would be impossible t o p r e d i c t t h e i r r e a c t i o n t o what 
they might see as a B r i t i s h advance i n t o t e r r i t o r y which had previously 
been under informal Tibetan c o n t r o l . Hardinge also believed t h a t any word 
t o the Chinese before the despatch of the proposed missions t o the l i s h m i , 
Miri,and Abor t r i b e s of the Assam f o o t h i l l s would be unwise, as t h e i r 
f i n d i n g s would need t o be studied. His m i l i t a r y s t a f f were also very 
anxious about the s t r a t e g i c i m p l i c a t i o n s of any Chinese occupation of 
Tawang.*20 I n the event the new p o l i c y was rendered unenforceable as a 
r e s u l t of the confusion generated by the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n a r y disturbances 
i n the area, but i t d i d have important repercussions f o r B r i t i s h Tibetan 
p o l i c y and l e d t o a renewal of o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n Tibetan 
a f f a i r s , making i t no longer simply a clandestine aspect of Indian f r o n t i e r 
p o l i c y . 
2. CHISESE CLAIMS TO BHUTAH A5D SEPAL 
During 1910 a c r i s i s threatened t o develop over Chinese claims t o the 
Hymalayan States of Bhutan and Sepal which re-opened the debate on t h e i r 
status.»21 
On 8 t h August 1910 B e l l reported r e c e i v i n g a communication from the 
Maharajah of Bhutan c o n t a i n i n g a l e t t e r from the Amban Lien Yu appearing 
t o suggest t h a t China was now cla i m i n g sovereignty over h i s country. 
B e l l f e l t t h a t the l e t t e r was both impertinent and d i s r e s p e c t f u l , since 
i t was addressed t o what Lien Yu e v i d e n t l y f e l t were the key f i g u r e s i n 
Bhutan, and not d i r e c t l y t o the Maharajah as r u l e r of the s t a t e . 
I t was also presented as an order from the Amban 'not t o l i s t e n t o 
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i n s t r u c t i o n s from other people' and announced t h a t Chinese s o l d i e r s would 
be s t a t i o n e d at the key Bhutanese towns of Lhoka and Konbu i n order t o 
provide what he described as ' p r o t e c t i o n ' f o r the country. The Bhutanese 
were also warned t o 'stay peaceful as before' or r i s k ' bringing t r o u b l e ' 
t o t h e i r country by ' a c t i n g u n l a w f u l l y ' . B e l l f e l t , and Minto agreed, th a t 
the l e t t e r had probably been an independent i n i t i a t i v e on Lien's pa r t , and 
a desperate show of s t r e n g t h , aimed at countering the e f f e c t s of the 
r e c e n t l y negotiated r e v i s i o n t r e a t y which Bhutan had signed with B r i t a i n ; 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as i n respect t o B r i t i s h e n q u i r i e s e a r l i e r t h a t year, Peking 
had o f f i c a l l y s t a t e d t h a t she d i d not claim suzerainty over Bhutan. B e l l 
t h e r e f o r e recommended t h a t a s t r o n g l y worded l e t t e r be sent t o the Wai Wu 
Pu p r o t e s t i n g at the tone of the l e t t e r and s t a t i n g t h a t i t s messsage was 
'not understood'. The Maharajah of Bhutan, n a t u r a l l y alarmed by the sudden 
t u r n of events, was promised B r i t i s h support and,in return,asked not t o 
r e p l y t o Lien Yu on the grounds t h a t the l e t t e r was 'not proper'. Despite 
t h i s undertaking however, and no doubt f e e l i n g equally vulnerable t o attack 
from China and B r i t a i n i f he d i d not comply w i t h t h e i r apparently 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y demands,the Maharajah d i d h i s best t o e x p l o i t the s i t u a t i o n 
i n h i s country's best i n t e r e s t s by p l a y i n g one o f f against the other, 
l o u d l y proclaiming Bhutanese independence t o the B r i t i s h , w h i l s t s e c r e t l y 
expressing a w i l l i n g n e s s t o co-operate w i t h Chinese demands. Minto 
believed t h a t , under the t e r n s of the revised Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty, India 
now c o n t r o l l e d Bhutan's f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , and he t h e r e f o r e f e l t t h a t the 
Chinese should be f i r m l y t o l d t h a t i n any f u t u r e dealing w i t h Bhutan, they 
should f i r s t consult w i t h B r i t a i n before t a k i n g any a c t i o n beyond t h a t 
which could be described a ' t r i v i a l ' or ' r o u t i n e ' . Grey agreed, and Max 
Muller was i n s t r u c t e d t o w r i t e t o the Wai ¥u Pu accordingly. His l e t t e r 
expressed the hope t h a t there was no foundation i n the rumours t h a t China 
was despatching missions t o Bhutan and Sepal f o r the purpose of presenting 
' t i t l e s ' and 'presents' t o t h e i r r u l e r s , since t h i s would lead t o a renewed 
debate over t h e i r s t a t u s . I n t h i s way the debate about Bhutan and Sepal, 
which B r i t a i n had s t r u g g l e d so hard t o s e t t l e i n the i n t e r e s t s of f r o n t i e r 
s e c u r i t y during 1910, was once again re-opened on the eve of the Chinese 
r e v o l u t i o n . 
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When the rumours t h a t Chinese envoys were planning t o v i s i t ITepal and 
Bhutan continued, the Indian government became convinced t h a t they 
c o n s t i t u t e d p o s i t i v e moves on China's part t o extend her Influence i n the 
Hymalayas and,in the process,threaten t e r r i t o r y which India wanted t o 
c o n t r o l . They t h e r e f o r e f e l t t h a t they had no option but t o meet t h i s 
advance,with f o r c e i f necessary, and despite the already tense s i t u a t i o n 
on the f r o n t i e r , G r e y and Morley were agreed t h a t as a f i r s t step l e p a l 
should be advised t o consult w i t h B r i t a i n before accepting any ' t i t l e s or 
g i f t s ' from the Chinese.«24 
Meanwhile the s i t u a t i o n i n Bhutan began t o look very ominous. On 29th 
October 1910 Max Muller had received a r e p l y t o h i s l e t t e r of protest 
which explained t h a t Bhutan was 'a vassal s t a t e of China' and had been so 
since the 'time of Yunicheng' when the Bhutanese had paid regular t r i b u t e 
t o the Chinese Emperor from whom they had f r e q u e n t l y received 'sealed 
orders'. The l e t t e r also went on t o say t h a t i n 1891 they had also 
accepted the Imperial s e a l , and t h a t from t h a t time on the Lhasa Amban had 
always addressed h i s l e t t e r s t o Bhutan i n the form of a manifesto, 
r e c e i v i n g r e p l i e s i n the form of p e t i t i o n s t o the Emperor. The Chinese 
claimed t h a t the s t y l e of the Amban's l e t t e r t o Bhutan had t h e r e f o r e been 
q u i t e proper and t h a t Lien Yu had not i n t e r f e r e d I l l e g a l l y i n Bhutanese 
a f f a i r s . What was even more d i s c o n c e r t i n g from the B r i t i s h point of view 
was the absence of any reference i n the r e p l y t o the revised Anglo-
Bhutanese Treaty, which had supposedly given B r i t a i n the r i g h t t o conduct 
Bhutan's f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . B e l l also discovered i n c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the 
Bhutanese agent Ugyen Kazi, t h a t they took a completely d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e 
t o t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Chinese. They agreed t h a t they had accepted 
aseal and a hat 'with a f a l s e c o r a l button' from them i n 1891, but denied 
t h a t i t had ever been used, and r e j e c t e d any suggestion t h a t Bhutan had 
paid T r i b u t e t o the Emperor. They f u r t h e r contested the Amban's r i g h t t o 
use the manifesto form of address I n correspondence t o them since they had 
never p e t i t i o n e d the Emperor, although they d i d agree t h a t some confusion 
may have a r i s e n i n 1909 when the Chinese o f f i c a l Ma had presented them w i t h 
a l e t t e r w r i t t e n i n manifesto form from Lien Yu, which they had accepted. 
They i n s i s t e d t h a t the Ma p a r t y had only been allowed t o enter a few miles 
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i n s i d e the Bhutanese border and t h a t as they had not been permitted t o see 
the Maharajah, t h i s meant t h a t the mission had not been regarded as 
o f f i c i a l . They f i r m l y r e j e c t e d any use of the Chinese seal i n Bhutan and 
any Chinese or Tibetan claijns t o suzerainty over them. B e l l was able t o 
c o n f i r m and support t h i s argument based on h i s own experiences of the 
s i t u a t i o n , and he d i r e c t l y reminded h i s government of a l e t t e r from the 
Chinese i n A p r i l 1910 t h a t had denied Bhutan's vassal status.»26 
The Sepalese responded t o Chinese claims of suzerainty w i t h s i m i l a r 
i n d i g n a t i o n , and Chandra Samsar expressed 'great astonishment and concern' 
at what he described as an 'unwarranted f i c t i o n ' on China's part. 
He argued t h a t the Chinese had always borne the f u l l cost of the 
Quinquennial Missions, which had only been sent i n the s p i r i t of 
f r i e n d s h i p , and on the s t r i c t understanding t h a t there were no o b l i g a t i o n s 
involved. The Missions had always c a r r i e d 'presents' and not t r i b u t e and 
t h i s , he explained, was the c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e . He went on t o suggest 
t h a t , i f there was any confusion, i t was the Chinese who were confused, and 
c i t e d as f u r t h e r evidence the f a c t t h a t , when t h e i r missions had entered 
Peking, they had not been required t o perform the kowtow.*27 The Indian 
government had themselves pr e v i o u s l y undertaken extensive research i n t o the 
nature of China's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Hymalayan s t a t e s as part of t h e i r own 
plans t o c o n t r o l the area, and could c o n f i r m t h a t the Sepalese Mission was 
not o b l i g a t o r y on the grounds t h a t i t had not always take place. In 1905 
f o r example, i t had not been sent because the previous Mission had been 
badly t r e a t e d by the Chinese during the course of t h e i r journey across 
China. Their research had i d e n t i f i e d three d i s t i n c t types of Mission, the 
Quinquennial f a l l i n g i n t o the category described as 'an independent mission 
capable of c l a i m i n g assistance', and on the basis of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n they 
t h e r e f o r e f e l t t h a t , i f there was any confusion, i t was being d e l i b e r a t e l y 
f o s t e r e d by the Chinese who were using the Missions as an excuse t o cl a i m 
vassal s t a t u s over a number of weaker neighbouring s t a t e s without t e l l i n g 
them. This s i t u a t i o n had p r e v i o u s l y s u i t e d weaker s t a t e s l i k e Sepal as i t 
meant t h a t they could c a l l upon Chinese p r o t e c t i o n when i t was convenient 
t o them and, as the Sepalese were quick t o p o i n t out, since the Chinese met 
the f u l l expenses of the Missions, and gave presents i n f i n i t e l y more 
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expensive than those they received, the whole exercise u l t i m a t e l y 
b e n e f i t t e d l e p a l whose t r a d e r s p a r t i c u l a r l y welcomed the o p p o r t u n i t y t o 
trade i n China.*28 
ffepalese and Bhutanese arguments were enough t o convince Grey t h a t the 
Chinese had no l e g a l case f o r suzerainty over e i t h e r Bhutan or Sepal, and 
he t h e r e f o r e had no h e s i t a t i o n i n advising both s t a t e s not t o accept any 
f u r t h e r t i t l e s from the Chinese. With t h i s decision f i n a l l y made, he f e l t 
more confident about the l e g a l s t a t u s of these states,and when a f u r t h e r 
c r i s i s threatened during the f o l l o w i n g year, he was able t o respond 
immediately and d e c i s i v e l y . * 2 9 
The second c r i s i s t h r e a t i n g the Hymalayan States came i n October 1911, 
when Manner-Smith reported from Khatmandu t h a t the lepalese had received 
i n s t r u c t i o n s from Amban Lien Yu t o send the Quinquennial Mission without 
delay.*30 Grey favoured I s s u i n g immediate i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the lepalese not 
t o send i t ; however, he was prevented from doing t h i s by Hardinge who 
feared t h a t such a move might upset the ffepalese, whose ghurkha troops were 
badly needed f o r f r o n t i e r defence. The s i t u a t i o n , w h i c h looked as though i t 
might become a p r o t r a c t e d and d i v i s i v e issue between B r i t a i n and China, was 
q u i c k l y shelved however as r e v o l u t i o n a r y disturbances began t o d i r e c t l y 
a f f e c t the f r o n t i e r . * 3 1 
The debate over the s t a t u s of l e p a l and Bhutan provides an i n t e r e s t i n g 
example of the way i n which both the Chinese and the leaders of the 
Hymalayan s t a t e s were able t o e x p l o i t B r i t i s h Ignorance of t h e i r 
t r a d i t i o n a l f r o n t i e r alignments which were o f t e n based on vaguely 
formulated understandings. l e p a l and Bhutan used them i n attempts t o 
e s t a b l i s h independence f o r t h e i r s t a t e as w e l l as t o fend o f f what they 
regarded as Indian i n t e r f e r e n c e , and the Chinese used them as an excuse t o 
argue f o r more concessions I n the Hymalayas, based on what they claimed as 
t r a d i t i o n a l custom and p r a c t i c e . 
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3. FROffTIER PROBLEMS 
On 1st September 1910 Morley had ordered the withdrawal of B r i t i s h troops 
from the Indo-Tibetan border f o l l o w i n g assurances from the Peking 
Government t h a t they were now i n a p o s i t i o n t o a f f o r d adequate p r o t e c t i o n 
f o r the trade marts.»32 Grey had also been able t o reassure both Japanese 
and Russian consuls t h a t B r i t a i n had 'no s e l f i s h ambitions' i n Tibet, and 
l i f e on the f r o n t i e r seemed set t o r e t u r n t o what passed f o r normality 
f o l l o w i n g the h y s t e r i a generated by Chinese a c t i v i t y i n the region during 
the previous year.»33 
<i) WEIR AT GYAITSE 
The months before the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n began t o d i s t u r b the r e l a t i v e 
peace of the f r o n t i e r i n lovember 1911 produced tensions of t h e i r own,as 
trade agents at Yatung and Gyantse were faced w i t h an i n c r e a s i n g l y d e l i c a t e 
s i t u a t i o n when the Manchu a d m i n i s t r a t i o n began t o collapse. At Gyantse 
Lt.Col.J.L.R. Weir came i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h Ma Chu-Fu, the newly appointed 
Chinese Superintendent of the trade marts, and the second most powerful 
Chinese o f f i c a l i n Tibet a f t e r Lien Yu.*34 Controversy had been b u i l d i n g 
f o r some time over r e n t s payable f o r the land on which the Indian 
government proposed t o b u i l d the much needed new accommodation f o r t h e i r 
trade agency, and Weir had already put i n an urgent request f o r new 
b u i l d i n g s at the end of September 1910, although the need f o r them had been 
appreciated long before t h i s as the e x i s t i n g accommodation was I n a very 
poor state.*35 Weir had e a r l i e r negotiated w i t h Ma's predecessor, the Tao 
Tai Lu, a Chinese o f f i c i a l of the o l d school, but now Tibetans were 
demanding compensation f o r the loss of land i n the form of higher r e n t s 
which the Indian government were q u i t e w i l l i n g t o pay, despite the f a c t 
t h a t i n the past, they had always r e s i s t e d such expenditure on the grounds 
t h a t they were not planning t o extend or develop t h e i r base i n Gyantse.*36 
Beside the dispute over r e n t s , Weir was also engaged i n b a t t l e w i t h Ma over 
the purchase of a water m i l l near the Tsechen Temple,just outside Gyantse, 
which he needed as a 'base f o r t r a n s p o r t ' and as a secure store f o r wheat 
supp l i e s which could be guarded against thieves. Ma was u n w i l l i n g t o s e l l 
the m i l l on the grounds t h a t he had already received complaints from Ku Zu 
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Ta, the Tibetan Superintendent at Gyantse,that the m i l l was outside the 
commerical l i m i t s of the mart, and was t h e r e f o r e unavailable f o r B r i t i s h 
use under the terms of the 1908 Trade Regulations. Despite the r i s k s 
involved i n pressing ahead w i t h t h i s r e l a t i v e l y minor request however, Veir 
p e r s i s t e d i n h i s attempts t o buy the water m i l l , arguing f o r c e f u l l y t h a t Ma 
himself had contravened A r t i c l e 2 of the same Trade Regulations by 
n e g o t i a t i n g d i r e c t l y w i t h Ku Zu Ta without f i r s t c o n s u l t i n g him.*37 Why, 
i n view of the d e l i c a t e f r o n t i e r s i t u a t i o n , d i d the e n t i r e Foreign Service, 
i n c l u d i n g Grey and Morley, support Weir i n these seemingly minor disputes? 
F i r s t l y , there was an obvious and pressing need t o support and preserve the 
s a f e t y of t h e i r s t a f f . The d i l a p i d a t e d s t a t e of the Agency b u i l d i n g s was, 
i n i t s e l f , a r e f l e c t i o n of B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e which could not a f f o r d t o be 
undermined at a time when the Chinese were con t i n u i n g t o appoint powerful 
new o f f i c a l s l i k e Ma t o key f r o n t i e r posts. Secondly, f o r the Indian 
government at l e a s t , the r e t e n t i o n of the trade marts and a t r a d i n g 
presence i n the area was an important economic and p o l i t i c a l end i n i t s e l f . 
Powerful i n v e s t o r s were not w i l l i n g t o allow t h e i r developing trade t o 
wither away, and i n the i n t e r e s t s of p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y i t was unwise t o 
a l l o w trade routes t o close or come under Chinese or Tibetan c o n t r o l , s i n c e 
t h i s might w e l l jeopardize the peaceful r e l a t i o n s between India and the 
many t r i b e s who traded i n the area. T h i r d l y , i t was e s s e n t i a l f o r the 
I n d i a n m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s t o at l e a s t ensure t h a t , i f an escort were t o 
be maintained at the mart, i t should be adequately accommodated and 
equipped, perhaps w i t h a view t o increasing the s i z e of the force i n the 
event of a c r i s i s . This idea created tension w i t h the m i l i t a r y over who 
would be expected f o o t the b i l l f o r new barracks at Gyantse, but the 
p r i n c i p l e of having new b u i l d i n g s there had never been contested,even by 
Morley. 
What i s perhaps even more remarkable about the s i t u a t i o n i s the f a c t t h a t 
both the Foreign O f f i c e and the I n d i a O f f i c e were w i l l i n g t o put such great 
pressure on the Chinese government i n order t o persuade them t o hand over 
the land at Gyantse and grant permission f o r b u i l d i n g t o go ahead before 
the s t a r t of the c o l d season at the beginning of October. Horley even 
supported moves t o 'blackmail' the Chinese i n t o g r a n t i n g permission 
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by using Minto's c a r e f u l l y compiled l i s t s of t h e i r various t r e a t y 
infringements at the mart, a move which was u l t i m a t e l y successful, as 
Jordan was able t o r e p o r t t o Grey i n A p r i l 1911 t h a t the land had been 
handed over and permission granted f o r b u i l d i n g under terms demanded by 
Br i t a i n . * 3 8 The c o n f l i c t proved very d i v i s i v e f o r the Chinese as tensions 
developed between t h e i r o f f i c a l s on the spot and t h e i r masters i n Peking, 
and despite i n s t r u c t i o n s from Peking ordering him t o co-operate w i t h Weir, 
Ma continued t o obstruct the progress of the b u i l d i n g at Gyantse by 
i n s i s t i n g t h a t he consult w i t h Lhasa before any land could be handed over, 
thus delaying the s t a r t of the b u i l d i n g f o r two months and making i t 
Impassible t o complete them before the onset of winter t h a t year.•39 
Although i n many ways t h i s a t t i t u d e had been t y p i c a l of the way i n which 
events had unfolded at the marts between B r i t i s h , Tibetan, and Chinese 
o f f i c a l s , the c o n f l i c t over the new agency land i s an i n t e r e s t i n g example 
of how the l o c a l p r a c t i c e of Chinese f r o n t i e r o f f i c a l s was in c r e a s i n g l y at 
odds w i t h Peking and more i n l i n e w i t h the independent p o l i c y then being 
adopted by the Lhasa Amban,Lien Yu.This s i t u a t i o n created many problen© f o r 
the Indian government and was I t s e l f a r e f l e c t i o n of how f a r the p o l i t i c a l 
system i n China had collapsed by t h i s time.*40 
(11) THE TRADE AGEUCY ESCORT 
A second r e l a t e d problem i n v o l v i n g the trade marts i n the months before 
the r e v o l u t i o n concerned the debate about whether I t was safe t o 
withdraw the agency escort. The issue had been under review since l a t e 
1910, when Minto had encouraged the b u i l d up of a sizeable army on the 
Indian borders t h a t he had e v e n t u a l l y withdrawn w i t h great reluctance.*41 
By 1911 Crewe believed t h a t formal p r e l i m i n a r i e s f o r the withdrawal of the 
escorts from Gyantse and Yatung should include guarantees from the Chinese 
government t o assure the s a f e t y of B r i t i s h agents and s t a f f who were t o 
remain there.The tense r e l a t i o n s h i p which had developed between Weir and Ma 
at Gyantse during l a t e 1910 and e a r l y 1911 seemed t o i n d i c a t e t h a t t h i s 
would not be the case and t h a t c l e a r l y Peking were unable t o exercise 
complete c o n t r o l over t h e i r own o f f i c i a l s at the marts, l e t alone give 
guarantees f o r the s a f e t y of Indian personnel.*42 
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Reports from Gyantse and Yatung received during March 1911 however seemed 
t o suggest t h a t the Chinese were regaining some c o n t r o l of the area, and by 
June 1911, agents themselves acknowledged t h a t the routes t o Gyantse and 
Yatung were being e n e r g e t i c a l l y p o l i c e d by the Chinese, making the case f o r 
withdrawal convincing.*43 
Despite h i s own r e s e r v a t i o n s , Crewe was w i l l i n g t o withdraw the escort i f 
Jordan thought i t wise, but the l a t t e r f e l t t h a t an immediate withdrawal 
would not be a good idea since, f o r him, the issue was becoming in c r e a s i n g l y 
t i e d t o the wider problem of Chinese i n f i l t r a t i o n i n the Burmese 
borderlands, and he was wary of g i v i n g China too much too soon. He f e l t 
t h a t i t would be b e t t e r t o wait f o r the Chinese t o request a withdrawal, 
thereby g a i n i n g a concession w i t h which t o bargain w i t h them over the 
Burmese f r o n t i e r . * 4 4 Hardinge f e l t t h a t an unprompted withdrawal was,in 
i t s e l f , a concession t h a t could be used as evidence of India's goodwill. 
By J u l y 1911, w i t h the d e c i s i o n of whether or not t o withdraw the escort 
s t i l l unmade, Indi a began t o receive r e p o r t s from the marts t h a t Chinese 
c o n t r o l was once again breaking down and t h a t e a r l i e r optimism about t h e i r 
a b i l i t y t o p o l i c e the marts e f f e c t i v e l y had been misplaced. Crewe now came 
t o b e l i e v e s t r o n g l y t h a t the s i t u a t i o n on the f r o n t i e r could never be t r u l y 
s e t t l e d u n t i l the Dalai Lama had returned t o Lhasa, and he supported 
Jordan's view t h a t an immediate withdrawal would endanger B r i t i s h l i v e s , a 
view confirmed i n Ind i a i n the l i g h t of r e p o r t s received from the trade 
marts.*45 
With Ind i a keen t o r e t a i n t h e i r escorts and begin work on the new 
Agency b u i l d i n g s at Gyantse before the s t a r t of the cold weather, and a 
Chinese presence b u i l d i n g up along the f r o n t i e r . Grey also came t o 
believe t h a t an immediate withdrawal was Inadvisable. His reluctance t o 
come t o a d e c i s i o n i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n g views and r a p i d l y 
changing events was an i n d i c a t i o n t o many o l d Foreign O f f i c e hands,that i n 
such circumstances, i t was more e f f e c t i v e t o simply leave the matter i n the 
hands of the men on the spot, and was i t s e l f a triumph f o r the P o l i t i c a l s 
whose courage and t e n a c i t y had kept B r i t i s h p r e s t i g e a l i v e i n d i f f i c u l t and 
dangerous circumstances. 
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( i l l ) THE POSTAL SERVICE 
A t h i r d set of problems were created f o r the marts i n the immediate 
p r e - r e v o l u t i o n a r y period by the Chinese decision t o increase the size and 
scope of i t s postal s e r v i c e Inside Tibet. Under A r t i c l e 8 of the 1908 Trade 
Regulations i t had been agreed t h a t , i f the Chinese managed t o organise and 
run an e f f i c e n t postal service i n Tibet, the p r i v a t e arrangements made by 
B r i t i s h trade agents f o r the despatch of malls t o and from the Indian 
f r o n t i e r would cease, and a l l post would have t o use the Chinese 
service.*46 The P o l i t i c a l s , the Indian government, o f f i c a l s at the India 
O f f i c e , and Jordan i n Peking, a l l took a very jaundiced view of the Chinese 
p o s t a l service based on past experiences, and w r i t i n g t o Grey i n February 
1911, Undersecretary of State, Raymond R i t c h i e , had already made reference 
t o the f a c t t h a t the Chinese service was dangerously u n r e l i a b l e , c i t i n g as 
evidence at l e a s t two cases where Important B r i t i s h papers had gone 
astray. On one occasion, l e t t e r s t r a v e l l i n g t o the Lhasa Regent i n Tibet, 
c o n t a i n i n g B r i t i s h p r o t e s t s about Tibetan infringements of the Lhasa 
Convention had simply f a i l e d t o a r r i v e , and on a second occasion, l e t t e r s 
f o r the Foreign O f f i c e , t r a v e l l i n g by the same route,but i n the opposite 
d i r e c t i o n , h a d met the same fate.*47 Jordan f e l t p a r t i c u l a r l y s c e p t i c a l 
about the claims f o r excellence made by the Chinese Board of 
Communications, but there were more than doubts about the e f f i c e n c y of the 
Chinese service Involved. Fears t h a t the Chinese might f i n d i t much easier 
than before t o vet a l l B r i t i s h correspondence t r a v e l l i n g across the 
f r o n t i e r were uppermost i n the minds of B r i t i s h trade agents, f o r the 
proposed new arrangements would now prevent them despatching t h e i r own mail 
p r i v a t e l y . A s t h i s had been the only safe way t o transmit s e n s i t i v e 
i n f o r m a t i o n without Chinese knowledge,they were understandably r e l u c t a n t t o 
f o r f e i t t h i s advantage.*48 
Further complications arose e a r l y i n 1911 when the Chinese announced t h a t 
they wished t o I n s t a l l telegraph l i n e s from Chamdo t o Gyantse and open 
•post o f f i c e s ' at Shlgatse, Gartok, and Gyantse, t o e s t a b l i s h what they 
described as an 'exchange se r v i c e ' f o r the Lhasa malls at Yatung.Hardinge 
was e s p e c i a l l y concerned t h a t the s i t i n g of an 'exchange service' at Yatung 
was too near the Indian border f o r comfort, and he suggested t h a t Jordan 
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might be asked t o f i n d out why t h i s s i t e had been chosen, and t o recommend 
Gyantse as a possible a l t e r n a t i v e which India might support, on the 
c o n d i t i o n t h a t the Chinese could demonstrate t h e i r a b i l i t y t o run an 
e f f i c e n t service.*49 Grey and Crewe agreed th a t t h i s request was 
reasonable, and i n 1911 began t o demand t h a t the Chinese show t h a t they 
could provide an e f f e c t i v e service.»50 Hardinge was r e l u c t a n t t o pursue 
the matter f u r t h e r however as he had no i n t e r e s t i n n e g o t i a t i n g terms f o r 
any expansion of the f r o n t i e r telegraph system at t h a t time, and had indeed 
abandoned plans f o r a telegraph l i n k between Lhasa and India altogether 
because of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i nvolved i n maintaining and p r o t e c t i n g i t . The 
idea t h a t the Chinese might i n s t a l l and c o n t r o l telegraph l i n e s between 
Chamdo and Lhasa was also not one t h a t he wished t o encourage by opening a 
dialogue on the subject.*51 
The issue was t o be f u r t h e r complicated by the on going and q u i t e separate 
o f f i c i a l correspondence being conducted between the Director-General of the 
Indian Postal Service, and the Director-General of the Chinese Imperial 
Post. The Chinese Imperial Post was part of the Chinese Customs Service, 
which at the time was headed by Francis Aglen, l i k e Henderson a B r i t i s h 
subject i n Chinese employ. The existence of t h i s q u i t e separate dialogue 
was p a r t i c u l a r l y worrying f o r Jordan who was most anxious t h a t 'outsiders' 
should not become involved i n f r o n t i e r Issues, and because i n the past 
employees of the Chinese Customs Service had created problems f o r B r i t i s h 
trade agents.*52 By A p r i l 1911 he was also under heavy pressure from 
Prince Ch'ing at the Wai Wu Pu t o agree f i r s t l y , t o the opening of Yatung 
as an 'exchange service',and secondly, t o an e x t e n t i o n of the Chinese 
po s t a l s ervice across T i b e t , i n v o l v i n g the i n e v i t a b l e loss of the p r i v a t e 
mail service which Aglen had made i t q u i t e c l e a r he d i s l i k e d , p r e f e r r i n g 
t h a t a l l mail passing t o and from Tibet should use the Chinese service.*53 
This pressure made Jordan u n w i l l i n g t o r a i s e Indian demands at a time when 
there were more important f r o n t i e r matters t o s e t t l e , n o t the lea s t of which 
was the embarressing Pienma c r i s i s on the Burma f r o n t i e r . * 5 4 However, as 
the year wore on and the stalemate continued, he asked Grey t o request t h a t 
the correspondence between the heads of the Indian and Chinese Postal 
Service should cease i n order t o all o w time f o r him t o handle the 
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s i t u a t i o n d i r e c t l y w i t h the Wai Wu Pu.*55 Once again the r e v o l u t i o n 
intervened t o prevent an e f f e c t i v e settlement of t h i s troublesome issue and 
both governments turned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o more pressing concerns. 
The dispute over the p o s t a l service i s an i n t e r e s t i n g one because i t shows 
the complexity of the f r o n t i e r s i t u a t i o n and the tensions i n the months 
before the r e v o l u t i o n , w h i c h made i t q u i t e Impossible t o s e t t l e any problem 
without t r i g g e r i n g a r e a c t i o n elsewhere. 
( i v ) THE DALAI LAMA'S RETURS TO LHASA 
During the l a t t e r h a l f of 1910 much diplomatic time was devoted t o the 
problem of whether t o encourage the Dalai Lama t o r e t u r n t o Lhasa. The 
Chinese were anxious f o r him t o r e t u r n because they were already unable to 
c o n t r o l the t e r r i t o r y they had taken i n Tibet and f e l t t h a t h i s presence i n 
Lhasa would help them s e t t l e the country. With t h i s i n mind they therefore 
began t o make moves which might prompt h i s r e t u r n . I n August 1910 Lien Yu 
had sent h i s envoy, Lo Chang,to t a l k w i t h him i n D a r j e e l i n g . Some alarm 
about the s t a t u s of the envoy and the purpose of h i s v i s i t were soon 
expressed by Minto, f o l l o w i n g the telegram from Lien Yu i n which he 
described Lo Chang as a 'Special Commlsioner'. Max Muller was therefore 
i n s t r u c t e d t o make i t q u i t e c l e a r t o the Chinese t h a t B r i t a i n d i d not 
recognise any s p e c i a l s t a t u s f o r Lo Chang who, so f a r as they understood at 
the time of departure, d i d not even hold the rank of Taotai.«56 
Obliv i o u s t o t h i s correspondence, and having apparently f a i l e d t o make any 
headway w i t h the Dalai Lama, Lo Chang next approached B e l l f o r help.*57 
I t then became c l e a r t o the Indian government t h a t what Lo Chang was r e a l l y 
o f f e r i n g d i d not accord w i t h the terms given t o Max Muller, who had 
understood t h a t the Dalai Lama was t o be o f f e r e d a f u l l r e s t o r a t i o n of h i s 
r i g h t s and t i t l e s . By probing f u r t h e r B e l l also discovered t h a t i n f a c t a l l 
t h a t was o f f e r e d r e a l l y only amounted t o a guarantee of p r o t e c t i o n f o r the 
journey home, plus the r i g h t t o l i v e i n the Potala on a modest annual 
'allowance' of 10,000 t a e l s , t o be paid t o him by the Chinese government. 
Understandably the Dalai Lama had been unimpressed w i t h these ters©,which 
would have made him once again l i t t l e more than a prisoner of the Chinese. 
Having f a i l e d t o gain B e l l ' s support Lo Chang next announced h i s 
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i n t e n t i o n of v i s i t i n g Minto at Simla i n order t o discuss h i s o f f e r 
further.»58 Minto, no doubt remembering a s i m i l a r t a c t i c attempted by 
Chang i n 1906, refused t o see Lo Chang personally on the grounds t h a t , as 
'expectant Taotai', he was not high ranking enough t o merit a personal 
i n t e r v i e w . As a gesture of good w i l l however, he o f f e r e d the envoy instead 
a c i v i c r e c e p t i o n and a possible i n t e r v i e w w i t h the Indian Foreign 
Secretary, i f he ever came t o Simla. »59 
The s i t u a t i o n became even more i n t r i g u i n g when, during the course of a 
conversation w i t h Max Muller at the Wai Wu Pu, Grand Secretary Ba T'ung 
f i r m l y denied any knowledge of Lo Chang's plan t o v i s i t Minto, and stated 
i n a subsequent i n t e r v i e w t h a t the envoy had never been made a 'Special' 
Commisioner as Lien Yu's telegram had claimed. This information confirmed 
t o many what had long been suspected, namely th a t Lien Yu had been a c t i n g 
q u i t e independently,and c e r t a i n l y without the o f f i c i a l support of the Wai 
Wu Pu.#60 The Indian government then began a long and sustained campaign 
t o unseat the Amban, whose imperious a t t i t u d e and unpredictable behaviour, 
they had long considered a dangerous t h r e a t t o f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y . The Lo 
Chang mission was concluded soon a f t e r Crewe took o f f i c e i n Sovember 1910 
when the envoy was h a s t i l y r e c a l l e d by Peking before he could prepare f o r 
h i s journey t o Simla.•Ol 
Having i n d i r e c t l y f a i l e d w i t h the Lo Chang mission, from whose success they 
might have b e n i f i t t e d even i f they d i d not o f f i c a l l y support i t , the 
Chinese now began t o explore other ways of persuading the Dalai Lama t o 
r e t u r n t o Lhasa. These were t o prove equally unsuccessful mainly because, 
a f t e r h i s years i n In d i a , he had been able t o update h i s knowledge of 
western a t t i t u d e s , and had acquired an ap p r e c i a t i o n of h i s powerful 
bargaining p o s i t i o n . I n September 1910 he had received a l e t t e r from the 
Panchen Lama p u r p o r t i n g t o be a plea f o r h i s r e t u r n t o Lhasa, accompanied 
by an o r a l message bidding him t o stay put,and e x p l a i n i n g t h a t the l e t t e r 
had been w r i t t e n under duress. Since Tibetans always regarded o r a l 
messages as more important than w r i t t e n ones, such a b l a t a n t attempt t o 
in f l u e n c e the Dalai Lama by engaging the u n w i l l i n g services of the Panchen 
Lama i n t h i s way was doonKd t o f a i l u r e . # 6 2 A second attempt, t h i s time 
employing the services of a delegation of Mongolian Buddhists 
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who were s a i d t o have t r a v e l l e d t o Yatung f o r the s p e c i f i c purpose of 
leav i n g a s i m i l a r message was equally unsuccessful, t h i s time because 
MacDonald became suspicious of t h e i r c l a l i B t o represent the 'peoples' of 
Mongolia,who were known t o be composed of warring f a c t i o n s and could never 
have presented such a u n i t e d f r o n t . * 6 3 
The continued presence of the Dalai Lama at D a r j e e l i n g meanwhile began t o 
create problems f o r the Indian government as w e l l as f o r the Chinese, 
e s p e c i a l l y as the Dalai Lama himself had made i t q u i t e c l e a r t h a t he had no 
i n t e n t i o n of r e t u r n i n g t o h i s c a p i t a l without a f u l l r e s t o r a t i o n of h i s 
secular and r e l i g i o u s t i t l e s . B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e s towards him had also begun 
t o change during h i s e x i l e , and i n the months before the r e v o l u t i o n he 
In c r e a s i n g l y came t o represent a s o l u t i o n t o the problem of f r o n t i e r 
s e c u r i t y , instead of the l i a b i l i t y he had been when he had f i r s t a r r i v e d 
i n India. Although s t i l l not e n t i r e l y t r u s t e d by the B r i t i s h , he was now 
seen as a powerful and I n f l u e n t i a l figure,and as a man f u l l y capable of 
s e t t l i n g h i s country and e s t a b l i s h i n g a strong and stable government i n 
Tibet.»64 
On the eve of the r e v o l u t i o n t h e r e f o r e the B r i t i s h , Indian, and Chinese 
governments were broadly u n i t e d i n a desire t o see h i s r e t u r n t o Tibet, 
a l b e i t f o r very d i f f e r e n t reasons. 
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4. THE RSVQLUTIOS ASP THE FROSTIER 
The r e v o l u t i o n , which had begun i n Wuchang i n October 1911, created 
immediate confusion and panic on the f r o n t i e r . Chao Erh-feng q u i c k l y l o s t 
contact w i t h Peking, and i n the ensuing chaos many Chinese troops mutinied, 
having been stranded without food and pay i n i s o l a t e d garrisons along the 
f r o n t i e r . I n December Chao Erh-feng himself was murdered by an organised 
mob i n Chengtu, and h i s death s i g n a l l e d the outbreak of open r e b e l l i o n i n 
East Tibet, w i t h the area of Hsiang Cheng completely breaking from Chinese 
control.#65 
Chao's death was a severe, but not a f a t a l blow f o r Chinese plans i n East 
Ti b e t , since h i s successor, an energetic young Japanese t r a i n e d o f f i c e r 
c a l l e d Yin Ch'ang-heug, was both anxious and w e l l able t o continue h i s 
campaign. By June 1912 t h e r e f o r e , w i t h the help of Hu Ching Yin, the 
M i l i t a r y Governor of Szechuan, Ch'ang was able t o relaunch the Chinese 
o f f e n s i v e under the guise of a peaceful mission of enquiry t o Lhasa, the 
r e a l aim of which was believed t o be an attempt t o reconquer the t e r r i t o r y 
l o s t t o East Tibet during the weeks a f t e r the outbreak of the r e v o l u t i o n , 
and t o recapture and secure the c i t y of Lhasa f o r the Szechuan government, 
who by now were now seeking t o t a l independence from China.*66 
The r e v o l u t i o n a r y disturbances i n the Assam Hymalayas had the u n l i k e l y 
e f f e c t of reducing tensions there since the events i n Pome had led t o the 
withdrawal of Chinese troops from the area which, during 1911, had 
threatened t o cause a d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n between the Chinese and Indian 
governments. The r e v o l u t i o n also provided an o p p o r t u n i t y t o make a f r e s h 
s t a r t i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h a new Republican government who might 
reasonably be expected t o be at odds w i t h the p o l i c y of the Manchu whom 
they had overthrown.»67 Before n e g o t i a t i o n s could go ahead however there 
were two worrying obstacles t o t a l k s t h a t needed t o be u r g e n t l y addressed. 
The f i r s t was the widespread panic created by the remnants of the o l d 
Chinese army. Soldiers, s t i l l unpaid and without regular supplies,were 
l o o t i n g and murdering t h e i r way across the f r o n t i e r en route t o j o i n t h e i r 
comrades at the Lhasa garrison.Asecond more i n s i d i o u s problem was created 
by the many c i v i l i a n refugees and f u g i t i v e s , i n c l u d i n g European 
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missionaries, who now f l o c k e d t o the trade marts seeking B r i t i s h 
p r o t e c t i o n . t e s The e f f e c t of the r e v o l u t i o n a r y disturbances on the 
vulnerable trade marts was dramatic but s h o r t l i v e d . By lovember 1911 
Ind i a began t o receive the f i r s t r e p o r t s of f i g h t i n g from Yatung and 
Gyantse, which, though f i e r c e , d i d not a f f e c t the marts d i r e c t l y . The 
serious t h r e a t t o s e c u r i t y came from the many refugees who had gone 
there f o r p r o t e c t i o n and the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n determining who were genuine 
refugees and who were deserters or spies t o be handed back t o the 
Chinese.By December 1911 even t h i s problem had been resolved however,and 
B e l l was r e p o r t i n g the f r o n t i e r r e l a t i v e l y calm.»69 
In Lhasa events were f a r more dramatic. I n December 1911 Chinese troops had 
deposed Amban Lien Yu, r e p l a c i n g him w i t h t h e i r Chinese general Chung Ying 
i n an attempt t o remove a l l traces of the Manchu a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the 
c i t y . This proved t o be an unwise move and the new Amban soon found 
himself q u i t e unable t o c o n t r o l the ensuing chaos as Tibetans, w i t h 
s p e c i f i c orders from the Dalai Lama t o k i l l as many Chinese s o l d i e r s as 
possible, clashed w i t h the embittered s u r v i v o r s of the disastrous Pome 
campaign who, since t h e i r a r r i v a l i n Lhasa, had made i t t h e i r sole purpose 
t o l o o t and k i l l as many Tibetans as possible i n an e f f o r t t o exact revenge 
f o r t h e i r loss of face.*70 
The deposed Lien Yu, having d i s c r e e t l y f l e d the c i t y soon a f t e r h i s 
dep o s i t i o n , now found himself i n a very precarious p o s i t i o n and forced t o 
decide whether t o remain i n the Lhasa v i c i n i t y i n the hope t h a t events 
might soon r i g h t themselves, or r e t u r n t o Peking t o await whatever f a t e 
might chose t o grant him. He ev e n t u a l l y decided upon the former course, 
remembering no doubt what had happened t o others who had attempted t o 
r e t u r n t o China a f t e r f a i l i n g i n s i m i l a r circumstances. #71 
By the begining of May 1912 both sides i n Lhasa had t i r e d of f i g h t i n g , 
and Chung Ylng made i t c l e a r t h a t h i s Chinese troops would welcome a 
ce a s e f i r e , a course which the Tibetans were now more than w i l l i n g t o 
consider since, besides the s t r a i n of b a t t l e , the clash between Drepung 
Monastery, (who had always favoured a more moderate approach towards the 
Chinese invaders),and the Monasteries of Sera and Ganden,(who both wanted 
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t o c a r r y out the Dalai Lama's orders t o the l e t t e r ) , was now threatening t o 
set Tibetans against each other. A temporary three day ceasefire was 
t h e r e f o r e s u c c e s s f u l l y negotiated w i t h i n days, but i t was not u n t i l the 
f o l l o w i n g August t h a t a l a s t i n g t r u c e was e f f e c t e d , t h i s time w i t h the help 
of Lai Bahadur, the Sepalese Representative i n Lhasa.*72 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s Involved i n organising the safe evacuation of Chinese 
troops from Tibet, and the f u t u r e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the country, now became 
major issues i n the months before the Simla Conference opened i n October 
1913. The f i r s t of these problems was solved when the Indian government 
agreed t o organise the evacuation of Chinese troops through India, which, 
though a lengthy and p a i n s t a k i n g process, was eventually successfully 
completed by the end of 1912 despite Chung Ying's dogged resistance. tTS 
The second problem of the Dalai Lama's r e t u r n and the f u t u r e s t a t u s and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Tibet, were f o r India f a r less easy t o solve because so 
many other f a c t o r s were involved. I t i s t o these f a c t o r s t h a t I now want t o 
t u r n . 
6. THE DALAI LAMA AID AIGLQ-RUSSIAI RELATIQIS 
A f t e r the r e v o l u t i o n the problem of what t o do about the Dalai Lama's 
r e t u r n became urgent. He had w r i t t e n at l e a s t two l e t t e r s t o the the Tsar 
during h i s period of e x i l e i n I n d i a , and i n December 1911, a f t e r much 
p r e v a r i c a t i o n and c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h St.Petersburg, Hardinge had allowed the 
Russians t o send a formal r e p l y d i r e c t l y t o him i n D a r j e e l i n g , where B e l l 
was asked t o act as t r a n s l a t o r . * 7 4 
I n February 1912 the Dalai Lama had spoken openly of h i s earnest desire t o 
r e t u r n t o h i s c a p i t a l and had moved h i s vast entourage t o Kalimpong i n 
order t o be nearer the border and t o await a s u i t a b l e moment f o r an entry 
i n t o Tibet.*75 Apart from the few people who had been w i t h h i s party since 
h i s a r r i v a l i n I n d i a , ( i n c l u d i n g B e l l and a Sikkimese agent known as Laden 
La, who had l o y a l l y supported him throughout h i s s t a y ) , there was s t i l l 
l i m i t e d sympathy f o r h i s p l i g h t . Indeed, many people f e l t t h a t he had not 
helped h i s cause by i s s u i n g orders f o r Tibetans t o k i l l Chinese s o l d i e r s i n 
Lhasa and f u r t h e r alarm had been created by rumours of h i s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h 
Russia, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , w i t h h i s reputed preoccupation w i t h a plan t o 
r e v i s e the Anglo-Russian Convention.*76 
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As w e l l as bombarding B e l l w i t h requests f o r t a l k s w i t h Hardinge and 
King George V on the subject, he had also sent h i s personal representative, 
Lonchen Shatra t o Calcutta w i t h a l e t t e r t o be presented t o the Indian 
Foreign Secretary Henry McMahon, cont a i n i n g a request f o r B r i t i s h arnB and 
an escort f o r h i s r e t u r n journey t o Lhasa. Although a harmless request i n 
i t s e l f , the l e t t e r had also h i n t e d t h a t f a i l u r e t o comply would almost 
c e r t a i n l y r e s u l t i n a s i m i l a r request being made t o the Tsar, and t h i s 
i m p l i e d t h r e a t , coupled w i t h the Dalai Lama's obvious i n t e n t i o n t o r e t u r n 
t o h i s c a p i t a l as soon as possible, s t i m u l a t e d debate about how best t o 
help him acheive h i s purpose without coming i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h e i t h e r 
Russia or China.*77 Hardinge, who had served as B r i t i s h Ambassador i n 
St. Petersburg during the Anglo-Tibetan c r i s i s of 1903-4, was already very 
s e n s i t i v e t o the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the Dalai Lama's t h r e a t t o approach the 
Tsar f o r help, and was f u l l y prepared t o o f f e r an escort, arms, and a 
f o r m l guarantee of p o l i t i c a l support f o r Tibet a f t e r h i s r e t u r n . Grey 
argued however t h a t i n view of the Convention, an escort would be q u i t e out 
of the question, but he was w i l l i n g t o send a message of goodwill,along 
w i t h the services of a 'native agent i n l i e u of an escort,as evidence of 
B r i t i s h g o o dwill. The n a t i v e agent selected f o r t h i s purpose was Laden La, 
a Buddhist who spoke good Tibetan, and a man w i t h considerable experience 
of d i p l o m a t i c work, having been a member of the Younghusband Expedition i n 
1904, and also one of the p a r t y who had accompanied the Panchen Lama t o 
I n d i a i n 1905. He was also the nearest equivalent t o D o r j i e v t h a t the 
In d i a n government could muster and was w e l l known t o have sympathies w i t h 
the Curzonian f a c t i o n . His f u t u r e r o l e was not only t o act as companion t o 
the Dalai Lama on h i s journey home, but more importantly, t o help oversee 
the evacuation of those Chinese troops s t i l l remaining i n Tibet and t o 
ensure t h a t the temporary c e a s e f i r e i n Lhasa became permanent.»78 
The Laden La Mission, as i t became known,was soon withdrawn by Grey who, 
l i k e Crewe, r e a l i s e d t h a t i t might be e a s i l y m i s i n t e r p r e t e d by the Russians 
as an attempt t o i n s t a l l a B r i t i s h r e presentative i n Lhasa and so 
contravene the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention.*79 This view was not 
shared by Hardinge who was i n f a c t so determined t h a t the mission should go 
ahead, t h a t he gave permission f o r i t s departure before the f i n a l 
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c o n f i r m a t i o n of orders f o r i t s c a n c e l l a t i o n could a r r i v e i n India, with the 
r e s u l t t h a t Laden La reached Gyantse before he was f i n a l l y forced t o h a l t , 
c r e a t i n g great problems f o r B r i t a i n , since withdrawal at t h i s p o i n t , so 
close t o Lhasa, would have serious i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r B r i t i s h prestige and 
meant t h a t the Chinese would almost c e r t a i n l y c l a i m t h a t i t was they who 
had ordered the p a r t y back t o India. A f t e r lengthy discussions i t was 
the r e f o r e agreed t h a t Laden La should remain at Gyantse t o act as an 
advisor f o r the Dalai Lama a f t e r h i s return.*80 
The Dalai Lama had been ready t o leave India since February 1912 and 
Hardinge was now faced the thorny problem of how t o word the o f f i c a l 
f a r e w e l l address from the Indian government without offending the Russians. 
I n the message he proposed t o send he had planned t o include a promise t h a t 
I n d i a would 'welcome l e t t e r s from the Dalai Lama i n Lhasa' i n order t o 
ensure t h a t 'the i n t e r n a l economy of Tibet was preserved from China'. 
Grey and l i c o l s o n both f e l t however t h a t t h i s wording contravened,both the 
Anglo-Russian Convention, and the Trade Regulations of 1908, but Hardinge 
i n s i s t e d t h a t t o send the Dalai Lama home without some B r i t i s h assurances 
would be equally d i s a s t r o u s f o r f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y , since i t would leave 
him vulnerable t o f u t u r e Chinese i n t e r f e r e n c e and would prevent him 
e s t a b l i s h i n g a s t a b l e and independent a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Tibet. A f t e r 
f u r t h e r discussions a compromise message was agreed w i t h the f i n a l wording 
expressing the desire of the B r i t i s h government t o see the i n t e r n a l 
autonomy of Tibet under Chinese Suzerainty maintained without Chinese 
i n t e r f e r e n c e , so long as the Dalai Lama was w i l l i n g t o uphold the Treaty 
o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h B r i t a i n and maintain f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s . * 8 1 
Despite the vaguewording of the f a r e w e l l message the Dalai Lama proved 
content w i t h even t h i s l e v e l of B r i t i s h support, and soon a f t e r r e t u r n i n g 
t o Lhasa,sent messages of thanks t o Hardinge i n India i n which h i s 
expressed desire t o l e a r n English seemed t o i n d i c a t e t h a t he intended t o 
r e t a i n h i s f r i e n d l y l i n k s w i t h the B r i t i s h . * 8 2 
The wrangles over the Dalai Lama's r e t u r n t o Tibet served t o f u r t h e r 
demonstrate the very d i f f e r e n t approaches t o the problem adopted by B r i t i s h 
governments i n London and Indi a . For the Foreign O f f i c e i n London, Tibet 
was but a small part of a wider Asian p o l i c y r e q u i r i n g the maintenance 
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of harmonious r e l a t i o n s w i t h China and Russia. For the Indian government, 
the Anglo-Russian Convention was an unnecessary obstacle t o the business 
of p a c i f y i n g and c o n s o l i d a t i n g the f r o n t i e r which had r e a l l y begun when 
Younghusband had negotiated the Lhasa Convention i n 1904, and which had 
since been undermined by the non-involvement p o l i c y orchestrated from 
London. Even Hardinge, whose very appointment as Viceroy had been made i n 
order t o ensure t h a t the London view p r e v a i l e d i n India, found himself 
r e l u c t a n t t o leave the f r o n t i e r t o the mercies of the Chinese and began t o 
pursue p o l i c i e s t h a t aimed t o s t a b i l i s e Tibet and provide a b u f f e r against 
Chinese i n f i l t r a t i o n along India's bordei-s. While the Dalai Lama remained 
a v o l a t i l e t h r e a t t o Asian s t a b i l i t y f o r London and Peking, h i s r e t u r n t o 
Lhasa, and the presence of Laden La as Indian representative at Gyantse, 
represented a triumph f o r India and a v i c t o r y f o r the Curzonian f a c t i o n who 
had now achieved most of what Younghusband had been asked t o do i n 1904, 
namely, t o e s t a b l i s h f r i e n d s h i p l i n k s w i t h the Dalai Lama, and a new 
understanding w i t h h i s people.»83 
7. AHGLO RUSSIAI RELATIQIS: MOIGQLIA AID TIBET 
By 1911 Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s were s t a r t i n g t o improve. The decision, 
made at the end of the year,to a l l o w the l o t e s attached t o the Anglo-
Russian Convention r e l a t i n g t o S c i e n t i f i c Missions t o lapse,had a l l e v i a t e d 
much of the f r i c t i o n created by the Kozlov Expedition and the other less 
published ventures and had even survived the Dalai Lama's attempts t o 
e n l i s t the Tzar's help i n h i s dealings w i t h India.A much more serious 
t h r e a t t o Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s now surfaced over Mongolia and the 
attempts by Russia t o t r y once again t o l i n k the two issues once again.*84 
During December 1911,Sir George Buchanan the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n St. 
Petersburg,drew Grey's a t t e n t i o n t o two a r t i c l e s t h a t had been published i n 
the Russian newspaper the 'Vroe Vremya' t h a t r e l a t e d t o Mongolia. The f i r s t 
a r t i c l e took the form of a reported conversation w i t h a person described 
as a "diplomat' who claimed t h a t the Mongols, incensed and alarmed by 
China's treatment of the Dalai Lama, were now working t o e s t a b l i s h t h e i r 
own independence and had already organised a strong freedom movement i n 
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Forth Mongolia under the leadership of the Bogdo i n Urga who,in the absence 
of the Dalai Lama, was now regarded by the Chinese as the Head of the 
Buddhist Church i n Central Asia. The a r t i c l e concluded by emphasising the 
Dalai Lama's devotion t o Russia and the f a c t t h a t he had 'always sought 
close union w i t h Mongolia'. The a r t i c l e also reported t h a t a Mongol 
deputation had r e c e n t l y a r r i v e d i n St. Petersburg requesting Russian 
p r o t e c t i o n f o r Mongolia as the only means of securing f o r t h e i r country 
'peaceful developments and commercial resources'. A second a r t i c l e i n the 
same newspaper argued t h a t the p u l l towards na t i o n a l i s m being f e l t by many 
of the s t a t e s on the borders of the Chinese Empire made i t now appropriate 
f o r China t o recognise Mongolia as a 'new' and independent state.*85 
The concern engendered by these a r t i c l e s i n London was then i n t e n s i f i e d by 
in f o r m a t i o n t h a t a meeting had taken place at Phari i n July 1912,between 
D o r j i e v and the Dalai Lama, which lead t o f r e s h f e a r s t h a t Russia was 
proposing t o take advantage of the obvious confusion on the f r i n g e s of the 
o l d Manchu Empire i n order t o pursue her separate i n t e r e s t s i n Mongolia, 
Sinkiang, and pos s i b l y i n Tibet i t s e l f , f e a r s seemingly confirmed i n August 
1912 by B r i t i s h r e p o r t s of disturbances i n Sinkiang. *97 
The r e v o l u t i o n i n China had placed the s t a t u s of Mongolia and Sinkiang 
i n question and i n doing so had created an e n t i r e l y new set of problems i n 
c e n t r a l Asia because most of the understandings between China and her 
neighbours i n t h i s region had been based on t r e a t i e s signed w i t h the Manchu 
who were no longer i n c o n t r o l . 
The i m p l i c a t i o n s of these new developments f o r f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y as well as 
f o r Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s were obviously serious, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r 
Mongolia had declared h e r s e l f independent i n December 1911 and had 
announced t h a t Chinese i n t e r e s t s Mongolia were 'abolished'. I t was c l e a r 
t h a t the in f o r m a t i o n contained i n the a r t i c l e s published i n Vroe Vremya had 
been accurate and t h a t the new Mongolian government had indeed turned t o 
Russia f o r support and p r o t e c t i o n . I n l a t e 1912 London received news th a t 
a formal t r e a t y , s i g n e d between Mongolia and Russia, had given the l a t t e r 
s u b s t a n t i a l commercial and p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s i n Mongolia as well as r i g h t s 
t o advise them i n matters of f o r e i g n policy.»87 
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In the l i g h t of these events, the need t o revise the Anglo-Russian 
Convention became a pressing concern t o both B r i t a i n and Russia, and i n 
September 1912,the Russian Foreign M i n i s t e r Sergei Sazonov had 
v i s i t e d B r i t a i n w i t h a view t o requesting t h a t discussions about Tibet and 
Mongolia might be included i n t h e i r tabled t a l k s on Persia. Upon a r r i v i n g 
i n B r i t a i n however,Sazonov t o l d Grey i n a p r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w between them at 
Balmoral, t h a t Mongolia could not be regarded by h i s country as a s u i t a b l e 
or equal exchange f o r B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n Tibet, and at a subsequent 
p r i v a t e i n t e r v i e w w i t h Crewe at Crewe H a l l , he s a i d t h a t the Russian people 
would not t o l e r a t e any a l t e r a t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n i n Tibet as f a r as 
B r i t i s h involvement was concerned, and t h a t a f a r b e t t e r exchange might be 
considered i f Afghanistan were t o be included i n discussions. 
For Grey t h i s suggestion was q u i t e out of the question f o r one of the ains 
of the Anglo-Russian Convention had been t o prevent the f u r t h e r development 
of Russian i n t e r e s t s i n Ti b e t , and when Sazonov p e r s i s t e d w i t h attempts t o 
inv o l v e Afghanistan i n t a l k s , he refused t o discuss the matter w i t h the 
r e s u l t t h a t the issue l a y dormant u n t i l 1917.»88 Meanwhile, the problem 
created by Russian i n t e r e s t i n Mongolia remained and the close t i e s between 
Tibet and Mongolia, r e - a f f i r m e d by the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty r e p o r t e d l y 
signed i n January 1913, caused f u r t h e r concern t o the Foreign O f f i c e . I n 
October 1912 the Tsongdu had f o r m a l l y broken a l l t i e s w i t h China. In 
s i g n i n g the Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, each country had signed as independent 
s t a t e s , the Dalai Lama having f o r m a l l y declared Tibet independent soon 
a f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o Lhasa.»89 What worried London f a r more than the t r e a t y 
hov^ever was the rumour t h a t D o r j i e v had acted as the Dalai Lama's 
repr e s e n t a t i v e during the n e g o t i a t i o n s at Urga, having t r a v e l l e d there 
a f t e r h i s alleged t a l k s w i t h the Dalai Lama at Phari. He had then 
apparently returned post haste t o St. Petersburg a f t e r the t r e a t y was 
concluded, presumably t o r e p o r t the d e t a i l s t o h i s government. Although 
Lonchen Shatra, the Dalai Lama's o f f l e a l r e presentative, l a t e r denied that 
D o r j i e v had p a r t i c i p a t e d e i t h e r i n the s i g n i n g of the Treaty or the 
ne g o t i a t i o n s beforehand, the Russian connection was r e i n f o r c e d by the 
presence of a Mongolian d e l e g a t i o n i n St. Petersburg whose a r r i v a l appeared 
t o co-incide w i t h D o r j l e v ' s r e t u r n . 
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Sazonov l a t e r s t a t e d o f f i c a l l y t h a t h i s government believed the Treaty was 
a f i c t i o n , but suspicions of Russian involvement remained strong and were 
compounded by the f a c t t h a t Russians were known t o be supplying Lhasa w i t h 
Winchester r i f l e s v i a t h e i r agents i n Urga, and t h a t Russian o f f i c e r s were 
helping t o t r a i n a new Mongolian army. I t was also known th a t two Russian 
b u r i a t s , t r a i n e d i n Urga as consular o f f i c a l s , had been posted t o Kumbum i n 
Kansu very close t o the Tibetan border, p r o v i d i n g Russia w i t h a d i r e c t l i n e 
t o Lhasa.*91 I n view of t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n Grey decided t h a t the tru e extent 
of Russian involvement i n Mongolia and Tibet needed t o be established, but 
he was faced w i t h the problem of how t o do t h i s as a l l d i r e c t attempts t o 
negotiate w i t h Russia had f a i l e d . 
Although only i n d i r e c t l y i n v o l v i n g Tibet i t s e l f , the nature of the 
Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y i n Central Asia came t o be dominated by the Tibetan 
question and i n many ways the tensions t h a t the Anglo-Russian Convention 
had set out t o solve continued t o generate misunderstandings and 
confusions between B r i t a i n and Russia,which were t o make,what the B r i t i s h 
i n c r e a s i n g l y r e f e r r e d t o as the Tibetan 'problem' even more complicated. 
I t also made a d e f i n i t i o n of B r i t i s h Tibetan p o l i c y an urgent p r i o r i t y and 
e v e n t u a l l y l e d t o the i s s u i n g of a p o l i c y statement t o the Wai Vu Pu i n 
August 1912 which w i l l be f u l l y discussed i n the next chapter.»92 
8. THE IE¥ REPUBLIC AID CHIIESE CLAIMS TO TIBET 
On 16th March 1912 Yuan Shih Kai became President of the new Chinese 
Republican Government i n Peking, ushering i n a period of closer co-
operation between China and the western powers, and increasing the personal 
power of Jordan and Morrison, who were both w e l l known t o the new 
President.*93 Yuan's Presidency was welcomed as a means of easing Anglo-
Chinese tensions i n general, and i t was also believed t h a t h i s influence 
might b r i n g about greater o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r t a l k s w i t h China about Tibet. 
An optimism unfounded as subsequent events were t o show.#94 
A l a s t a i r Lamb has argued t h a t the change i n the Republican government had 
l i t t l e e f f e c t on China's Central Asian p o l i c y , and t h i s i s t r u e t o some 
extent since, on t a k i n g o f f i c e , Yuan's government continued t o hold 
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t e r r i t o r i e s i n Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Tibet acquired under the Manchu. 
However, Chinese forward p o l i c y i n Tibet, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
c r e a t i o n of the new Chinese province of Sikang, had not been a Manchu 
i n i t i a t i v e , the main d r i v i n g force behind the p o l i c y having come from the 
P r o v i n c i a l government of Szechuan where Yuan had many supporters and who 
had o f t e n acted i n defiance of Peking.The changes i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y , which 
appeared t o the B r i t i s h t o be unexpected and dramatic departures, were 
th e r e f o r e simply extensions of p o l i c i e s already begun i n Szechuan i n the 
dying days of the Manchu dynasty.*95 
New Republican p o l i c y was most obviously r e f l e c t e d i n the 'Five Races 
Decree' of May 1912, an attempt t o enhance the s t a t u s of those previously 
regarded as the subject races of China, by d e c l a r i n g them Chinese subjects. 
As one of the f i v e races covered by the Decree, Tibetans 
now had the r i g h t t o r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n the new Republican Assembly i n 
Peking, but t h i s was a dual edged sword whose i m p l i c a t i o n s were not l o s t on 
the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e , since t o a l l i n t e n t s and purposes i t meant that 
China could now c l a i m Tibet as p a r t of China proper.«96 A second, and 
perhaps less obvious m a n i f e s t a t i o n of t h i s new approach was the appointment 
at the beginning of 1913 of Yuan's close associate Lu Hsing-Chi as 
' P a c i f i c a t o r of Tibet', the Republican equivalent of Amban under the 
Manchu. Lu had been s e c r e t l y engaged i n promoting t i e s w i t h the Tibetans 
throughout the period of the Chinese evacuation i n 1912,but h i s new r o l e 
was t o f r o n t the new humane p o l i c y , and t o open up dialogue w i t h the Dalai 
Lama and the Tibetan government about the f u t u r e s t a t u s of Tibet i n the new 
Republic. I n order t o do t h i s , however, he had t o persuade both the Dalai 
Lama and the Indian government t o a l l o w him t o enter Tibet and t h i s was 
proving understandably d i f f i c u l t . * 9 7 
Yuan had not expected h i s new p o l i c y t o sour h i s f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
the B r i t i s h and he added t h e i r increasing h o s t i l i t y t o the other problems 
he experienced during h i s f i r s t year as President, the greatest of which 
was how best t o hold together the disparate Provinces of the o l d Manchu 
Empire who were now j e a l o u s l y guarding t h e i r new found independence, 
enhanced by the breakdown of communication w i t h Peking during the course of 
the r e v o l u t i o n a r y struggle.*98 Yuan was not helped i n s o l v i n g t h i s problem 
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by h i s own lack of p o l i t i c a l experience, h i s r i s e t o power having been 
accomplished by an a b i l i t y t o survive court i n t r i g u e and a l l y himself t o 
the r i g h t people a t the r i g h t time. His p o p u l a r i t y w i t h Sinophiles l i k e 
Jordan and Morrison, who agonised over the slow decay of the Manchu Empire, 
was based on t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t he would t r y t o r e s t o r e the o l d China t o 
former greatness.Their confidence i n the a b i l i t y of the Republican 
government t o do t h i s however was not shared i n London and India where the 
Republic was seen as an unstable and untrustworthy l e f t wing force w i t h 
whom i t was going t o be d i f f i c u l t t o acheive an understanding. The new 
approach,manifested i n the Five Races Decree,was f u r t h e r regarded by them 
as an attempt t o intervene i l l e g a l l y i n Tibetan a f f a i r s as well as a 
d e l i b e r a t e s t r a t e g y aimed at o v e r t u r n i n g a l l previous t r e a t i e s with B r i t a i n 
concerning Tibet. The Chinese were f u r t h e r incensed by B r i t a i n ' s decision 
t o l i n k the Tibetan issue w i t h t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o o f f i c a l l y recognise the 
Republic, and before going on t o discuss the way i n which they attempted t o 
do t h i s , I want t o look b r i e f l y at the nature of the Republican claims t o 
Tibet and B r i t i s h r e a c t i o n s t o them.*99 
Following the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty i n 1911 Tibetans f e l t 
themselves t o be independent of a l l t i e s w i t h China since the Cho-yon 
had bound them only t o the Manchu. The Dalai Lama's formal d e c l a r a t i o n 
of independence i n 1913 was simply a r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t t h a t , w i t h the 
passing of the Manchu, China had f o r f e i t e d a l l r i g h t s t o intervene i n 
Tibetan a f f a i r s . Yuan had come t o the Presidency prepared t o restore 
the Dalai Lama's f u l l powers and t i t l e s and from h i s point of view the 
Five Races Decree was nothing more than an attempt t o elevate the Tibetans 
by making them equal Chinese subjects. I n support of t h i s p o l i c y he had 
even r e c a l l e d h i s Chinese Commander from East Tibet and had made attempts 
t o dismantle Chinese i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n areas occupied by Chinese troops. His 
a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l troop movements from Peking was however h i g h l y 
questionable i n view of the f a c t t h a t the occupied areas were under the 
d i r e c t c o n t r o l of the v i r t u a l l y independent P r o v i n c i a l governments of 
Szechuan and Yunnan, and h i s aim was probably merely an attempt t o h a l t 
the f u r t h e r advance of Chinese forces. His attempts t o defuse the s i t u a t i o n 
i n East Tibet were received w i t h great scepticism i n London and India , 
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where i t was f e l t t h a t these moves were simply stages i n a pre-prepared 
plan f o r the t o t a l absorption of Tibet i n t o China proper. 
This confusion about Yuan's motives therefore exacerbated Anglo-Chinese 
tensions f u r t h e r instead of r e l i e v i n g them. Greater complications also 
arose when, i n r e t u r n f o r r e - i n s t a t i n g the Dalai Lama, he began t o claim 
what he now r e f e r r e d t o as 'sovereign' r i g h t s i n Tibet, marking the 
beginning of the f i e r c e semantic debate about what c o n s t i t u t e d sovereignty 
which would dominate discussions at the Simla Conference, convened i n 1913 
p a r t l y i n an attempt t o resolve t h i s problem. The Foreign O f f i c e had 
p r e v i o u s l y accepted t h a t China had 'suzerain' r i g h t s t o Tibet but India had 
always st r e n o u s l y r e j e c t e d even these l i m i t e d claims. By 1912 however i t 
became c l e a r t o Ind i a t h a t unless she was w i l l i n g t o accept some compromise 
there would be no p o s s i b i l i t y of n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h China over Tibet and 
t h e r e f o r e no prospect of s t a b i l i s i n g the f r o n t i e r and p r o t e c t i n g Indian 
borders.They agreed r e l u c t a n t l y t h e r e f o r e t o accept the idea of t a l k s with 
China over the issue.«100 
Although London and Ind i a were now broadly united, the main b a r r i e r t o 
t a l k s about Tibet was Yuan's obvious i n a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l both h i s own 
Republican government i n Peking,and the P r o v i n c i a l governments i n Szechuan 
and Yunnan,who had t r a d i t i o n a l l y taken charge of Tibetan f r o n t i e r matters 
and who were c l e a r l y keen t o continue w i t h the Chao offensive. To t h i s end 
the Szechuan Expedition had set out i n A p r i l 1912, and from t h i s time on a 
race began between Ind i a and China which aimed t o organise e f f e c t i v e t a l k s 
on Tibet before the Expedition reached Lhasa, any Republican p r e v a r i c a t i o n 
now being seen i n I n d i a as yet f u r t h e r evidence of Yuan's attempt t o s t a l l 
t a l k s u n t i l the Szechuan Expedition reached i t s t a r g e t . f l O l 
The extent of Yuan's involvement i n what t o the Indian government was seen 
as a s i n i s t e r p l o t t o re-invade Lhasa, i s unclear. He o f t e n s t a t e d openly 
t h a t he d i d not support forward movements i n Tibet, and i t was obviously 
not i n h i s own p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s t o grant even more power t o the Szechuan 
government who had organised and promoted the new Expedition t o Lhasa. 
However, he was c l e a r l y unable t o c o n t r o l events,and h i s opinion, though 
important t o the B r i t i s h , had l i t t l e r e a l impact on what was happening by 
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t h i s stage. The B r i t i s h response t o events i n East Tibet and Szechuan was 
thus d i v i d e d between those i n I n d i a advocating force, and the more 
diploma t i c approach recommended by Jordan i n Peking who,having a much 
greater a p p r e c i a t i o n of Yuan's s i t u a t i o n than most of h i s colleagues, f e l t 
t h a t there was nothing t o be gained by d i r e c t l y challenging h i s 
authority.»102 He was t h e r e f o r e t o t a l l y opposed t o Crewe's suggestion t h a t 
a B r i t i s h f o r c e might be s t a t i o n e d somewhere between the B r i t i s h post at 
Sadiya i n Assam and the f r o n t i e r w i t h East Tibet i n order t o h a l t f u r t h e r 
Chinese advances, because he f e l t i t extremely inadvisable t o l i n k Tibetan 
f r o n t i e r problems w i t h those of the Burmese borders, where Yunnanese troops 
were c o n t i n u i n g t o t h r e a t e n Indian s e c u r i t y , and which had been a constant 
source of worry t o him f o r many years. I n the end Jordan's view prevailed 
and on 12th August 1912 he de l i v e r e d a Memo t o the newly formed Vai Chaio 
Pu c o n t a i n i n g B r i t a i n ' s t e r n s f o r a settlement of the Tibetan issue. 
Although Jordan had won the case f o r s e t t l i n g the issue d i p l o m a t i c a l l y , 
Hardinge came t o resent what he perceived as an i n t r u s i o n i n t o matters t h a t 
he regarded as purely Indian, and from t h i s time on he questioned Jordan's 
a b i l i t y t o act i n the best i n t e r e s t s of B r i t a i n , o f t e n accusing him 
u n f a i r l y of i d e n t i f y i n g himself too c l o s e l y w i t h Yuan Shih Kai.*103 
9. THE AUGUST MEMQRAIDUM AHD THE PREPARATIOIS FOR SIMLA 
The document which Jordan presented t o the Wai Chaio Pu, and which became 
known as the August Memorandum,sought t o e s t a b l i s h an understanding w i t h 
the new Republican Government over Tibet. Couched i n f i r m and unambiguous 
language, the document hoped t o make i t c l e a r t o the Chinese t h a t B r i t a i n 
would not t o l e r a t e any a c t i o n t h a t might threaten the independence of Tibet 
and r e f e r r e d t o the launching of the Szechuan Expedition as an act of 
aggression. I t marked a complete departure i n the London a t t i t u d e towards 
Yuan's government, which had p r e v i o u s l y made a po i n t of not i n t e r f e r i n g 
w i t h Chinese plans f o r Tibet, and i t displayed undisguised disapproval of 
hi s p o l i c y which had sought t o i n t e g r a t e Tibetans i n t o the new Republic by 
gr a n t i n g them equal c i t i z e n s h i p . Jordan c a l l e d f o r Tibetan s t a t u s t o be 
once again r e s t a t e d i n accordance w i t h the terms of the Lhasa Convention 
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of 1904 and the Chinese Adhesion Treaty of 1906, and he f u r t h e r condemned 
the a c t i o n s of Chinese o f f i c e r s and o f f i c a l s i n s i d e Tibet which had 
contravened the terms of the t r e a t y . Whilst accepting t h a t the Republican 
government had a r i g h t t o s t a t i o n a permanent representative i n Lhasa,he 
argued t h a t the s i z e of the escort should be s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduced and 
stressed the importance of what he described as " f r i e n d l y negotiations'. 
I m p l i c i t w i t h i n the document was a strong suggestion t h a t , i f i t s views 
were not complied,with B r i t a i n would be u n w i l l i n g t o recognise the new 
Republic. »104 The new Wai Chaio Pu behaved i n much the same way as t h e i r 
Manchu predecessors when confronted w i t h ultimatums from the B r i t i s h , and 
l i k e them,they chose t o ignore i t . As on previous occasions the Foreign 
O f f i c e were now faced w i t h the problem of how t o proceed. The impasse was 
e v e n t u a l l y broken when Jordan received an i n v i t a t i o n f o r t a l k s at the Wai 
Chiao Pu from Dr.Yen, Vice Foreign M i n i s t e r , and leader of the powerful 
youth f a c t i o n known as the Young China Party, who amongst other things had 
been responsible f o r r e v o l u t i o n i s i n g the Chinese Foreign Office.»105 
The i n t e r v i e w which took place between Jordan and Yen on 14th December 1912 
revealed how f a r from contact w i t h the r e a l source of power Jordan had been 
and how weak Yuan's a b i l i t y t o determine f o r e i g n p o l i c y a c t u a l l y was. Yen 
made i t c l e a r from the s t a r t of the i n t e r v i e w t h a t h i s p o l i c y was not only 
t o r e s i s t any suggestion t h a t China surrender any gains made i n Tibet, but 
t h a t moreover, he saw the f e r t i l e lands i n East Tibet as an i d e a l s o l u t i o n 
t o the problems created by overpopulation i n some of the Chinese Provinces. 
I n response t o accusations from Jordan t h a t China was behaving aggressively 
i n East Tibet, Yen r e p l i e d t h a t he regarded the B r i t i s h closure of the 
Indian border w i t h Tibet as a h o s t i l e act, and as a sign t h a t India were no 
longer prepared t o d i s p l a y the same generosity towards China t h a t they had 
p r e v i o u s l y shown during the evacuation of Chinese s o l d i e r s i n 1912. A l l 
discussion broke down at t h i s p o i n t and was followed by a t o t a l r e j e c t i o n 
of the August Memorandum by the Chinese soon a f t e r . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s , 
and t o Jordan's intense i r r i t a t i o n , they then completely misrepresented h i s 
conversation w i t h Yen by c l a i m i n g t h a t he had shown sympathy f o r the idea 
t h a t Tibet might become one of the f i v e races, an idea which Jordan 
found abhorrent.#106 
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By l a t e 1912 the new B r i t i s h p o l i c y towards Tibet had been c l e a r l y shaped, 
and i n e a r l y 1913 the Indian government had drawn up the d r a f t agreement 
which they hoped would form the basis of a proposed t r e a t y which they 
wanted China t o sign. Jordan f e l t t h a t i f t a l k s were t o take place with 
China they must be pushed forward as q u i c k l y as possible and c e r t a i n l y 
before the Chinese had a chance t o consolidate t h e i r advances i n East 
Tibet, and t h i s was unanimously agreed. I n s p i t e of c r i t i c i s m t h a t he was 
l o s i n g touch i n the face of the almost overwhelming pressure t h a t h i s post 
demanded, Jordan's o p i n i o n continued t o c a r r y weight i n London, and the key 
r o l e he played i n s e t t i n g up the Simla t a l k s i s demonstrated by the f a c t 
t h a t h i s idea f o r t r i p a r t i t e t a l k s , based on the precedent established by 
n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the 1908 Trade Regulations, was the option eventually 
taken up. 
The idea behind the t r i p a r t i t e t a l k s was t h a t India might be able t o act as 
a 'benevolent a s s i s t a n t ' i n n e g o t i a t i o n s between China and Tibet. This i t 
was hoped would have the e f f e c t of r e l i e v i n g them of the problems involved 
i n n e g o t i a t i n g a separate t r e a t y w i t h Tibet which they would then have t o 
persuade the Chinese t o sign, and which had caused so many d i f f i c u l t i e s on 
a previous occasion when the Chinese had prevaricated over the s i g n i n g of 
the Adhesion Treaty i n 1906.#107 Hardinge was q u i t e happy w i t h the idea 
f o r t r i p a r t i t e t a l k s , seeing them as a more n a t u r a l development and as a 
b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t y t o secure India's borders than any Anglo-Chinese Treaty 
signed i n London or Peking t h a t might widen the scope of discussions. 
Before t a l k s could be begin,however,the Chinese s i g n a l l e d t h a t they 
p r e f e r r e d t o conduct b i p a r t i t e t a l k s w i t h B r i t a i n i n London,employing the 
s e r v i c e s of Wen Tsung-Yao,the Assistant Amban i n Lhasa,who was already w e l l 
known f o r h i s sympathetic a t t i t u d e towards Tibetans. When t h i s o f f e r was 
r e j e c t e d , they refused t o even consider the idea of t r i p a r t i t e t a l k s , 
s t a t i n g t h a t they found the idea of a Tibetan delegate e n t i r e l y 
unacceptable.*108 Yuan's subsequent o f f e r t o provide the notorious Chang 
Yin Tang as an a l t e r n a t i v e delegate was also f i r m l y declined and,after 
c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h Jordan, agreement was reached t o appoint Ivan Chen, a 
Chinese diplomat w i t h B r i t i s h experience who was eventually accepted as 
Chinese delegate t o the talks.«109 
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Chen's appointment,which at f i r s t had seemed so approriate,now threatened 
t o jeopardize the s t a r t of the t a l k s f o l l o w i n g r e p o r t s received by the 
Foreign O f f i c e t h a t he had been named as one of two Republican 
' P a c i f i c a t o r s ' i n Tibet. Since t h i s t i t l e had only been previously applied 
under the Manchu t o postings i n Chinese Dependencies,this announcement had 
obvious i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r Yuan's s i n c e r i t y and f o r Jordan's competence, and 
Crewe was f u r t h e r alarmed by rumours t h a t the P a c i f i c a t o r s were already i n 
East Tibet engaged i n n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a q u i t e seperate Treaty w i t h the 
East Tibetans. Although these rumours could not be confirmed, they raised 
doubts about the v i a b i l i t y of a t r i p a r t i t e conference i n such 
circumstances, e s p e c i a l l y as Yuan had previously agreed t o h a l t a l l Chinese 
a c t i v i t y i n East Tibet,both before and during the conference and, even 
though Jordan explained t h a t Yuan had no e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l over Chinese 
a c t i v i t i e s i n East T i b e t , t h e s i t u a t i o n on the eve of h i s leave, looked 
ominous. When Beilby Alston became Charge d ' A f f a i r e s i n June 1913 he was 
already aware of the very d e l i c a t e s t a t e of Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s but 
understood less about Yuan's p l i g h t than Jordan. He was therefore w i l l i n g 
t o take a much f i r m e r l i n e w i t h the President,warning him that,unless 
Chinese troops ceased a c t i v i t y i n East Tibet, there could be no f u r t h e r 
dialogue.Although t h i s prompted Yuan t o issue orders, once again, f o r a 
ce a s e f i r e , t h i s was only a token gesture and B r i t i s h e f f o r t s t o open 
t a l k s were f u r t h e r thwarted by Chen's belated a r r i v a l i n Peking w i t h f r e s h 
proposals f o r t a l k s t h a t delayed the opening of negotia t i o n s f o r a f u r t h e r 
two weeks,and helped counter a l l e g a t i o n s made by Jordan's c r i t i c s t h a t i t 
was h i s ' s o f t approach' towards the President which had allowed the Chinese 
t o p r e v a r i c a t e . 
The problems surrounding the or g a n i s a t i o n of the Simla Conference reveal 
the t r u e complexity of B r i t a i n ' s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Sew Republican 
government. F i r s t l y , there was confusion about the r o l e t h a t Yuan played i n 
determining and d i r e c t i n g p o l i c y outside Peking which l e d t o u n f a i r 
c r i t i c i s m of Jordan's handling of the s i t u a t i o n . The extent t o which the 
Chinese p r e v a r i c a t e d over t a l k s had v a r i e d considerably. Yuan could do 
very l i t t l e t o c o n t r o l what was happening i n East Tibet, n e i t h e r could he 
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reveal the t r u e extent of h i s weakness,and h i s a t t i t u d e therefore appeared 
t o o u t s i d e r s t o be i n c o n s i s t e n t and insincere. He was also worried t h a t 
attempts t o create the new Province of Sikang, which he had previously 
supported, could only undermine h i s own p o s i t i o n as President since the new 
Province would now i n e v i t a b l y become a power base f o r forces i n Szechuan 
from which t o extend t h e i r already powerful i n f l u e n c e i n western China at 
h i s expense. F i n a l l y , the Tibetans themselves were not united i n t h e i r 
aims. C e r t a i n p a r t s of East Tibet had always been h o s t i l e t o r u l e from 
Lhasa, p r e f e r r i n g t o t o l e r a t e informal c o n t r o l from the Chinese which, i n 
the past, had allowed them a greater independence.*110 
I t soon became a matter of urgency f o r a l l sides t o f i n d some s o r t of 
s o l u t i o n however, and the Indian government were p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned 
t h a t some d e f i n i t i o n of t h e i r borders be agreed, i f only t o put an end t o 
the c o s t l y business of defending them. I n Chapter 8 I w i l l discuss the 
extent t o which attempts t o solve the problem d i p l o m a t i c a l l y both succeeded 
and f a i l e d i n t h e i r aim, but before doing t h i s I w i l l take tisie t o document 
the changes t h a t took place w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Foreign Service between 1914 
and 1922, and i n p a r t i c u l a r , the e f f e c t t h a t the outbreak of war had upon 
the Service i n Asia. 
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CHAPITER S E V E N 
THE FOREIGN SERVICE 1914-1922 
This Chapter seeks t o e x p l a i n the broad changes i n the B r i t i s h Foreign 
Service between 1914 and 1922. The aim i s simply t o provide a b r i e f 
background against which changes i n B r i t i s h Tibetan p o l i c y may be 
understood and i s not an attempt t o give a f u l l d e s c r i p t i o n of events. 
I . LOSDOS: THE FOREIGN SERVICE 
The d e c l a r a t i o n of war i n August 1914 had a profound psychological e f f e c t 
on the Foreign O f f i c e . Grey and many of h i s colleagues had entered the war 
w i t h an i n b u i l t sense of shame at t h e i r f a i l u r e t o prevent i t which only 
increased as the f u l l h o r r o r s of trench warfare became known and senior 
s t a f f l o s t sons i n the f i g h t i n g . The O f f i c e had enjoyed unprecedented 
p r e s t i g e i n the immediate pre-war period which was s i g n i f i c a n t l y undermined 
by t h e i r f a i l u r e t o avert the catastrophe, and i t was easy f o r many t o c i t e 
'ol d diplomacy' as a major cause of the war.»l 
As w e l l as the psychological b a t t e r i n g i n f l i c t e d on i n d i v i d u a l s , the war 
i t s e l f acted as a c a t a l y s t f o r change w i t h i n the Service. By 1913 i t was 
g e n e r a l l y acknowledged t h a t the 1906 reforms had not kept pace w i t h the 
demands generated by the increasing workload, and i n t h a t year the 
MacDonnell Commision began a d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o o f f i c e procedures. 
I n t h e i r lengthy Report, published soon a f t e r the war,the Commissioners 
made a number of recommendations t h a t were intended t o reduce the cost and 
e x c l u s i v i t y of the Service and b r i n g i t i n t o l i n e w i t h 'new diplomatic' 
p r a c t i c e . This included proposals t o amalgamate the Foreign O f f i c e and the 
Diplomatic Service, as w e l l as plans t o upgrade the Consular Department i n 
order t o r e f l e c t the i n c r e a s i n g importance given t o trade and commerce i n 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . *2 
Besides the discussions about the f u t u r e o r g a n i s a t i o n of the O f f i c e , 
debates about the nature of diplomacy began t o question the t r a d i t i o n a l 
approach of diplomats l i k e Hardinge, who r e t u r n i n g from India i n 1916 t o 
resume h i s o l d Post as Permanent Undersecretary, found the O f f i c e much 
changed. Fo longer regarded as a pushy young reformer, and 
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d i s i l l u s i o n e d as the r e s u l t ot his experiences i n India, Hardinge found 
himself i l l - e q u i p p e d t o handle the changes needed t o update the O f f i c e and 
l i k e Jficolson, f a i l e d t o appreciate the extent t o which economic 
considerations were i n c r e a s i n g l y determining i n t e r n a t i o n a l policy.»3 
Balfour, who replaced Grey as Foreign Secretary i n 1916, was more w i l l i n g 
t o accept the new s i t u a t i o n than h i s successor Curzon. Grey had been very 
disparaging about the 'new diplomacy' and h i s views were supported by 
Curzon who,as Foreign Secretary a f t e r 1919,was strong enough t o carry t h i s 
o p p o s i t i o n against a l l odds, ensuring t h a t 'old diplomacy' survived well 
i n t o the 1920's, and a l l o w i n g the e x c l u s i v i t y of the diplomatic service t o 
be preserved.#4 
2. THE ISDIA SESVICE 
As Viceroy of In d i a i n 1914 Hardinge was presented w i t h the immediate 
problem of deciding what c o n t r i b u t i o n India should make towards supporting 
B r i t a i n i n the c o n f l i c t . At f i r s t he had t o t a l l y r e j e c t e d the idea of 
sending any troops t o Europe, and had r e s i s t e d any suggestion t h a t India 
had an o b l i g a t i o n t o what he saw as a European st r u g g l e . By 1913 however, 
h i s a t t i t u d e began t o change as he r e a l i s e d t h a t , as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o 
sending troops t o Europe, India might be expected t o help meet B r i t i s h 
Naval expenses, a f a r nmre c o s t l y option. By the end of August 1914 
t h e r e f o r e he had sent s i x t y thousand troops t o f i g h t i n Europe, the largest 
f o r c e t o leave India since those sent t o r e l i e v e the Peking Legations 
d u r i n g the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. In s p r i n g 1915 t h i s number had 
increased even f u r t h e r , making the s i z e of India's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the war 
e f f o r t very impressive indeed. This l e v e l of support was provided at great 
cost t o f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y but Hardinge reasoned th a t i f B r i t a i n were t o 
lose the war, India would i n e v i t a b l y be l o s t , and the r e s t of the B r i t i s h 
Empire put at r i s k . Like many of h i s contemporaries he believed t h a t the 
war could only l a s t a few months and t h a t t h e r e f o r e the s a c r i f i c e would be 
affordable.#5 
The outbreak of war had also produced unexpected support f o r B r i t a i n from 
I n d i a n Princes i n the Independent States,as w e l l as from the governments 
of Hepal and Tibet, who each o f f e r e d troops f o r Europe. When the leaders 
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of the Independence Movement i n s i d e India also declared t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o 
h a l t t h e i r campaign f o r the d u r a t i o n of the war, Hardinge f e l t t h a t the 
s a c r i f i c e of troops p r e v i o u s l y engaged i n f r o n t i e r defence would not 
present as many problems f o r the maintenence of f r o n t i e r s e c u r i t y as he had 
p r e v i o u s l y feared.*6 I n the event however t h i s proved f a l s e l y o p t i m i s t i c 
and the Indian army soon became embroiled i n serious f i g h t i n g on the 
borders of Afghanistan at a time when t h e i r forces were s e r i o u s l y 
depleted.*7 
On 27th May 1915 Crewe r e t i r e d from the In d i a O f f i c e and the post of 
Secretary of State f o r In d i a was taken by Austen Chamberlain. ¥hen the war 
s t a r t e d Chamberlain had been out of o f f i c e f o r nearly nine years,having 
e a r l i e r f a i l e d i n a b i d t o lead the Conservative Party i n 1911. 
A f t e r years i n the p o l i t i c a l wilderness Chamberlain was g r a t e f u l f o r t h i s 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o resume h i s p o l i t i c a l career, and as a passionate b e l i e v e r I n 
the B r i t i s h Empire, he took a keen i n t e r e s t i n the work of h i s new 
department, managing very q u i c k l y t o e s t a b l i s h a good rapport w i t h 
Hardinge who had r e l u c t a n t l y agreed t o extend h i s term i n India u n t i l the 
appointment of Viscount Chelmsford as Viceroy i n A p r i l 1916.«8 Chelmsford 
had p r e v i o u s l y been Governor General of Queensland and Hew South Vales and, 
although he was not Chamberlain's favoured choice as successor t o Hardinge, 
the new Secretary of State was pleased t o discover t h a t the new Viceroy was 
less 'blinkered' and more f l e x i b l e i n approach than h i s predecessor.»9 
With c o n t r o l of a l l m i l i t a r y operations now t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Var O f f i c e , 
Chamberlain had time t o t u r n h i s a t t e n t i o n t o the domestic probleins,as the 
Independence Movement resumed i t s a c t i v i t i e s and gained i n strength,and as 
I n d i a became i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o govern. By the time of h i s 
r e s i g n a t i o n over the i l l - f a t e d Mesopotamia Campaign i n 1917 he was g i v i n g 
serious thought t o the mechanics of l i m i t e d devolution, a move supported 
and continued by Lord Montagu,who replaced him as Secretary of State i n 
August of t h a t year,and which would culminate i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of the 
Chelmsford/Montagu Reforms and the Government of India Act of 1919.#10 
During t h i s p e r i o d of great i n t e r n a l change India was q u i e t l y e s t a b l i s h i n g 
an i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a t u s of her own as one of the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s t o the 
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Treaty of V e r s a i l l e s . This had been p a r t l y granted i n r e c o g n i t i o n of her 
great c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the war e f f o r t , but was also a manifestation of the 
new i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m which attempted as f a r as possible t o give each 
country a separate status. I n B r i t i s h terms t h i s was r e a l l y the beginning 
of an open acknowledgement t h a t she could no longer a f f o r d I n d i a , e i t h e r 
morally or f i n a n c i a l l y , and made progress towards the granting of f u l l 
independence i n e v i t a b l e . * 1 1 The dramatic events i n Europe and India between 
1914 and 1922 had l i t t l e d i r e c t e f f e c t on the r o u t i n e p o l i c y of the Forth-
East f r o n t i e r , and w i t h the outbreak of war i n 1914, B r i t i s h and Indian 
governments turned t h e i r a t t e n t i o n t o more pressing matters, abandoning 
attempts t o s e t t l e the Tibetan problem f o r the d u r a t i o n of the war. For 
the men s t i l l s erving on the f r o n t i e r t h i s withdrawal of support presented 
s p e c i a l problems and made t h e i r u p h i l l s t r u g g l e t o maintain B r i t i s h 
i n t e r e s t s and p r e s t i g e even more d i f f i c u l t and dangerous, e s p e c i a l l y as the 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y disturbances i n s i d e China continued t o threaten the s e c u r i t y 
of Indian borders, presenting the same problens of c o n t r o l as before. These 
disturbances were most keenly f e l t i n East Tibet and i n those areas 
monitored by the men of the China Service and i t i s the character and 
conduct of t h i s Service t h a t I now want t o discuss. 
3. THE CHIFA SERVICE 
(1) THE FAR EASTERF DEPARTMEFT IF LOFDOF 
As Head of the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign O f f i c e from Campbell's 
death i n 1911, Walter Langley had pursued a p o l i c y very s i m i l a r t o t h a t of 
h i s predecessor, based on the promotion of co-operation w i t h other powers 
i n c a p i t a l i s t ventures i n s i d e China. During 1911, both he and Campbell had 
l i a s e d w i t h Japanese a l l i e s on r a i l w a y p r o j e c t s i n the Yangtze Basin, 
r e a l i s i n g t h a t i t would no longer be possible t o get r e c o g n i t i o n f o r such a 
vast area as a purely B r i t i s h sphere of influence. As Japanese power grew 
i n s i d e China they began t o challenge B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s o v e r t l y and t h i s 
p o l i c y became d i f f i c u l t t o s u s t a i n . By 1914 Langley t h e r e f o r e found 
himself i n c r e a s i n g l y i s o l a t e d w i t h i n the Far Eastern Department as 
o p p o s i t i o n t o Japanese a c t i v i t y hardened.•12 
S i r B eilby Alston had been Charge d ' A f f a i r e s during the summer of 1913 
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and h i s experiences at t h i s time had made him vehemently a n t i - Japanese. 
His strong c o n v i c t i o n t h a t they coveted B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n the Yangtze 
Basin was r e f l e c t e d i n h i s c o l o u r f u l r e p o r t s of Japanese aggression during 
t h i s period but t h e i r impact was reduced because they were countered by 
more sober accounts from B r i t a i n ' s Ambassador to Tokyo, S i r Congyham 
Greene.•IS Alston's c r e d i b i l i t y was only preserved by the support he 
subsequently received from Jordan i n London, and from the experienced 
Senior Clerk J.D. Gregory, who by 1913 was e x e r c i s i n g some influence on the 
f o r m u l a t i o n of p o l i c y i n London.*14 By 1914 t h e r e f o r e the poor s t a t e of 
the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e was becoming a source of great concern t o the 
Far Eastern Department, but the demands of war, and the need t o preserve i t 
f o r s t r a t e g i c reasons, prevented the development of any d i r e c t 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n . Jordan found t h i s s i t u a t i o n i n c r e a s i n g l y tiresome and he 
resented Japanese attempts t o i n t e r f e r e i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of China, 
e s p e c i a l l y as they appeared t o be a c t i n g as a b a r r i e r t o f r u i t f u l dialogue 
w i t h the Chinese over T i b e t , f o r whenever the subject was mentioned i n 
Peking, the a c t i o n s of B r i t a i n ' s Japanese a l l i e s became part of the 
discussion. *14 
The war years were d i f f i c u l t times f o r the Far Eastern Department. Like the 
r e s t of the Foreign O f f i c e they s u f f e r e d depletions of s t a f f as well as the 
f r u s t r a t i o n s of t r y i n g t o conduct r o u t i n e business i n war time. From the 
d e c l a r a t i o n of war u n t i l h i s retirement i n December 1916, Grey's f a i l i n g 
eyesight forced him t o take long absences from London, leaving the Far 
Eastern Department t o t h e i r own devices during a period when events inside 
China were moving s w i f t l y and required prompt diploi a a t l c a t t e n t i o n . »15 The 
appointment of Arthur Balfour as Foreign Secretary i n 1916 d i d not help the 
s i t u a t i o n and ' o l d China hands' l i k e Morrison were dismayed by what they 
saw as h i s f a i l u r e t o appreciate the importance of Far Eastern questions 
at such a c r i t i c a l p eriod f o r Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s . * 1 6 Hardinge's 
appointment as Permanent Undersecretary i n May 1916 was warmly applauded by 
the China Service and by Jordan i n p a r t i c u l a r , as i t was w e l l known t h a t , 
u n l i k e Sicolson, who had displayed a marked lack of i n t e r e s t i n Far Eastern 
matters, Hardinge at l e a s t understood the problems of the f r o n t i e r , having 
experienced them at f i r s t hand during h i s time as Viceroy i n India. His 
3. Lord Charles hardi:;?^ 
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a b i l i t y t o in f l u e n c e events was much reduced by t h i s time however, because 
he was forced t o devote most of h i s a t t e n t i o n t o the European front.»17 
A f t e r i n i t i a l misgivings, Curzon's appointment as Foreign Secretary i n 1919 
was ev e n t u a l l y welcomed and h i s great i n t e r e s t and experience of Indian 
a f f a i r s were t o lead t o a much f i r m e r approach towards Japanese forward 
p o l i c y i n China i n the post war period.*18 
( i i ) THE PEKIFG LEGALIOF 
Between 1914 and 1918 Jordan and h i s overworked s t a f f at the Peking 
Legation s t r u g g l e d t o cope w i t h the dual c r i s i s created by Yuan's attempt 
t o get h i a s e l f crowned Emperor, and increasing Japanese inte r f e r e n c e i n 
Chinese a f f a i r s . The workload at the Legation was enormous i n the f i r s t 
months of the war, and even Jordan found i t very d i f f i c u l t t o cope. He 
complained b i t t e r l y t o London t h a t he was forced t o carry the f u l l burden 
of d i p l o m a t i c meetings and decide on courses of action,without the b e n e f i t 
of advice from London,and as war progressed, and communications w i t h the 
outside world became even more e r r a t i c , h i s papers r e f l e c t h i s growing 
sense of isolation.»19 His h e a l t h had been impaired even before the war as 
a r e s u l t of the s t r e s s and a d d i t i o n a l workload created by the v o l a t i l e 
s i t u a t i o n i n s i d e China during the post r e v o l u t i o n a r y period,which c a l l e d 
f o r h i s constant t a c t and v i g i l a n c e , and on occasions h i s l i f e was c l e a r l y 
i n danger.*20 Contemporaries l i k e Korrison had also noticed how d i f f i c u l t 
I t was f o r him t o r e f r a i n from coming t o Yuan's a i d as Japanese h o s t i l i t y 
towards theRepublican government i n t e n s i f i e d , a n d London in c r e a s i n g l y sought 
t o distance i t s e l f from the confrontation.»21 In these circumstances the 
sudden and unexpected death of Yuan Shih Kai i n June 1916 came as a severe 
blow, and the close r e l a t i o n s h i p Jordan subsequently developed w i t h Paul 
Reinsch, the American Ambassador t o Peking, helped t o re s t o r e h i s own 
confidence and a b l i t y t o cope, as we l l as g i v i n g a boost t o Anglo-American 
co-operation i n China i n t h i s tense and d i f f i c u l t time.»22 In 1918 the 
death of h i s much beloved only daughter a f t e r a short i l l n e s s , a n d the 
co n t i n u i n g a n x i e t y f o r the s a f e t y of h i s son and son i n law, both serving 
on the Western Front, added even greater s t r a i n , and i t i s a t r i b u t e t o 
h i s sense of duty and the s t r e n g t h of h i s p e r s o n a l i t y t h a t he managed 
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t o c a r r y the Legation through the c r i s i s f o l l o w i n g Yuan's death without 
incident.*23 
Rumours of Jordan's impending retirement had begun t o c i r c u l a t e i n the 
e a r l y summer of 1916 and Alston was seen as the man most l i k e l y t o succeed 
him as B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r . A l s t o n ' s candidacy was regarded w i t h s c o r n f u l 
amusement by many w i t h experience of Chinese a f f a i r s , and Morrison branded 
him a 'buffoon' who was t o acquire the post by the 'side door', and by 
v i r t u e of h i s close a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h Langley.»24 As Jordan appeared t o him 
t o become less and less e f f e c t i v e however, Morrison l a t e r modified t h i s 
e a r l i e r view of Alston s l i g h t l y , but hecontinued, w i t h others, t o f e e l t h a t 
the 'stammering'though amiable contender was never a worthy man f o r such an 
important j o b and t h a t what was r e a l l y needed was someone l i k e 
Younghusband, who seemed t o him t o have both the s t a t u r e and a b i l i t y t o 
lead the Legation w i t h i n t e g r i t y through t h i s v o l a t i l e period.*25 
Jordan's c r e d i b i l i t y began t o be s e r i o u s l y challenged as the r e s u l t of h i s 
outspoken h o s t i l i t y towards the Japanese during the Demands c r i s i s of 
January 1915 which had l e d t o Japanese requests f o r h i s reiHDval.»26 These 
requests had created considerable embarrassment f o r the Foreign O f f i c e at a 
t i n e when Japanese co-operation was considered e s s e n t i a l t o the war e f f o r t , 
and while Grey continued t o support Jordan u n t i l he r e t i r e d i n 1916, h i s 
p o s i t i o n once Balfour took o f f i c e was no longer i n v i o l a t e . Following Grey's 
departure, and i n the face of Balfour's apparent lack of i n t e r e s t i n the 
Far East, Langley was able t o excercise a greater influence over p o l i c y 
than before, and f o r the f i r s t time, Alston's appointment on Langley's 
recommendation looked p r o b a b l e . l t was confirmed f o r many by Jordan's 
emotional overreaction t o Yuan's death i n 1916, and by h i s continuing open 
h o s t i l i t y towards the Japanese,which became so overt t h a t some f e l t he 
could no longer be t r u s t e d t o obey London without question.*27 In l a t e 
1916 he l e f t Peking f o r what h i s c r i t i c s believed t o be a well deserved 
retirement however,less than a year l a t e r , he had persuaded London t o allow 
him t o r e t u r n . The reason why he was able t o do t h i s had much t o do w i t h 
the arguments which, i n the past, had prevented the Peking Legation from 
being upgraded t o an Embassy. B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n China had remained 
purely commercial, and her a b i l i t y t o influence events there were now 
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e n t e r i n g a slow decline; i t was the r e f o r e easier t o leave things as they 
were, r a t h e r than r i s k any change th a t might upset the d e l i c a t e balance of 
Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s at such a c r i t i c a l time. Jordan's experience and 
h i s close a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the American Legation, an incre a s i n g l y powerful 
counter t o Japanese aggression i n China, also helped t o restore Foreign 
O f f i c e confidence i n h i s a b i l i t y t o handle a f f a i r s i n Peking, and so, 
despite Japanese p r o t e s t s , Jordan remained i n post, looking and f e e l i n g h i s 
age u n t i l March 1920 when Alston, who had waited i n the wings f o r so long, 
was f i n a l l y able t o take over.»28 
A f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o B r i t a i n Jordan continued t o serve the Foreign O f f i c e 
as advisor t o Curzon's sub-committee formed t o make recommendations on 
Asian p o l i c y i n the lead up t o the Washington Conference of 1922. This gave 
him an o p p o r t u n i t y t o give f u l l vent t o h i s anti-Japanese views,which by 
t h i s time were shared by most members of the Foreign Service who had had 
any dealings w i t h China.»29 
Morrison p o r t r a y s Jordan i n h i s d i a r i e s and l e t t e r s as a t i m i d yet 
'devoted servant of the Foreign O f f i c e ' i n h i s l a t e r years, but t h i s 
judgement i s a l i t t l e harsh. Jordan had worked through one of the most 
d i f f i c u l t and dramatic periods of upheaval i n Chinese h i s t o r y when, on at 
le a s t one occasion, h i s l i f e had been threatened, and when h i s h e a l t h had 
been at r i s k from the constant s t r e s s and the burden of overwork. He had 
remained an astute diplomat, much respected and admired by Chinese 
diplomats as w e l l as by the B r i t i s h community, and many mDurned h i s 
departure from Peking i n 1920. Even i n h i s l a t e r years, when h i s health was 
s e r i o u s l y beginning t o f a i l and h i s I r i s h temper growing shorter, he was 
s t i l l w e l l ahead of many contempories i n h i s understanding of the Chinese 
s i t u a t i o n and of the nature of B r i t a i n ' s f u t u r e r o l e there. 
A f t e r 1918 and against t h i s background of v i o l e n t and dramatic change, 
f u r t h e r attempts were made t o s e t t l e the Tibetan problem. I n the f i n a l 
Chapters, covering the period 1914 t o 1922, I w i l l discuss the nature of 
these attempts and the extent t o which they succeeded. 
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THE_gEARCH FOR A SQLUTIQS: BRITAIN, CHIM AND TIBET, 1913-1918 
1. THE SIMLA CQHFERESCE: OCTOBER 1913-JULY 1914 
Ivan Chen's a r r i v a l i n Simla i n e a r l y October 1913 was greeted by the 
Indian government w i t h a mixture of resentment and r e l i e f , since i t was 
now possible f o r the t a l k s t o go ahead f o l l o w i n g weeks of 
p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n by the Chinese.»1 
When Conference opened a week l a t e r on October 13th, Chen's advisors 
included T. H. Shah, h i s Chinese Secretary, T. C, Wang h i s Tibetan 
i n t e r p r e t e r , and h i s English Secretary,B. D. Bruce, of the Chinese 
Customs Service, whose c o n t r o v e r s i a l appointment created problems f o r 
the Indian government, who were u n w i l l i n g t o accept European employees 
of the Chinese Custojis Service as part of the Chinese delegation and who 
the r e f o r e launched strong p r o t e s t s leading t o h i s removal before the 
t a l k s got st a r t e d . * 2 Chen was already well known t o the B r i t i s h Foreign 
Service,having worked i n London f o r a number of years, and i t was 
th e r e f o r e hoped t h a t h i s f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h western diplomatic p r a c t i c e 
would enable t a l k s t o proceed without the misunderstandings which had 
dogged a l l previous n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h China about Tibet.*3 Chen's 
experiences at Simla were not t o be happy ones however, and he 
complained i n l e t t e r s t o Morrison t h a t he f e l t t h a t he was working alone 
I n very d i f f i c u l t circumstances.*4 This was f i r s t l y because, although 
the Conference was conducted i n English, the dialogue w i t h Peking had t o 
be relayed i n Chinese, o f t e n leading t o d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion over the 
t r a n s l a t i o n of many l e g a l and t e c h n i c a l terms w i t h which the Chinese 
were u n f a m i l i a r . Secondly, although Chen himself spoke excellent 
English, Bruce's removal meant t h a t he now had t o wade 
s i n g l e - handedly through the vast amount of paperwork covering the 
conference . T h i r d l y , he had c l e a r l y been poorly b r i e f e d and was not 
provided w i t h the ki n d of d e t a i l e d evidence he needed t o promote Chinese 
claims t o Tibet;and f i n a l l y , the a d d i t i o n a l presence of Lu Hslng Chi i n 
Simla t o t r y t o e f f e c t a separate deal w i t h the Dalai Lama, d i d not 
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help him present h i s case, e s p e c i a l l y as d e t a i l s of Lu's mission had not 
been revealed t o him by the government i n Peking.*5 
Facing him across the conference t a b l e was the B r i t i s h P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y 
S i r Henry McMahon, a man of formidable experience, who had already made 
an exhaustive study of the Tibetan s i t u a t i o n and had a long and 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d career i n Indi a behind him. ^ 6 The Tibetan delegate 
Lonchen Shatra might i n i t a l l y have appeared less of a t h r e a t , but i t was 
soon obvious t o Chen t h a t such appearances were deceptive. At the f i r s t 
meeting of the Conference i t appeared f o r c i b l y t o him th a t the Tibetan 
Delegate was ' e n t i r e l y i n the hands of the English'and that i n any case, 
a l l chances of enjoying h i s co-operation had been destroyed by the 
behaviour of the l a s t Chinese Amban, Lien Yu, against whom Lonchen 
appeared t o be harbouring a personal grudge which Chen l a t e r discovered 
was because the Amban had moved i n t o h i s house during h i s period of 
e x i l e w i t h the Dalai Lajna i n India, and had f i n a l l y l e f t Tibet i n 1912 
t a k i n g w i t h him a l l of Lonchen's household f u r n i t u r e and valuables. 
Chen was also aware t h a t Lonchen Shatra already had a valued r e p u t a t i o n 
w i t h the B r i t i s h and was w e l l known t o them as a senior a r i s t o c r a t i c 
o f f i c e r of the highest rank w i t h considerable diplomatic experience, 
having been chosen t o act as close adviser t o the Dalai Lama while he 
was i n India.He was also reputed t o have a great knowledge of the 
geography of the Forth-East f r o n t i e r and of Sino-Tibetan h i s t o r y , and 
before coming t o the Conference,and w i t h B e l l ' s help, had ammassed a 
vast c o l l e c t i o n of documents r e l a t i n g t o the various claims t o t e r r i t o r y 
which the Chinese had p e r i o d i c a l l y occupied but which had reverted t o 
Tib e t , as w e l l as a d e t a i l e d h i s t o r y of Sino-Tibetan r e l a t i o n s across 
the centuries.#7 The i n f o r m a t i o n which Lonchen was thus able t o present 
t o the Conference was impressive i n both bulk and depth of d e t a i l and 
Chen t h e r e f o r e f e l t very i l l equipped, having at h i s disposal only the 
d e t a i l s of Chao Erh-feng's most recent Tibetan campaigns w i t h which t o 
contest them.*8 Besides McMahon, the B r i t i s h delegation t o the 
Conference included Charles B e l l , s p e c i a l l y commissioned as h i s Tibetan 
advisor, and S i r Archibald Rose of the Chinese Counsular Service, who 
was t o advise on Chinese matters.»9 Unlike Chen, the B r i t i s h team were 
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w e l l b r i e f e d and had a very c l e a r idea of what they wanted from the 
t a l k s and the way i n which they proposed t o get i t . This was p a r t l y 
because the idea f o r the Conference had come from B r i t a i n , and p a r t l y 
because Tibetan and Chinese claims were both u n r e a l i s t i c and t o t a l l y 
incompatible.»10 These f a c t o r s allowed McMahon t o e s t a b l i s h h i n s e l f i n 
the r o l e of mediator e a r l y on and when elected President of the 
Conference at i t s f i r s t meeting, he proceeded t o throw himself 
e n t h u s i a t i c a l l y i n t o the task of f i n d i n g an easy, r a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n t o 
an apparently unsolvable problem.*11 The Simla Conference had s i x 
f u r t h e r meetings over the f o l l o w i n g s i x months, conceding f a i l u r e t o 
reach agreement i n A p r i l 1914. The d e t a i l e d Tibetan claims, prepared 
w e l l i n advance of the Conference,had been presented before the f i r s t 
meeting apparently on the mistaken assumption t h a t they would be 
supported by B r i t a i n . Lonchen Shatra had been ordered by h i s government 
t o be f i r m i n upholding a l l the p o i n t s and i n p a r t i c u l a r t o ask t h a t 
China acknowledge the Dalai Lama's r i g h t t o j u r i s d i c t i o n over a l l 
Tibetan peoples and t h a t a l l lands taken from Tibet during the Chao 
campaigns should be returned. I t soon became obvious t o him however 
t h a t the McMahon d i d not i n t e n d t o support these proposals, which would 
give Tibet everything she wanted at China's expense, and was i n f a c t 
f o l l o w i n g a very s p e c i f i c and q u i t e separate agenda of h i s own.#12 
The c o u n t e r c l a i i e which Chen presented t o the Conference were s i m i l a r l y 
i n f l e x i b l e and showed t h a t the Chinese were not only keen t o e s t a b l i s h 
an a c t i v e presence i n s i d e T ibet, but were adamant i n wanting the r e t u r n 
of a permanent re p r e s e n t a t i v e i n Lhasa. I t was of immense psychological 
importance t o the powerful Young China Party w i t h i n Yuan's government 
t h a t Chao Erh Feng's gains should not be l o s t t o China, and as w e l l as 
pressing f o r an Amban i n Lhasa, they were keen t o r e t a i n Batang, 
L i t a n g , and Chamdo,taken by Chao i n 1910. Although the Chinese were 
q u i t e happy not t o press sovereign claims t o Tibet, t h e i r insistence on 
maintaining a l o o s e l y c o n t r o l l e d network of Chinese o f f i c i a l s i n s i d e the 
country, together w i t h the r i g h t t o c o n t r o l the main routes t o Lhasa, 
threw out ominous s i g n a l s t h a t they might l a t e r use these advantages t o 
re-invade Lhasa as they had p r e v i o u s l y done i n 1910, and t h i s i n e v i t a b l y 
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coloured McMahon's a t t i t u d e towards Chinese proposals f o r the duration 
of the Conference.»13 Fews reaching Simla soon a f t e r the t a l k s had 
opened t h a t h o s t i l i t i e s had been resumed i n East Tibet, together w i t h 
r e l i a b l e c o n f i r m a t i o n t h a t a 'deal' had been s t r u c k between the Kalon 
Lama (as leader of the Tibetan forces i n East T i b e t ) , and the Chinese 
Commander i n Chief, f u r t h e r served t o r e i n f o r c e these b e l i e f s , making i t 
very d i f f i c u l t f o r e i t h e r the Tibetans or the B r i t i s h t o accept the 
s i n c e r i t y of Chen's proposals. This a t t i t u d e became a r e a l obstacle t o 
e f f e c t i v e discussion and l e d t o t h e i r eventual breakdown i n April.*14 
McMahon's idea f o r T i b e t t o be d i v i d e d i n t o 'Inner' and 'Outer' zones 
was based very obviously on a s o l u t i o n t h a t had previously proved 
successful i n Mongolia. The Outer zone was t o involve the placing of a 
wide area west of the h i s t o r i c Yangtse f r o n t i e r under Tibetan 
j u r i s d i c t i o n , a l l o w i n g no Chinese i n t e r f e r e n c e of any kind. The Inner 
zone was t o extend northwards t o the A l t y n range and eastwards t o the 
borders of Kansu and Szechuan, where the population was predominantly 
Tibetan. I n t h i s zone China was permitted t o s t a t i o n o f f i c i a l s and c a l l 
i n troops i n times of c r i s i s but was t o have no power t o colonise the 
region or i n any way t r y t o t u r n i t i n t o a Chinese Province.f15 What t o 
McMahon and h i s colleagues seemed a sensible and neat solution,however, 
provoked f u r y from the Tibetans and the Chinese, f o r i t offended both 
sides by o f f e r i n g n e i t h e r what they r e a l l y wanted. I n Peking Jordan was 
also scathing i n h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o the proposals, describing them as a 
h i g h l y unsuitable s o l u t i o n i n view of Yuan's weak p o l i t i c a l position,and 
o f f e r i n g terms t h a t would make i t impossible f o r Yuan t o accept.*16 
From the Tibetan p o i n t of view there could be no acceptance of a 
s o l u t i o n which e f f e c t i v e l y rendered large parts of East Tibet helpless 
i n the face of f u t u r e Chinese aggression,and which even threatened 
Lhasa, since Chinese promises not t o reinvade the c i t y could never be 
t r u s t e d . Despite p r o t e s t s from Jordan, McMahon's d r a f t Treaty was put 
t o the delegates at the seventh meeting of the Conference on 27th A p r i l 
1914. By t h i s time the Tibetans had been persuaded t o sign, Lonchen 
Shatra having been made aware t h a t there would be no B r i t i s h concessions 
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and no a d d i t i o n a l support a f t e r the Conference f o r h i s country i f he 
refused. Chen had also agreed t o i n i t i a l the document a f t e r a period of 
r e f l e c t i o n , b u t only 'on the c l e a r understanding t h a t t o i n i t i a l and t o 
s i g n were regarded as two separate actions' . The c r i s i s generated by 
Chen's de c i s i o n t o i n i t i a l and not t o sign the Treaty was made even 
worse when he received a s t r o n g l y worded r e b u t t a l f o r h i s actions from 
Peking on the f o l l o w i n g day. He was c l e a r l y m y s t i f i e d by the force of 
these i n s t r u c t i o n s and, i n an attempt t o save face, he t r i e d 
unsuccessfully t o argue t h a t there had been some 'misapprehension' of 
h i s a c t i o n s due t o the ' i m p o s s i b i l i t y of c o r r e c t l y expressing i n Chinese 
what the act of i n i t i a l l i n g means',»17 Suggestions made a f t e r the event 
t h a t Chen, who was obviously keen t o make a success of the Conference, 
was i n f a c t being i n t i m i d a t e d by McMahon seem improbable. I t i s f a r more 
l i k e l y t h a t , i n making t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between i n i t i a l l i n g and signing, 
he was simply humouring the B r i t i s h Plenipotentary i n an atteaqpt t o 
prolong the discussions and play f o r time. •IS Once the r e b u t t a l had 
been issued however Chen knew t h a t he had been abandoned and t h a t there 
had been no serious i n t e n t i o n i n Peking t o sign any Treaty. From now on 
he l o s t a l l c r e d i b i l i t y as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Chinese government 
and although Morrison continued t o defend him from Peking, Jordan s t i l l 
b elieved t h a t he had been 'coerced' i n t o i n i t i a l l i n g , e i t h e r by McMahon 
or by h i s own government, and f e a r f u l l e s t t h i s act might endanger 
B r i t i s h l i v e s and threaten her commercial I n t e r e s t s i n s i d e China, he 
also condemned him.^19 McMahon was taken aback by the speed and 
h o s t i l i t y of the Chinese response and when Chen asked him what r e p l y he 
should give t o Peking he expressed himself 'unable t o formulate an 
answer t o so unusual a message'.^20 McMahon's response r e f l e c t s the 
very wide gap i n communication between the Indian Government, so secure 
i n the b e l i e f t h a t i t had proceeded calmly, sensibly, and reasonably, i n 
attempting t o organise the complex s i t u a t i o n i n terms which might be 
acceptable t o both sides, and the Chinese government who, d i v i d e d 
amongst themselves, seemed t o view the Tibetan s i t u a t i o n as an exercise 
i n boosting p r e s t i g e and winning popular support at home.^21 
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Meanwhile, i n t h i s i n c r e a s i n g l y desperate s i t u a t i o n , the Tibetans d i d 
what they could t o placate both sides by n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h Lu i n Simla, 
and w i t h Chinese representatives i n East Tibet throughout the e n t i r e 
course of the Conference, while at the saae time continuing w i t h e f f o r t s 
t o persuade the Indian government t h a t they were worthy of support.*22 
The Simla Conference i s commonly regarded as a f a i l u r e because i t d i d 
not r e s u l t i n the conclusion of a T r i p a r t i t e Treaty; however t h i s view 
i s based very much on a B r i t i s h view of events and the Convention can 
only r e a l l y be assesed i n terms of what the three p a r t i c i p a n t s wished t o 
get out of i t . For China, Simla had never been a serious i n i t i a t i v e , 
but merely one of several holding operations aimed at keeping Yuan's 
government a f l o a t i n d i f f i c u l t circumstances. Although Yuan h l n s e l f 
subsequently expressed a keen i n t e r e s t i n securing an understanding on 
the Tibetan s i t u a t i o n , h i s a b i l i t y t o e f f e c t any k i n d of compromise 
compatible w i t h the a s p i r a t i o n s of the powerful Young China Party was 
never a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y . The l u c k l e s s Chen was t h e r e f o r e l e f t t o the 
mercy of the n e g o t i a t o r s , and without adequate s t a f f or information he 
was t o l i n g e r on i n Simla t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h some kin d of understanding 
w i t h the B r i t i s h months a f t e r the Conference ended. When he d i d 
e v e n t u a l l y r e t u r n t o Peking during the summer of 1914 he faded i n t o 
p o l i t i c a l o b s c u r i t y . D i e t i n g much the same f a t e as the Tibetan delegate 
Lonchen Shatra who was also accused of f a i l i n g h i s government.»23 
Of the three main d e l e g a t e s only McMahon was able t o continue w i t h a 
successful p o l i t i c a l career. His ' s o l u t i o n ' was regarded as a triumph by 
h i s government who had seen the Conference as a means of securing the 
goals of the Younghusband Expedition aims t h a t were l a r g e l y s a t i s f i e d 
under the terne of the B i p a r t i t e Declaration signed w i t h Tibet i n July 
1914.*24 The Conference d i d r e s u l t i n some i n d i r e c t gains f o r the 
Chinese who had been able t o use the breathing space afforded by the 
Conference t o e f f e c t a t r u ce i n East Tibet. However, t h i s was an 
i n i t i a t i v e mainly orchestrated by the Young China Party over which Yuan 
had no c o n t r o l . For Yuan, h e a v i l y i n debt throughout the course of the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s , and f e a r f u l f o r h i s own p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e , the Simla 
i n i t i a t i v e was a nightmare. 
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I n despatches t o London and Ind i a Jordan made no secret of h i s b e l i e f 
t h a t the Chinese could not come t o any compromise s o l u t i o n and t h a t Yuan 
had l i t t l e c o n t r o l over events i n East Tibet.^25 I n p r i v a t e discussions 
w i t h Jordan,Yuan had c o n s i s t e n t l y invoked China's ancient connections 
w i t h the conquered t e r r i t o r i e s of L i t a n g and Batang i n East Tibet and 
had persuaded Jordan t h a t the Chinese had a good c l a i m t o these 
areas.^26 I n the l i g h t of t h i s 'evidence' t h e r e f o r e , both Jordan i n 
Peking, and Langley i n London, became h i g h l y c r i t i c a l of what they 
considered t o be McMahon's f a i l u r e t o see any merit i n the Chinese 
case.^27 Jordan sumned up the f e e l i n g s of the China Service by 
d e s c r i b i n g the sense of u n r e a l i t y which they f e l t had surrounded the 
proceedings and t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t , not only had the Chinese and Tibetan 
governments 'known each others cards throughout", but t h a t Chen had also 
not been 'too l o y a l t o h i s own government'. ^28 He described the methods 
of the Indian government as 'obsolete' and was c l e a r l y i r r i t a t e d by the 
t o r t u o u s procedures which he and h i s colleagues had been forced t o 
monitor w i t h i n c r e a s i n g f r u s t r a t i o n i n Peking, ^ 29 Long a f t e r the 
Conference was over he continued t o r a i l against t h e i r poor handling of 
the n e g o t i a t i o n s and was p a r t i c u l a r l y v i t r i o l i c about what he believed 
t o be t h e i r i n e p t i t u d e i n f a i l i n g t o negotiate a deal w i t h Yuan while 
the l a t t e r was s t i l l w e l l disposed towards B r i t a i n . T h i s had confirmed 
h i s view, formed during the days of the Pienma c r i s i s , t h a t the Indian 
government were not equipped t o deal w i t h the problem of Tibet, a view 
t h a t would soon have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r h i s own forward p o l i c y i n East 
Tibet a f t e r 1916.^30 
For Langley i n London there was the immediate and r a t h e r daunting 
problem of when t o o f f i c i a l l y i n f o rm the Russians t h a t the Simla t a l k s 
had f a i l e d , s i n c e Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s had s u f f e r e d a setback during 
the sumBter of 1914, f o l l o w i n g a c r i s i s i n Persia, and once again 
diplomats on both sides were faced w i t h a f r e s h round of negotiations 
and compromise. •SI The f a i l u r e t o secure Chinese assent had also 
created f u r t h e r discord i n Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s which placed 
a d d i t i o n a l s t r a i n on Jordan and the China Service. 
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2. THE BIPARTITE TREATY VITH TIBET - JULY 1914 
Hardinge had watched the slow collapse of the t a l k s w i t h a heavy heart 
and had f e l t very p e s s i m i s t i c about the p o s s i b i l i t y of persuading the 
Chinese t o s i g n a T r i p a r t a t e Agreement. He believed t h a t they had 
already been o f f e r e d a good deal i n securing agreement f o r a permanent 
rep r e s e n t a t i v e and escort i n Lhasa which had been one of t h e i r main 
o b j e c t i v e s , but he s t r o n g l y suspected t h a t Jordan had not done enough t o 
persuade them t o s i g n and f e l t t h a t , once again, India was being made a 
'cats paw' f o r the sake of B r i t i s h commercial success i n China.*32 
He welcomed the a u t h o r i s a t i o n t o close the Sino-Tibetan negotiations i n 
East Tibet,issued by Yuan on 2nd July 1914, as the best means of p u l l i n g 
China i n t o l i n e , but again blamed Jordan f o r the excessive delay i n 
g e t t i n g him t o do t h i s , and f u r t h e r accused him of g i v i n g Yuan the 
impression t h a t B r i t a i n might be prepared t o modify her demands.»33 
In order t o remedy the s i t u a t i o n , and i n the l u l l before delegates l e f t 
Simla i n the summer of 1914, he t h e r e f o r e seized the opportunity t o sign 
a B i p a r t i t e Agreement w i t h Tibet which enabled In d i a t o secure a large 
p o r t i o n of the unprotected f r o n t i e r running from Bhutan t o Assam and 
o f f e r e d an o p p o r t u n i t y t o revise the 1908 Trade Regulations. The 
f r o n t i e r between Assam and Burma, s t a b i l i s e d by the new B r i t i s h p o l i c y 
of loose p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l , was by now paying dividends f o r India 
p r o v i d i n g , i n Hardinge's words, areas of 'great richness and wealth', 
and although he had not yet completely given up hope of securing a 
T r i p a r t i t e Agreement, the Viceroy f e l t t h a t a B i p a r t i t e Treaty w i t h 
Tibet might not only prove useful t o India, but might even induce China 
t o s i g n a T r i p a r t i t e Agreement at a l a t e r date. He was also keenly aware 
of the need t o organise a separate arrangement w i t h Tibet i n order t o 
t i e up what he described as a number of 'loose ends' t h a t had been 
'plagueing the f r o n t i e r harmony' since the o f f i c i a l B r i t i s h withdrawal 
i n 1910. *34 The Tibetan government were s t i l l very unhappy about the 
terms contained i n the Simla d r a f t agreement which they had been 
v i r t u a l l y blackmailed i n t o s i g n i n g , but they were also d i v i d e d amongst 
themselves because, under McMahon's proposals,they were set t o lose the 
important f e r t i l e areas of Syarong and Derge i n East Tibet as well as 
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the whole area of Tawang. At the root of the problem was the 
fundamental misunderstanding between the Republican Government and the 
government of In d i a about the nature of Tibetan r u l e and of the 
s p i r i t u a l and temporal d i v i d e t h a t allowed the Dalai Lama t o exercise 
varying degrees of c o n t r o l and influence from region t o region across 
Tibet. The Tibetans were p a r t i c u l a r l y unhappy about the loss of Tawang 
f o r example, where the Dalai Lama's powerful influence had allowed them 
t o enjoy safe passage and t r a d i n g r i g h t s without in t e r f e r e n c e from the 
o f t e n h o s t i l e t r i b e s who l i v e d there.*37 Once the Simla t a l k s had 
collapsed however, and the Chinese had refused t o sign, the Tibetans 
were l e f t w i t h a dilemma and were forced t o decide whether t o r i s k 
f u r t h e r r e p r i s a l s from the Chinese by s i g n i n g a separate agreement w i t h 
B r i t a i n . They eve n t u a l l y decided t o sign on 3rd J u l y i n order t o 
p r o t e c t what r i g h t s they had, and t o ensure continuing B r i t i s h 
f r i e n d s h i p and p r o t e c t i o n . Once signed, copies of the i n i t i a l l e d but 
u n r a t i f i e d Simla Treaty were attached t o the document and both p a r t i e s 
then agreed upon, and signed,a new Tibetan Trade Agreement t o replace 
the Trade Regulation Agreeuents of 1893 and 1908.•38 By completely 
removing the Chinese presence at the trade marts, believed t o have been 
the main cause of f r i c t i o n i n the past, the new trade agreements 
e f f e c t i v e l y gave India what she needed i n order t o develop her trade and 
commercial i n t e r e s t s i n s i d e Tibet. In a d d i t i o n , the Dalai Lama was now 
even more anxious t o secure B r i t i s h a i d f o r h i s country and had given 
B e l l t o understand t h a t he also wanted t o develop the p o t e n t i a l l y 
l u c r a t i v e gold, s i l v e r , and other metal mining i n d u s t r i e s which Indian 
entrepreneurs had coveted f o r so long. Within the B i p a r t a t e Treaty 
i t s e l f there was a f u r t h e r clause r e l a t i n g t o the troublesome 
Bhutan/Assam borderlands between India and Tibet which allowed India t o 
move her f r o n t i e r from the f o o t h i l s t o the c r e s t s of the Hyioalayas, 
enabling her t o extend her borders from Kashmir t o Assam and i n doing so 
achieve one of the major o b j e c t i v e s voiced by McMahon at the s t a r t of 
the Conference. Under t h i s new arrangement India now acquired Tawang, 
an area of approximately 200 square miles, much of i t f e r t i l e , which now 
became a b u f f e r zone running along the whole northern f r o n t i e r from 
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Assam t o Tibet. The agreement also favoured India by binding Tibet t o 
the terms of the Simla D r a f t without a l l o w i n g the Chinese any of the 
b e n e f i t s t o which they would have been e n t i t l e d had they signed. Tibet 
f o r example had agreed t o uphold A r t i c l e 4 of the Lhasa Convention of 
1904 under which she had agreed not t o levy t a r i f f s or taxes without 
permission but, since A r t i c l e 3 of the 1906 Adhesion Treaty was now 
i n v a l i d as a r e s u l t of China's f a i l u r e t o si g n the Simla d r a f t , she no 
longer had equal r i g h t s t o s t a t i o n trade representatives at the marts, 
w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t I n d i a now had f u l l r i g h t s t o obtain a l l t r a d i n g 
concessions i n s i d e Tibet without any in t e r f e r e n c e . I n r e t u r n f o r these 
concessions the Tibetans were given a formal assurances by McMahon tha t 
they 'might depend upon the diplomatic support of His Kajesty's 
Government' and on 'reasonable m i l i t a r y assistance' i n the event of 
co n t i n u i n g Chinese aggression.»39 Although, as Walt Van Praag has 
observed, i n di p l o m a t i c terms Tibet had secured f o r hers e l f what he 
described as an ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l p e r s o n a l i t y ' by sig n i n g the B i p a r t i t e 
Treaty, the Tibetan government was somewhat dismayed by the subsequent 
events which now appeared t o leave East Tibet e n t i r e l y unprotected. 
Valueless t o India, i t had not been mentioned i n the Treaty, and so t h i s 
p art of Tibet remained unsettled.*40 Tibetan fears were s h o r t l y t o be 
confirmed, f o r as soon as the delegates had l e f t Simla during the summer 
of 1914, the Chinese resumed t h e i r e f f o r t s t o secure a separate Sino-
Tibetan Treaty i n East Tibet.*41 
With the s i t u a t i o n n e a t l y organised i n India's favour, what diplomatic 
a t t e n t i o n could be spared f o l l o w i n g the outbreak of the war i n Europe i n 
September 1914 now switched t o East Tibet, and i t I s t o events i n t h i s 
area t h a t I now want t o t u r n . 
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3. JOSDAg'S ISITIATIVE I g EAST TIBET 
( i ) THE PEKISG MEMQRAIDUM SEPTEltBER 1916 
During the run up t o the Simla Conference the Indian government had put 
considerable pressure on Jordan t o e s t a b l i s h a 'watching post' a t 
Tachienlu on the borders of East Tibet i n order t o monitor the s i t u a t i o n 
there and provide d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n about Chinese a c t i v i t i e s . 
They were e s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d I n news of any successful attempt by the 
Chinese t o s i g n a separate Treaty w i t h the Tibetans.*42 Jordan had 
never been happy about l o c a t i n g Consular Posts i n remote areas because 
they placed excessive demands on the mental and physical health of the 
s t a f f expected t o run them as wel l as saddling the Legation w i t h an 
ext r a a d m i n i s t r a t i v e burden, and the Post at Tachienlu was i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s e n s i t i v e p o s i t i o n , being j u s t w i t h i n Chinese t e r r i t o r y on 
the disputed Sino-Tibetan border. Situated 10,000 f e e t above sea l e v e l 
i n mountainous t e r r a i n and twelve days journey by road from Chengtu, I t s 
very remoteness af f o r d e d greater p r o t e c t i o n than might have otherwise 
been a n t i c i p a t e d , but t h i s was o f f s e t by the explosive p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n i n East T i b e t , and by the d i f f i c u l t i e s of e s t a b l i s h i n g contact 
w i t h Peking i n the event of a sudden c r i s i s . The c i t y i t s e l f was an 
important a d m i n i s t r a t i v e post f o r the Chinese who had re c e n t l y i n s t a l l e d 
a new F r o n t i e r Commissioner there, and was also a t h r i v i n g commercial 
centre f o r the Chinese tea trade, although the m a j o r i t y of i t s 
population were Tibetan.*43 
The Indian government was t o be e s p e c i a l l y g r a t e f u l f o r the d e t a i l e d 
r e p o r t s produced by the Consuls at Tachienlu, who between 1913 and 1923 
r i s k e d t h e i r l i v e s and t h e i r s a n i t y t o produce them. Louis King f o r 
example, the f i r s t occupant of the post, was commended f o r the 
excellence of h i s r e p o r t s as wel l as f o r the 'conspicuous t a c t , a b i l i t y , 
and presence of mind' which he had displayed, and h i s replacement Eric 
Coales, who took over i n 1916, was able t o use the superior s t r a t e g i c 
p o s i t i o n t h a t Tachienlu a f f o r d e d him i n order t o produce comprehensive 
r e p o r t s countering B e l l ' s r a t h e r h y s t e r i c a l accounts of Chinese 
aggression i n the area which were o f t e n based on second or t h i r d hand 
sources.»44 A l l the r e p o r t s issued by the Consular s t a f f from Tachienlu 
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are masterpeices of d e t a i l about the geography and complex p o l i t i c s of 
t h i s otherwise inacessable region. Eventually Tachienlu proved i t s 
worth, even t o Jordan, p r o v i d i n g him w i t h a f a r more comprehensive 
p i c t u r e of what was a c t u a l l y happening at a time when w i l d ruaiours were 
c i r c u l a t i n g i n s i d e China i n the period f o l l o w i n g Yuan's death i n June 
1916, and when the country was e n t e r i n g a period of warlordism and c i v i l 
war i n which a l l c e n t r a l c o n t r o l appeared t o have broken down.*45 As 
the war i n Europe d i v e r t e d o f f i c i a l a t t e n t i o n away from events on the 
North-East f r o n t i e r , Jordan found t h a t he now had greater freedom t o 
implement h i s own s o l u t i o n s t o the problem of East Tibet and he began t o 
organise a forward p o l i c y of h i s own. The discovery t h a t t a l k s had 
taken place between the Chinese and the Kalon Lama at Chamdo i n November 
1913 and the reawakening of i n t e r e s t i n Tibetan a f f a i r s by Japan and 
Russia, both of whom were helping t o t r a i n Tibetan troops f o r the Dalai 
Lama's new modern army, made the Indian government and the Foreign 
O f f i c e very anxious t o discover the tr u e s t a t e of Sino-Tibetan 
r e l a t i o n s . They were p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned t h a t i f the s i t u a t i o n 
d e t e r i o r a t e d f u r t h e r i n t o f u l l scale war between the countries, Tibet 
would be keen t o in v o l v e B r i t a i n as p r o t e c t o r , i n accordance w i t h the 
terms of the B i p a r t i t e Agreement.»46 Moreover, the u n o f f i c a l war, 
conducted i n East Tibet throughout the period of the Simla t a l k s , had 
continued despite an agreed truce,each side complaining b i t t e r l y t h a t 
the other v i o l a t e d i t s terms.*47 
Following h i s r e t u r n t o Tibet i n 1913, the Dalai Lama and h i s closest 
advisors Chamba Tendar, and Tsarong Shape, had modernised and increased 
the s i z e of the Tibetan army, l o c a t i n g four out of f i v e of t h e i r newly 
created b a t a l l i o n s on the East Tibetan f r o n t i e r , where t h e i r modern arns 
and t a c t i c s were already proving successful against the Chinese.»48 
These m i l i t a r y successes, i n v o l v i n g the recapture of t e r r i t o r y r e c e n t l y 
taken by the Chinese, had proved very expensive however, and the 
Tibetans were n a t u r a l l y anxious t o s e t t l e matters t o t h e i r advantage 
while they were s t i l l winning. I n the s p r i n g of 1915 they therefore 
resumed t a l k s w i t h the Chinese at Shupando i n East Tibet, despite 
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vehment o p p o s i t i o n from the powerful pro-Indian acnasteries of Sera and 
Ganden which s e r i o u s l y threatened any successful outcome.*49 
Having regained some c o n t r o l of h i s armies a f t e r the set backs of 1913 
and 1914, Yuan had made an arrangement w i t h the P r o v i n c i a l governments 
i n Szechuan and Yunnan t o place Kokonor under the command of the Chinese 
Muslim, General Ka Vu. Since 1911 the Muslims had dominated Kansu 
Province, pursuing a forward p o l i c y i n the Kokonor region, an area whose 
remoteness had p r e v i o u s l y always protected i t from the worst e f f e c t s of 
Chao Erh-feng's campaigns.#50 Unlike the Szechuanese troops, who 
d i s l i k e d f i g h t i n g i n such harsh t e r r a i n , Jta's men were hardy horsemen, 
w e l l s u i t e d t o the k i n d of campaigning necessary i n Kokonor. They were 
soon able t o e s t a b l i s h a loose c o n t r o l of the region, previously shared 
between a v a r i e t y of independent Tibetan C h i e f t a i n s whose hatred f o r 
each other prevented them o f f e r i n g u n i t e d resistance t o the Muslim 
invaders. By s p r i n g of 1916 Ma was i n a p o s i t i o n t o issue a 
Proclamation o u t l i n i n g h i s plans f o r Kokonor.»51 This a c t i v i t y i n 
Kokonor was t o c o n f i r m a view already held by Jordan t h a t , had the 
region been f o r m a l l y o f f e r e d t o them, the Chinese might well have signed 
the Simla Treaty, and the e s c a l a t i n g c r i s i s i n East Tibet might have 
been avoided. He c i t e d t h i s as f u r t h e r evidence of the incompetence of 
the Indian government and i n h i s opinion i t provided even f u r t h e r 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r an independent i n i t i a t i v e of h i s own, which led t o the 
production of h i s important Memorandum on the Tibetan s i t u a t i o n w r i t t e n 
i n September 1916.•52 
Towards the l a t t e r p art of 1915 Yuan's a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l events began 
t o f a i l , and what amounted t o a c i v i l war between the independent 
Provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan began t o s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t the 
f r o n t i e r . * 5 3 Despite h i s f a i l u r e t o secure desperately needed f i n a n c i a l 
a i d from the B r i t i s h government t o b o l s t e r h i s f l a g g i n g economy. Yuan 
s t i l l regarded B r i t a i n as the most powerful country i n Asia, and he 
continued w i t h attempts t o re-negotiate a revised form of the Simla 
Treaty w i t h Jordan. By 1916 however, events had turned against him, and 
the prospects of any Anglo-Chinese agreement became very remote 
indeed.*54 His sudden death i n June 1916 l e d t o a greater e s c a l a t i o n of 
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of the f r o n t i e r c o n f l i c t , although the news of h i s death r e l i e v e d 
the s i t u a t i o n at Tachienlu, the scene of i n t e n s i v e f i g h t i n g between 
r i v a l factions.#55 In r e p o r t i n g t o the Indian government, B e l l 
claimed t h a t Chinese aggression i n East Tibet had i n t e n s i f i e d i n the 
months f o l l o w i n g Yuan's death,(claims t h a t were confirmed i n Coale's 
r e p o r t s from Tachienlu), as s o l d i e r s , o f t e n themselves confused and 
without food or pay, ran amok i n the areas i n and around the c i t y and, 
by 1917,the l a s t vestiges of order had broken down i n the area.*56Jordan 
had been profoundly shaken by Yuan's death, and was now convinced t h a t 
the Foreign O f f i c e had l o s t a l l confidence i n China's a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l 
her own a f f a i r s . This prompted him t o produce a Memorandum as a 
statement of h i s own thoughts and ideas about the s i t u a t i o n i n East 
Tibet and how i t might best be solved i n B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t s . *57 
The Memorandum acknowledged a need f o r a p o s i t i v e B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e t o 
t r y t o s o r t out the c r i s i s created by Yuan's death, since f o r 
JordanTibet was one of the 'running sores' of Yuan's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
which needed t o be healed before China could even begin t o f u n c t i o n as a 
modern s t a t e i n the western sense. »58 I t c a l l e d f o r B r i t a i n t o abandon 
the Simla agenda e n t i r e l y and embark upon f r e s h n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r a new 
Anglo-Chinese Treaty on T i b e t , suggesting as a s t a r t i n g point f o r t a l k s 
t h a t B r i t a i n accept Chinese c o n t r o l of Kokonor under General Ma, as well 
as the r e t e n t i o n of those p a r t s of Eastern Tibet taken during Chao's 
campaigns which had p r e v i o u s l y had a long h i s t o r y of involvement w i t h 
China. He f u r t h e r argued t h a t the c r e a t i o n of the inner and outer zones 
i n the Simla Treaty should be abandoned since they were q u i t e 
unworkable, the whole concept of zones being e n t i r e l y a l i e n t o a l l 
previous Chinese and Tibetan t h i n k i n g about the region.*59 I t warned 
of the d i r e consequences of a successful separate Sino-Tibetan agreement 
on T i b e t from which B r i t a i n would be excluded, and i t recommended th a t 
the Dalai Lama r e t a i n h i s s p i r i t u a l influence over the monasteries i n 
Kokonor and Kansu which could remain under the p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of a 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Republican government. Although an o f f i c i a l 
Legation docunent the Memorandum was a c l e a r statement of Jordan's views 
on T i b e t , and showed a deep understanding of the Tibetan s i t u a t i o n . 
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as w e l l as an a p p r e c i a t i o n of i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r f u t u r e Anglo-Chinese 
r e l a t i o n s . * 6 0 
The document was c l e a r l y a t odds w i t h what has been described as the 
'Simla p o s i t i o n ' which came t o dominate Indian Government t h i n k i n g 
about Tibet, and which viewed the country as a 'subordinate of China' 
but w i t h an 'extensive automony' over which India had a duty t o keep a 
'watchful eye'.*61 The Indian government were also q u i t e anxious t o 
shelve f u r t h e r discussion about Tibet and were not prepared t o take the 
Memorandum s e r i o u s l y , f o r Jordan's c r e d i b i l i t y , as we l l as h i s health 
had been obviously a f f e c t e d by Yuan's death, and the ext r a s t r e s s 
created by the wartime c o n d i t i o n s . I n order t o even consider a r e v i s i o n 
of the Simla p r o v i s i o n s t h e r e f o r e , the new Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, 
needed t o be sure t h a t Tibet was strong enough t o keep China at bay and 
t h a t the Tibetans would want t o maintain close contact w i t h B r i t a i n 
a f t e r a t r e a t y had been signed.*62 There were also a d d i t i o n a l fears 
about Russian i n t e n t i o n s , f o r although by September 1917, Russia was i n 
the throes of the domestic c r i s i s t h a t would eventually lead t o the 
successful Bolshevik takeover i n November, there were no guarantees at 
t h i s p o i n t t h a t the chaos i n s i d e Russia would be more than temporary. I f 
a Tsar resumed c o n t r o l , B r i t a i n might s t i l l be c a l l e d t o account f o r 
what he might choose t o regard as v i o l a t i o n s of the terms of the Anglo-
Russian Convention of 1907. I n London on extended leave, and f o l l o w i n g 
Grey's retirement i n December 1916, Jordan found himself less able t o 
in f l u e n c e events as he had done before, and w i t h the c i v i l war i n China 
worsening, and the war i n Europe preoccupying the Foreign O f f i c e , 
s e t t l i n g Tibet becane important only t o a handful of diplomats. 
The Tibetan question now entered a new phase w i t h the appointment of 
E r i c Teichman t o the post at Tachienlu i n November 1917.#63 Jordan had 
l e f t Peking f o r what many assumed t o be the l a s t time, and Beilby Alston 
had again become Charge d ' A f f a i r e s , t h i s time w i t h strong expectations 
of f i n a l l y becoming B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r . Within a year however, Jordan had 
requested,and been given permission,to r e t u r n t o Peking and i n Sovember 
1917 he a r r i v e d back at the Legation w i t h a coherent plan t o s e t t l e the 
a f f a i r s of East Tibet.#64 
199 
( i i ) ERIC TEICHMA5 ASD EVENTS AT TACHIESLU 1913 - 1919 
E r i c Teichman's appointment as Consul i n Tachienlu was confirmed i n 
September 1917, but had been known about well i n advance. As a f i r s t class 
diplomat w i t h a promising career ahead of him, many found him an odd choice 
f o r t h i s e s s e n t i a l l y low key p o s i t i o n , although h i s experience as Vice 
Consul i n Chengtu i n 1911, and h i s t r a v e l s i n remote areas of Kokonor and 
Kansu i n 1912 more than f i t t e d him f o r the task.*65 
Since the post at Tachienlu had i n i t i a l l y been created at the request of 
the Indian government simply t o monitor events on the East Tibetan 
f r o n t i e r , I t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o see t h a t i n appointing Telchman,with whom 
he had r e c e n t l y worked c l o s e l y i n Peking, Jordan intended t o use h i s 
e x p e r t i s e f o r more important matters than the compilation of regular 
r e p o r t s , the k i n d of work t h a t even a new r e c r u i t might handle; and 
Teichman's subsequent behaviour at Tachienlu can only be understood i n the 
context of the r e j e c t e d Memorandum of September 1916, w i t h i t s aim of 
s e t t l i n g the Sino-Tibetan boundary dispute by opening up discussions w i t h 
the Chinese on a f r e s h basis.*66 
When Teichman e v e n t u a l l y a r r i v e d i n Tachienliu i n November 1917, the Sino-
Tibetan c o n f l i c t had entered a new and intense phase f o l l o w i n g the collapse 
of a temporary truce which had been negotiated at Riwoche.*67 Between 1916 
and 1917 Louis King and E r i c Coales had been c a r e f u l l y monitoring the 
s i t u a t i o n , o f t e n p l a c i n g themselves i n great danger when they l e f t the c i t y 
t o t r a v e l t o the areas of f i g h t i n g . * 6 8 Tachienlu i t s e l f could be a 
claustrophobic place i n which t o work, being surrounded by mountains on a l l 
sides, and a f f o r d i n g l i t t l e o p p o r t u n i t y f o r escape. I t was also a place i n 
which minor i n c i d e n t s could q u i c k l y become serious, and during 1916 Coales 
had reported an i n c i d e n t i n which there had been widespread l o o t i n g i n the 
c i t y by three hundred hungry Chinese s o l d i e r s , aided and abetted by Tibetan 
women.*69 As a major a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centre f o r the new Republican 
government i n East Tibet Tachienlu had i n e v i t a b l y a t t r a c t e d c o n f l i c t , and 
i n 1914 the c i t y had been captured by Tibetan forces, only t o be retaken i n 
1916 by General Yin who then took on the new appointment of Chinese 
F r o n t i e r Commisioner there, a Republican decision not much t o Coales l i k i n g 
since Yin soon proved a very d i f f i c u l t man w i t h whom t o l i a i s e , being i n 
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Coale's words ' c r u e l ' and 'opium addicted'.*70 In the small confines of a 
c i t y l i k e Tachienlu, where good r e l a t i o n s h i p s between l i a i s i n g o f f i c a l s was 
v i t a l l y important, t h i s was a dangerous problem f o r Coale's whose own 
p o s i t i o n was, t o say the l e a s t tenuous,at a time when i t wasn't always 
c l e a r whether Peking, Yunnan, Szechuan or Tibetan forces were i n c o n t r o l . 
Yin's p o s i t i o n was e q u a l l y fraught. O r i g i n a l l y from Yunnan, he was now the 
new o f f i c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Peking Central Government at Tachienlu 
when the r e a l power i n the wider region was i n the hands of the Szechuan 
P r o v i n c i a l Government, who by t h i s time were i n c o n f l i c t w i t h both Yunnan 
and Peking. I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n Coales found himself under much the same kind 
of pressure as t h a t experienced by O'Connor at Gyantse, and Campbell at 
Chumbi only a few years e a r l i e r , and i t was t h e r e f o r e w i t h some r e l i e f that 
he witnessed Yin's f l i g h t from Tachienlu i n the summer of 1917, when 
intense h o s t i l i t i e s between Szechuan and Yunnan had resumed a f t e r a l u l l . 
He welcomed Yin's replacement Ch'en Hsai-Ling,a veteran of Chao Erh-feng's 
campaigns, who as Acting High Commisioner at Tachienlu, was s t i l l i n post 
on the day of Teichman's arrival.»71 
Teichman's progress t o Tachienlu had been a d e l i b e r a t e l y slow one and he 
had taken the o p p o r t u n i t y a f f o r d e d by the tortuous journey i n order t o 
study the f r o n t i e r s i t u a t i o n at f i r s t hand w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t , soon a f t e r 
h i s a r r i v a l , h e was able t o present Jordan w i t h a very d e t a i l e d account of 
what was happening on the f r o n t i e r , c o n t a i n i n g proposals f o r a realignment 
of the border between Autonomus Tibet and Chinese Szechuan, based on h i s 
own ' p r i v a t e investigations'.»72 Although Louis King and Eric Coales had 
both p r e v i o u s l y made recommendations i n t h e i r monthly r e p o r t s t o Peking, 
what was c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t about Teichman's st a t u s was t h a t , from the 
beginning, he had not only f e l t confident i n producing such an audacious 
proposal,but had also f e l t able t o acknowledge i t as h i s own idea.•73 His 
r e g u l a r correspondence w i t h Jordan i n the months between h i s a r r i v a l i n 
Tachienlu and h i s departure f o r the f r o n t i e r i n March 1918 on what he 
described as a 'peace mission", reveals the close r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Jordan 
which had developed when they worked together i n Peking, and leads t o the 
unavoidable conclusion t h a t Teichman was i n f a c t responding t o orders from 
Jordan, although he was always t o deny any c o l l u s i o n between them.^74 
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Although he l e f t Tachienlu i n March 1918 without w a i t i n g f o r o f f i c a l 
sanction, h i s behaviour was not as unreasonable as might f i r s t appear since 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n a c q u i r i n g w r i t t e n permission i n such 
circumstances were always exacerbated by the length of time any 
correspondence took t o reach Tachienlu from Chengtu, the nearest Consular 
post; and because the problems created by any c r i s i s t h a t could 
spontaneously e r r u p t i n t h i s war t o r n and v o l a t i l e region made i t 
impossible f o r o f f i c e r s t o survive without some a b i l i t y t o exercise 
i n t i t i a t i v e . The sheer monotony of l i f e at Tachienlu had previously ensured 
t h a t past Consuls had also welcomed any opportunity t o escape the c i t y on 
s i m i l a r missions of i n v e s t i g a t i o n despite the dangers involved, simply as a 
more i n t e r e s t i n g means of passing the time. In December 1916 f o r example, 
Coales had set out on such a mission t o the Chamdo area i n the company of 
Mr, Clements of the China Inland Mission, and was able t o o f f e r valuable 
i n f o r m a t i o n about Chinese a c t i v i t y there.#75 Unfortunately, although 
Coales, as King before him, had received commendation f o r these exce l l e n t 
f i r s t hand accounts of the s i t u a t i o n , h i s presence on the f r o n t i e r had also 
generated embarrassing f r i c t i o n w i t h the Peking A u t h o r i t i e s when F r o n t i e r 
Commisioner Yin, who had opposed the journey from the s t a r t , suggested t h a t 
Coale's ' i r r e g u l a r behaviour'had l e d t o problems w i t h the Szechuanese 
A u t h o r i t i e s , and soon awkward questions began t o be asked i n Peking about 
B r i t a i n ' s r i g h t t o s t a t i o n a Consular o f f i c a l at Tachienlu.»76 Even i n t h i s 
context Teichman's journey was unusual however,not simply because,like h i s 
predecessors, he was going t o the f r o n t i e r t o record the scene, but 
because,in d e s c r i b i n g the journey as a 'peace mission',he had a more 
d e f i n a t e aim i n mind and had claimed t o be a c t i n g upon a request from the 
Chinese themselves t o mediate i n t h e i r dispute w i t h the Tibetans.*77 
Teichman's d e t a i l e d r e p o r t of December 1917 had been based on h i s 
personal account of events on the f r o n t i e r during the l a t e summer and 
e a r l y autumn of t h a t year which were the main reason why he had taken so 
long t o reach h i s post.Between h i s a r r i v a l at Tachienlu i n November 1917 
and h i s departure i n March 1918 however, events had taken a dramatic 
turn,and, as he l e f t the r e l a t i v e s e c u r i t y of h i s consulate, he would have 
been unaware of the great personal dangers ahead. 
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( i l l ) TEICHMAH'S MISSIOI AID THE TRUCE OF RQgGBASTA 
Chinese forces i n East Tibet were we l l organised under the leadership of 
three Generals or F r o n t i e r Commisioners,having headquarters at Tachienlu, 
Chamdo, and Batang. As B r i t i s h Consul i n Tachienlu Teichman was expected t o 
l i a s e w i t h Acting F r o n t i e r Commissioner Ch'en about h i s journey, but on 
t h i s occasion he had been prevented from doing so by Chen's absence from 
the c i t y a t the time of departure.^78 Each of the three Commisioners was 
empowered by the Chinese t o exercise f u l l m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l i n the area 
assigned t o them, and they d i d t h i s w i t h varying degrees of success. Of the 
three, General P'eng, whose base was i n Chamdo,was a l l e g e d l y the most 
feared and despised, not j u s t because he was c r u e l and arrogant towards h i s 
own men,as wel l as t o the Tibetans, but also because of the part he was 
al l e g e d t o have played i n the d e s t r u c t i o n of the great monasteries at 
Chamdo, Draya, and Yemdo during the Chao campaigns some years e a r l i e r . 
For many Tibetans t h i s had made him a p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of Chinese 
oppression. His handling of what was e s s e n t i a l l y a minor f r o n t i e r incident 
was t o lead t o an e s c a l a t i o n of the Sino-Tibetan c o n f l i c t during which the 
Tibetans would make s i g n i f i c a n t gains, enabling them t o a l t e r the balance 
of f r o n t i e r power i n t h e i r favour. Peng's actions were p a r t l y the r e s u l t 
of h i s b l i n d personal ambition t o lead an assault on Lhasa, and were 
conducted i n the misguided b e l i e f t h a t the East Tibetans so d i s l i k e d and 
resented the a u t h o r i t y of the Lhasa government t h a t they would not be 
prepared t o r e s i s t the Chinese.^79 
The i n c i d e n t which lead t o the e s c a l a t i o n of c o n f l i c t began during August 
1917 when a p a r t y of Chinese troops i n P'eng's service went out t o cut 
grass f o r t h e i r ponies i n a remote v a l l e y i n the disputed area near the 
Chinese held town of Riwoche. Here they were approached and challenged by 
two Tibetan s o l d i e r s who questioned t h e i r r i g h t t o be there.^80 Following 
a s c u f f l e the Tibetan s o l d i e r s were 'arrested' and taken t o a temporary 
Chinese camp est a b l i s h e d nearby, from where they were subsequently 
t r a n s f e r r e d a few days l a t e r t o Chinese headquarters i n Riwoche. Their 
Tibetan Commander, q u i t e unaware t h a t h i s men had been taken t o Riwoche, 
then approached the Chinese camp demanding the release of h i s men, 
At t h i s stage the i n c i d e n t might have been sorted out amicably i f the 
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Chinese Camp Commander,Chang, had not panicked and r e f e r r e d the matter on 
t o P'eng at Chamdo. Driven t o exasperation, the Tibetans now attacked and 
destroyed the Chinese camp before moving on t o t r y t o organise the release 
of t h e i r men imprisoned at Riwoche. Meanwhile P'eng, having received 
Chang's message, had decided t o t u r n the whole a f f a i r t o h i s own 
advantage.*81 The s i t u a t i o n i s confused at t h i s point by the d i f f e r i n g 
accounts of the i n c i d e n t provided l a t e r by Teichman and King, and by the 
f a c t t h a t Teichman's account f u r t h e r d i f f e r s from h i s o r i g i n a l f i r s t 
r e p o r t w r i t t e n i n January 1918 and tha t given i n h i s 'Travels' published i n 
the f o l l o w i n g year.»82 The p o i n t s of comparison centre on the d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n given t o P'eng's motives by each w r i t e r . Teichman's o r i g i n a l 
r e p o r t had been based p a r t l y upon evidence supplied by Chinese s o l d i e r s 
whom he met s h o r t l y a f t e r the i n c i d e n t i n the l a t e summer of 1917 while he 
was en route t o Tachienlu, and on the assumption t h a t P'eng was very keen 
t o renew t a l k s w i t h Tibetans and would t h e r e f o r e not have wanted t o 
exacerbate tensions.*83 His l a t e r account i n 'Travels' however, reveals 
f a r less sympathy w i t h Chinese actions and was possibly w r i t t e n i n an 
attempt t o present the Chinese as aggressors f o r purely diplomatic reasons. 
King's account i n h i s book 'China i n Turmoil',published i n 1928,tends t o 
present a more balanced view, arguing t h a t there were f a u l t s on both sides. 
Although he l a t e r married a Tibetan and adopted a very pro-Tibetan stance 
as a r e s u l t , K i n g ' s sympathy f o r P'eng i s f u r t h e r evidence t h a t the 
General's a c t i o n s had more t o do w i t h s t u p i d i t y and ignorance than w i t h any 
malevolent intent.#84 
Teichman had p r e v i o u s l y had the dubious pleasure of meeting P'eng before 
coming t o Tachienliu and although he d i d not approve of P'eng's behaviour 
i n T i b e t , he d i d f e e l t h a t the General genuinely believed t h a t East Tibetan 
h o s t i l i t y toward the Lhasa A u t h o r i t i e s would make them l o a t h t o repel a 
Chinese advance on the city.»85 Whatever the t r u e f a c t s , events moved 
very q u i c k l y as a r e s u l t of a quar r e l over the in c i d e n t between P'eng and 
the Kalon Lama, Commander i n Chief of the Tibetan forces i n East Tibet.»86 
P'eng had pr e v i o u s l y refused t o answer the Kalon Lama's p o l i t e requests f o r 
the r e t u r n of the a r r e s t e d Tibetan s o l d i e r s and had then responded t o a 
subsequent w r i t t e n communication from him by pla c i n g dung inside an 
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envelope and posting i t back t o him. Undeterred by t h i s gross i n s u l t the 
Kalon Lama had sent a t h i r d l e t t e r , t h i s time r e c e i v i n g a r e p l y i n which i t 
was s t a t e d t h a t P'eng's men were already i n the process of advancing on 
Lhasa. ^ 87 Having despatched h i s troops t o Lhasa, P'eng had apparently also 
given orders f o r the Tibetan prisoners t o be brought t o him i n Chamdo 
and,on hearing t h i s , T i b e t a n troops had given chase, s e i z i n g Riwoche and 
breaking the temporary t r u c e before moving on t o Chamdo and l a y i n g siege t o 
the town.^88 
The siege of Chamdo l a s t e d many months and P'eng, forced t o defend h i s 
headquarters against f a r stronger o p p o s i t i o n than he had a n t i c i p a t e d , 
s u f f e r e d a h u m i l i a t i n g defeat i n A p r i l 1918, only weeks a f t e r Teichman had 
set out from Tachienllu. ^ 89 The successful siege of a large and important 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centre l i k e Chamdo gave the Tibetan forces a huge boost of 
confidence, e s p e c i a l l y as the Chinese army had been shown to be divided, 
and P'eng had been deserted by h i s f e l l o w Commisioners at Tachienlu and 
Batang, who had refused t o come t o the a i d of someone they perceived as a 
dangerous p o t e n t i a l r i v a l . He had been humiliated f u r t h e r by h i s own 
forces, who immediately disowned him a f t e r the siege had ended, leaving him 
t o the mercy of the Kalon Lama.^90 V l t h v i c t o r y i n h i s grasp however, the 
Kalon Lama was u n w i l l i n g t o press haws h i s advantage and advance on 
Tachienlu,despite the Dalai Lama's approval and the enthusiam of h i s own 
troops; the seige having been viewed generally as a great v i c t o r y t h a t had 
swung the balance of power i n Tibet's favour. ^ 91 As the declared purpose 
of Teichman's mission was t o s e t t l e the f r o n t i e r enough t o make a 
settlement between B r i t a i n and China over the Tibetan boundary possible, 
t h i s unexpected development created both an opportunity and a problem f o r 
him, since t h i s was now a v o l a t i l e s i t u a t i o n r e q u i r i n g very t a c t f u l 
handling. There was no doubt t h a t at t h i s point Teichman's l i f e was i n 
danger, f o r although he had an e x c e l l e n t knowledge of Chinese, and was 
noted f o r h i s a b i l i t y t o communicate w i t h Chinese o f f i c e r s on a man t o man 
basis, h i s knowledge of the Tibetan language was minimal and he was now 
e n t i r e l y dependent on the goodwill of the Tibetan people i n order t o 
succeed i n a mission which could not possibly work t o t h e i r advantage or 
gain them more t e r r i t o r y . ^ 9 2 
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When he wrote of the mission i n h i s 'Travels' a year a f t e r the event,and 
w i t h the b e n e f i t of h i n d s i g h t , Teichman defined one of i t s aims as the 
stemming of the Tibetan advance,which he believed,'threatened t o submerge 
the country up t o Tachienlu'.*93 He f e l t no personal animosity towards the 
Tibetan people, and indeed had some sympathy f o r t h e i r p l i g h t , as wel l as a 
great respect f o r the Kalon Lama whom he had met before a r r i v i n g i n 
Tachienlu, and whom he described as 'a majestic presence' who 'overshadowed 
a l l other f i g u r e s on the f r o n t i e r ' . # 9 4 As a l o y a l and ambitious servant of 
the China Consular Service however he believed t h a t , f o r peace t o l a s t , the 
balance of power had t o be res t o r e d i n China's favour. His account of h i s 
peace mission f i r s t t o Batang, then on t o Chamdo and Rongbasta, i s r i c h i n 
d e t a i l , and provides a f a s c i n a t i n g , yet c o n t r o l l e d d e s c r i p t i o n , of a vast 
and l i t t l e known land, i n which the experience of war varied g r e a t l y from 
region t o region. 
One of the greatest problems f a c i n g any f o r e i g n t r a v e l l e r on t h i s f r o n t i e r 
was the a p p o s i t i o n he might receive from the nomadic t r i b e s who l i v e d there 
and who had made i t v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r e i t h e r the Tibetans, or the 
Chinese, t o administer the f r o n t i e r e f f e c t i v e l y , e s p e c i a l l y where Tibetans 
withheld ula and i t became impossible t o r e p l e n i s h horses needed f o r the 
long journeys between a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centres. #95 The area through which 
Teichman was t o pass on the f i r s t stage of h i s journey from Tachienlu t o 
Jyekundo i n Kokonor was p a r t i c u l a r l y notorious f o r the h o s t i l i t y of i t s 
t r i b e s and he observed how, when he passed through t h i s country, the 
increase i n r i f l e s acquired from Muslim t r a d e r s i n recent years had made 
the tr i b e s n e n appear f a r more formidable than on the occasion of h i s 
previous v i s i t t o the area i n 1912.«96 A few miles from Jyekundo i t s e l f 
however he found the area q u i t e peaceful i n comparison w i t h most of the 
other d i s t r i c t s through which he had passed which had seemed t o be ' e i t h e r 
i n open r e b e l l i o n , or on the verge of revolt'.§97 He had also observed 
great d i f f e r e n c e s between those areas i n which the Chinese skeleton 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n held f i r m because the o f f i c a l s here were of 'good 
character', and those where the o f f i c a l s were ' m i l i t a r y adventurers of low 
o r i g i n ' who e x p l o i t e d the people and where, as a r e s u l t , a l l law and order 
had broken down.•98 At Jyekundo, an important a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and t r a d i n g 
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centre f o r Southern Kokonor, he found the l o c a l Tibetans r e s e n t f u l but 
forced t o accept the d i c t a t o r s h i p of General Ma, who at the time of h i s 
a r r i v a l was s t i l l i n the process of e s t a b l i s h i n g c o n t r o l of the region by 
l e v y i n g new taxes and organising the appointment of h i s own magistrates t o 
administer j u s t i c e . ^ 9 9 
Teichman described Kokonor as almost e n t i r e l y 'nomad grassland' mostly 
'too high t o be in h a b i t e d ' , but the area had always been s t r a t e g i c a l l y 
important t o the Chinese because i t s geographical p o s i t i o n made i t an 
e f f e c t i v e b u f f e r between Tibet and China; and i n r e c o g n i t i o n of t h i s the 
Manchu had est a b l i s h e d an Amban at Sining, an important s p i r i t u a l centre 
f o r Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhists l i v i n g a few miles away at the great 
monastery of Kumbum. •lOO Teichman's account was much influenced by h i s 
great admiration f o r Ma's s o l d i e r s , whom he described as 'sturdy f i g h t e r s , 
s t i f f e n e d by t h e i r r e l i g i o n ' , and ' s k i l l e d horsemen', well used t o the 
hardships of Tibetan c o n d i t i o n s , and he compared them favourably w i t h the 
Szechuanese troops who seemed weak and 'always p i n i n g f o r t h e i r opium 
pip e s ' . • l O l He found t h a t Kokonor had been remarkably unaffected by the 
f i g h t i n g and he a t t r i b u t e d t h i s t o the good working r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
General Ma and the Kalon Lama, both of whom he judged t o be men of 
wisdom and i n t e g r i t y . ^ 1 0 2 Having l e f t Jyekundo he found t h a t he was able 
t o o b t a i n yaks t o replace h i s exhausted horses under the ula system l a r g e l y 
because ula was less unpopular, being less r e g u l a r l y requested due t o the 
remoteness of the region •lOS 
On the evening of 8th May events took a dramatic and unexpected t u r n when a 
horseman a r r i v e d i n Teichman's camp w i t h a message from the Kalon Lama 
b r i n g i n g news t h a t Chamdo,his next port of c a l l , had f a l l e n t o the 
Tibetans.This message had taken nearly a month t o reach him and i t took a 
f u r t h e r twelve days f o r h i s party t o reach the c i t y but, even prepared f o r 
chaos, he d i d not expect the t e r r i b l e s i g h t s t h a t greeted him, and h i s 
f i r s t impression of the great r e l i g i o u s and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centre of Chamdo 
was of a 'miserable p l a c e ' , c o n s i s t i n g of a 'a few yamens and temples and a 
v i l l a g e of mud h o v e l s ' , i t s depressing appearance f u r t h e r emphasised by the 
t r a g i c r u i n s of Chamdo monastery, formerly one of the greatest and 
weal t h i e s t monasteries i n East Tibet, which dominated the plateau above 
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the tovm and which had once been of great s p i r i t u a l and coumierclal 
importance t o Tibetans of the region.•104 The c i t y l a y halfway along the 
ancient Lhasa-Tachienlu road and was over one month's journey from Lhasa 
f o r t r a v e l l e r s , although Lhasa c o u r i e r s could get urgent messages through 
t o the c i t y i n ten days because they rode without stopping.*105 Teichman 
formed the d i s t i n c t impression t h a t , had Chao Erh-Feng been able t o press 
ahead w i t h h i s programme of reform i n 1908, Chamdo might have accepted 
Chinese r u l e , b u t t h a t the chaos subsequently generated by the Republican 
government's grand, but half-formed plans f o r the area, had allowed the 
c i t y t o lapse i n t o a s t a t e of v i r t u a l anarchy i n the months before the 
siege, g i v i n g Tibetan forces an easy victory.*106 By the time he a r r i v e d 
there on 19th May, Chamdo was s t i l l s u f f e r i n g the a f t e r e f f e c t s of the long 
siege and h a l f buried corpses s t i l l lay everywhere. Having spent most of 
h i s l i f e behind a Legation desk, Teichman n a t u r a l l y found t h i s very 
shocking. He was p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r u c k by the f a c t t h a t the Chinese s o l d i e r s 
remaining there were also very shocked and seemed completely out of 
c o n t r o l , d i v i d e d amongst themselves, but u n i t e d i n a common hatred of t h e i r 
leader, P'eng, who had disowned and f o r g o t t e n them i n an attempt t o save 
hi s own skin.»107 Like Jordan, Teichman was c l e a r l y under the impression 
t h a t the Batang-Litang area was Chinese by r i g h t and, according t o h i s 
sources, the t e r r i t o r y had been under nominal Chinese r u l e f o r two 
cent u r i e s . He was t h e r e f o r e much alarmed by the reverence and respect 
given t o the Kalon Lama by the Tibetan forces and thought t h a t they would 
have advanced t o Batang without a moment's h e s i t a t i o n had t h e i r leader 
given the word.*108 For Teichman, who believed himself there t o e f f e c t 
a t r u c e , one of the most immediate and pressing problems was t o f i n d a 
replacement f o r P'eng who, when he set out from Tachienlu, had been the 
person he had assumed would act as Chinese negotiator f o r h i s peace t a l k s . 
He was also w e l l aware t h a t he needed t o act q u i c k l y i n the short'breathing 
space' provided by the ending of the siege i f he was going t o organise a 
truce and prevent any resumption of h o s t i l i t i e s , which at t h i s stage would 
almost c e r t a i n l y have r e s u l t e d i n a Tibetan v i c t o r y ; and he therefore 
determined t o approach General Liu,Garrison Commander of the Chinese forces 
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I n Batang and, i n these p e c u l i a r circumstances, the nearest person of 
st a t u s who might be persuaded t o represent the Chinese at the t a l k s . 
A f t e r ' l e n g t h y discussions' w i t h the Kalon Lama, who agreed t o accept Liuas 
an a c c r e d i t e d Chinese delegate,Teichman set out f o r the Chinese held c i t y 
of Batang.*109 When he a r r i v e d there however he found t h a t Liu had 
l e f t the c i t y f o r Markham Gartok, a town t o the south west of Batang, where, 
w i t h the help of Dr. Shelton of the American Bap t i s t Mission, he hoped t o 
e f f e c t a t r u c e w i t h the T e j i , the Lhasa o f f i c a l commanding the southern 
f l a n k of the Tibetan troops i n East Tibet, who ranked only second i n 
importance t o the Kalon Lama himself,*110 Teichman eventually met up wi t h 
L i u and Shelton i n Markham Gartok on 4th June. However, Liu i n s i s t e d on 
si g n i n g a temporary month long truce w i t h the Tibetans before he would 
agree t o r e t u r n t o Batang i n order t o help Teichman negotiate w i t h the 
Kalon Lama, who had t r a v e l l e d t o the c i t y f o r the express purpose of 
conducting peace t a l k s aiined at s e t t l i n g the f r o n t i e r . *111 
Teichman's p o s i t i o n i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n was now a very strange one. Although 
a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the B r i t i s h government, he was a self-appointed 
mediator and,unlike Shelton, who had been approached d i r e c t l y by L i u , he 
could not c l a i m t o have been f o r m a l l y approached by e i t h e r side t o 
intervene once P'eng had been discredited.*112 He was therefore now 
completely dependent upon Shelton as the only f o r e i g n e r known and t r u s t e d 
by both sides. He subsequently f a i l e d t o acknowldge t h i s f a c t f u l l y i n h i s 
l a t e r account of the events, possibly i n an attempt t o exaggerate the 
importance of h i s presence there t o h i s own government, but also as a need 
t o j u s t i f y t o a wider p u b l i c the necessity f o r B r i t i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n i n a 
s i t u a t i o n which, i n such anarchic conditions, could only be n e g l i g i b l e . #113 
I r o n i c a l l y , h i s very p o s i t i o n at t h i s time r e i n f o r c e d h i s o r i g i n a l argument 
f o r going t o the f r o n t i e r , f o r i n these circusistances only a t r e a t y 
negotiated on the spot, and between people acknowledged as a u t h o r i t i e s on 
the s i t u a t i o n , could expect t o have any impact on events. 
His optimism about the successful completion of peace t a l k s at t h i s point 
i s r e f l e c t e d i n a l e t t e r t o Jordan, w r i t t e n en route t o Batang, i n which he 
expressed the view t h a t , a t l a s t , 'the unpleasant sore' t h a t Tibet had 
created i n Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s could be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y healed. 
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This approach t o the s i t u a t i o n , w h i c h both men shared, would be severely 
t e s t e d i n the coming weeks.*114 
Vhen he returned t o Batang w i t h Liu and Shelton on 15th June, Teichman's 
f i r s t o b j e c t i v e was t o secure o f f i c a l r e c o g n i t i o n from the Chinese 
A u t h o r i t i e s i n Szechuan and Peking t h a t would confirm Liu's s t a t u s as 
o f f i c i a l delegate t o the t a l k s . Batang was the headquarters f o r Chinese 
troops on the southern f r o n t i e r and contained a g a r r i s o n composed of the 
remnants of the o l d Pien Chun forces who had been there since Chao's time 
and were now, i n Teichman's words,'worn out, sodden w i t h opium, and 
g e n e r a l l y demoralised'. He considered them t o be 'nearly useless as a 
f i g h t i n g f o r c e ' and he r e a l i s e d t h a t the c i t y had now become a 'dumping 
ground f o r a l l the disabled, s i c k , and d e s t i t u t e Chinese i n Eastern Tibet', 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as the number of wounded e n t e r i n g the c i t y had increased as a 
r e s u l t of the recent f i g h t i n g . * 1 1 5 He discovered t h a t the Tibetans l i v i n g 
i n Batang had an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t a t t i t u d e towards the Chinese under 
whose nominal r u l e they had l i v e d f o r many years, and seemed t o fear the 
Lhasa A u t h o r i t i e s t o such an extent t h a t they were prepared t o r e s i s t any 
attempt t o r e t u r n them t o Lhasa r u l e by force. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , where 
there were strong rumours t h a t Tibetans might a t t a c k and almost c e r t a i n l y 
take the c i t y a t any time, Teichman knew t h a t he must act q u i c k l y , and 
could not a f f o r d t o wait f o r a r e p l y about Liu's s t a t u s from Chinese 
a u t h o r i t i e s so f a r away. He t h e r e f o r e determined t o r e t u r n immediately w i t h 
Liu t o Chamdo where the Kalon Lama had h i s base, and which was 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y the most important centre from which t o negotiate a 
successful truce. News had also reached him on 29th June th a t the temporary 
month long truce negotiated by Liu and Shelton at Markham Gartok had almost 
elapsed, and t h a t the T e j i was planning h i s own advance on Batang.»116 
He was also very aware t h a t what was l e f t of the Chinese forces at Batang 
were now discussing the p o s s i b i l i t y of a general evacuation t o Tachienliu, 
despite the f a c t t h a t t h i s involved a dangerous r e t r e a t through 'brigand 
i n f e s t e d ' country. However, he was comforted by the news th a t the Kalon 
Lama, who was himself anxious t o ensure t h a t peace t a l k s took place f o r 
reasons of h i s own, had ordered a ceasefire u n t i l the party s a f e l y reached 
Chamdo and when he a r r i v e d there on 15th July, and much t o h i s amazement. 
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he was greeted by an o f f i c i a l r e ception of Tibetan d i g n a t o r i e s , and a guard 
of honour.»117 He was also f u r t h e r encouraged by a message from the 
Chinese A u t h o r i t i e s i n Szechuan and Chengtu two weeks l a t e r which gave 
permission f o r Liu t o act as Chinese delegate t o the t a l k s , and 
included a proposal f o r a temporary f r o n t i e r along the h i s t o r i c Yangtze 
boundary which Teichman was able t o accept, although he was mindful of the 
f a c t t h a t i t might not be acceptable t o Tibetans who had only r e c e n t l y 
re-occupied Derge and Ifyarong, a f a c t confirmed by the Kalon Lama's 
he s i t a n t response t o Liu's i n i t i a l approaches.*118 Events now took a 
r a t h e r unexpected course when, on 20th July, Teichman received an o f f i c a l 
l e t t e r from Tachienlu announcing the imminent a r r i v a l of the Prince of 
Chala, described as an o f f i c i a l 'peace emissary' who would act on behalf of 
F r o n t i e r Commlsssioner Ch'en. The Prince of Chala was already w e l l known 
t o the missionaries at Batang and had been a puppet leader f o r the Chinese 
since the disturbances began.*119 He had previously been sent as Ch'en's 
peace emissary t o the Kanze f r o n t , where i n the company of a Chinese 
magistrate from Tachienlu c a l l e d Han Kuang-Chung, he had successfully 
organised a temporary c e a s e f i r e , despite the f a c t t h a t the Depon commanding 
the Tibetan troops had refused t o l i a i s e w i t h him because, l i k e many other 
Tibetans, he thought Chala was a t r a i t o r . »120 Upon r e c e i v i n g h i s summons t o 
Chamdo, Chala l e f t Han Kuang-Ching at Kanze, where the magistrate f e l t much 
safer behind Chinese l i n e s , and t r a v e l l e d t o Chamdo where Ch'en hoped he 
might have b e t t e r success than Liu i n n e g o t i a t i n g a pernianent ceasefire 
w i t h h i s f e l l o w Tibetans.•121 
Meanwhile, Teichman had given a great deal of thought t o the terms of the 
settlement he wished t o e f f e c t , and on 26th June, while s t i l l i n Batang, 
he had w r i t t e n a personal l e t t e r t o Jordan i n which he included what he 
described as a 'rough d r a f t ' of the 'sort of proposals' he intended t o put 
forward. I n doing t h i s he was obviously c e r t a i n of Jordan's support, and 
when t a l k s opened i n Chamdo on 11th August, he f e l t confident i n 
n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h Liu as Chinese delegate, e s p e c i a l l y as the Prince of Chala 
had s t i l l not a r r i v e d i n the city.^122 Liu was a r e l a t i v e l y minor Chinese 
o f f i c a l w i t h no r e a l diplomatic experience however and soon proved very 
ignorant of Tibetan procedures. He was also by t h i s time extremely nervous 
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about h i s own s i t u a t i o n , and began t o prove a l i a b i l i t y , being r e l u c t a n t t o 
discuss terms f o r f e a r of r e p r i s a l s . A f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t y was created by 
the f a c t t h a t L i u had no contact w i t h the Szechuan A u t h o r i t i e s , who by now 
had completely broken from Peking Central government and declared 
themselves an independent Province. As t r a d i t i o n a l guardians of the 
f r o n t i e r under the Manchu t h i s gave them c r e d i b i l i t y as the r e a l power i n 
the area. Teichman's own problems were f u r t h e r complicated by the f a c t t h a t 
he too was out of touch w i t h Peking since a l l h i s communications had t o 
pass through Chengtu, by now the scene of r e a l l y serious f i g h t i n g between 
the p r o v i n c i a l armies of Szechunan and Yunnan.*123 Despite a l l these 
d i f f i c u l t i e s however a t r e a t y was somehow put together and signed on 19th 
August 1918 by Teichman, the Kalon Lama, and L i u . The Chamdo truce as i t 
became known, s u c c e s s f u l l y defined the geographical boundaries of East 
Tibet but f a i l e d t o reach agreement over the d u r a t i o n of the truce and 
Teichman was now faced w i t h the problem of how t o proceed.»124 A decision 
was soon made f o r him however when,on 22nd August, three days a f t e r the 
Chamdo t r e a t y had been signed, he received a l e t t e r from Jordan dated 10th 
May ordering him t o consult w i t h Ch'en i n Tachienlu before going ahead w i t h 
t a l k s . A second l e t t e r from Simla, included i n the same mailing, 
requested t h a t he remain i n Chamdo i n order t o e f f e c t the truce.*125 
As the man very much on the spot Teichman was c l e a r l y confused and probably 
q u i t e shaken by these c o n t r a d i c t i n g opinions from Simla and Peking, 
e s p e c i a l l y as the s i t u a t i o n had looked so p o s i t i v e only a few days before. 
I n a p r i v a t e l e t t e r t o Meyrick Hewlett, B r i t i s h Consul i n Chengtu, which 
managed t o reach him through war t o r n East Tibet w i t h i n a few days of 
w r i t i n g , Teichman described h i s f e e l i n g s of t o t a l i s o l a t i o n and h i s own 
sense of u n c e r t a i n t y , and asked Hewlett t o inform the Szechuan A u t h o r i t i e s 
t h a t the Tibetan forces were only prevented from a t t a c k i n g and destroying 
Batang by the promise of a successful outcome t o the t a l k s w i t h the 
Chinese.*128 Like Younghusband before him, Teichman found h i i s e l f faced 
w i t h the dilemma of having t o make an important decision i n i s o l a t i o n and 
without being sure t h a t i t would receive o f f i c a l approval, since i t was now 
obvious t o him t h a t Jordan had disagreed w i t h the Indian government about 
the r o l e he was t o play. 
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A f t e r t h i s agonising period of i n d e c i s i o n he must have welcomed the a r r i v a l 
of the Prince of Chala from Kanze on 29th August, since h i s presence 
immediately helped t o s e t t l e the problem. Chala had brought w i t h him 
l e t t e r s from Chinese o f f i c a l s r e p o r t i n g the a r r i v a l of three thousand 
'good' Chinese troops from Tachienlu at Rongbasta i n Kanze, the scene of 
recent b i t t e r f i g h t i n g . Although the s u c c e s s f u l l y negotiated ceasefire 
which Chala had helped t o organise s t i l l held, the a r r i v a l of f r e s h Chinese 
troops from Tachienlu had placed an unbearable s t r a i n on the s i t u a t i o n , 
which now threatened t o erupt i n t o violence at any moment. Attempts by 
both sides t o negotiate by l e t t e r had also apparently f a i l e d , p a r t l y the 
r e s u l t of Chinese reluctance t o t r e a t the Tibetans as any more than 
'naughty c h i l d r e n ' , but also because Tibetan confidence, boosted by the 
recent v i c t o r y at Chamdo, had made them ' i t c h i n g ' t o press ahead w i t h t h e i r 
advantage.•127 As Liu's nerve had completely f a i l e d him by t h i s stage 
Teichman was now prepared t o accept Chala as the Chinese delegate and l e f t 
w i t h him a t once f o r Rongbasta. He reached the Rongbasta f r o n t on 19th 
September, and accompanied by Chala, he f i r s t v i s i t e d the Chinese camp, 
where he was introduced t o Han Kuang-Chung, the Chinese magistrate from 
Tachienlu, who had been aw a i t i n g Chala's r e t u r n w i t h some t r e p i d a t i o n . The 
Chinese camp at Rongbasta was s i t u a t e d i n a remote v a l l e y on one of the 
main roads from Tachienlu t o Jyekundo which l e d on t o the main northern 
road t o Lhasa, and as such was a very s e n s i t i v e spot. A f t e r a subsequent 
v i s i t t o the Tibetan camp, Teichman was surprised t o discover t h a t most of 
the Tibetan o f f i c a l s , or Fan Kuan, were 'most c i v i l i s e d ' . This impression 
was l a t e r confirmed i n h i s own mind when he l e a r n t t h a t some of them had 
p r e v i o u s l y v i s i t e d India and c a r r i e d 'kodak cameras', and ' f i e l d glasses' 
among t h e i r possessions. Armed w i t h t h i s knowledge he became extremely 
hopeful t h a t the Fan Kuan would see sense, although the enemies they faced 
were, by comparison, very narrowminded, and despite t h e i r apparent 
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n , most had never before t r a v e l l e d outside Szechuan, In the 
l i g h t of t h i s he found t h e i r a t t i t u d e t o the Fan Kuan q u i t e r i d i c u l o u s , 
e s p e c i a l l y as the men they l a b e l l e d 'barbarians' appeared to him t o have 
f a r more western s o p h i s t i c a t i o n than the Szechuanese who derided them.^128 
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During the course of h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n at both camps Teichman noticed that 
the sides were evenly matched i n s t r e n g t h and t h a t despite the bravado, 
both were ' g e t t i n g uneasy' about the forthcoming b a t t l e . Unlike the 
Tibetans, who could e x i s t q u i t e e a s i l y on a simple d i e t of barley, f e r r i e d 
t o them across the d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n i n sacks t i e d t o the backs of yaks and 
mules, the Szechunese s o l d i e r s required a more r e f i n e d r i c e based d i e t 
which was c o s t l y and d i f f i c u l t t o provide i n t h i s remote situation.#129 
The Tibetans were eq u a l l y unsure of t h e i r a b i l i t y t o endure a sustained 
period of f i g h t i n g so f a r from t h e i r base, and were q u i t e dismayed by the 
a r r i v a l of f r e s h Chinese forces from Tachienlu.*130 Taking a l l these 
f a c t o r s i n t o consideration,therefore,Teichman f e l t t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n w i t h 
both sides was possible and on 20th September c a l l e d a conference t o 
discuss a truce which both sides agreed t o attend and which was convened 
i n a large t e n t erected i n a f i e l d between the l i n e s . Having got the two 
sides together however there followed what he l a t e r described as 
' interminable discussions', i n which a great debate ensued about the 
c o r r e c t procedure f o r a mutual withdrawal, both sides demanding th a t the 
other withdraw f i r s t . The fresher Tachienlu force, who had always been more 
w i l l i n g t o f i g h t , were p a r t i c u l a r l y anxious t o e s t a b l i s h the point t h a t 
they were making peace w i t h the Tibetans, not because they feared them, but 
simply because they had no wish t o 'chastise or h u m i l i a t e them' any 
f u r t h e r . This sentiment was obviously not much appreciated by the Tibetans, 
who were equally keen t o s t r e s s t h a t t h e i r recent v i c t o r y over P'eng had 
made them the v i c t o r s , and t h a t i f necessary, they were q u i t e w i l l i n g t o 
resume h o s t i l i t i e s . Eventually some agreement was reached and both sides 
accepted a simultaneous withdrawal of one days journey from Rongbasta that 
would take the Chinese t o Kanze, and the Tibetans t o a point j u s t w i t h i n 
the Derge border. The truce was then duly signed and messages were sent t o 
Ch'en a t Tachienlu, and the Kalon Lama i n Chamdo, t o secure t h e i r o f f i c a l 
approval.*131 A f t e r e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t l o c a l Tibetans could now r e t u r n t o 
t h e i r v a l l e y i n order t o harvest t h e i r ripened crops, the Conference then 
adjourned and both sides r e t i r e d t o t h e i r respective camps t o await the 
o f f i c a l r a t i f i c a t i o n which,given the remoteness of the area, could not be 
expected f o r at l e a s t three weeks. I t was not u n t i l 10th October therefore 
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t h a t t a l k s were re-convened f o l l o w i n g news t h a t the Kalon Lama and the 
Szechuan F r o n t i e r A u t h o r i t i e s had both approved the truce.The Rongbasta 
Agreement was then f o r m a l l y r a t i f i e d on t h a t date.•132 
A f t e r the ceremony the Prince of Chala held a huge banquet at which, 
according t o Teichman, 'everyone p a r t i c i p a t e d despite the previous angry 
t a l k ' . The Prince was much r e l i e v e d when t a l k s ended successfully f o r h i s 
own sake f o r , had they f a i l e d , he would almost c e r t a i n l y have been c a l l e d 
t o account by h i s own people f o r having helped the Chinese at t h e i r 
expense. His own r o l e as nediator now over, Teichman spent h i s remaining 
days a t Rongbasta s i t t i n g on a ' f l a t r o o f w i t h f i e l d glasses and watching, 
w i t h some amusement, the very gradual withdrawal, as both sides continued 
t o argue and p r o c r a s t i n a t e about who should be the f i r s t t o leave. He also 
noted the j o y of the l o c a l Tibetan farmers who were now able t o gather i n 
t h e i r harvest and r e t u r n t o t h e i r uneventful, but peaceful existence, i n 
t h i s remote p a r t of Tibet.•ISS 
The Rongbasta t r u c e d i f f e r e d from the Chamdo truce i n t h a t i t set out a 
c l e a r time l i m i t of one year from the day of s i g n i n g and was r a t i f i e d by 
authorised r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on both sides. Unlike Chamdo i t was a b i p a r t i t e 
agreement since Teichman had i n s i s t e d t h a t he was there only as mediator 
and witness. Although intended as a temporary settlement, i t remained 
e f f e c t i v e u n t i l 1930, p a r t l y because both sides had no wish t o resume 
f i g h t i n g over what was r e a l l y a wilderness, and p a r t l y because an 
a d d i t i o n a l a r t i c l e i n the t r e a t y defined a point at Beri beyond which the 
Chinese could not advance without v i o l a t i n g the truce.•134 The truce was 
h a i l e d as a great d i p l o m a t i c v i c t o r y i n B r i t a i n , as well as a great 
personal triumph f o r Teichman himself, and he was always c a r e f u l t o take 
f u l l c r e d i t f o r the venture. His p i v o t a l r o l e as mediator i s h i g h l y 
questionable however, f o r without the support of the Kalon Lama, General 
L i u , and Dr.Shelton, he would have been lucky t o have survived unharmed i n 
areas where i t was q u i t e passible, even f o r a B r i t i s h o f f i c a l , t o vanish 
without trace. 
Teichman's 'Travels', which he was encouraged t o p u b l i s h soon a f t e r h i s 
r e t u r n t o Peking, gives a very massaged account of events, and was probably 
d e l i b e r a t e l y d i s t o r t e d i n order t o present a view acceptable t o the Foreign 
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O f f i c e , s i n c e Teichman's own o f f i c i a l r e p o r t s are sometimes at odds w i t h 
t h i s l a t e r account. For him, Chamdo and Rongbasta were both successful 
attempts t o e s t a b l i s h a f r e s h basis f o r t a l k s w i t h the Chinese, and a f t e r 
s i g n i n g the t r u c e and supervising the withdrawal, and no doubt heady w i t h 
h i s own success, he decided t o take o f f on an impromptu survey of the East 
Tibetan Marches, apparently unaware of Jordan's repeated requests t h a t he 
r e t u r n immediately t o h i s post at Tachienlu.•ISS 
I n Peking the s i t u a t i o n had been d r a m a t i c a l l y a l t e r e d by events i n East 
Tibet t h a t had taken place during the course of Teichman's peace mission, 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r by the formal d e c l a r a t i o n of independence by Szechuan. 
Jordan himself, d i s i l l u s i o n e d and d i s p i r i t e d by the death of h i s daughter 
i n May 1918, as w e l l as by the e x t r a burden of war work, had begun t o f i n d 
h i s subordinate tiresome,especially as conversations w i t h Tuan,the new 
Republican President,had revealed t h a t the Chinese were now more concerned 
w i t h r e g a i n i n g c o n t r o l of Szechuan, than w i t h the resumption of campaigning 
i n East Tibet.•136 He was even more worried by Chinese attempts t o 
challenge the s t a t u s of General Liu during the t a l k s preceding the signing 
of the Chamdo tr u c e , and became very angry indeed when Chelmsford, w i t h no 
obvious o p p o s i t i o n from Montagu at the India O f f i c e , began to request that 
Teichman remain i n Chamdo i n order t o s e t t l e the truce.^137 His i r r i t a t i o n 
was increased by Teichman's r e f u s a l t o obey orders t o r e t u r n t o Tachienlu 
and by h i s unauthorised decision t o t o u r the East Tibetan marches a f t e r 
s i g n i n g the truce at Rongbasta. Despite t h i s i n s ubordination Teichman's 
behaviour went e n t i r e l y unpunished, and he was able t o r e t u r n t o Peking and 
continue w i t h a successful diplomatic career at the Peking Legation.^138 
The truce at Rongbasta s e t t l e d the area f o r many years and marked the 
e f f e c t i v e ending of a l l B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n East Tibet. Although the post 
at T a c h i e n l i u remained t e c h n i c a l l y open u n t i l 1928, mainly due t o pressure 
from the Indian government, i t was not f u l l y maintained a f t e r Louis King 
l e f t i n 1921, and i n 1924 a l l i t s correspondence was l o s t t o bandits.^139 
I n the f i n a l chapter I want t o look at events i n India and Peking t h a t were 
t o lead t o a reawakening of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n Central,and Western Tibet 
I n the post war years, and at the involvement of B r i t a i n ' s Japanese a l l y i n 
Tibetan a f f a i r s . 
27. George Curzon, Foreign Secretary 
1 
CUSZQE AND THE EVQLUTIQS OF POLICY IS THE POST VAS VQRLD 
1918 -1922 
I n the period between the ending of the Rongbasta Truce i n 1918 
and the s t a r t of the Washington Conference i n 1922, B r i t i s h Tibetan 
p o l i c y was dominated by attempts t o resume t a l k s w i t h China, 
thwarted by Chinese r e f u s a l t o si g n the T r i p a r t i t e Agreement 
at Simla i n 1914.*1 
The nature of the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the resumption of t a l k s w i t h China 
over Tibet exposed the very d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n B r i t a i n found h e r s e l f i n 
I n the postwar world,as powerful new forces intervened t o prevent 
t h e i r successful outcome. The growing s t r e n g t h of America and 
Japan i n Chinese a f f a i r s , coupled w i t h the Dalai Lama's awareness t h a t 
he might exercise greater i n f l u e n c e on events i n the new climate of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy, and above a l l the confusion generated by 
the chaos i n s i d e China i t s e l f , a l l helped t o prevent the achievement 
of a s o l u t i o n t o what the B r i t i s h continued t o see as t h e i r 
'Tibetan problem'. 
I n t h i s f i n a l chapter I w i l l t r a c e the course of the attempts t o 
t o s e t t l e the 'Tibetan problem' w i t h China and examine i n greater 
d e t a i l the reasons why the Chinese refused t o negotiate w i t h the 
B r i t i s h Government. 
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I . THE MAY PROPOSALS 
On 30th May 1919 the Chinese presented a set of proposals t o the B r i t i s h 
government i n an attempt t o s e t t l e the stalemate created by t h e i r r e f u s a l 
t o s i g n the T r i p a r t i t e Agreement i n 1914, which the l a t t e r f e l t able t o 
accept on the f o l l o w i n g day. A f t e r months of speculation i t f i n a l l y looked 
as though there was a r e a l chance of reaching some agreement w i t h China on 
a problem which had been haunting Jordan since Teichman's u n o f f i c a l mission 
t o Bast Tibet I n 1918,and there was also strong f e e l i n g i n London and India 
t h a t no time should be l o s t i n g e t t i n g the Chinese t o the n e g o t i a t i n g table 
before they had an o p p o r t u n i t y t o change t h e i r minds. Indeed the sense of 
urgency was so great t h a t i t was unanimously decided i n London, India, and 
Peking, t o go ahead w i t h t a l k s without c o n s u l t i n g Tibet.^3 
As Foreign Secretary Curzon was q u i t e w i l l i n g t o duck the 'knotty question' 
of c o n s u l t i n g Russia on the proposals, f e e l i n g i t unwise t o r a i s e the 
v a l i d i t y of these t a l k s i n the context of the 1907 Convention, a t r e a t y 
which he himself had vehemently opposed and which had been a b a r r i e r t o 
t a l k s w i t h China about Tibet a f t e r 1907.^4 As a strong supporter of a 
permanent presence i n Tibet he was even prepared t o temporarily abandon h i s 
plan t o s t a t i o n a B r i t i s h Representative i n Lhasa i n an attempt t o get 
t a l k s moving, although he continued t o press f o r t h i s as a possible f u t u r e 
option.•S He t h e r e f o r e issued i n s t r u c t i o n s t o go ahead w i t h t a l k s and on 
June 1st 1919, a f t e r a v i s i t t o Mr Ch'en Lu, the Chinese Foreign M i n i s t e r , 
Jordan was overjoyed t o r e p o r t t h a t the Chinese themselves were s t i l l 'most 
w i l l i n g ' t o open discussions on the terms o u t l i n e d , and were even ready t o 
debate the boundary issue t h a t had been s t a t e d as the reason f o r the 
breakdown of e a r l i e r negotiations.•& 
When t a l k s opened i n Peking on 13th August Jordan reported t h a t the Chinese 
s t i l l 'appeared reasonable' and t h a t a f u r t h e r meeting had been planned 
f o r the f o l l o w i n g week.^7 I t came as r a t h e r a shock therefore when 
ne g o t i a t i o n s suddenly collapsed a few days l a t e r on 27th August, and the 
Chinese refused t o continue discussions.^8 The o f f i c i a l excuse given was 
t h a t 'the s i t u a t i o n i n China had changed' since the Proposals had been put 
forward at the end of May, but a f e e l i n g t h a t the Japanese were somehow at 
the bottom of the breakdown created a c r i s i s between B r i t a i n and her a l l y 
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which undermined hopes of e f f e c t i n g a s e t t l e n e n t . Faced w i t h the immediate 
problem of the breakdown, there was now considerable confusion about the 
best way t o proceed i n the face of obvious Chinese p r e v a r i c a t i o n and i t 
became obvious,during the attempts t o re-open t a l k s between August 1921 and 
October 1922, t h a t the Japanese were only a part of the problem.*9 
By November 1919 Curzon questioned Jordan's view t h a t the Japanese were a 
major obstacle t o the resumption of t a l k s and he became convinced that 
Jordan's presence i n Peking would prove a l i a b i l i t y . H e t h erefore began t o 
suggest t o Jordan t h a t he should r e t i r e before the re-opening of t a l k s 
which he had expected t o i n i t i a t e as a grand f i n a l e t o h i s long and 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d diplomatic career.#10 I t i s obvious at t h i s point t h a t i t 
was Curzon's i n t e n t i o n t o c a r r y forward the Tibetan p o l i c y alone, and i t 
t h e r e f o r e seems l i k e l y t h a t he had d e l i b e r a t e l y shelved discussions about 
Tibet at t h i s p o i n t i n an attempt t o secure Jordan's removal,and despite 
p r o t e s t s from Chelmsford and Montagu th a t t h e i r equally p o s i t i v e 
suggestions f o r s e t t l i n g the issue were being ignored.»11 
By December 1919 Curzon had c l e a r l y taken the decision t o handle t a l k s from 
London a f t e r conversations w i t h A l f r e d Sze, Chinese M i n i s t e r at the London 
Legation.•12 This complete confidence i n h i s own a b i l i t y t o solve problems 
by adopting a 'hard l i n e ' was t y p i c a l of the s o r t of approach th a t had 
caused him so much g r i e f i n In d i a , and i n these new circumstances t h i s 
t a c t i c f a r e d equally badly. He was e v i d e n t l y so determined t o bludgeon the 
Chinese i n t o t a l k s by t h i s time t h a t he was w i l l i n g t o leave the Legation 
i n Peking without an experienced M i n i s t e r i n an attempt t o make the Chinese 
believe t h a t the issue was of no consequence t o B r i t a i n . This was a blow 
t o Chinese p r e s t i g e which Jordan, and anyone w i t h any r e a l experience i n 
Chinese matters, would not have i n f l i c t e d , since o f f e r i n g s o l u t i o n s which 
enabled them t o r e t a i n p r e s t i g e had h i t h e r t o been regarded an e s s e n t i a l 
p r e - r e q u i s i t e f o r harmonious r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Chinese.»13 The f a c t t h a t 
Jordan's suggestion f o r a Chinese Mission t o be sent t o Tibet t o discuss 
proposals had also been ignored, despite the f a c t t h a t Montagu and 
Chelmsford were supporting the idea, leads t o the inescapable conclusion 
t h a t Curzon was d e l i b e r a t e l y dispensing w i t h Jordan's services i n order t o 
handle matters himself. Vhen Jordan e v e n t u a l l y l e f t Peking f o r the l a s t 
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time i n March 1920 he d i d so w i t h the s i t u a t i o n unresolved, although by 
then Curzon had b e l a t e d l y accepted h i s suggestion f o r a China Mission i n 
p r i n c i p l e . Montagu had been incensed by the way h i s advice had been 
ignored, and from t h i s time on the India O f f i c e began t o play a more 
p o s i t i v e r o l e i n Tibetan n e g o t i a t i o n s , c u l m i n a t i n g i n the despatch of the 
B e l l Mission t o Tibet i n November 1920.^14 I n February 1920, s h o r t l y 
before h i s enforced r e t i r e m e n t , Jordan had informed London th a t the Central 
Government i n Peking had disowned e a r l i e r announcements of a possible 
resumption of t a l k s over Tibet, and the s i t u a t i o n was thus deadlocked u n t i l 
A p r i l 1921, when hopes were once again r a i s e d by a f r e s h Chinese approach 
on the matter. B e l l ' s presence i n Lhasa by t h a t time having added a new 
dimension t o the s i t u a t i o n . • I S 
Meanwhile Curzon was by now anxious t o go ahead w i t h the new plans f o r 
t a l k s since h i s f i r s t i n i t i a t i v e w i t h Sze had f a i l e d , and h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h Sze's successor, Wellington Koo, was proving equally unproductive. ^16 
On the p r e t e x t of a 'change of events i n China' he t h e r e f o r e ordered the 
new B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n Peking, Beilby Alston, t o approach the Chinese 
without delay, i n order t o secure a date.^17 Alston had n e i t h e r the 
confidence nor the experience of h i s predecessor however, and f e l t f a r less 
sure of h i s a b i l i t y t o secure an agreement w i t h the Chinese. Following a 
p r e l i m i n a r y meeting at the Wai Chalo-Pu, he had reported t h a t the Chinese 
Foreign M i n i s t e r , 'though friendly',was'not at a l l r e l i a b l e ' , and had 
begged Curzon t o attempt t o i n i t i a t e discussions from London.•IS Curzon 
was more than w i l l i n g t o do t h i s and documents were accordingly prepared. 
During the course of a subsequent i n t e r v i e w w i t h Wellington Koo i n London 
on 26th August 1921, he managed t o f i n d 'an opportunity' t o present him 
w i t h a statement together w i t h some 'explanatory' observations of h i s 
own.^19 Alston also approached h i s Chinese counterpart i n Peking w i t h the 
statements and observations which Curzon had copied t o him, and on 31st 
August, the Japanese were informed of what had taken place. ^20 
Despite these hopeful signs however i t soon became obvious t h a t , even i f 
they had wanted t o , the Chinese Central Government i n Peking were i n no 
p o s i t i o n t o negotiate w i t h the B r i t i s h . I n London, Wellington Koo admitted 
t h a t China was so r i v e n by i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s t h a t a l l Central Government 
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c o n t r o l had broken down and t h a t they were no longer able t o c o n t r o l 
t h e i r own a f f a i r s , l e t alone t o determine the f a t e of another nation.#21 
I n a d d i t i o n t o Chinese weakness, two new elements c o n t r i v e d t o block 
f u r t h e r discussion. The f i r s t was Koo's announcement t h a t h i s government 
would not be prepared t o discuss the Tibetan s i t u a t i o n u n t i l a f t e r the 
Washington Conference.«22 The second was the a t t i t u d e adopted by the Dalai 
Lama who, w i t h B e l l ' s f u l l support, had declared t h a t he d i d not wish 
Tibetan a f f a i r s t o be discussed i n a faraway c i t y l i k e Washington, where 
any decisions could have no meaning or relevance f o r Tibet. I t was the 
moral force of h i s argument i n the new post war climate, favouring 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l u t i o n s t o diplomatic problems, which became a powerful 
f a c t o r leading t o a B r i t i s h agreement t o defer the t a l k s on Tibet u n t i l 
a f t e r the Washington Conference was over.»23 
Attempts t o re-open t a l k s a f t e r the Conference had convened i n 1922 were 
once more rebuffed by the Chinese, but t h i s time the B r i t i s h were aware 
t h a t the op p o r t u n i t y t o s e t t l e the Tibetan 'problem' had possibly been l o s t 
forevever i n a s i t u a t i o n where they were no longer a force t o be reckoned 
w i t h i n China, and where Japan and America now competed f o r the spoils.»24 
There was thus an i n e v i t a b i l i t y about the f a i l u r e t o re-open the Simla 
Talks which was f a r wider than the i n a b i l i t y of B r i t a i n and China t o work 
together, and i t i s t o these wider aspects t h a t I now want t o t u r n . 
2. JAPANESE FORWARD POLICY AND TIBET 1904 - 1922 
Growing Japanese i n t e r e s t i n Tibet became a great source of concern t o the 
B r i t i s h Foreign Service between 1918 and 1922. I t had been believed f o r 
some time t h a t Japanese 'agents' were operating i n Lhasa, a f a c t apparently 
confirmed by B e l l during h i s v i s i t there i n 1921. Before the f i r s t world 
war however t h e i r presence there had never been regarded as a p a r t i c u l a r 
problem.*25 Since the formation of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e i n 1902, 
Japanese agents had co-operated w i t h B r i t i s h agents inside Tibet, passing 
on i n f o r m a t i o n about Russian a c t i v i t y q u i t e s u c c e s s f u l l y because, as 
Buddhists, they were able t o t r a v e l f r e e l y i n the country and o f t e n studied 
f o r long periods i n Tibetan monasteries.»26 Despite t h i s t e n t a t i v e p o l i c y 
of co-operation i n Tibet however, wider c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h the Japanese on 
221 
Central Asian p o l i c y i n general was not encouraged, e s p e c i a l l y when Japan 
began t o become i n c r e a s i n g l y involved i n Central Asia f o l l o w i n g t h e i r 
d e c isive v i c t o r y over Russia i n 1905.^27 While i t was recognised as 
worthwhile t o i n f o r m Japan about 'what was passing i n Tibet", t h i s was only 
done i n the b e l i e f t h a t , as a l l i e s , they were e n t i t l e d t o know about what 
were considered t o be l e g i t i m a t e B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s there.^28 
During the n e g o t i a t i o n s leading t o the Anglo-Russian Convention however 
t h i s view was revised as a r e s u l t of growing Japanese i n t e r e s t i n Mongolia, 
about which the Russians were very concerned. Russian a g i t a t i o n about the 
presence of Japanese agents i n Mongolia, and attempts by them t o l i n k Tibet 
w i t h Mongolia i n the course of discussions w i t h B r i t a i n , had made i t 
necessary t o involve the Japanese i n t a l k s about Tibet t o a much greater 
extent than before, and even more so when i t became known th a t the Japanese 
themselves were a c t i v e l y pressing f o r more information.^29 
A f t e r s i g n i n g the Convention w i t h Russia i n 1907, Grey was at great pains 
t o ensure t h a t the Japanese were kept w e l l informed about the f r o n t i e r , 
o f t e n i n advance of the Russians. Japan's s t a t u s as B r i t a i n ' s a l l y thus 
allowed her t o l e g i t i m a t e l y pursue a number of p r o j e c t s i n Central Asia 
without r a i s i n g undue comment and,after 1909, leading China hands l i k e 
Jordan were w r i t i n g p r i v a t e l y of t h e i r concerns about growing Japanese 
in f l u e n c e there.^30 
A f t e r the overthrow of the Manchu i n 1911 Japanese f o r e i g n p o l i c y , always 
f a c t i o n a l , became even more d i v i d e d over what r o l e i t should now assume i n 
China. Japanese F a t i o n a l i s t s l i k e Miyazaki Torazo became c l o s e l y 
associated w i t h Chinese M a t i o n a l i s t s l i k e Sun Yet-sen, but Jordan began t o 
be most concerned about the a t t i u d e and behaviour of the Japanese m i l i t a r y 
p a r t y i n Peking, which soon became openly h o s t i l e towards Yuan Shih-Kai and 
c r i t i c a l of Jordan's support f o r him, and as a r e s u l t , a serious r i f t 
developed between Jordan and I j u i n , t h e Japanese M i n i s t e r i n Peking.^31 
This r i f t created problems f o r Jordan d i p l o m a t i c a l l y , as Japanese influence 
increased i n China, and as t h e i r pronounced opposition t o Yuan Shih Kai 
deepened. The c o n f l i c t also exposed grave weaknesses i n the Anglo-Japanese 
A l l i a n c e , although Grey continued t o honour the o b l i g a t i o n s t o the Japanese 
by keeping them w e l l informed of B r i t i s h movements i n Tibet.^32 
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As tension mounted between Russia and Japan i n Mongolia however, the 
c r e d i b i l i t y of the A l l i a n c e became i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o maintain and 
i t was not long before cracks began t o show, even i n t h e i r dealings w i t h 
Tibet. I n 1913 Grey became aware t h a t the Japanese were i n t r i g i n g w i t h a 
Tibetan c a l l e d Lungshar, who had become the s e l f appointed guardian t o four 
Tibetan boys who had been s p e c i a l l y selected t o receive an education i n 
B r i t a i n . The Japanese were apparently attempting t o persuade the boys t o 
r e j e c t the B r i t i s h o f f e r i n exchange f o r an education i n Japan and although 
not a serious problem i n i t s e l f , as Lungshar was n o t o r i o u s l y i l l - e q u i p p e d 
f o r h i s r o l e and was openly attempting t o p r o f i t f i n a n c i a l l y from h i s 
p o s i t i o n , Japanese moves began t o be seen as part of an o v e r a l l p a t t e r n of 
o v e r t l y a n t i - B r i t i s h behaviour. #33 This was t o be f u r t h e r confirmed by the 
conduct of Japanese agents i n Simla during the run up t o the Conference i n 
1913,when o f f i c i a l s from the Japanese Legation i n Simla had contacted Ivan 
Chen, demanding t h a t he supply them w i t h d e t a i l e d information about the 
course of the ne g o t i a t i o n s . Although Chen had refused t o do t h i s , the 
Indian government were very alarmed by t h i s b l a t a n t approach t o the Chinese 
delegate, and even more so when Chen claimed t o be 'uncertain of what h i s 
a t t i t u d e should be toward the Japanese i n the f u t u r e ' . #34 The problem of 
what t o do about the a c t i v i t i e s of these Japanese Consular O f f i c i a l s l e d t o 
a d d i t i o n a l f r i c t i o n w i t h the Indian government, and Crewe became anxious 
t h a t Hardlnge might overreact t o the s i t u a t i o n by p u b l i c l y denouncing the 
Japanese before he could approach t h e i r government f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n . 
Although frayed tempers were even t u a l l y cooled, the in c i d e n t uncovered the 
great u n c e r t a i n t y about the s e c u r i t y of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e w i t h i n 
B r i t a i n as we l l as a keen awareness of the increasing Japanese i n t e r e s t i n 
Tibet.»35 Alston's own experiences as a c t i n g Charge D'Affaires at Peking 
i n 1913 had confirmed h i s growing d i s l i k e of Japanese behaviour, a view 
which confirmed Jordan's own p r i v a t e reservations and d i d l i t t l e t o ease 
the tensions.*36 The outbreak of war i n 1914 and the need t o court Japan, 
f i n a l l y prevented the a l l i a n c e from d i s i n t e g r a t i n g , but during the course 
of the war Japanese i n t e r e s t i n Tibet increased t o the detriment of Anglo-
Chinese r e l a t i o n s , and i n 1915, a f u r t h e r c r i s i s developed over her promise 
t o supply Tibet w i t h arms. 
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I n March 1916 the Indian Government reported t o Chamberlain, who had 
replaced Crewe as Secretary of State i n 1915, t h a t a Japanese emissary 
known as Aokl had Just returned from a v i s i t t o Lhasa, having apparently 
promised t o supply the Tibetans w i t h arms through the Japanese Consulate i n 
Calcutta. Tibetan M i n i s t e r s had already w r i t t e n t o B e l l i n Sikkim 
requesting machine guns from In d i a s t a t i n g t h a t , i f necessary, they would 
be prepared t o t r a v e l t o Japan t o get them. *37 The Indian Government now 
found themselves i n an extremely d e l i c a t e p o s i t i o n , s i n c e f i r s t l y , they were 
i n no p o s i t i o n t o supply the arms requested, even though the Tibetans could 
argue t h a t they had an o b l i g a t i o n t o do so under the terms of the Anglo-
Tibetan B i p a r t i t e Agreement of 1914.*38 Secondly, they could not a f f o r d t o 
upset t h e i r Japanese a l l i e s , whose support was v i t a l t o the war i n Asia; 
and t h i r d l y , they could not a l l o w the Japanese t o go ahead and supply arms 
i n case much wider issues about t h e i r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n developed and Russia 
chose t o become involved. #39 Chamberlain had a more p o s i t i v e approach t o 
the s i t u a t i o n than Crewe but had l i t t l e experience i n handling Tibetan 
a f f a i r s . He agreed w i t h I n d i a t h a t an immediate r e a c t i o n was c a l l e d f o r , 
and i t was t h e r e f o r e decided t o d i s a l l o w the passage of any arms through 
I n d i a , which i t was f e l t might be construed as a v i o l a t i o n of wartime 
agreements on the supply of arms, while at the same time arrange f o r B e l l 
t o i n i t i a t e separate t a l k s w i t h the Tibetans w i t h a view t o persuading them 
t o drop t h e i r request a l t o g e t h e r , a p r o j e c t many experienced India hands 
r e a l i s e d was doomed t o f a i l u r e since the Tibetans were now very w e l l aware 
of t h e i r strong bargaining p o s i t i o n . »40 In the event B r i t a i n was forced t o 
supply the Tibetans w i t h guns and ammunition i n order t o prevent the 
Japanese from doing so, and t h i s i n c i d e n t reveals the extent t o which the 
Japanese were prepared t o involve themselves i n Tibetan a f f a i r s , even at 
the r i s k of j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e i r e x i s t i n g A l l i a n c e w i t h Britain.»41 
I n 1917, Japan and America exchanged notes d e f i n i n g the extent of t h e i r 
mutual 'special i n t e r e s t s ' i n China.This news was greeted p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y 
by Montagu at the In d i a O f f i c e who argued t h a t , although the agreement 
between Japan and America could not be s a i d t o represent a d i r e c t challenge 
t o B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s i n China or Tibet, i f B r i t a i n were to contemplate 
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adhering t o such an a l l i a n c e as a t h i r d partner, i t might be b e t t e r t o 
a t t a c h t o the agreement 'a formal r e s e r v a t i o n on the subject of Tibet'. As 
Foreign Secretary Balfour agreed t h a t any arrangement t h a t might recognise 
Japan's 'special i n t e r e s t s ' i n ' c e r t a i n p a r t s of China' could not be said 
t o a f f e c t the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , or t r e a t i e s already signed between 
Tibet and B r i t a i n , but t h a t I n d i a would need t o be sure, even i n f o r m a l l y , 
t h a t Montagu's r e s e r v a t i o n s had been taken i n t o account i n any t r i p a r t i t e 
agreement w i t h the Americans and Japanese.»42 These views r e f l e c t an 
in c r e a s i n g a n x i e t y about what B r i t a i n ' s post war p o s i t i o n i n China would be 
i n the face of obvious Japanese and American desires t o carve the country 
i n t o spheres of i n f l u e n c e along t r a d i t i o n a l i m p e r i a l i s t l i n e s . »43 
B r i t i s h f e ars about Japanese behaviour i n the post war period were soon 
confirmed by the c r i s i s generated by Japanese attempts t o prevent a 
resumption of the Anglo-Chinese t a l k s on Tibet i n 1919.*44 In a Memo dated 
the day a f t e r t a l k s had broken down i n August 1919, R. H. Clive of the 
Peking Legation exposed what he believed t o be a concerted attempt by the 
Japanese c o n t r o l l e d press i n Peking, t o 'grossly misrepresent the nature 
and scope of the Tibetan n e g o t i a t i o n s ' by d e l i b e r a t e l y comparing the 
Tibetan s i t u a t i o n w i t h Japanese ac t i o n s i n Shantung as a way of minimising 
Japanese outrages,and presenting B r i t i s h designs on Tibet as malevolent. »45 
Jordan had already reported t h a t a s e r i e s of pamphlets accusing the B r i t i s h 
of scheming t o include i n Tibet 'the Chinese Province of Kansu, h a l f of 
Szechuan, p a r t of Yunnan, and Kueichow' had been published i n Peking, and 
he was p a r t i c u l a r l y alarned by the scale and vehemence of the press 
campaigns, which included a r t i c l e s i n the Japanese press i n Tokyo, as well 
as i n Peking, and he had taken the precaution of i s s u i n g a statement t o 
Reuters denying the a l l e g a t i o n s . By t h i s time Jordan's personal antagonism 
towards the Japanese was w e l l known, and h i s tendency t o t r y t o blame them 
f o r the downfall and death of Yuan Shih Kai made i t i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t 
f o r him t o lead discussions on the issue from Peking, despite the f a c t t h a t 
he continued t o have the f u l l support of h i s Legation.«46 
Cli v e ' s Memorandum c e r t a i n l y r e f l e c t e d the views of the Legation s t a f f who 
believed t h a t the whole campaign t o d i s c r e d i t B r i t a i n had been orchestrated 
from Tokyo, and although C l i v e himself accepted t h a t he had no d i r e c t 
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evidence t o t h i s e f f e c t , such strong condemmation of an a l l y was a f u r t h e r 
i n d i c a t i o n of how problematical f u t u r e dealings w i t h Japan might 
becone.*47 
As Foreign Secretary i n 1919 Curzon was faced w i t h yet another c r i s i s i n 
Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , and f o l l o w i n g conversations w i t h Chindra, the 
Japanese Ambassador i n London, who strenuously denied suggestions that 
Japanese i n t e r f e r e n c e i n Chinese a f f a i r s had endangered the f u t u r e of 
Anglo-Chinese t a l k s on Tibet, he attempted t o defuse the s i t u a t i o n by 
sending f o r the Chinese M i n i s t e r and presenting him w i t h Japanese 
denials.¥hen confronted i n t h i s way the Chinese M i n i s t e r expressed great 
supprise at Japanese re a c t i o n s , and agreed t o telegraph Peking f o r a 
r e a c t i o n . This f u r t h e r attempt by Curzon t o handle Chinese a f f a i r s from 
London was also destined t o f a i l however, as events were t o show th a t both 
Japanese and Chinese representatives were c l e a r l y out of touch w i t h the 
r a p i d changes of p o l i c y i n t h e i r respective c a p i t a l s , and Curzon's attempt 
t o a r r i v e at a balanced view i n London only complicated matters even 
further.«48 On the saias day as t h e i r f i r s t interview,Chindra returned t o 
Curzon w i t h 'a s p e c i a l message 'from h i s Government i n which he'developed, 
at considerable length', arguments about 'the p o l i t i c a l and economic claims 
of Japan' t o regions w i t h i n the Chinese Empire i n which they had l e g i t i m a t e 
i n t e r e s t s . Mongolia i n p a r t i c u l a r was mentioned, as were the 'hardships' 
endured by the Japanese during the course of recent wars which had created 
the need f o r them t o set up ' b a r r i e r s ' against the p o s s i b i l i t y of f u t u r e 
aggression i n Asia, e i t h e r from a recovered China, or from a restored 
Germany. He explained t h a t the Japanese were now f u l l y aware of t h e i r new 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r o l e and f e l t t h a t the balance of power i n Asia had swung i n 
t h e i r favour t o the detriment of B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s there. When Curzon 
e v e n t u a l l y pressed f o r a response t o a l l e g a t i o n s t h a t the Japanese had 
d e l i b e r a t e l y engineered the breakdown of Anglo-Chinese t a l k s , Chindra 
'broke i n ' on h i s questions, denying t h a t Obata, Japan's M i n i s t e r i n 
Peking,had had anything t o do w i t h such proceedings,and expressing a 
w i l l i n g n e s s t o telegraph t o Tokyo f o r confirm a t i o n of Obata's innocence. 
Curzon had already noticed however th a t Chindra h i n s e l f appeared t o 'have 
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some suspicions about the p o l i t i c a l prejudices and the character of Mr 
Obata' whose behaviour, he t o l d Curzon i n confidence, seemed strange, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n view of the Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and he went on t o say 
t h a t he believed h i s Government were probably unaware or 'did not believe' 
the r e p o r t s which they had received about i t . F i n a l l y , he denounced the 
Japanese m i l i t a r y p a r t y and t h e i r conduct i n Korea, which had provoked 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l condejmation,and went on t o e x p l a i n the great d i v i s i o n s i n 
Japanese p o l i t i c s which were now preventing coherent p o l i c y making. »49 
Despite Obata's p r o t e s t a t i o n s i n October 1919 t h a t the two issues were 
l i n k e d , Jordan had experienced at t h a t time 'a f e e l i n g of intense 
nervousness about touching Tibet while the problem of Shantung remained 
unsettled'»50 Meanwhile Curzon's concern over the delayed resumption of 
t a l k s had led t o f u r t h e r i n t e r v i e w s w i t h the Chinese Min i s t e r and a s t e r n 
warning t h a t Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s were being threatened by t h e i r 
continued r e f u s a l t o t a l k i n the face of o f f l e a l Japanese d e n i a l s . t S l By 
t h i s time Chinese p r e v a r i c a t i o n was seen as a primary cause of the f a i l u r e 
t o resume t a l k s , and Jordan's r e p u t a t i o n and standing i n London had 
undoubtedly s u f f e r e d as a r e s u l t of h i s r e f u s a l t o drop h i s h o s t i l i t y 
towards the Japanese, whom he continued t o blame f o r the f a i l u r e of t a l k s . 
He went on t o express these views at a s p e c i a l Conference i n London i n 
1920, c a l l e d t o debate B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n the lead up t o the Washington 
Conference, where he acted as an advisor on Chinese a f f a i r s f o l l o w i n g h i s 
retirement from the China Service.*52 S h o r t l y before Jordan had l e f t 
Peking,Japanese a t t e n t i o n began t o t u r n t o America,their main r i v a l i n 
China,and tensions between the two countries increased as B r i t a i n ' s a b i l i t y 
t o i n f l u e n c e events s t e a d i l y declined.*53 
During the tensions generated by the c r i s i s i n s i d e China the Indian 
government and the India O f f i c e , under the more f o r c e f u l regime introduced 
by Montagu and Chelmsford i n 1919, were beginning t o r e a l i s e t h a t , i f the 
Tibetan question were t o be s e t t l e d , India would need t o take a more a c t i v e 
part i n any f u t u r e n e g o t i a t i o n s . Taking as a lead Jordan's proposals f o r a 
China mission t h e r e f o r e , they began t o work toward a s o l u t i o n based on 
Indian i n i t i a t i v e s . I n the next s e c t i o n I w i l l look at the way i n which 
they d i d t h i s by sending t h e i r own Mission t o Lhasa i n lovember 1921. 
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3. THE REVISED FQRWA5D POLICY: BELL'S MISSIQB TO TIBET 
.OCTOBER 1920 - lOVEMBER 1921 
Within a year of the Rongbasta Truce, r e p o r t s of f r e s h f i g h t i n g began t o be 
received from Tachienlu.#54 What was p a r t i c u l a r l y worrying t o the Indian 
Government i n 1919 however were strong rujnours t h a t a Mission from Kansu 
was already making i t s way t o Lhasa, under the leadership of a mysterious 
'Tibetan Lama'.*55 Although the Wai Chaio pu i n s i s t e d t h a t the Mission 
was an independent p r o v i n c a l i n i t i a t i v e launched by General Ma, Jordan f e l t 
I t u n l i k e l y t h a t the Chinese Governa^nt i n Peking would be w i l l i n g t o 
ent r u s t such 'serious n e g o t i a t i o n s ' t o a 'Tibetan Lama, however pro-Chinese 
he might be' and suspicions about the nature of the Mission grew, as 
f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n was supplied by B e l l , and l a t e r by Bailey i n Sikkim. *56 
Knowledge of the existence of the Kansu Mission prompted immediate c a l l s 
from I n d i a f o r a B r i t i s h Mission t o be sent t o Lhasa i n order t o e s t a b l i s h 
a presence i n the c i t y i n the event of any attempt by China t o i n i t i a t e 
independent discussions w i t h the Dalai Lama, and thus the Kansu Mission was 
d i r e c t l y responsible f o r the despatch of B e l l ' s Mission t o Lhasa i n 
October 1920.*57 
The mission from Kansu appeared t o be a very low key a f f a i r , and from 
i n f o r m a t i o n received about i t during h i s time i n Lhasa, B e l l discovered 
t h a t i t had apparently consisted of two Lamas named Ku Lang Tsang, and Lab 
Trulku, and two Chinese o f f i c a l s c a l l e d L i Chung Lien and Chu Hsin. 
According t o r e p o r t s given t o Macdonald at Gyantse the Lamas were 
accompanied by t h e i r 'wives' and seemed t o be f a i r l y ignorant about any 
deeper purpose behind t h e i r Mission beyond t h a t of extending the hand of 
f r i e n d s h i p t o the Tibetan people.*58 B e l l and Cheln^ford soon became 
convinced t h a t there were deeper motives involved,and as more information 
came t o l i g h t about the nature of the t a l k s w i t h the Dalai Lama, i t seemed 
i n c r e a s i n g l y probable t h a t the Chinese accompanying the party had t r i e d t o 
persuade two Tibetan 'representatives' t o r e t u r n w i t h them t o Peking i f 
possible, or f a i l i n g t h a t t o Kansu, f o r f u r t h e r discussions.*59 The Dalai 
Lama's i n i t i a l reluctance t o discuss the Mission w i t h him a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l 
i n Lhasa alarmed B e l l , as d i d the f a i l u r e t o inform him about the date of 
i t s departure from the c i t y . Once aware t h a t an impending B r i t i s h Mission 
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was a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y , the Dalai Lama had apparently been very keen t o 
urge the Kansu p a r t y on i t s way and although, as B e l l was t o discover, the 
mission had spent three and a h a l f months i n the c i t y , g i v i n g strong 
encouragement t o the pro-Chinese f a c t i o n i n the Tsongdu, any l a s t i n g damage 
t o Anglo-Tibetan r e l a t i o n s had been o f f s e t by the Dalai Lama's very pro-
B r i t i s h stance.#60 
B e l l had been r e t i r e d f o r nearly nine months and was l i v i n g i n Dar j e e l i n g 
studying Tibetan l i t e r a t u r e and Buddhism when a c a l l came i n January 
1920 asking him t o r e t u r n t e m p o r a r i l y t o spec i a l duties. Although h i s 
retirement had been necessitated by i l l h e a l t h and other unspecified 
reasons, he was w i l l i n g t o go t o Lhasa, provided i t was on h i s own terms. 
I n p a r t i c u l a r he wanted t o o f f e r p r a c t i c a l help t o the Tibetans i n the form 
of arms, e s p e c i a l l y as the Kansu Mission, and the fr e s h disturbances i n 
East Tibet,had made them both very nervous about the f u t u r e and anxious t o 
t e s t the r e a l i t y of B r i t i s h promises t o help them defend themselves i n the 
event of renewed Chinese aggression.*61 As B e l l would soon r e a l i s e , the 
Dalai Lama's withdrawal f o r over three years of int e n s i v e meditation 
between 1916 and 1919, had f u e l l e d i n s e c u r i t i e s amongst h i s people which 
the pro-Chinese f a c t i o n s i n Lhasa had been quick t o exploit.»62 Once the 
unanimous dec i s i o n t o send B e l l t o Lhasa had been taken however, an 
immediate c o n f l i c t arose between the Peking Legation and India over the 
leng t h of h i s stay. Having sanctioned and supported the Mission, the Indian 
Government was now beginning t o worry about the I m p l i c a t i o n s of the v i s i t 
f o r Anglo-Tibetan r e l a t i o n s , f o r i t soon became apparent t h a t , the longer 
B e l l stayed i n Ti b e t , the greater would be the opportunity f o r Tibetans t o 
press t h e i r requests f o r B r i t i s h arms and f o r a permanent B r i t i s h o f f i c a l 
t o be s t a t i o n e d i n Lhasa.#63 The despatch of the Mission had come i n i t a l l y 
from Jordan,but h i s successor Beilby Alston also tended t o see the 
Tibetan problem i n the wider context of Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s and Alston 
believed t h a t the longer B e l l stayed i n Lhasa the b e t t e r were the chances 
of alarming the Chinese and thus f o r c i n g them t o resume t a l k s over 
Tibet.*64 B e l l h i n s e l f , having already booked a r e t u r n t i c k e t t o England 
f o r December, d i d not t o want t o stay too long i n Tibet i n i t i a l l y ; h o w e v e r . 
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once he had a r r i v e d i n Lhasa i n Fovember 1920, he found himself unable t o 
r e s i s t the warm e n t r e a t i e s t o stay from the Tibetans, and began t o press 
h i s employers t o l e t him stay on, using a v a r i e t y of excuses t h a t were 
apparently convincing enough t o ensure an extension of h i s stay u n t i l 
October 1921, nearly a year a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l . * 6 5 
B e l l ' s own account of h i s time i n Lhasa provides a f a s c i n a t i n g i n s i g h t i n t o 
h i s deep and c o n t i n u i n g f r i e n d s h i p w i t h the Dalai Lama who i n s i s t e d that he 
take up residence less than a quarter of a mile from the Potala, and who 
en t e r t a i n e d him i n places never previously open t o non-Tibetans, even 
extending an i n v i t a t i o n t o B e l l ' s wife t o j o i n him i n Lhasa i n order t o 
meet and s o c i a l i s e w i t h the wives of high ranking Tibetan o f f i c i a l s . * 6 6 
B e l l was so impressed by t h i s h o s p i t a l i t y , and so convinced of h i s own 
a b i l i t y t o i n f l u e n c e the Tibetans, t h a t he stayed, despite the t h r e a t s t o 
h i s own personal s a f e t y posed by the disturbances and near r e b e l l i o n i n 
Lhasa during the s p r i n g and summer of 1921.*67 His reports about the 
cosmopolitan nature of Lhasa l i f e were not only i n t e r e s t i n g i n themselves, 
but were a v i t a l source of i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the Indian Government, as well 
as f o r Alston, whose confidence i n the r e p o r t s he was r e c e i v i n g from Louis 
King i n Tachienlu at t h a t time was not great.*68 B e l l eventually l e f t 
Lhasa on October 19th 1921, having delayed h i s departure, as he had h i s 
a r r i v a l , i n order t o leave on a day regarded as auspicious by h i s hosts. »69 
During h i s time there h i s own views about Tibet and her f u t u r e r o l e i n the 
modern world changed and he l e f t f e e l i n g very uneasy about B r i t i s h attempts 
t o c o n t r o l Tibetan a f f a i r s b e l i e v i n g t h a t , u l t i m a t e l y , Tibet should have the 
a u t h o r i t y t o determine her own policies.»70 Despite the praise heaped on 
B e l l , the achievements of the Mission i t s e l f were l a t e r s t r o n g l y 
questioned, e s p e c i a l l y i n India, where demands f o r h i s r e t u r n had continued 
throughout the d u r a t i o n of h i s stay.*71 As a public r e l a t i o n s exercise 
however the Mission had undoubtedly been very successful i n 
r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g Tibetan confidence i n B r i t i s h support, and eventually 
p r o v i d i n g the Tibetans w i t h the arms they needed t o defend t h e i r country 
against the Chinese.»72 
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B e l l ' s own r e p u t a t i o n was also enhanced and when he f i n a l l y returned t o 
Indi a he acted as advisor t o t a l k s aimed at e s t a b l i s h i n g a new and even 
' f r i e n d l i e r ' p o l i c y towards Tibet'»73 A l a s t a i r Lamb has argued t h a t , 
although the B e l l Mission d i d not r e t u r n w i t h any formal Treaty, i t d i d 
pave the way f o r great changes i n Tibetan l i f e , and although there i s much 
t r u t h i n the argument t h a t B e l l ' s v i s i t had acted as a c a t a l y s t f o r changes 
i n the country and t h a t B r i t i s h 'experts' were i n c r e a s i n g l y c a l l e d upon t o 
help w i t h the modest modernisation programme resumed by the Dalai Lama 
a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from meditation i n 1919, t h i s should be set against the 
help given t o Tibet from other countries, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
w i l l i n g n e s s and a b i l i t y of the Tibetans t o help theuBelves.*74 
The Dalai Lama had been anxious t o strengthen and modernise h i s army as one 
of h i s top p r i o r i t i e s a f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o Lhasa i n 1913, and although 
w i l l i n g t o accept B r i t i s h a i d , he was not averse t o accepting help from 
other quarters. Japanese s o l d i e r s had been employed i n t r a i n i n g Tibetan 
s o l d i e r s f o r many years, and the close l i n k s between Mongols and Tibetans 
had allowed Japanese arms t o reach Tibet v i a Mongolia. Many of the 
i n i t i a t i v e s r e s u l t i n g from the B e l l Mission however, such as the B r i t i s h 
school i n Gyantse; the mining survey, and the gr a n t i n g of permission f o r 
the Everest Expedition of 1924 t o climb the mountain from the Tibetan side, 
a l l ended i n f a i l u r e . * 7 5 What the Mission d i d accomplish i n B r i t i s h terms 
was a breathing space, enabling Peking, India, and London t o take stock of 
t h e i r p o s i t i o n , and reassess Tibetan p o l i c y i n the l i g h t of the new 
i n f o r m a t i o n which B e l l had supplied, The Mission d i d not,as Biany 
hoped,result i n the resumption of t a l k s w i t h China, but t h i s was hardly 
s u r p r i s i n g i n view of the very serious obstacle t o successful dialogue 
posed by the growing tensions between Chinese Central Government and the 
newly independent P r o v i n c i a l Governments of Yunnan and Szechuan. 
4. EAST TIBET 1919 -1922 
Although the T r e a t i e s of Rongabasta and Chamdo had enabled the 
Sino-Tibetan f r o n t i e r t o s e t t l e i n t o a long period of comparative peace, 
disturbances and the rumours of disturbances persisted. These were l a r g e l y 
due t o the exaggerated accounts from agents employed by the India and 
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China Services who were o f t e n simply observing p r o v i n c i a l troop movements, 
as tensions between Yunnan and Szechuan mounted. *76 Between 1918 and 1922 
various accusations of Tibetan aggression were made by China, and i t was 
c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t a strong Tibetan presence had been maintained on the 
f r o n t i e r i n these years,made even more formidable by the modernisation of 
the Tibetan army, and by the supply of superior arms from Japan, and from 
B r i t a i n a f t e r 1921.»77 The s i t u a t i o n was f u r t h e r complicated f o r B r i t a i n 
by her i n a b i l i t y t o t o make d i r e c t contact w i t h the various forces 
involved, since by 1919 i t was c l e a r t h a t the Chinese Central Government i n 
Peking had no c o n t r o l over the a c t i v i t i e s of P r o v i n c i a l Governments i n 
Szechuan or Yunnan, whose 'warring armies' they had themselves come t o 
believe were a main cause of f r o n t i e r disturbance.*78 
F r o n t i e r tension had also been generated by General Ma's statements from 
Kansu v o i c i n g h i s opposition,both t o the negotiated boundary,and t o the 
Simla proposals. I n the l i g h t of these, the despatch of the Kansu Mission 
i n l a t e 1919 had appeared as s i n i s t e r t o the governments of Peking and 
Szechuan as they had t o the Government of India.»79 
In a d d i t i o n , the modernisation of the Tibetan army, very successfully 
organised from Lhasa by the Dalai Lama and h i s Commander i n Chief Tsarong, 
was now bearing f r u i t , and Chinese r e p o r t s of Tibetan aggression were now 
t o some extent j u s t i f i e d . I n May 1920 f o r example, the Hepalese Resident i n 
Lhasa, who was monitoring Tibetan movements c l o s e l y f o r reasons of h i s own, 
had reported t h a t Tibetans had occupied the Lakuang Lama Monastery on the 
f r o n t i e r and were 'busy m o b i l i s i n g troops'; and from Tachienlu, King was 
r e p o r t i n g on the 'unpopularity' of the new Tibetan a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Draya, 
Chamdo, and Markham, cla i m i n g t h a t the l o c a l people were demanding a 
r e t u r n t o Chinese rule.•SO Despite t h i s mounting evidence however, Curzon 
tended t o dismiss these r e p o r t s as exaggerated, or as simply i s o l a t e d 
i n c i d e n t s generated by the presence of s o l d i e r s i n the region, and he was 
s t i l l u n w i l l i n g t o believe the Tibetans capable or desirous of organising a 
massive m o b i l i s a t i o n programme i n East Tibet, p a r t l y the r e s u l t of h i s 
f a i l u r e t o understand the changes i n the p o l i t i c a l philosophy of the Dalai 
Lama w i t h whom he had f i r s t had dealings i n 1903.»81 He had nevertheless 
taken advantage of B e l l ' s presence i n Lhasa 
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during 1920 and 1921 t o confirm or deny re p o r t s of Tibetan aggression 
coming from King and other sources. The f a c t t h a t B e l l had been q u i t e 
unable t o supply the k i n d of i n f o r m a t i o n requested about the r e a l s t a t e of 
a f f a i r s i n East Tibet from h i s I s o l a t e d p o s i t i o n i n Lhasa, was never r e a l l y 
acknowledged. During h i s v i s i t the c i t y had been flooded w i t h rumours and 
counter rumours of an impending Chinese invasion, and B e l l himself 
bombarded w i t h requests from the Dalai Lama f o r B r i t i s h arms t o defend h i s 
country, and i t was u n l i k e l y t h a t he would have been informed of any 
Tibetan m i l i t a r y successes i n circumstances where the Tibetans needed t o 
present themselves as helpless v i c t i m s of Chinese aggression.*82 
Lack of confidence i n King, who by t h i s time was believed by the Peking 
Legation t o be not only u n r e l i a b l e , b u t unprofessional i n h i s approach,was a 
major source of concern f o r the Service. King had returned t o Tachienlu (a 
post he had opened and s u c c e s s f u l l y manned between 1913 and 1916),as a 
replacement f o r Teichman, who had returned t o Peking i n 1918. To some 
extent he s u f f e r e d from the reckless behaviour of h i s predecessor, since 
Jordan had e v e n t u a l l y blamed Teichman f o r c r e a t i n g f u r t h e r problems f o r 
B r i t a i n as a r e s u l t of h i s u n c o n t r o l l e d behaviour i n East Tibet.«83 
However King was happy t o resume h i s d u t i e s at Tachienlu despite the 
' b a r n l i k e rooms' and ' i c y draughts' of the rearate Consulate, and the 
presence of a F r o n t i e r Commisioner, whom Teichman had previously described 
as 'not e n t i r e l y normal'; because t o him, Tachienlu was a prestigous, 
e x c i t i n g , and unusual posting, which he viewed as an opportunity t o advance 
himself.•84 During h i s second period of service there between 1918 and 
1922, he found h i s i n t e g r i t y s i g n i f i c a n t l y undermined by the complete 
r e f u s a l of h i s superiors t o believe h i s r e p o r t s or accept h i s 
recomnendations, and h i s l a t e marriage t o a Tibetan, s h o r t l y before h i s 
'removal' i n 1922, f i n a l l y put paid t o a l l hope of promotion. Although h i s 
r e p o r t s remained l u c i d and balanced t o the l a s t , and were c e r t a i n l y no 
w i l d e r than those he had issued during the period of h i s f i r s t posting 
between 1913 and 1916 f o r which he had been commended, a concerted campaign 
waged against him by Lampson and other members of the Peking Legation 
during t h i s second period i n o f f i c e , destroyed h i s career.*85 The reasons 
f o r t h i s campaign had more t o do w i t h the I n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s of the 
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Service than w i t h King's behaviour, since he was always very e n t h u s i a s t i c 
about h i s r o l e i n East Tibet and i n the run up t o the Lhasa Mission had 
o f f e r e d t o head the Mission.In doing t h i s he had crossed B e l l , w i t h whom he 
already shared an acrimonious r e l a t i o n s h i p , having outshone him i n reports 
on East Tibet.»86 This h o s t i l t y from B e l l , an established and well 
respected a u t h o r i t y on Tibet, undoubtedly helped t o f u r t h e r undermine h i s 
re p u t a t i o n , and h i s attempts t o promote the opening of a second f r o n t i e r 
post at Atunzu i n Yunnan from which t o monitor the East Tibetan area more 
accurately was greeted w i t h open h o s t i l i t y , as were h i s o f f e r s t o act as 
u n o f f i c a l mediator i n the Sino-Tibetan disputes.•87 This adverse r e a c t i o n 
t o King's sincere attempt t o s e t t l e the f r o n t i e r was i n part due t o B r i t i s h 
desires t o withdraw from the area, which, by 1919, was viewed as a 
dangerous t r o u b l e spot and as an o b s t r u c t i o n t o Anglo-Chinese 
understanding.•SS His appointnent a f t e r Teichman had l e f t was, i n i t s e l f , 
a r e f l e c t i o n of the f a c t t h a t Tachienlu was now once again regarded as a 
low p r i o r i t y posting, and a f t e r King l e f t i n 1922 no consular o f f i c a l 
resided there, although f o r some years a f t e r u n o f f i c a l r e p o r t s were 
received from Paul Sherap and the Chengtu s t a f f who v i s i t e d i t . ^ 8 9 
5. A KEV TIBETAI POLICY 
I f the confused s i t u a t i o n i n East Tibet had acted as a b a r r i e r t o e f f e c t i v e 
communication w i t h China about the re-opening of t a l k s on Tibet, a major 
f a c t o r i n preventing n e g o t i a t i o n s was B r i t a i n ' s i n a b i l i t y t o form a 
coherent Tibetan P o l i c y a f t e r 1918. This was p a r t l y the r e s u l t of a ra p i d 
turnover of personnel during the post war period and of the lack of 
in f o r m a t i o n about the country a f t e r the Dalai Lama's r e t u r n i n 1913.^90 
In 1918 B r i t a i n had continued a p o l i c y of ' s t e r i l i s a t i o n ' i n Tibet, based 
on the concept of i s o l a t i n g her as f a r as possible from contact w i t h other 
nations i n the hope of p r o t e c t i n g her from 'undesirable' influences i n 
accordance w i t h the s p i r i t of the Anglo-Tibetan B i p a r t i t e Agreement of 
1914. 
In May 1920, during the run up t o the Washington Conference and i n the 
l i g h t of co n t i n u i n g Chinese r e f u s a l t o resume t a l k s about Tibet, Alston 
issued a s e r i e s of p o l i c y statements s e r i o u s l y challenging the 'Simla 
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p o s i t i o n ' and arguing t h a t , since the pace of events would eventually force 
Tibet t o open her doors t o the outside world, B r i t a i n ' s r o l e should now 
be t o ensure t h a t t h i s would be a gradual process t h a t should proceed at a 
pace comfortable f o r the Tibetans themselves. #91 I n order t o monitor and 
f a c i l i t a t e the process, Alston maintained t h a t the presence of a Permanent 
B r i t i s h Representative i n Lhasa was e s s e n t i a l . He was s u r p r i s i n g l y less 
f e a r f u l of Japanese p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o Tibet than many of h i s colleagues, f o r 
though he d i d f e a r Japanese in f l u e n c e i n China, he believed t h a t Japanese 
and American approaches t o the Tibetans might be b e t t e r monitored i f they 
came v i a In d i a r a t h e r than through China or Mongolia, and f o r t h i s reason 
he advocated the re-opening of the Indian route t o Tibet, closed t o 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a f f i c since 1913.*92 He also recommended th a t settlement 
of the Tibetan question was a matter of some urgency, t o be accomplished 
without China i f necessary, since the pressure of i n t e r n a t i o n a l events 
would now determine the extent t o which Tibet was forced i n t o congress w i t h 
the outside world.*93 
B e l l ' s Mission had also had some e f f e c t on Government p o l i c y i n India, 
e s p e c i a l l y as B e l l had remained adviser on Tibetan issues, even i n 
r e t i r e n e n t , and had continued t o advocate what he described as a more 
' l i b e r a l ' p o l i c y towards Tibet, based on h i s own experiences during h i s 
stay i n Lhasa. Unlike Alston however, he d i d not favour s t a t i o n i n g a 
Permanent B r i t i s h Representative i n the Tibetan c a p i t a l because he believed 
t h a t the remote l o c a t i o n and the ever present p o s s i b i l i t y of violence would 
make the posting unsafe. He believed t h a t the Yatung Agency should be 
closed and proposals t o e s t a b l i s h a post at Chamdo also abandoned. In many 
ways t h i s complete change of heart was an acknowledgement that B r i t i s h 
power and i n f l u e n c e was waning i n Asia, but i t was also based on a more 
t o l e r a n t and humanitarian approach t o weaker nations t h a t was i t s e l f a 
product of the 'new diplomacy' of the post war period.»94 Curzon shared 
these sentiments t o some extent, but u n l i k e B e l l , he r e j e c t e d the concept 
of 'new diplomacy' and remained f a r more t r a d i t i o n a l i n h i s approach t o 
diploma t i c a f f a i r s , arguing merely t h a t a ' f i r m l i n e ' , and an 'open 
a t t i t u d e ' on Tibet was needed i n f u t u r e dealings w i t h China. The e f f e c t of 
t h i s approach i n p o l i c y terms however tended t o be the same, so that by 
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1921 there was general consensus w i t h i n the Foreign Service t h a t the 
Tibetan 'problem' could be s e t t l e d without China i f necessary.^95 
By 1922 B r i t i s h p o l i c y towards Tibet had reached a s o r t of s o l u t i o n based 
on B r i t a i n ' s need t o s e t t l e her Asian a f f a i r s i n the general climate of her 
d e c l i n i n g s t a t u s i n the post-war world. I n t h i s new world the 'problems' of 
Tibet were no longer of v i t a l importance, the main aim of p o l i c y f o r 
B r i t a i n being merely t o survive i n Asia. 
1 
1 ^ 
II. T i b e t a a S o l d i e r s c I v i O 
1» 
29. S o l d i e r s of the Jtew T i b e t a n Army c. 1921 
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The Younghusband Expedition acted as a c a t a l y s t f o r change i n B r i t i s h 
Tibetan p o l i c y . R e l u c t a n t l y sanctioned by the Foreign O f f i c e i n the hope 
of f i n a l l y s e t t l i n g trade disputes on the f r o n t i e r , i t had soon generated 
i t s own momentum f o l l o w i n g China's r e f u s a l t o accept the Lhasa Convention 
which marked the beginning of the problem which Tibet created f o r 
Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s t h a t came t o dominate Tibetan p o l i c y between 
1904 and 1922. 
There was a sad i n e v i t a b i l i t y about the q u a d r i l a t e r a l c o n f l i c t which 
developed w i t h i n the B r i t i s h Foreign Service over the Tibetan Question 
between 1904 and 1922. The problem of Tibet t e s t e d the resources of a l l 
f o u r branches of the service during t h i s time because each had a d i f f e r e n t 
view of the problem. For the Foreign O f f i c e , Tibet was but a small part of 
i t s wider p o l i c y i n Asia which aimed at countering Russian i n t e r e s t there 
and r e l i e d on the maintenance of harmonious r e l a t i o n s w i t h China i n the 
i n t e r e s t s of commercial p r o f i t . Within the Foreign O f f i c e I t s e l f the Far 
Eastern Department was given a great deal of f l e x i b i l i t y during Grey's 
tenure as Foreign Secretary and h i s p r o t e c t i o n also ensured t h a t , i n 
Peking, Jordan was allowed considerable leeway i n the implementation of 
p o l i c y i n East Tibet as wel l as great influence i n decisions about the 
Tibetan problem w i t h i n the service, a f a c t demonstrated by h i s r a p i d f a l l 
from grace a f t e r Grey's retirement i n December 1916. 
The problem which Tibet presented f o r India was q u i t e d i f f e r e n t , For the 
Indian government Tibet was purely a f r o n t i e r matter. I t s main aim was t o 
s e t t l e the f r o n t i e r i n order t o provide a s u i t a b l e b u f f e r t o protect Indian 
f r o n t i e r s , f i r s t l y from the Russians and,after 1907, when the Anglo-Russian 
Convention had prevented any overt attempts by Russia t o exercise formal 
c o n t r o l over T i b e t , from the Chinese, although attempts were s t i l l made 
a f t e r t h i s time t o r e t a i n the commercial gains secured by the Lhasa 
Convention.The p u l l and push of p r i o r i t i e s over Tibet at various 
times,which generated intense c o n f l i c t s w i t h i n the various branches of the 
Service,allowed i n d i v i d u a l s t o exert considerable influence over p o l i c y at 
d i f f e r e n t times,but the support which Jordan received from Grey between 
1906 and 1916 allowed h i s i n f l u e n c e t o be d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y large 
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throughout these years. A f t e r t h i s t i n e h i s Influence waned, but he managed 
t o hold on t o h i s post u n t i l March 1920,by v i r t u e of h i s experience and 
r e p u t a t i o n as a China expert. 
As Viceroy of I n d i a , and l a t e r , as Foreign Secretary, Curzon's views 
I n e v i t a b l y dominated much of the t h i n k i n g of those keen t o promote a 
forward p o l i c y i n Tibet. However,his a b i l i t y t o d i r e c t l y influence Tibetan 
p o l i c y a f t e r 1905 was minimised by the powerful e f f e c t of the non-
Involvement p o l i c y f r o n t e d by Xorley at the India O f f i c e , and l a t e r by 
Hardinge's defensive a t t i t u d e towards Tibet i n h i s dealings with the India 
O f f i c e and the China Service i n the debate over c o n t r o l of f r o n t i e r p o l i c y . 
Hardinge's d i s l i k e of Jordan, and h i s own presence i n the Foreign O f f i c e 
a f t e r 1916, may have been a f a c t o r i n promoting Jordan's premature 
departure but u l t i m a t e l y , although powerful f i g u r e s l i k e Hardlnge came and 
went, the conduct of p o l i c y was determined by wider events i n Asia which 
only the Foreign O f f i c e i n London could e f f e c t i v e l y respond t o , and on h i s 
r e t u r n t o the Foreign O f f i c e i n 1919, Curzon f e l t able t o take over the 
conduct of t h i s p o l i c y himself and dispense w i t h Jordan's services. 
One of the r e c u r r i n g themes of t h i s t h e s i s has been the c o n f l i c t between 
those charged w i t h the implementation of p o l i c y on the spot, and the 
Increasing number of experts d r a f t e d i n t o the Foreign O f f i c e t o help deal 
w i t h the e x t r a workload. The Curzonlans who worked at the Trade Marts were 
the f i r s t v i c t i m s of t h i s s t r u g g l e , but the China Service also had i t s 
v i c t i m s not the lea s t of whom was Jordan himself who, i n challenging the 
power of ex-Viceroys l i k e Curzon and Hardinge, made powerful enemies f o r 
himself who e v e n t u a l l y caused h i s downfall. 
Underpinning many of the disputes were arguments about the promotion of 
trade which had been l u c r a t i v e enough t o ensure t h a t Trade Agents remained 
i n Tibet long a f t e r the evacuation of Chumbi had made t h e i r s i t u a t i o n 
p o l i t i c a l l y weak. The cost of p r o t e c t i n g them was undertaken by the 
Government of In d i a , p a r t l y as a consequence of pressure from business 
i n t e r e s t s , but also because Tibet was seen as part of an o v e r a l l plan t o 
develop the commercial p o t e n t i a l of the whole Hymalayan region, as White's 
plans f o r Bhutan and Slkklm reveal, and which was suggested i n O'Connor's 
Report of 1906. A f t e r 1911, many of those ventures had t o be abandoned. 
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but i n t e r e s t i n the commercial p o t e n t i a l of Tibet never r e a l l y disappeared, 
and resurfaced i n B e l l ' s recommendations f o r the mining survey of 1921. 
B r i t i s h misperceptions about the nature of Tibetan s o c i e t y and the r o l e s 
played by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were a very important source 
of c o n f l i c t i n t h i s period. U n t i l the Dalai Lama's e x i l e i n India between 
1910 and 1912, most i n f o r m a t i o n about Tibet had come from contact with the 
Panchen Lama, but a f t e r 1912 the Dalai Lama began t o gain respect as a 
powerful r u l e r i n h i s own r i g h t , and the B e l l Mission t o Lhasa i n 1921 
marked a watershed i n B r i t i s h r e l a t i o n s w i t h Tibet since, f o r the f i r s t 
time since 1904,the Dalai Lama was approached d i r e c t l y as the r u l e r of 
Tibet without reference t o China. I n a sense B e l l ' s Mission brings the 
wheel f u l l c i r c l e because the need t o e s t a b l i s h closer l i n k s w i t h Tibet as 
a means of ensuring the s a f e t y of India's borders had been the main aim 
behind Curzon's decision t o send the Younghusband Expedition i n 1904. 
The B r i t i s h c l e a r l y l o s t face i n Tibet between 1904 and 1922. Their 
attempts t o woo the Dalai Lama were o f t e n the subject of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s c r u t i n y , and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o compete w i t h e i t h e r the Japanese or the 
Russians i n a c q u i r i n g access t o the country without force was a serious 
handicap t o t h e i r c r e d i b i l i t y . Apart from a few i n d i v i d u a l s l i k e B e l l and 
O'Connor, who were able t o e s t a b l i s h a rapport w i t h Tibetan leaders, there 
was never a f i g u r e who could replace Dorjlev as a t r u s t e d f r i e n d t o the 
Dalai Lama. Despite i t s p r o x i m i t y t o Tibet, the Indian government could 
never, l i k e the Chinese, c l a i m t r a d i t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s w i t h the country, and 
most t r e a t i e s they signed w i t h the Tibetans were made under duress, 
accompanied w i t h promises of support which were not e f f e c t i v e l y honoured. 
The mutual antagonism between C h r i s t i a n missionaries and Buddhist monks 
denied B r i t i s h Consular O f f i c e r s any possible access which they might 
otherwise have had t o the great monasteries of East Tibet and, since there 
were many missionaries i n the region, and few B r i t i s h Consular o f f i c i a l s , 
t h i s was a serious problem which o f f i c i a l s l i k e Teichman and Vhite 
i d e n t i f i e d i n r e p o r t s . B r i t i s h attempts t o r e t a i n prestige on the f r o n t i e r 
were also s i g n i f i c a n t l y undermined by the t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s between the 
Chinese i n East Tibet and the powerful Drepung monastery i n Lhasa. 
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The B r i t i s h problem i n Tibet was e s s e n t i a l l y one of t h e i r own making since 
i t was based on a f a l s e perception of what c o n s t i t u t e d c o n t r o l i n the 
country. Although by 1922 a few Tibetan experts appreciated the nature of 
the vast network of t r a d i t i o n a l a l l i a n c e s and informal understandings that 
governed the conduct of p o l i c y i n Central Asia, there was s t i l l great 
ignorance about the importance of the understandings which was p a r t l y the 
r e s u l t of misinformation supplied by the Chinese and by the Tibetans 
themselves, but was o f t e n the r e s u l t of t h e i r own f a i l u r e t o perceive the 
nuances of diplomatic p r a c t i c e other than i n western terms. 
B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t i n Tibet by i t s very nature helped t o create the problems 
leading t o the Chinese invasion of 1959, since without the Lhasa Convention 
of 1904, the Adhesion Treaty of 1906, the Trade Regulations of 1908, and 
the Anglo-Tibetan B i p a r t i t e Agreement of 1914, Chinese i n t e r e s t i n what 
they had h i t h e r t o regarded as a remote and backward region, might not 
have been so suddenly and d i s a s t r o u s l y awakened, and the f u l l scale 
i n v a s i o n i n 1910 of what they had previously regarded as merely a vassal 
s t a t e , might have been avoided. This invasion, which could not be sustained 
much beyond the Manchu collapse i n 1911, only l i n g e r e d t o embarrass the new 
Republican Government who, i n order t o save face, had t o f i n d a s u i t a b l e 
r o l e f o r Tibet w i t h i n t h e i r new Republic. Part of the problem f o r them was 
also the way i n which t h e i r long standing involvement i n East Tibet, as 
part of t h e i r wider plan f o r the c r e a t i o n of Sikang, becaiae i n e x t r i c a b l y 
t i e d t o t h e i r b e l i e f i n the need f o r formal c o n t r o l i n Tibet. Their 
i n a b i l i t y t o curb the enthusiasm of the P r o v i n c i a l Governments of Szechuan 
and Yunnan, and t h e i r attempts t o avoid l o s i n g face by a d m i t t i n g t h i s 
weakness, had i m p l i c a t i o n s , not only f o r t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Tibet, but 
also f o r those w i t h B r i t a i n and f o r t h e i r own s t a t u s under i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
law. Fear of once again being at the mercy of f o r e i g n powers, as had been 
the case a f t e r the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, dominated Republican t h i n k i n g 
on t h i s issue, and was p a r t l y responsible f o r t h e i r withdrawal from the 
Simla Conference i n 1913. 
The B r i t i s h government must bear some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r exposing Tibet t o 
aggressive Chinese p o l i c y between 1904 and 1911, but even a f t e r t h i s , t h e i r 
f a i l u r e t o honour promises t o support the country under the terms of the 
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B i p a r t i t e Agreement of 1914 and i n the face of continuing Chinese 
aggression, made Tibet once again vulnerable t o Chinese invasion. Had the 
Foreign O f f i c e been prepared t o honour t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s t o Tibet a f t e r 
1914, Tibetans might have been more w i l l i n g t o accept a place i n the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l community than they were. A f t e r B e l l ' s departure i n 1921 
they began t o withdraw from involvements, and by 1924 were once again 
adopting an i s o l a t i o n i s t stance which, i n the absence of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t i n Tibet, the Chinese were eve n t u a l l y able t o f u l l y e x p l o i t , 
launching the f u l l scale invasion of the country i n 1959. 
V i t h h i n d s i g h t , i t i s possible t o see t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the roots of the 
p o l i c y which placed Anglo-Chinese r e l a t i o n s above the i n t e r e s t s of 
Tibetans, and which has allowed the present B r i t i s h government t o acquiesce 
i n China's d e s t r u c t i o n of Tibetan autonomy and c u l t u r e , may be traced back 
to the c r i t i c a l debates about f r o n t i e r p o l i c y between the Younghusband 
Expedition i n 1904, and the Washington Conference of 1922. 
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GLOSSARY OF TBBMS 
A t r i b a l group whose name I n Assamese meant 'unruly' or *disobediant' and 
who are now c a l l e d Adl ( h l l l m e n ) . I n h a b i t i n g the r i v e r system of Dihang 
(Slang) they enjoyed a f i e r c e r e p u t a t i o n as plunderers and slavetakers, 
launching frequent a t t a c k s on the Indian Plains below the Assam f o o t h i l l s . 
As o f f i c i a l contacts w i t h them became more frequent a f t e r 1826 t h i s 
r e p u t a t i o n was discovered t o be undeserved and the Abor f r i e n d l i e r than 
p r e v i o u s l y thought. The B r i t i s h b e l i e f t h a t they had been involved i n the 
death of Joel Williamson i n March 1911 l e d t o the despatch of a p u n i t i v e 
Expedition i n October 1911 which r e s u l t e d i n a greater B r i t i s h involvement 
i n Abor a f f a i r s . 
AKBAJS. 
O f f i c i a l Representatives of the Kanchu Bmperor. There was one Amban 
l i v i n g i n Lhasa and another at Sining i n Eansu Province. An attempt 
t o e s t a b l i s h a t h i r d i n Batang i n Bast Tibet during 1905 f a i l e d when 
he was k i l l e d by Lamaist monks while t r y i n g t o f l e e the c i t y . The 
Amban's power increased or decreased according t o the p o l i t i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n i n s i d e Tibet but,at the height of t h e i r i n f l u e n c e , a l l 
o f f l e a l communication w i t h Peking was v i a the Amban i n Lhasa.By 1900 
t h i s power was dangerously reduced and remained so u n t i l the Chinese 
took away the Dalai Lama's r i g h t t o memorallse the Emperor d i r e c t i n 1908 
and,the Lhasa Amban Yu Ta'i began t o reassert some influence and I n t e r f e r e d 
i n the I n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of Tibet.This power was ended when he was deposed 
by Republican troops i n 1912.In 1913 the post was restored under the new 
t i t l e of P a c i f i c a t o r . 
CHQ-YQH. 
Cho, meaning diety.Yon, meaning dispenser of o f f e r i n g s t o r e l i g i o u s 
persons.The Cho- Yon was a p r i v a t e and personal agreement entered i n t o 
f r e e l y between the Dalai Lama and the Manchu Emperor under which the Dalai 
Lama agreed t o look a f t e r the s p i r i t u a l needs of the Emperor i n r e t u r n f o r 
p o l i t i c a l p r o t e c t i o n I n times of i n t e r n a l disputes or f o r e i g n invasion. 
I t was e s s e n t i a l l y an understanding between equals.Ambans were therefore 
Representatives of the Xanchu Emporer i n Tibet. Vhen the Chinese Invaded 
Lhasa i n 1910 wost Tibetans believed t h a t the Cho-Yon had collapsed.The 
f a l l of the Manchu i n 1911 confirmed t h i s b e l i e f and from then on Tibetans 
regarded themselves f r e e of a l l o b l i g a t i o n s t o China. Such arrangements 
were not unusual i n Central Asia and a s i m i l a r understanding e x i s t e d 
between the Dalai Lama and the r u l e r of the Xongol Buddhists. This had been 
undertaken between the heads of the two Churches i n the s i x t e e n t h century 
and which r e i n f o r c e d the strong s p i r i t u a l and p o l i t i c a l bonds between 
Tibet and Kongolia. (See under Gelugpa). 
CPR2QBIAIS. 
Those members of the Service committed t o the forward p o l i c y o u t l i n e d by 
(leorge Curzon a f t e r 1899 t h a t r e s u l t e d i n the despatch of the Younghusband 
Expedition i n 1903. 
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Tibetan m i l i t a r y rank equal t o General. 
Leader of the Legation Committee i n Peking. He represented the Legations 
as a body i n dealings w i t h the Chinese and enjoyed the b e n e f i t s of a clear 
working r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Chinese as we l l as an a d d i t i o n a l heavy 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e burden. Jordan was Doyen from February 1911 and t h i s kept 
him out of the Legation f o r much of the time, o f t e n on matters 
i n v o l v i n g the Chinese Customs Service. 
GARPQUS. (Tibetan O f f i c i a l ) 
Garpons or Viceroys administered the t e r r i t o r y around Gartok. Tibetan 
o f f i c i a l s appointed from Lhasa they had t h e i r o f f i c a l headquarters at 
Gartok,but l i v e d there only during the short summer. There were three 
Garpons at Gartok who held the post f o r 3 years.Sometimes they sent 
deputies t o c a r r y out t h e i r d u t i e s while they remained i n t h e i r comfortable 
quarters i n Lhasa. 
GELUGPA SECT (YELLOW HATS) 
Formed by Tsong Kapa (1357-1419) who then became reincarnated as the 
F i r s t and Second Dalai Lama. Sonam Gyatso (1534-88), the Thir d Dalai 
Lama,travelled t o Mongolia and established the Cho-Yon wi t h the Mongol 
Rulers, r e i n f o r c i n g the st r o n g r e l i g i o u s and p o l i t i c a l bonds between 
the two Buddhist churches of Mongolia and Tibet. I n 1656, under the 
d i r e c t i o n of the Lobsang Gyatso,the F i f t h Dalai Lama, known as the 
Great F i f t h , the Gelugpa ousted the older Red Hat Sect from a l l 
c o n t r o l of the Church i n Central Tibet r e s t r i c t i n g t h e i r influence 
t o East Tibet. This l e f t a legacy of b i t t e r n e s s towards succeeding Dalai 
Lamas which was s t i l l there when Thubten Gyatso came t o power i n 1894. 
JQIfG. 
Fort. 
JQNGPESS. (Tibetan o f f i c i a l ) 
Subordinate t o Garpons. The Jongpens were appointed from Lhasa but 
administered smaller d i s t r i c t s . 
KQW-TQV. 
Touching the ground w i t h the forehead as a sign of t o t a l submission. 
The Dalai Lama would n a t u r a l l y wish t o avoid doing t h i s . 
MIRI, 
One of the many t r i b e s i n h a b i t i n g the h i l l country around the r i v e r 
Sabanari.In 1911 a mission was despatched t o study them and explore t h e i r 
t e r r i t o r y , a f t e r which time t h e i r lands came under the loose p o l i t i c a l 
c o n t r o l of the Indian Government. 
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l l l S M i . 
A t r i b e composed of three clans who l i v e d i n the basin of the Dibang and 
Lohit r i v e r s , t h e Mishmi fought amongst themselves and were h o s t i l e towards 
strangers.They r e s i s t e d Chinese attempts t o b e f r i e n d them during 1910 and 
1911 and,between 1910 and 1911 and between 1911 and 1912 the Indian 
government despatched a Mission t o study them and explore t h e i r t e r r i t o r y 
By 1914 t h e i r lands had come under the loose p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of the 
Indian Government. 
PON PCS. 
Chinese l o c a l o f f i c i a l , u s u a l l y i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l of a town. 
SQVERE T GNTY/SUZERA T STY. 
Suzerainty; The r i g h t t o exercise l i m i t e d c o n t r o l over governments of 
semi-independent or autonomous s t a t e s . 
Sovereignty; Absolute c o n t r o l over a s t a t e . 
Between 1904 and 1922 there was extensive debate and considerable 
misunderstanding i n the West about the sta t u s of Tibet v i s a v i s 
the Chinese Empire. I n 1793 the Manchu had assumed suzerain r i g h t s 
over Tibet and, since the Tibetans had no f o r e i g n o f f i c e , they 
undertook the conduct of Tibetan f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . The Tibetans 
had always allowed t h i s arrangement t o stand as long as i t s u i t e d them. 
The d e c l i n i n g power of the Amban le d them t o review t h i s s i t u a t i o n as 
Tibetans had never recognised the r i g h t of the Emperor t o conclude 
t r e a t i e s on t h e i r behalf. They were p a r t i c u l a r l y angered by what they saw 
as Chinese f a i l u r e t o come t o t h e i r a i d during the Younghusband invasion 
of 1904 and the term suzerain was not included i n the Lhasa Convention. 
I n 1906 the words 'suzerain' and 'sovereign' were excluded from the 
Adhesion Treaty of 1906 at the express wish of the Wai Wu Pu, despite 
B r i t i s h a n x i e t y t h a t the Chinese might t r y t o cl a i m 'sovereignty' over 
Tibet. The issue remained unsolved between B r i t a i n , China and Tibet and 
was a major cause of the breakdown of the T r i p a r t i t e Talks at Simla i n 
1914. Tibetans regarded theaselves as independent and fr e e of a l l t i e s 
t o China a f t e r the invasion of 1910 and, under the Anglo-Tibetan B i p a r t i t e 
Agreement signed i n Simla i n 1914,Britain recognised Tibetan independence. 
lAQ-TAI 
Chinese o f f i c i a l . 
TEJI, 
Commander of the Southern f l a n k of the Tibetan army i n East Tibet 
TSUBGLI. 
A Chinese s o l d i e r w i t h the equivalent rank of General. 
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The Tsongdu or Tibetan National Assembly was composed of lay and c l e r i c a l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and took decisions by e s t a b l i s h i n g a consensus view. Since 
nothing could be decided u n t i l a l l were agreed, debates could continue f o r 
days, and even weeks. The Tibetans had no f o r e i g n o f f i c e as such, and part 
of the problem between B r i t a i n and Tibet was t h a t n e i t h e r side could 
understand how the other took decisions. This confusion had much t o do with 
the misunderstandings t h a t subsequently arose about the reasons f o r the 
imdemnity payments as w e l l as about the l e g a l i t y of the Lhasa Convention 
of 1904. 
The forced labour and p r o v i s i o n of pack animals f o r o f f i c i a l s and important 
persons t r a v e l l i n g i n Tibet. Deeply resented i n some areas, but absolutely-
e s s e n t i a l i n these p a r t s of Tibet where there were long distances between 
settlements. 
URGA HUTUKHTU. (Bogdo) 
Hutukhtu are high ranking incarnations. The Urga Hutukhtu was the powerful 
r u l e r of the Buddhist Church i n Mongolia. 
WAI-CHAIQ-PP. (See Vai Vu-pu) 
The Val Chiao-pu was formed by the Republican Government w i t h the 
involvement of the Young China Party and i t s leader Dr.Yen. I t survived 
i n t o the Kuomintang era w i t h minor o r g a n i s a t i o n a l changes. Much of i t s 
business w i t h B r i t i s h diplomats was then conducted i n English.This a f f e c t e d 
the l e v e l of l i n g u s t i c a b i l i t y r e q u i red w i t h i n the China Service as i t was 
no longer necessary f o r diplomats t o speak and w r i t e p e r f e c t Chinese i n 
order t o conduct diplomatic business w i t h the Chinese. 
VAI-VU-PU. (See Vai Chaio-pu) 
U n t i l 1861 the Chinese d i d not possess a f o r e i g n o f f i c e as such, but 
pressure from the 'Powers' forced them t o e s t a b l i s h one by Imperial Decree 
and the Tsungli Yamen became the c e n t r a l organ f o r the conduct 
of d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s . I n 1864 the Tsungli Yamen was divided i n t o f i v e 
bureaus, f o u r concerned w i t h the various groups or 'powers', and the f i f t h 
d e a ling w i t h naval matters. I n 1901, a f t e r the Boxer Rebellion, the 
Tsungli Yamen became a f u l l M i n i s t r y of the Manchu Imperial Government, 
known as the Val-Vu-Pu. This was then d i v i d e d i n t o bureaus dealing with 
matters l i k e mining and r a i l w a y concessions, diplomatic r e l a t i o n s being 
conducted through the Bureau of Harmonious Intercourse. I n 1912 i t was 
reorganised along western l i n e s under the Republican Government and became 
known as the Val-Chaio-Pu. 
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GLOSSARY OF PLACES 
BATABG. 
Formerly a Tibetan State under the p r o t e c t i o n of the Szechuan 
Authorities,The Tibetans a t Batang spoke a corrupted form of the 
Lhasa d i a l e c t . The c i t y had been brought under d i r e c t Chinese c o n t r o l 
f o l l o w i n g the suppression of a lama r e b e l l i o n i n 1905 during which an 
Amban had been k i l l e d and the monastery at Batang completely destroyed. 
Batang was then made headquarters f o r Chinese troops garrisoned i n 
the southern f r o n t i e r d i s t r i c t s . I t was also a centre f o r missionary 
a c t i v i t y , w i t h a French Cat h o l i c Mission and an American Protestant 
Mission located i n the c i t y , 
CHAMDQ. 
B u i l t on a plateau between two narrow r i v e r valleys,Chamdo was l i t t l e 
more than a v i l l a g e of mud hovels by the time Teichman a r r i v e d 
there i n 1918, The once powerful Chamdo Monastery,(the la r g e s t i n Bast 
T i b e t ) t h a t had dominated the city,was destroyed by Chinese forces i n 
1912. An Important r e l i g i o u s and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centre and formerly 
the c a p i t a l c i t y of Chamdo Province, i t had strong h i s t o r i c a l and 
r e l i g i o u s l i n k s w i t h Lhasa, 
CHSBGTU. 
Famed f o r i t ' s h i b i s c u s flowers,Chengtu was the c a p i t a l c i t y of 
Szechuan, one of the r i c h e s t Provinces i n China despite i t s 
remoteness. I t was described by S i r Alexander Hosie, who v i s i t e d i n 
1895, as'a c i t y of broad paved streets,and shop signs made of g o l d ' ( S i r 
A.Hosle ,Three Years i n Western China,pp85-87), Teichman, who went 
there i n 1912, described i t as the ' f i n e s t c i t y I n China' but returned 
i n 1916 t o f i n d i t i n r u i n s , (Teichman,Travels of a Consular O f f i c a l 
i n lorth-West China. ppl03-4). S i r Meyrick Hewlett l i v e d there between 
1916-22 and described the changes i n h i s book, Forty Years i n 
China,pp84-91. 
The l a r g e s t , w e a l t h i e s t , a n d most independent of the Tibetan c o n t r o l l e d 
s t a t e s i n Bast Tibet, I n 1895 a power s t r u g g l e w i t h i n the r u l i n g f a m i l y 
r e s u l t e d i n Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n and i n 1908, Chao Erh Feng's troops 
entered the s t a t e , d e f e a t i n g the rebel arar^ and occupying the 
the c a p i t a l t o the great consternation of the Lhasa A u t h o r i t i e s , 
DEEEMSL. M05ASTERY 
The l a r g e s t of the three powerful monasteries closest t o Lhasa and, 
w i t h Ganden and Sera,one of the three p i l l a r s of the Tibetan s t a t e . 
I n 1912 there were between seven and ten thousand monks l i v i n g there, 
Drepung monks had greater sympathy f o r the Chinese because many of them 
came from t h a t p a r t of East Tibet bordering China and had no desire 
t o f i g h t Chinese troops who l i v e d so close t o t h e i r f a m i l i e s , Drepung 




Sit u a t e d t w e n t y - f i v e miles outside Lhasa and,with Drepung and Sera, 
one of the three p i l l a r s of the Tibetan s t a t e . I n 1904 there were 
5,000 monks l i v i n g there who were f a n a t i c a l l y antl-Chlnese.During 
1913 Ganden and Sera j o i n e d forces t o a t t a c k Chinese troops I n 
Lhasa. 
GABTQK. 
Situ a t e d on an exposed plateau a t 15000ft. above sea l e v e l , the c i t y was 
an ancient a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p i t a l f o r the Garpons who c o n t r o l l e d t h i s 
p art of Vestern Tibet.Apart from the extreme co l d i n winter, there were 
problems w i t h the water supply f o r , i n times of drought, the water became 
poisonous t o animals and,if taken w i t h g r a s s , i t caused them t o moult. 
There were few houses i n Gartok and most people l i v e d i n 
t e n t s during the season t h a t culminated i n a huge f a i r held at the 
end of August t h a t a t t r a c t e d many traders. By mld-Hovember most people 
had l e f t the c i t y . From 1904 a B r i t i s h Agent c a l l e d Thakin J a i Chand 
administered Indo-Tlbetan trade there.A nephew of the r u l e r of the 
neighbouring s t a t e of Lahaul,he was i n a good p o s i t i o n t o f o s t e r l i n k s 
w i t h the peoples of the borderlands and he developed a reasonable 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the Gartok Garpons.The B r i t i s h believed t h a t the 
the area's close p r o x i m i t y t o Chinese Turkestan would prove very useful 
i n f u t u r e years. (Younghusband, India and Tibet pp.258-9) 
GYAJTSF.(TRADF MART) 
The t h i r d l a r g e s t town i n Tibet and a noted centre f o r carpets. Only a 
few miles from Lhasa, Gyantse was a p o l i t i c a l l y s e n s i t i v e l o c a t i o n 
f o r a trade mart. 
KOKOHOR. 
An area composed of the whole of the upper basin of the Yangtze and 
Yellow r i v e r s and p a r t of the Mekong headwater country. Sparsely 
populated and l a r g e l y uninhabitable desert.The whole area was under the 
nominal c o n t r o l of an Amban based at Sining on the border of Kansu. 
MARQHG, 
A semi-Independent s t a t e i n East Tibet. I n 1860 Tibetans i n lyarong had 
conquered neighbouring s t a t e s and had upset the s t a t u s quo i n East 
T i b e t . I n response t o requests from the r u l e r s of these s t a t e s the Dalai 
Lama had sent h i s army and,from 1865,the Lhasa government e f f e c t i v e l y 
c o n t r o l l e d Fyarong.The Chinese then annexed the s t a t e t o the Dalai Lama 
and Ifyarong remained i n Tibetan hands u n t i l occupied by Chao Erh-feng 
i n 1911. 
PIEIMA. 
A v i l l a g e on the watershed between the disputed Chinese and Burmese 
border, Pienma was occupied by the Chinese because i t s people refused 
t o pay increased tax on the c o f f i n wood they supplied t o Yunnan. 
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PHARI. 
The highest i n h a b i t e d town i n Tibet and not the most popular posting. 
Waddell described i t as the d u l l e s t town i n the world. I t was i n f a c t an 
important t r a d i n g centre on the main route t o Kalimpong and Curzon had 
o r i g i n a l l y wanted the trade mart s i t e d there instead of at Yatung.It had 
once been located i n Sikkim but the f a i l u r e of the Slkkimese t o send a 
rep r e s e n t a t i v e t o the Tibet-Fepalese Segotiations i n 1792 had r e s u l t e d i n 
the whole of Chumbi v a l l e y , I n c l u d i n g Phari,being t r a n s f e r r e d t o Tibet. 
A Tibetan d i s t r i c t i n an area where the Tsangpo r i v e r t u rns south toward 
the Assam Hymalayas t o become the Brahmaputra. A t r i b a l region of l a r g e l y 
unexplored mountain and j u n g l e , i t had been the subject of commercial 
r i v a l r y between B r i t a i n and China f o r many years.Together w i t h the 
neighbouring Z a y a u l , l t commanded the shortest route between Lhasa and 
Yunnan and, f o r the Chinese, i t was a desirable a l t e r n a t i v e t o the 
longer Szechuan-Lhasa road. I n 1910 the Chinese occupied Pome and the 
people,who were of mixed Chinese and Tibetan blood and had enjoyed 
v i r t u a l independence under Lhasa r u l e , were i n no mood t o t o l e r a t e Chinese 
c o n t r o l . I n 1911 they attacked and drove out the Chinese occupation force, 
I n f l i c t i n g a h u m i l i a t i n g defeat upon them and e f f e c t i v e l y h a l t i n g Chinese 
forward p o l i c y i n the area. 
Main a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centre of Zayaul. 
RQUGBASTA. 
A f e r t i l e v a l l e y near Kamze s i t u a t e d near the Szechuan t o Lhasa road. A 
Survey of the region i n 0,R,Coales 'Eastern Tibet' The Geographical Journal 
L I I I . 1 9 1 9 , 
S t a f f e d by the India Service and used t o moniter a c t i v i t i e s on the Assam 
borders but i t sometimes picked up Information about Tibet, I n 1909 the 
Indian government set up a language school there t o teach Chinese t o Indian 
O f f i c e r s . 
SERA.MOIIASTERY 
With Ganden and Drepung, one of the three p i l l a r s of the Tibetan s t a t e . 
I n 1904 7,000 monks l i v e d there. Sera was a great r i v a l t o Drepung and 
was noted f o r i t s ' w a r r i o r monks'.The Japanese monk, Kawaguchi, who l i v e d 
there f o r a time, noted t h a t the Abbot even allowed d u e l l i n g before prayer. 
I n 1913 Sera was attacked by Chinese forces during the occupation of Lhasa 
and, w i t h Ganden, launched a s e r i e s of f i e r c e a ttacks on the 
Lhasa g a r r i s o n . 
SHIGATSE. 
The second town i n Tibet and s i t u a t e d close t o the great palace of 
Tashilunpho, home of the Panchen Lama. 
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STITTO. 
Chief c i t y of Kansu and centre f o r the prosperous wool trade w i t h Kokonor, 
i t was a l s o s i t u a t e d i n a notable wheat and corn growing area.An important 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centre, i t was the seat of the Amban f o r Koknor and l a t e r , 
f o r the Moslem leader, General Ma. There was a missionary post i n 
Sining manned by French-Ridley. The nearby monastery of Kumbum was an 
inqportant r e l i g i o u s centre and the Dalai Lama stayed there during h i s 
e x i l e i n 1905. 
TACHIEyLL'. 
S i t u a t e d nearly 10,000 f e e t above sea level,and hemmed i n by mountains on 
a l l sides,Tachienlu was an ia ^ j o r t a n t commercial centre f o r the Sino-Tibetan 
tea trade as w e l l as the seat of the i l l - f a t e d Prince of Chala, whose 
palace was Just outside the c i t y w a l l s . A f t e r 1912 Tachienlu became a key 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e centre f o r the Chinese and one of the Chinese F r o n t i e r 
Commlsioners had h i s headquarters t h e r e . I n 1913 a B r i t i s h Consulate was 
opened a t the the request of the Indian government i n order t o monitor 
events i n Bast Tibet.This post was o f f i c a l l y closed a f t e r Louis King's 
departure i n 1922, but Paul Sherap kept the Chengtu Consul informed about 
about developments i n the c i t y . I n 1924 the Tachienlu archives were s t o l e n 
by bandits. 
TASHILPBFHQ MQHASTBSY, 
S i t u a t e d about h a l f a mile from Shigatse and the home of the Panchen Lama. 
I n 1905 i t had a p o p u l a t i o n of 4,000 monks. I t was an iaiportant r e l i g i o u s 
and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e seat. 
TAYAIG TRACT. 
Adjacent t o the eastern border of Bhutan,Tawang was a s t r i p of t e r r i t o r y 80 
miles wide extending from the c r e s t s of the main Hymalayan ranges down t o 
the Brahmaputra v a l l e y i n Assam. Between 1913 and 1919 i t was o f f i c i a l l y 
described as p a r t of the western s e c t i o n of the Morth-East f r o n t i e r . I n 
1919 i t became known as the B a l l p a i a F r o n t i e r Tract, and l a t e r as the 
Kameng D i v i s i o n of the Horth-East F r o n t i e r Agency. An area of wide r i v e r s 
i n h a b i t e d by Tibetanised Buddhist t r i b e s , the area contains a monastery of 
Tawang, daughter t o Drepung Monastery which was founded i n the 17th century 
and housing between 500 and 700 monks. A complex and loose system of 
c o n t r o l bound the i n h a b i t a n t s of t h i s remote area t o Lhasa. 
TEMQYEPH. (COISULAR POST).Situated i n a remote p a r t of Yunnan,Tengyeuh 
s u f f e r e d incessant monsoon r a i n between May and October, making e f f e c t i v e 
monitoring impossible f o r much of the year.Since h a l f the cost of running 
the Consulate was met by the Indian Government,its primary f u n c t i o n was t o 
monitor trade between China and those p a r t s of Indian held Burma annexed i n 
1894. 
URGA. 
Mow Ulam Bator. C a p i t a l c i t y of Mongolia and seat of the Bodgo or leader of 
the Mongolian Church.Urga was the Dalai Lama's f i r s t p oint of c a l l 
f o l l o w i n g h i s f l i g h t i n 1904.Situated on the main Lhasa t o Urga trade route 
crossing the S i b e r i a n Pl a i n s , i t was also an iii5>ortant centre f o r trade. 
- 309 -
(TRADE MART) 
Yatung was the most s o u t h e r l y of the three posts i n the Chumbi v a l l e y and 
the nearest t o the Indian b o r d e r . I t had been the scene of a h u m i l l t a t i n g 
B r i t i s h defeat during 1903 when the Chinese b u i l t a w a l l r i g h t across the 
v a l l e y entrance, preventing them from t r a d i n g w i t h the Tibetans or 
gaining access t o Tibet. Yatung had been opened as a trade mart a f t e r 
the successful conclusion of the 1893 Trade Regulations. 
YUMAHFU. (CONSULAR POST) 
A walled c i t y and the o l d P r o v i n c i a l c a p i t a l of Yunnan. Like Tengyeuh the 
Consulate was set up i n 1894 a f t e r the Anglo-Chinese Convention on Burma. 
Although i n a good p o s i t i o n t o monitor Tibetan a f f a i r s , i t s primary 
f u n c t i o n was t o i n v e s t i g a t e French, Chinese,and t r i b a l a c t i v i t y on t h a t 
upper part of the Burma border annexed by B r i t a i n . Hosle, who v i s i t e d there 
i n 1882, found i t a clean c i t y w i t h wide s t r e e t s . 
ZAlMJu^ (See Pome) 
Like Pome, Zayaul was a t r i b a l area of low a l t i t u d e and a r i c h and f e r t i l e 
growing region. I n August 1910 Chao Erh-feng established a Chinese 
settlement there. The Tibetans who opposed h i s c o n t r o l were defeated and a 
large Chinese g a r r i s o n of 300 men established j u s t n orth of Rima, the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a p i t a l of Zayaul.The occupation l a s t e d only a short time 
however, and, by the e a r l y summer of 1912, Tibetans had massacred the 
remaining Chinese who had f a i l e d t o withdraw. 
- 310 
APPE5DIX BIOGRAPHIES 
ALSTOB, S i r Beilby,(1868-1929) CHIIA SERVICE 
P r i v a t e l y educated i n Europe, Alston entered the Foreign O f f i c e 
i n 1890 and by 1895 was Acting Second Secretary i n Copenhagen. 
Between 1898 and 1910 he held various diplomatic posts before 
going t o Peking t o w o r k , f i r s t l y as a C o u n c i l l o r ( 1911-12), and 
then as Charge d ' A f f a i r e s at the B r i t i s h Legation i n 1913. He 
returned t o the Far Eastern Department and worked there between 
1916 and 1919 before becoming B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n Tokyo between 
1919 and 1920. Between 1920 and 1922 he replaced Jordan as 
B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n Peking. Between 1923 and 1925 he was 
B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r t o Argentina and Paraguay,before becoming 
B r i t i s h Ambassador t o B r a z i l . 
2. BALFOUR, S i r Arthur James,(1848-1930) FOREIGH OFFICE 
Educated at Eton and T r i n i t y College Cambridge, he became Private 
Secretary t o Lord Salisbury at the Foreign O f f i c e between 1878 and 
1880. Leader of the Conservative Opposition between 1892 and 1895, 
he then became Prime M i n i s t e r between 1902 and 1905. He served as 
Foreign Secretary between 1916 and 1919 and headed the B r i t i s h 
Mission t o the Vashington Conference i n 1922. 
BAILEY, Lt . Col. Frederick, (1882-1965) INDIA SERVICE (Curzonian) 
Born i n Lahore,India,and educated at V e l l i n g t o n College and 
Sandhurst, Bailey j o i n e d the 17th Bengal Lancers and served 
i n I n d i a between 1901 and 1903.In 1903 he j o i n e d the Younghusband 
Expedition and subsequently became Acting B r i t i s h Trade Agent at 
Gyantse between 1904 and 1905. I n 1911 he explored Vestern China, 
South-East Asia, and the Mlshmi H i l l s and was awarded 
the G i l l Memorial Medal by the Royal Geographical Society. 
Between 1916 and 1917 he was P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Mesopotamia 
and Persia and,in 1917, he served on the North-Vest F r o n t i e r . 
Between 1921 and 1931 he was P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Slkkim and 
then went on t o become B r i t i s h Resident i n Kashmir u n t i l 
1933. From 1935 u n t i l 1938 (the year i n which he r e t i r e d ) , h e was 
B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n Nepal.A freemason, whose f a t h e r knew Younghusband, 
Bailey had a v a r i e d and very successful career as a P o l i t i c a l , 
s o l d i e r , explorer, p l a n t c o l l e c t o r and spy. 
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BELL, S i r Charles IJDIA SERVICE (Curzonian) 
Born i n Calcutta and educated at Winchester and Hew College Oxford, 
B e l l entered the I.C.S. i n 1889 and was posted t o the Indian Plains. 
I n 1900 he t r a n s f e r r e d t o D a r j e e l i n g and,in 1903, j o i n e d the 
Younghusband Expedition. During t h i s period he Investigated the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n s t r u c t i n g a road l i n k i n g India w i t h Chumbi Valley 
but the scheme was l a t e r abandoned as too expensive. Between 1904 
and 1905 he was P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Chumbi Valley and between 
1906 and 1908,served as Assistant P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim. 
Between 1908 and 1918 he was P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim and 
became Special Advisor t o the Dalai Lama while he was l i v i n g 
i n I n d i a between 1910 and 1912. He was Tibetan advisor t o the Simla 
Conference between 1913 and 1914. He r e t i r e d i n 1918 but was 
then re-employed t o lead an Expedition t o Lhasa i n 1920. He 
r e v i s i t e d Lhasa during a wider t o u r of Central Asia and China 
between 1933 and 1935. A f t e r 1912 he replaced Younghusband as 
B r i t a i n ' s leading expert on Tibet. 
5, BRODRICK, St,John, Earl of Midleton, (1856-1942) IIDIA OFFICE 
Educated at Eton,(where he befriended Curzon), and at B a l l i o l 
College Oxford,Between 1880,and 1885, he was Conservative MP 
f o r West Surrey. A f t e r t h i s he served i n the War Offlee,becoming 
Secretary of State f o r War between 1897 and 1898. I n 1898 he 
became Undersecretary of State f o r Foreign A f f a i r s before 
serving as Secretary of State f o r In d i a i n the run up t o the 
Younghusband Expedition between 1900 and 1903. I n 1907 he 
was Leader of the Southern Unionists i n Ireland. 
6. CAMPBELL, S i r Francis Alexander,(1852-1911) FAR EASTER5 DEPARTMENT 
Undersecretary of State f o r the Far Eastern Department between 1902 
and h i s untimely death from a kidney i n f e c t i o n i n December 1911. 
7, CAMPBELL, C.W. (b. 1861) CHIIA SERVICE 
Whilst serving as Consul i n T i e n t s i n i n 1900, he was shot when 
attempting t o pa r l e y w i t h the Chinese during the Boxer Rebellion 
and never recovered f u l l y from the subsequent blood poisoning. 
He spent some time i n Korea where,like Jordan, he befriended 
Yuan Shih Kal before becoming Consul-General i n Canton i n 1905. 
He was Consul-General a t Chengtu f o r a b r i e f period i n 1905 but 
requested a t r a n s f e r on hea l t h grounds. Between 1909 and 1912 he 
served as F i r s t Secretary t o the B r i t i s h Legation i n Peking but 
r e t i r e d prematurely f o l l o w i n g a badly handled i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
l e d by Max-Muller (So.44) who accused him of hogging the most 
i n t e r e s t i n g Legation work f o r himself. 
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CHALA, PRINCE (or King) TIBETAN RULER 
A l o c a l Tibetan c h i e f t a n or t'ssu, and o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o as the 
'King' of Chala, a s t a t e i n East Tibet. The kingdom of Chala was 
subject t o i n d i r e c t c o n t r o l from China and,in 1903,was attacked by 
troops l o y a l t o the Dalai Lama. His p o p u l a r i t y w i t h Tibetans and 
w i t h western missionaries made him unpopular w i t h the Szechuan 
government, and i n 1911 he was deposed by Chao Erh Feng. He 
subsequently made peace w i t h the Chinese and agreed t o act as 
intermediary between them and other s t a t e s i n East Tibet. 
The Prince provided Jordan and King w i t h valuable information 
about Chinese a c t i v i t i e s i n the region from h i s palace j u s t 
outside Tachienlu. The Tibetan population of Tachienlu remained 
l o y a l t o the Prince,but he was l a t e r arrested and imprisoned by 
the Chinese f o r a number of crimes and he met h i s death while 
t r y i n g t o escape from Tachienlu i n July 1922. 
9. CHAMBERLAIN, Austen (1863-1937) INDIA OFFICE 
Eldest son of Joseph Chamberlain and Conservative MP f o r East 
Vorcestershire i n 1892, he went on t o become Chancellor of the 
Exchequer i n Balfour's government between 1903-1905. A f t e r 
some years i n o p p o s i t i o n he was happy t o accept the post of 
Secretary of State f o r In d i a i n 1915 but resigned i n 1917 
over the Mesopotamia Campaign. Between 1919 and 1921 he was 
Chancellor of the Exchequer i n Lloyd George's government and 
went on t o become Foreign Secretary between 1924 and 1929. 
10. CHANG YIN-TANG CHINESE OFFICAL 
Chief promoter of the Chinese forward p o l i c y i n Tibet a f t e r 1905 
Chang acted as locum tenens f o r Tang Shao Yi (no.59) at the 
Adhesion Talks held i n Calcutta between 1905 and 1906, t a k i n g 
over when Tang became i l l . I n 1906 he was promoted t o become 
High Commisioner f o r Tibet and,in 1907, he submitted a r t i c l e s 
t o the Val Vu pu on the subject of strengthening Chinese r u l e 
there. V h i l s t i n Tibet he made i t h i s business t o humble and 
punish a l l Chinese and Tibetan o f f i c a l s who had helped 
Younghusband i n 1904. Between 1907 and 1908 he represented 
China at the Trade Regulation n e g o t i a t i o n s leading t o the 
successful Trade Regulation Treaty of 1908. In 1913 the Chinese 
put h i s name forward as Chinese P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y t o the Simla 
t a l k s but h i s un p o p u l a r i t y w i t h the B r i t i s h made h i s appointment 
impossible. 
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11. CHAO ERH FESG CHINESE OFFICAL 
A s k i l f u l m i l i t a r y Commander responsible f o r the conduct of the 
Slkang campaign promoted by the Szechuan government. Between 1907 
and 1908 Chang was a c t i n g Viceroy of Szechuan,and i n 1908, 
was appointed Imperial Commlsioner f o r Tibet, a post equivalent 
t o t h a t of Amban. I n 1909 he ordered the despatch of an invasion 
force t o Lhasa under the leadership of h i s deputy, Chung Ying, 
while he concentrated on a c q u i r i n g more t e r r i t o r y i n East Tibet. 
I n 1911 he became Viceroy of Szechuan and was murdered by a mob 
i n Chengtu i n 1912, 
12, CHEN, Ivan CHINESE DIPLOMAT 
An experienced diplomat w i t h western experience, Chen had been 
Second C o u n c i l l o r t o the Chinese Legation i n London between 
1911 and 1912 and had earned a r e p u t a t i o n f o r being reasonable 
which had endeared him t o Foreign O f f i c e o f f i c a l s . Between 1911 
and 1912 he p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the n e g o t i a t i o n s leading t o the 
Opium Agreement of 1913,(Jordan No,32) and i n 1912 took the post of 
Tao-Tai on the Burma-Yunnan border, l a t e r becoming Commisioner 
f o r Trade and F r o n t i e r A f f a i r s i n Shanghai.He was welcomed 
by the B r i t i s h as Chinese P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y t o the Simla Talks 
i n 1913 but was subsequently c r i t i c i s e d by h i s own government 
f o r being too f r i e n d l y w i t h the B r i t i s h . A f t e r he l e f t Simla 
i n 1914 he found i t d i f f i c u l t t o obtain employment but managed 
t o hang on t o the remnants of h i s c a r e e r , p a r t l y as the r e s u l t 
of the support and encouragement he received from Morrison 
(NO.48). 
13. CHELMSFORD, Thesiger Frederic John Napier, T h i r d Baron and F i r s t 
Viscount Chelmsford, (1868-1933), VICEROY 
Educated at Winchester and Magdalen College Oxford, he was 
c a l l e d t o the bar i n 1893, He went on t o become Governor of 
Queensland (1905-9); Governor of New South Wales (1909-13); 
and Viceroy of India (1916-21) While Viceroy he helped t o 
push through a s e r i e s of Reforms t h a t led t o the Government 
of India Act of 1919 and which beame known as the Montagu-
Chelmsford Reforms. I n 1892 he had been elected a Fellow 
of Old Souls Oxford, He was re-e l e c t e d t o t h i s post i n 
1929 and remained there u n t i l h i s death i n 1933. 
-314 
14. COALES, O l i v e r Robert (b.1880) CHINA SERVICE 
Son of a London t u t o r , Coales entered the Consular Service i n 
1901. Although not strong he was en t h u s i a s t i c f o r rough t r a v e l 
and,in 1910,sacrificed e i g h t months of leave i n t r a v e l l i n g t o 
B r i t a i n v i a Central Asia. He was Consul (Jeneral i n Tachienlu 
between 1916 and 1917 and i n l a t e 1916,he t r a v e l l e d t o the 
East Tibetan f r o n t , accompanied by Dr. Clements of the China 
Inland Mission i n Tachienlu.He disagreed w i t h B e l l over 
Tibetan claims t o East Tibet and he thought the main cause 
of the f r i c t i o n was the r e s u l t of the r e l i g i o u s dispute between 
the Red Hat Sect and the Gelugpa (Yellow Hat) Sect which,by 
chall e n g i n g the Dalai Lama's supremacy over the Buddhist Church 
i n T i b e t , had undermined h i s c o n t r o l i n the region. 
15. CREVE, Robert O f f l e y Ashburton, Second Baron Houghton and Marquess 
of Crewe, (b.1858) " INDIA OFFICE 
Educated at T r i n i t y College Cambridge he became Assistant Secretary 
t o Lord G r a n v i l l e before becoming Lord Lieutenant of I r e l a n d and 
Chief Secretary i n the Colonial O f f i c e . Between 1910 and 1915 he 
was Secretary of State f o r India a f t e r which time he became B r i t i s h 
Ambassador t o Paris. I n 1911 he v i s i t e d India during the preparations 
f o r the Dehli Durbar. I n 1931 he became Secretary of State f o r Var. 
16. CURZON, George Nathaniel, Marquess of Kedleston, (1859-1925) 
(VICEROY/FOREIGN OFFICE) 
Educated at Eton and B a l l l o l College Oxford before becoming 
Conservative MP f o r Stockport i n 1886. Between 1891 and 1892 
he was Undersecretary of State f o r India and between 1895 and 
1898 he worked at the Foreign O f f i c e as Undersecretary of State 
f o r Foreign A f f a i r s . He was appointed Viceroy of India i n 1899 
but resigned i n November 1905 over a dispute w i t h Lord Kitchener 
before he could begin a second term. Between 1919 and 1924 he 
was Foreign Secretary. 
Between 1887 and 1895 he t r a v e l l e d e x t e n s i v e l y i n the Far East, 
Middle East,and on the North Vest F r o n t i e r and he came t o the 
conclusion t h a t Russian involvement i n Central Asia was s t i l l 
a t h r e a t t o Indian s e c u r i t y . B r i l l i a n t , but obsessive and 
demanding, a back i n j u r y i n youth forced him t o wear a corset 
and l e f t him i n constant pain. This combination of f a c t o r s 
made him a d i f f i c u l t colleague. 
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17 DALAI LAMA, THIRTEENTH, Thubten Gyatso (1876-1933) 
(TIBETAN RULER) 
Born of humble peasant stock i n the Tibetan Province of Takpo 
South East of Lhasa, he was enthroned i n 1879 a f t e r s u r v i v i n g 
several attempts t o poison him before he reached h i s majority. 
In 1904 he f l e d s h o r t l y before the Younghusband Expedition 
entered Lhasa, v i s i t i n g Urga and other Buddhist centres i n 
Mongolia. I n 1908 he was summoned t o Peking and deprived of 
h i s power t o memorialize the throne direct.He returned t o Tibet 
i n 1909 but f l e d once again, only hours before the Chinese 
invasion force reached Lhasa i n February 1910.Between 1910 and 
1912 he l i v e d i n e x i l e i n India. He returned t o Tibet i n 1913 
de c l a r i n g independence and s i g n i n g a f r i e n d s h i p t r e a t y with 
Mongolia. He began a modest programme of modernisation beginning 
w i t h the Tibetan army which he re-formed and used t o attack 
Chinese troops i n East Tibet between 1913 and 1916. Between 
1916 and 1919 he withdrew f o r a period of meditation and, i n 
1920, welcomed the B e l l Expedition t o Lhasa, requesting 
m i l i t a r y a i d from B r i t a i n i n the event of f u t u r e attacks by 
the Chinese, Between 1923 and 1933 he sought diplomatic t i e s 
w i t h America and China and welcomed the Weir Missions t o Lhasa i n 
1924 and 1928. Although remaining f r i e n d l y w i t h other Powers, 
he refused t o al l o w Tibet t o j o i n the League of Nations. He 
died i n December 1933 i n mysterious circumstances and 
amid rumours t h a t he had been murdered. His feud w i t h the 
Panchen Lama (No.52) i n t e n s i f i e d during h i s period of e x i l e 
i n India between 1910 and 1912, 
18, DANE, S i r Louis,(b,1856) IIDIA SERVICE 
Dane entered the ICS i n 1876 and became Foreign Secretary t o 
the Governi^nt of In d i a between 1902 and 1906, I n 1905 he l e d 
a Mission t o Afghanistan f o r the purpose of concluding a t r e a t y and 
was Governor of the Punjab between 1908 and h i s retirement i n 1913, 
19, DORJIEV, Aghvan RUSSIAN BUDDHIST 
A B u r i a t from East S i b e r i a and, l i k e the Dalai Lama, a member 
of the Gelupa (Yellow Hat) Sect, A d i s t i n g u i s h e d scholar he 
attended Drepung monastery i n the 1860's and i n 1898, was sent 
t o Russia by the Dalai Lama, then h i s p u p i l , i n order t o study 
western c u l t u r e . I n the s p r i n g of 1900 he t r a v e l l e d t o Odessa 
t o meet the Tsar,a t r i p t h a t a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n of the 
Indian government who began t o suspect him of spying f o r the 
Russians, As h i s ex tu t o r , a n d l a t e r as h i s t r u s t e d f r i e n d , 
D o r j i e v worked f o r the Dalai Lama u n t i l l a t e 1910, r e t a i n i n g 
contact w i t h him u n t i l the Dalai Lama died i n 1933. A f t e r t h i s 
he l o s t i n f l u e n c e i n Tibet and i n 1934 he disappeared and 
he died i n 1938, probably a v i c t i m of the S t a l i n i s t regime i n 
Russia, 
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20. EDGAR, J.H. MISSIONARY 
A New Zealander, Edgar worked w i t h the China Inland Mission i n East 
Tibet from 1908 u n t i l 1922. His command of Tibetan and Chinese,both 
w r i t t e n and spoken, were good,and h i s extensive r e p o r t s on the 
s i t u a t i o n i n Tibet were a valuable source of information f o r Jordan. 
I n 1911 he accompanied Bailey (No3) on a journey from China t o India 
v i a East Tibet, a c t i n g as guide and i n t e r p r e t e r t o the party. 
21. FOX, H.H. CHINA SERVICE 
The son of a c l e r k i n the mercantile trade. I n 1895 he was stoned by 
a mob during the pre-Boxer riots.From 1887 he served at various 
Treaty p o r t s , u s u a l l y i n makeshift c o n d i t i o n s during which time 
he l o s t h i s f i r s t w i f e i n a typhoid epidemic.He brought h i s second 
wife t o the Consulate i n Chengtu i n 1907 but,when i l l h e alth forced 
her t o r e t u r n , he asked f o r a t r a n s f e r t o a h e a l t h i e r post. He was 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i r r i t a t e d by the l a v i s h l i f e s t y l e enjoyed by the 
American and Canadian missionaries who l i v e d i n Chengtu,although 
he agreed t o r e t u r n there between 1914 and 1918. He refused a t h i r d 
term however since h i s wife s t i l l s u f f e r e d from the lung disease 
t h a t had forced her r e t u r n i n 1907. 
22. GODLEY, S i r Arthur, Lord Kilbracken (1847-1912) INDIA OFFICE 
The eldest and only son of John Robert Godley, he was educated at 
Rugby because h i s f a t h e r had apparently l e f t i t too l a t e t o get 
him i n t o Harrow. He won an E x h i b i t i o n t o Oxford i n 1868 where 
he studied under Jowett who converted him t o Li b e r a l i s m . A f t e r 
s e r v i n g as Pri v a t e Secretary t o Gladstone and G r a n v i l l e , and as 
Assistant Secretary t o the Treasury,he entered the India O f f i c e 
i n 1880. Between 1883 and 1909 he served as Permanent Undersecretary 
of State f o r India. During 1905 he became obsessed with the need t o 
oppose what he described as 'Curzonian influences' i n India. His 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Morley (No 47), h i s p o l i t i c a l c h i e f , was good, 
although, i n l a t e r years, i t was tinged w i t h resentment at what he 
f e l t was Morley's f a i l u r e t o l i s t e n t o h i s advice. 
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23. GOFFE, S i r H. CHIIA SERVICE 
The son of a Master Plumber, Goffe j o i n e d the China S e r v i c e at the 
age of twenty. I n t e l l i g e n t and e f f i c e n t he n e v e r t h e l e s s acquired 
a r e p u t a t i o n f o r b u l l y i n g subordinates which made him unpopular i n 
some quarters.He b e l i e v e d t h a t a n t i - f o r e i g n f e e l i n g would disappear 
when China was s t r o n g enough to compete with other powers on equal 
terms,and welcomed the enthusiasm of the Republicans and the 
d i s c i p l i n e d i s p l a y e d by t h e i r troops as evidence of a new s p i r i t 
i n China. A f t e r j o i n i n g the S e r v i c e he served as Consul General 
i n v a r i o u s posts before becoming Acting Consul General i n Chengtu 
between 1905 and 1907.In September 1908 he t r a n s f e r e d to Vu-hu, 
and,in January 1 9 0 9 , t r a n s f e r r e d to ffanking.Between 1911 and 1912 
he was Acting Consul General a t Hankow and from October 1912, 
was Acting Consul General a t Yunnanfu. I n 1920,and, on Alston's 
(Jo 1) recommendation, he became Acting Consul General at Canton 
but, to h i s annoyance, t h i s d i d not becoaie a permanent posting. 
He d i s t i n g u i s h e d h i m s e l f f o r bravery at Hankow. 
24. GOULD, S i r B a s i l , (1883-1956) I I D I A SERVICE 
Educated at Winchester and Few College Oxford, he j o i n e d the ICS 
i n 1907 and was posted to the Punjab. I n 1909 he j o i n e d the 
P o l i t i c a l s and between 1910,and 1912,worked as Undersecretary 
i n the F o r e i g n Department i n Simla before becoming Trade Agent 
a t Gyantse i n 1912. During 1913 he was A s s i s t a n t P o l i t i c a l 
O f f i c e r i n Sikkim and between 1914 and 1917, he served on the 
l o r t h Vest F r o n t i e r . I n 1917 he returned to I n d i a to become 
A s s i s t a n t P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r y to the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford. 
Between 1918 and 1925 he was B r i t i s h Consul i n S e i s t a n i n P e r s i a 
and between 1926 and 1929,was a C o u n c i l l o r at the B r i t i s h 
L e g a t i o n i n Kabul. He s e r v e d on the Horth-Vest F r o n t i e r as 
a P o l i t i c a l Agent between 1929 and 1935,and he returned to the 
F o r t h E a s t F r o n t i e r to s e r v e a s P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim 
u n t i l 1947. 
25. GREGORY, John Duncan, (bl878) FAR EASTERF DEPARTKEFT 
J u n i o r C l e r k i n the F o r e i g n O f f i c e between 1909 and 1913. 
He became a S e n i o r C l e r k a f t e r 1913 and, between 1925 
and 1928, he was A s s i s t a n t Undersecretary of S t a t e f o r Foreign 
A f f a i r s . 
26. GREY, S i r Edward, T h i r d Baronet and Viscount Grey of Falloden. 
(1862-1933) FOREIGF OFFICE 
Educated a t Winchester and B a l l i o l College Oxford. In J u l y 1884 
he was P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r y to S i r E v e l y n Baring (Lord Cromer).He 
was L i b e r a l MP f o r Berwick-Upon-Tweed between 1892 and 1916. 
He was Parlia m e n t a r y Undersecretary at the Foreign O f f i c e between 
1892 and 1895 and F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y between 1906 and 1916 when 
i n c r e a s i n g b l i n d n e s s f o r c e d him to r e t i r e . 
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27. HAKDIFGE, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, (1859-1944) 
(VICEEOY/FOHEIGlf OFFICE) 
Educated at Harrow and T r i n i t y College Cambridge he j o i n e d the 
German Department at the Foreign O f f i c e i n 1880. He then served 
as Attache i n Constantinople,(1881-4); as Th i r d Secretary I n 
Be r l i n , ( 1 8 8 4 ) i and as Second Secretary i n Washington DC, before 
being made Ambassador t o St. Petersburg i n 1904. I n 1906 he 
returned t o the Foreign O f f i c e as Permanent Undersecretary and, 
i n 1910,became Viceroy of India. While i n India i n 1913 an 
attempt was made on h i s l i f e and t h i s , t o g e t h e r w i t h the death 
of h i s w i f e , made him anxious t o r e t u r n home.He agreed t o remain 
i n post u n t i l 1916, when he returned t o h i s o l d post as Permanent 
Undersecretary at the Foreign O f f i c e . Fearly forced t o resign 
over h i s part i n the conduct of the Mesopotamia Campaign, he 
went on t o become Ambassador t o Paris between 1920 and h i s 
retirement i n 1922. 
28. HAECOUET-BUTLER, S i r Spenser, (1869-1938) IIDIA SERVICE 
Educated at harrow and B a l l i o l College Oxford, he entered the ICS 
and between 1901,and 1915, served i n various departments, r i s i n g 
t o become Foreign Sceretary t o the Government of India. Between 
1915 and 1917 he was L t . Governor of Burma and i n 1918,served as 
Lt. Governor i n Agra and Duda. Between 1921 and 1923 he was Governor 
of the United Provinces and between 1923,and 1927,he was Governor 
of B i h a i . I n 1928 he chaired the Indian States Committee. 
29. HEWLETT, S i r Meyrick, CHI5A SERVICE 
Educated at Harrow he j o i n e d the China Service a t h i s second attempt. 
Between 1898 and 1901 he was a Student I n t e r p r e t e r i n Peking, staying 
on f o r an e x t r a year i n order t o become Satow's Private Secretary 
i n the Treaty n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t followed the Boxer Rebellion of 
1900. He then undertook Consular work at various Treaty ports before 
becoming Consul General at Chengtu between September 1916 and A p r i l 
1919, and again between February 1920,and November 1922. Alston (Ho 1) 
recommended him f o r promotion t o Chinese Secretary at the Peking 
Legation but, f o r reasons unknown, t h i s appointment was never 
confirmed by h i s successor. 
30. HOSIE, S i r Alexander (1859-1931) CHISA SERVICE 
Son of a farmer from Aberdeenshire i n Scotland, he became Acting 
Consul General at Wenchow between 1884 and 1887 before becoming 
Consul General at Chungking beteen 1900 and 1902. I n 1902 he 
opened the Consulate at Chengtu, where he l i v e d f o r some time, 
t a k i n g the o p p o r t u n i t y t o t r a v e l e xtensively i n Western China. 
Author of two comprehensive r e o r t s on trade i n East Tibet, Hosie 
was employed by Jordan from 1904 as a kin d of roving reporter. 
Between 1906 and 1908 he p a r t i c i p a t e d i n plans f o r the Opium 
Treaty which aimed t o ban the import of Indian opium t o China. 
(See Jordan, So 32; and Wilton,Jo 6 9 ) . E a r l i e r i n h i s career 
he became involved I n a scheme t o open the Upper Yangtse 
t o steam ships,a plan t h a t had t o be abandoned due t o cost. 
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31, IJUIF, H l k o k i c h i , (1864-1924) JAPAFESE DIPLOMAT 
Japanese diplomat and p o l i t i c i a n . Consul General at T i e n t s i n 
between 1901 and 1906, he was Japanese M i n i s t e r t o Peking between 
1906 and 1913.He then became Japanese M i n i s t e r t o the Paris Peace 
Conference i n 1919. Between 1916 and 1920 he served as Ambassador 
t o I t a l y and i n 1923, became Japanese M i n i s t e r i n Tokyo. His 
spoken English was very poor. 
32. JORDAF, S i r John Fewell, (1852-1925) CHIFA SERVICE 
The son of an I r i s h Presbyterian farming f a m i l y from Balloo i n County 
Down, and educated at Queens College B e l f a s t , where he received a 
f i r s t c l a ss honours i n Classics and subsequently an MA, before going on 
t o become a Senior Classics scholar. He Joined the China Service i n 
1876, passing the Chinese Entrance examination w i t h c r e d i t . Between 
1876 and 1891 he held various posts w i t h i n the service, becoming 
Chinese Secretary at the Peking Legation between 1891 and 1896. 
I n 1896 he became B r i t i s h P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y i n Korea and probably 
met Yuan Shih Kai i n Seoul during t h i s period. On Morrison's 
(50.48) recommendation, he was appointed B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n Peking 
i n 1906. With Alexander Hosie,(Fo.30), and Tang Shao-yl,(Fo.59), he 
s u c c e s s f u l l y negotiated the Opium Treaty of 1913 t h a t banned the 
i m p o r t a t i o n of Indian opium t o China. This Treaty had d i r e consequences 
f o r Indian finance and made him enemies i n India. I n February 1911 
he became Doyen of the Peking Legations and between 1914 and 1918 
used h i s i n f l u e n c e t o b r i n g China i n t o the war on the a l l i e s side. 
He also mounted h i s own forward campaign i n East Tibet, (see Teichman, 
Fo.60).He r e t i r e d i n March 1920 and between 1920 and 1921 he took 
p a r t I n the discussions leading t o the Washington Conference, 
accompanying Balfour as advisor t o the t a l k s i n 1922. He died i n 
London i n 1925, l e a v i n g three sons, h i s only daughter having died 
suddenly from a v i r a l i n f e c t i o n i n 1918. His wife Anne, whom he had 
married i n 1885, spent many years w i t h him i n China and made an 
an important c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the l i f e of the Peking Legation. 
Legation. 
33. KALOF LAMA TIBETAF QFFICAL 
Commander i n Chief of the newly modernised Tibetan army of East Tibet, 
the Kalon Lama was u n i v e r s a l l y respected and admired by h i s people. 
He was most concerned t o e f f e c t a Sino-Tibetan settlement, w i t h or 
without B r i t i s h involvement,and t o t h i s end, he was l e n i e n t w i t h 
General P'eng a f t e r the Siege of Chamdo i n 1918 and was prepared 
t o work w i t h Teichman(Fo.60) during h i s peace mission t o East Tibet. 
The Kalon Lama was rumoured t o have been murdered i n l a t e May or 
e a r l y June 1923. 
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34. KAWAGUCHI, Ekal JAPA5ESE TRAVELLER 
A Buddhist monk of humble o r i g i n s , Kawaguchi spent three years i n 
Tibet between 1889 and 1901.He was possibly working i n f o r s i a l l y 
as a spy f o r the Japanese government but he always claimed t h a t the 
purpose of h i s mission was r e l i g i o u s and f i n a l l y before reaching Lhasa 
he studied f o r many months at Sera Monastery. His published 
account of h i s experiences i n Tibet was t r a n s l a t e d i n t o English 
i n 1909, I n 1905 he v i s i t e d the Panchen Lama at Tashllunpho. He 
returned t o Tibet i n 1914. 
35. KI5G, Louis Macgarth CHIJA SERVICE 
Born i n China, h i s mother was the daughter of missionaries and h i s 
f a t h e r worked as a Chinese Customs O f f i c a l . He entered the 
China Service at twenty and was the f i r s t Vice-Consul at 
Tachienlu between 1913 and 1915. Between 1915 and 1919 he served 
on the Western Front before r e t u r n i n g t o Tachienlu f o r a second 
term. He remained i n Tachienlu as Vice Consul and then as 
Honorary Consul from 1919 u n t i l 1922,when h i s marriage t o a 
Tibetan lady c a l l e d Rin-chen Lhamo forced him t o r e t i r e from 
the Service on a meagre pension at the age of t h i r t y eight. 
I n 1925, while l i v i n g i n Peking i n s t r a i t e n e d c i r c u i s t a n c e s , 
he attempted, unsuccessfully,to secure employment i n the China 
Service as advisor t o the Panchen Lama. He eventually returned 
t o B r i t a i n and c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h Rinchen-Lhamo i n w r i t i n g 
We Tibetans which was published i n 1926. He wrote about h i s 
own experiences i n China i n Turmoil. 
36. LADES LA IIDIA SERVICE 
A B r i t i s h subject and a na t i v e of Sikklm, Laden La was a staunch 
Buddhist who came t o work f o r the B r i t i s h as a spy. A Superintendent 
i n the D a r j e e l i n g Police Force, he j o i n e d the Younghusband Expedition 
i n 1904 and i n 1905 was attached t o the Panchen Lama's entourage 
during h i s t r i p t o India. I n 1910 he was s i m i l a r l y employed and 
j o i n e d the Dalai Lama's pa r t y i n India,becoming a t r u s t e d f r i e n d 
t o the Tibetans. I n 1912 he le d a Mission t o Tibet and became 
B r i t i s h Representative at Gyantse. I n 1921 he went t o Lhasa t o 
j o i n B e l l and r e p l a c i n g h i s Assistant, Achuk Tsering, who had died soon 
a f t e r reaching Lhasa.He remained i n Lhasa a f t e r B e l l l e f t i n order 
t o organise a new p o l i c e force there but l e f t under a cloud i n 1924, 
having been i m p l i c a t e d i n an attempt t o seize m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l there. 
He was apparently f o r g i v e n , and returned several times a f t e r 1925. 
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37. LAFGLEY, Walter,(1855-1918) FAR EASTERF DEPARTMBFT 
Campbell's (Fo.6) A s s i s t a n t from 1907, he re p l a c e d (^mpbell 
a f t e r December 1911. He promoted Alston a s B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r 
i n Peking i n 1920. 
38. LAFSDOWFE, S i r Henry P e l t y - F l t z m a u r i c e , F i f t h Marquess of Lansdowne, 
(1845-1927) VICEROY/FOREIGF OFFICE 
Viceroy of I n d i a between 1888 and 1894 he then became S e c r e t a r y of 
S t a t e f o r War i n S a l i s b u r y ' s cabinet. Between 1900 and 1905 he 
was Fo r e i g n S e c r e t a r y and, from 1905 u n t i l 1915,led the Conservative 
Opposition i n the House of Lords. 
39. L I E F YU CHIFESE OFFICAL 
Manchu o f f l e a l and Lhasa Amban between 1907 and 1911. He founded a 
school i n Lhasa, a c q u i r i n g a p r i n t i n g p r e s s from I n d i a which he 
used to p r i n t t r a n s l a t i o n s of Chinese c l a s s i c s i n t o Tibetan i n an 
attempt to i n f l u e n c e the c u l t u r e and h a b i t s of the Tibetans. In 
1908 he s e t up a Ti b e t a n M i l i t a r y College where Chinese and 
Japanese i n s t r u c t o r s helped to t r a i n T i b etan s o l d i e r s to become 
o f f i c e r s . I n 1910 he e s t a b l i s h e d Trapchi b a r r a c k s i n Lhasa. H i s 
proposal to improve a g r i c u l t u r e by i n t r o d u c i n g Chinese s e t t l e r s 
i n t o T i b e t , and the c r e a t i o n of a Board of Mines to e x p l o i t 
i t s gold, s i l v e r , and mineral r e s o u r c e s d i d not endear 
him to the Lhasa A u t h o r i t i e s . He opened s c h o o l s i n key Tibetan 
c e n t r e s l i k e Gyantse which were intended to promote Chinese 
language s t u d i e s . H i s arrogance and h i s high-handed approach 
antagonised both T i b e t a n s and B r i t i s h who each complained to the 
Chinese and In d i a n governments. He was e v e n t u a l l y deposed i n 1912 
and was summoned back to China. F e a r i n g h i s r e c e p t i o n i n Peking 
however, he f a i l e d t o obey the summons and remained i n h i d i n g i n 
T i b e t . 
40. LOFCHEF SHATRA ( P a l l o r Dorje Kalon) TIBETAF OFFICAL 
Between 1894 and 1895 he had v i s i t e d D a r j e e l i n g and had learned 
something of western d i p l o m a t i c p r a c t i c e . I n 1904 he was imprisoned 
f o r h i s p r o - B r i t i s h syii5>athies but was r e - i n s t a t e d i n 1908. Between 
1910 and 1912 he accompanied the D a l a i Lama i n t o e x i l e i n I n d i a and 
became Ti b e t a n P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y to the Simla t a l k s i n 1913, c o l l e c t i n g 
a v a s t amount of evidence to support Tibetan claims.On h i s r e t u r n to 
Tib e t i n 1914 he was again c r i t i c i s e d f o r being too w i l l i n g to 
accept the B r i t i s h terms. He died i n 1923. 
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41. McMAHOS, S i r Henry,(b.1862) IIDIA SERVICE 
A keen freemason, he j o i n e d the P o l i t i c a l s i n 1890. Between 
1894 and 1896 he was charged w i t h demarcating the boundary 
between Baluchistan and Afghanistan. He served as a P o l i t i c a l 
Agent i n Di r , Swat, and C h i t r a l between 1899 and 1901 and i n 
1903 became B r i t i s h Commisioner f o r Seistan i n Persia. Between 
1905 and 1911 he was P o l i t i c a l Agent i n Baluchistan. I n 1913 
he was appointed B r i t i s h P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y t o the Simla t a l k s 
and put forward a plan t o d i v i d e Tibet between Inner and 
Outer zones. A f t e r he l e f t Simla i n 1914 he became High Commisioner 
f o r Egypt and subsequently Foreign Secretary f o r the Indian 
government. I n 1919 he became B r i t i s h Commisioner on the Middle 
Eastern I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commision. McMahon was the l a s t Indian 
Foreign Secretary t o have charge of both the Foreign and 
P o l i t i c a l Departments w i t h i n the Indian government. 
42. MACDOSALD, David IIDIA SERVICE 
B r i t i s h Trade Agent at Yatung and Gyantse and a c t i v e on the 
f r o n t i e r f o r twenty years,MacdonaId survived the stigma of 
mixed parentage,(Scottish f a t h e r and Sikkimese mother), t o become 
B r i t i s h Trade Agent at Gyantse i n 1908, and at Yatung i n 1912. 
His marriage t o a woman of mixed S c o t t i s h and lepalese blood 
prevented f u r t h e r promotion but h i s knowledge of many regional 
languages and d i a l e c t s made him a very important B r i t i s h 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on Tibetan a f f a i r s u n t i l he r e t i r e d i n 1924. 
43. MAIIEES-SMITH, L t . Col John, (1864-1920) IIDIA SERVICE 
Educated at T r i n i t y College Cambridge and Sandhurst, he served as 
M i l i t a r y Attache f o r the Indian government between 1883 and 1885. 
I n 1888 he accompanied a B r i t i s h Expedition t o Sikkim.He received 
the V i c t o r i a Cross f o r h i s services on the lorth-West F r o n t i e r and, 
i n 1893,became P o l i t i c a l Agent at Kabul.Between 1899 and 1918 
he served as P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Kashmir, Baluchistan,Rajputana 
and l e p a l . 
44. MAX-MULLER, W i l l i a m G r e n f e l l (1867-1945) CHIIA SERVICE 
The son of a German born scholar and not noted f o r h i s t a c t , h i s 
career was di v i d e d between Peking and the Far Eastern Department. 
Between 1909 and 1911 he was Co u n c i l l o r and Charges d ' A f f a i r e s at 
the Peking Legation and i n 1910, conducted an enquiry i n t o 
Campbell's conduct as F i r s t Secretary, do.7). During h i s time 
i n Peking he ' f o r g o t ' t o re p o r t on h i s to u r of Consulates w i t h 
the r e s u l t t h a t there were no w r i t t e n r e p o r t s on them between 
1909 and 1911. He was passed over f o r promotion t o B r i t i s h 
M i n i s t e r i n Peking i n 1920. 
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45. MIFTO, S i r G i l b e r t John Murray Kynmond, Fourth Earl of Mlnto 
(1845-1914) VICEROY 
Educated at Eton and T r i n i t y College Cambridge, he entered the army, 
ser v i n g i n many campaigns between 1867 and 1882.Between 1883 and 1885 
he was M i l i t a r y Secretary t o the Governor General of Canada succeeding 
him as Governor General i n 1891. Between 1905 and 1910 he was Viceroy 
of India. 
46. MOFTAGU, Edwin, (1879-1924) IFDIA OFFICE 
Educated at T r i n i t y College Cambridge and L i b e r a l MP f o r 
Chesterton i n Cambridgeshire from 1906 u n t i l 1922. Between 1906 
and 1910 he was Asqulth's P r i v a t e Secretary and, from 1910 u n t i l 
1914, was Parliamentary Undersecretary of State f o r India. Between 
1914 and 1916 he was Fi n a n c i a l Seceretary t o the Treasury and i n 1916 
became M i n i s t e r of Munitions, r e s i g n i n g soon a f t e r h i s appointment. 
Between 1917 and 1922 he served as Secretary of State f o r India but 
was forced t o r e s i g n over Turkish p o l i c y . He coll a b o r a t e d w i t h 
Chelmsford,(Fo. 13) i n drawing up the reforms t h a t lead t o the 
Government of India Act of 1919. 
47. MORLEY, John, F i r s t Viscount of Blackburn. IFDIA OFFICE 
The son of a Lancashire doctor, Morley was a p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r 
and a Gladstonian Liberal.He spent many years i n I r e l a n d as 
Chief Secretary (1886-92) and i n 1899, became MP f o r Blackburn 
i n Lancashire. I n 1905 he returned t o I r e l a n d as Secretary of 
State and, between 1906 and 1910,was Secretary of State f o r 
India . Between 1910 and 1912 he r e l i e v e d Grey at the Foreign 
O f f i c e d uring h i s frequent periods of i l l n e s s and returned 
b r i e f l y t o the Indi a O f f i c e t o replace Lord Crewe i n 1911. 
(Fo.15). 
48. MORRISOF, George Ernest, (1849-1928) NEVSPAPEEMAF 
An A u s t r a l i a n r e p o r t e r and t r a v e l l e r whose d i a r i e s and papers are 
a r i c h source of in f o r m a t i o n about Peking society. He f i r s t came 
t o Peking i n 1895 and worked as Times Correspondent there u n t i l 
1912 when he resigned t o take up an appointment as an Advisor 
t o Yuan Shih Kai. He used h i s influence w i t h the Foreign O f f i c e 
t o secure Jordan's appointment as B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r t o Peking but, 
a f t e r 1912, f r i c t i o n developed between the two f r i e n d s as Morrison's 
l o y a l t i e s became increasing d i v i d e d between B r i t a i n and China. 
He gave Ivan Chen considerable support during and a f t e r Simla. 
(Ivan Chen.Fo.12). 
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49. IICOLSOI, S i r Arthur, F i r s t Baron Carnock, 
(1849-1928) FOREIGI OFFICE 
Entered the Foreign O f f i c e as A s s i s t a n t P r i v a t e S e c r e t a r y to Lord 
G r a n v i l l e . He then Joined the Diplomatic Service,becoming T h i r d 
S e c r e t a r y i n B e r l i n and, i n 1876,served as T h i r d S e c r e t a r y i n 
Peking.Between 1879 and 1906 he held v a r i o u s diplomatic posts i n 
Teheran (1879-1882); Budapest (1888-93); Sofia(1894),and Tangier 
(1895). I n 1906 he became B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n S t . Petersburg during 
n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. In 1910 he 
he returned to the F o r e i g n O f f i c e to become Permanent Undersecretary, 
a post he held, r e l u c t a n t l y , u n t i l h i s retirement i n 1916. Between 
1916, and h i s death i n 1928, he acted a s an u n o f f i c a l l l a s o n o f f i c e r 
between the F o r e i g n O f f i c e , the Royal Court and the c i t y . 
50. SOMI, Y u t a k a , ( l a t e r Kan) JAPAIESE TRAVELLER 
Much I n f l u e n c e d by h i s Oxford P r o f e s s o r l a n j o Bunyu. lomi was 
was determined to go to T i b e t i n order to t r a n l a t e Tibetan 
S c r i p t u r e s i n t o S a n s k r i t . Although u n s u c c e s s f u l i n h i s attempt 
to reach Lhasa i n 1899,he t r a v e l l e d e x t e n s i v e l y i n East T i b e t and 
was able to pass on v a l u a b l e information about the area to the 
Japanese government.He disappeared somewhere i n Tibe t during 1904. 
51. O'COJIOR, L t . Col. W. F r e d e r i c k IIDIA SERVICE 
O'Connor j o i n e d the B r i t i s h Mountain B a t t e r y i n D a r j e e l i n g i n 1895 
and, between 1895 and 1897, made s e v e r a l journeys i n t o Sikkim.In 
1897 he became a Pioneer Correspondent, r e p o r t i n g on events on the 
f r o n t i e r . I n 1898, while s e r v i n g as A s s i s t a n t I n s p e c t i n g O f f i c e r to 
the Kashmiri I m p e r i a l S e r v i c e A r t i l l a r y Unit, he began to l e a r n 
s e v e r a l languages i n c l u d i n g , Tibetan, Urdu, l e p a l e s e , Punjabi, 
P e r s i a n and Russian. H i s a p t i t u d e f o r languages a t t r a c t e d the a t t e n t i o n 
of Lord Curzon and i n 1901,0'Connor was i n v i t e d to Simla to d i s c u s s 
T i b e t a n matters. I n 1902 O'Connor stayed with Claude White do.68) i n 
Gartok, where the two men apparently d i s c u s s e d Curzon's plans f o r 
T i b e t and, i n January 1903, O'Connor was posted back to D a r j e e l i n g 
i n order to a s s i s t White i n the p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r the Younghusband 
Expedition. He a c t e d as Tibetan I n t e r p r e t e r to the E x p e d i t i o n 
and, i n 1904, drew up the Lhasa Convention. I n 1905 he was appointed 
Trade Agent a t Gyantse and during t h a t year c o l l u d e d with White, 
(probably on Curzon's i n s t r u c t i o n s ) , to b r i n g the Panchen Lama to 
I n d i a . He accompanied the Panchen Lama to I n d i a i n 1906 and, 
a f t e r t a k i n g leave, he returned to Gyantse to face the c o n f l i c t with 
Gow t h a t would do so much damage to h i s reputation.He l e f t Gyantse 
i n 1908 to a c t as T i b e t a n Advisor to the Trade Regulation T a l k s and, 
a f t e r they were signed, he found himself unable to get another 
p o s t i n g to T i b e t . I n 1908 he accompanied the Maraj Kumar to Peking 
at the s t a r t of h i s world tour and probably met the D a l a i Lama. 
Between 1914 and 1918 he s e r v e d i n Consular posts i n P e r s i a r e t u r n i n g 
the l o r t h - E a s t F r o n t i e r i n 1918 to become B r i t i s h Resident i n Kashmir 
where he negotiated an Anglo-Iepalese F r i e n d s h i p T r e a t y i n 1923. 
- 325 -
52. PAFCHEF LAMA, Fi n t h . TIBETAF RULER 
As s p i r i t u a l advisor t o the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama was the 
second most important r e l i g i o u s f i g u r e i n Tibet as well as a 
powerful r u l e r i n h i s own r i g h t . I n 1728 the temporal power of the 
Panchen Lama was r e s t r i c t e d t o h i s own Province of Tsang, w i t h i t s 
c a p i t a l c i t y , Shigatse, and a vast court at Tashilunpho a few miles 
away. Modest and r e t i r i n g I n nature, and less p o l i t i c a l l y aware than 
Thubten Gyatso ( T h i r t e e n t h Dalai Lama, Fo.l7), he had already 
es t a b l i s h e d good r e l a t i o n s w i t h the B r i t i s h and was persuaded t o 
v i s i t I n d i a between 1905 and 1906. He stayed on i n Tibet a f t e r the 
Chinese Invasion of 1910, remaining on reasonable terms w i t h the 
Chinese a f t e r the Dalai Lama f l e d and, under duress, agreed t o go 
t o Lhasa t o help s t a b i l i s e the government there. This created 
f u r t h e r tension w i t h the Dalai Lama. Attempts t o mend the r i f t when 
the Dalai Lama returned t o Lhasa i n 1912 were unsuccessful and, 
even t u a l l y , i n 1923 the Panchen Lama f l e d T i b e t , l i v i n g i n e x i l e 
i n China u n t i l h i s death i n 1937. 
53. RITCHIE, Raymond, (1854-1912) IFDIA OFFICE 
Educated at Eton and Cambridge and r e l a t e d t o Anthony Trollope, 
R i t c h i e was fond of w r i t i n g and was noted f o r the excellence of 
h i s w r i t t e n r e p o r t s . Before becoming Permanent Undersecretary 
at the India O f f i c e between 1909 and 1912, he had worked as 
Pr i v a t e Secretary t o Godley (Fo.22). His premature death i n 
1912 shocked and saddened h i s colleagues. 
54. ROCKHILL, W i l l i a m Woodvllle, (1854-1914) AMERICAF DIPLOMAT 
Educated i n Paris, he l a t e r b r i e f l y j o i n e d the Foreign Legion before 
e n t e r i n g the Diplomatic Service i n 1884, He was employed at the 
American Legation i n Peking u n t i l 1888 when he resigned h i s p o s i t i o n 
i n order t o t r a v e l e x t e n s i v e l y i n Central Asia attenipting, 
unsuccessfully,to reach Lhasa. He had studied Tibetan while i n 
France and had developed a passion f o r Chinese and Tibetan c u l t u r e . 
I n 1901 he returned t o China as American Special Envoy t o the post 
Boxer t a l k s and devised America's Open Door p o l i c y towards China. 
He was American M i n i s t e r t o Peking between 1905 and 1909 and, i n 
1908, was Special Advisor t o the Dalai Lama i n Peking, although 
he was s c e p t i c a l about T i b e t ' s a b i l i t y t o achieve Independence 
from China. I n 1909 he became American M i n i s t e r t o St. Petersburg 
and, i n 1912 was American M i n i s t e r i n Turkey. I n 1913, on Morrison's 
(Fo.48) recommendation, he applied for,and was accepted,as Special 
Advisor t o Yuan Shih Kai. He took the post on the understanding 
t h a t he would not have t o r e t u r n t o China but changed h i s mind 
and died i n Honolulu while enroute t o Peking. 
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55. ROSE, Archibald, (b. 1879) CHIIA SERVICE 
He received a China Medal and Clasp f o r h i s services t o the B r i t i s h 
Legation during the Boxer Siege of 1900 and afterwards served i n 
various China Consulates i n c l u d i n g , Chungking, Ilngpo.and Hanchow and 
was Consul General a t Tengyeuh during the Pienma c r i s i s of 1910. 
He t r a v e l l e d widely i n China, Mongolia and Central Asia and was 
Chinese Advisor t o the delegation t o the Simla Conference i n 1913. 
I n 1915 he became Commercial Attache i n Shanghai and went on t o become 
Chinese Secretary at the B r i t i s h Legation i n Peking between 1917 and 
1921. 
56. SATOW, S i r Ernest, (b. 1843) CHIIA SERVICE 
Born i n London, the f o u r t h son of an English mother and Swedish 
merchant f a t h e r , Satow's s t r i c t Protestant upbringing made him 
uncomfortable i n society. He gained a BA from London U n i v e r s i t y 
before becoming a Student I n t e r p r e t e r at the B r i t i s h Consulate 
i n Tokyo where h i s l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s secured h i s promotion t o 
Japanese Secretary i n 1868.His f r i e n d s h i p w i t h I t o helped 
t o advance Anglo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s and, i n 1900,he was asked 
t o become B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n Peking. I n 1900 he negotiated the 
terms of the Boxer Settlement w i t h the Chinese and he remained 
M i n i s t e r i n Peking u n t i l 1906.In 1902 he warned of the dangers 
of an Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e and, u n l i k e many of h i s colleagues, 
he was not su r p r i s e d by the Japanese v i c t o r y over Russia 
i n 1905. I n 1906 he was the only high ranking o f f i c a l i n the China 
Service t o have worked as i n t e r p r e t e r i n China and Japan and h i s 
great fluency i n both languages was enormously valuable. With 
Jordan do.32), he was one of the few people t o t r a n s f e r from the 
Consular t o the Diplomatic Service but, l i k e Jordan,he was not 
promoted t o Ambassador. Between 1906 and 1912 represented B r i t a i n 
as a member of the Court of A r b i t r a t i o n i n the Hague and a f t e r 
h i s retirement, continued t o act as u n o f f i c a l advisor t o the 
Foreign O f f i c e on Chinese and Japanese matters. A keen scholar 
and author of several books on Japanese c u l t u r e , he never 
married, but h i s very open long term r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a Japanese 
woman probably cost him f u r t h e r promotion. 
57. SHELTOI, Dr. AMERICAI MISSIOIARY 
A freemason and one of a group of American and B r i t i s h missionaries 
based i n Batang i n East Tibet, Shelton and h i s colleagues t r a v e l l e d 
e x t e n s i v e l y i n East Tibet. He was we l l l i k e d by l o c a l Tibetans and 
became a great f r i e n d of the Prince of Chala d o . 8 ) . I n 1917 he 
t r i e d t o organise h i s own peace i n i t i a t i v e but co-operated w i t h 
Teichman do.60) i n organising the Chamdo Truce. I n 1922 he 
was murdered by bandits a f t e r an abo r t i v e attempt t o reach Lhasa. 
- 327 -
58. SHERAP, Paul ( D o r j i e Zodba) CHIFA SERVICE 
The son of Tibetan and Mongolian parents, Sherap was born i n 
Rongbasta i n East Tibet but t r a v e l l e d e xtensively, l i v i n g f o r 
a while i n D a r j e e l i n g where he became a Protestant, t a k i n g 
the C h r i s t i a n name Paul.Although he earned h i s l i v i n g as a merchant, 
he also worked p a r t - t i m e f o r the China Service, passing on 
in f o r m a t i o n about events i n Tachlenlu between 1924 u n t i l 1928, 
59, T'AFG SHAO-YI, (b,1860) CHIFESE OFFICAL 
P a r t l y educated i n America between 1904 and 1906 he was Chinese 
delegate t o the Adhesion Talks. He l e f t India before t a l k s were 
completed and returned t o Peking t o becone a M i n i s t e r at the Wai-
Wu-Pu. Jordan was convinced t h a t T'ang was the O f f l e a l mainly 
responsible f o r the Chinese forward p o l i c y from t h i s time. In 
1908 he was delegate t o the t a l k s leading t o the Opium Treaty 
of 1913, (see Jordan Fo.32). Between 1908 and 1909 he was 
Vice President of the Wal-Wu-Pu. 
60. TEICHMAF, E r i c , (1884-1944) CHIFA SERVICE 
Born i n London, the son of a n a t u r a l i s e d German f u r t r a d e r , Teichman 
j o i n e d the China Service i n 1907. Between 1911 and 1912 he served 
as Wilkinson's (Fo.67) Assistant at Chengtu, d i s t i n g u i s h i n g himself 
f o r bravery during the r e v o l u t i o n a r y disturbances i n the c i t y . I n 
1911 he undertook a long journey t o Forth-West China and was 
Jordan's Assistant i n Peking between 1913 and 1917.In 1917 he was 
appointed Consul General at Tachlenlu. Between March 1918 and February 
1919 he went on a peace mission t o East Tibet t h a t r e s u l t e d i n the 
s i g n i n g of t r e a t i e s a t Chamdo and Rongbasta. He then departed on an 
unauthorised t o u r of East T i b e t , eventually r e t u r n i n g t o Tachienlu 
i n February 1919. He returned t o Peking t o become Chinese Secretary 
t o the Legation u n t i l 1924. He was allowed t o pub l i s h a book about 
h i s mission I n East Tibet while s t i l l i n the Service. He r e t i r e d 
i n 1936 but was c a l l e d from retirement i n 1942 t o advise on 
on n e g o t i a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o the ending of e x t r t e r r i t o r i a l i t y 
i n China. 
61. TSOFGA PEFLOP,(Sir Ugyen Wanchek) BHUTAFESE RULER 
A f i g u r e of great p o l i t i c a l importance as Bhutan emerged from a 
period of c i v i l war t o become a stable Hymalayan s t a t e f r i e n d l y t o 
B r i t a i n . Ugyen had acted as an intermediary w i t h the Lhasa 
A u t h o r i t i e s d uring the Younghusband Expedition and i n 1905 was 
i n v i t e d t o Calcutta t o meet the Prince and Princess of Wales. 
His f r i e n d s h i p was p a r t i c u l a r l y valued as previous r e l a t i o n s with 
Bhutan, v i a the Bhutanese Representative or Vak i l i n Darjeeling, 
had been d i f f i c u l t . He was instrumental i n the successsful 
s i g n i n g of the Anglo-Bhutanese Friendship Treat of 1910. 
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62. TWYMAI, B CHIIA SERVICE 
A weaver's son from Kent, Twyman became Consul General at Chengtu 
i n 1909. He l e f t a f t e r a year, having s u f f e r e d a nervous breakdown 
but went on t o d i s t i n g u i s h himself f o r bravery i n 1915 when he 
r i s k e d h i s l i f e by f a c i n g an angry mob who were storming h i s 
Consulate. 
63. UGYEI KAZI BHUTAIESE OFFICAL 
Bhutanese Representative i n Da r j e e l i n g , he sometimes spied f o r the 
B r i t i s h . I n 1901 he agreed t o d e l i v e r Lord Curzon's l e t t e r t o the 
Dalai Lama, who l a t e r s t a t e d t h a t he had received i t but had chosen 
not t o open i t . He was attached t o the Younghusband Expedition as 
the Ugyen Wnachek's Secretary. I n 1908 he was s t i l l spying f o r B e l l 
I n Sikkim. 
64. WEIR, Lt. Col. James L e s l i e Rose, (1883-1950) IIDIA SERVICE 
Educated at Wellingborough and the Royal M i l i t a r y Academy i n Woolwich, 
he was seconded t o the P o l i t i c a l s i n 1908 a f t e r a short army career i n 
Indi a . I n 1908 he was B r i t i s h Resident i n Gwallor before becoming 
B r i t i s h Trade Agent at Gyantse between 1909 and 1912. Between 1912 and 
1914 he served on the l o r t h West F r o n t i e r and i n Mesopotamia and, 
between 1918 and 1922, served as a Consul i n various p a r t s of Persia. 
I n 1926 he became P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim and while i n post he l e d 
two Expeditions t o Lhasa i n 1928 and again i n 1933. Between 1933,and 
h i s retirement i n 1938, he was B r i t i s h Resident f o r the Indian States 
of Baroda and Gujarat. 
65. WEI T'SUIG-YAO CHIIESE OFFICAL 
Assistant Amban i n Lhasa under Lien Yu do.39), and a man of 
comparatively l i b e r a l views. More t r u s t e d by the Tibetans than 
most Manchu o f f i c a l s , he resigned over the Chinese invasion of 
Lhasa i n 1910. I n 1913 he was o f f e r e d as delegate t o the Simla 
t a l k s and was accepted by the B r i t i s h but declined the post, 
r e f u s i n g t o t r a v e l t o India because he f e l t t h a t the t a l k s would not 
make progress i n London. His support f o r Yuan Shih Kai's do.72) 
Five l a t i o n s p o l i c y i n 1913 l o s t him support i n s i d e Tibet. 
66. WELLIIGTOI KOO (b.1888) CHIIESE OFFICAL 
One of the new breed of western educated diplomats, Koo was educated 
i n America and, between 1911 and 1914,was Secretary t o Yuan Shlh Kai 
and a member of the Wai Wu pu. In 1915 he was appointed Chinese 
M i n i s t e r t o America and, between 1919 and 1920, he led the Chinese 
delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. I n 1921 he was appointed 
M i n i s t e r t o London and was Chinese P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y t o the Washington 
Conference i n 1922. He returned t o China i n 1922 t o become Mi n i s t e r 
f o r Foreign A f f a i r s and l a t e r M i n i s t e r f o r Finance. Between 1931 
and 1941 he was Minister,and l a t e r Ambassador t o France and between 
1941 and 1946, he was Ambassador t o London. 
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67. WILKIFSOF, W.H. CHIFA SERVICE 
The son of a commercial agent i n Wolverhampton, he served i n a 
v a r i e t y of Consular posts i n China from 1902 u n t i l he became 
Consul General f o r Chengtu between 1909 and 1915. A brave man who 
d i s t i n g u i s h e d himself by s t a y i n g i n post during the disturbances 
of 1911, he could also be p e t t y and snobbish. I n 1911 he prevented 
h i s Assistant l e a v i n g Chengtu i n order t o marry the 
widow of a missionary. 
68. WHITE, Claude IFDIA SERVICE 
O r i g i n a l l y an engineer w i t h the Public Works Department, White 
was seconded t o the P o l i t i c a l s i n 1888 i n order t o a s s i s t the P o l i t i c a l 
O f f i c e r i n Sikkim where i t was hoped he could use h i s engineering 
s k i l l s t o organise bridge and road b u i l d i n g schemes i n the area. 
I n 1889 he became P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Sikkim and,in 1903, was 
appointed Commisioner t o the Younghusband Expedition, A f t e r 1904 
the area under h i s s u p e r v i s i o n was increased t o include Bhutan and 
p a r t s of Tibet, Between 1905 and 1906 he colluded w i t h 0'Connor(Fo.51) 
i n b r i n g the Panchen Lama t o India. I n 1906 he undertook an 
e x p l o r a t o r y mission t o East Bhutan followed by a second v i s i t there 
i n 1907 t o represent B r i t a i n during the i n s t a l l a t i o n of Ugyen Wanchek 
(Tsonga Penlop,Fo.61) as Mahrajah of Bhutan. During h i s years as 
P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r of Sikkim (1889-1908) he b u i l t many roads and 
bridges but, although he t r i e d hard t o i n t e r e s t h i s government i n 
f u r t h e r schemes, he was forced t o r e t i r e before many of them could be 
implemented. 
69. WILTOF, S i r E r i c , ( b . 1870) CHIFA SERVICE 
He entered the China Service i n 1890 and i n 1903 was Special Chinese 
Advisor t o the Younghusband Expedition. A f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o China 
he served as Consul General at Tengyueh i n 1906 and, i n 1908 was 
sent t o In d i a as Special Chinese Advisor t o the Trade Regulation 
t a l k s . Between 1912 and 1915 he was Chinese Secretary i n Peking 
and was a member of the Special Opium Commision,(see Jordan Fo. 32). 
I n 1915 he became a Commercial Attache i n Shanghai before being 
promoted t o F i r s t Secretary t o the Peking Legation i n 1917, a 
p o s i t i o n he held u n t i l h i s retirement i n 1921, 
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70. YAJIMA, Yas u j l r o JAPAIESE TRAVELLER 
A veteran of the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, Yajima abandoned a 
successful m i l i t a r y career t o j o i n the I l p p o n Rikkowa (World 
T r a v e l l i n g S o c i e t y ) , a C h r i s t i a n organisation whose aim was t o 
help poor students. He paused i n Szechuan on the f i r s t l e g of 
h i s solo journey round the world t o help t r a i n troops i n the Szechuan 
P r o v i n c i a l army and a r r i v e d i n Tibet during 1910. In 1911 he v i s i t e d 
the Dalai Lama, then i n e x i l e i n India, and returned t o Tibet i n 
1913 where he was employed as an i n s t r u c t o r t o the new Tibetan 
army. Yajima's movements a t t r a c t e d a l o t of i n t e r e s t i n India 
and Hardinge, convinced t h a t he must be a Japanese spy, went 
t o a great deal of t r o u b l e t o i n v e s t i g a t e h i s background. 
71. YOUIGHUSBAID, S i r Francis IIDIA SERVICE 
From a m i l i t a r y f a m i l y i n Bamburgh i n lorthumberland, Younghusband 
was born at Muree H i l l S t a t i o n on the l o r t h West F r o n t i e r and was 
educated at C l i f t o n Public School and at Sandhurst.In 1882 he was 
sent t o j o i n the Kings Dragoon Guards at Meerut and, by 1884, was 
employed as a reconnaisance scout on the Kohat f r o n t i e r . About 
t h i s time he began t o develop an i n t e r e s t i n Manchuria and, i n 
March 1886,he v i s i t e d Peking en route f o r Manchuria, the f i r s t 
of many Central Asian journeys. He met Lord Curzon while on 
leave i n London i n 1891 and, when he returned t o India,he became 
F i r s t Assistant t o the B r i t i s h Resident i n Kashmir,going on i n 
August 1892 t o became P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Hunza and then i n 
C h i t r a l where Curzon v i s i t e d him i n October 1894. In March 1895 
he resigned from the P o l i t i c a l s t o become Times Correspondent 
i n C h i t r a l and, i n August 1895,met and married Helena Maghioc. 
In November 1897 he r e j o i n e d the P o l i t i c a l s , r e t u r n i n g t o India 
t o become P o l i t i c a l O f f i c e r i n Rajputna, and subsequently, 
B r i t i s h Resident i n Indore i n Southern India. Both appointments 
had been secured on Curzon's recommendation and, i n May 1903, he 
was summoned t o Simla where Curzon o f f e r e d t o make him leader 
of an Expedition t o Tibet. Between 1903 and 1904 he led the 
Expedition t o Tibet and negotiated and signed the Lhasa 
Convention of 1904. He returned t o B r i t a i n t o face severe 
c r i t i c i s m of h i s conduct i n Tibet which he deeply resented. 
I n 1907 he returned t o Kashmir as B r i t i s h Resident r e t i r i n g 
I n January 1910. Between 1914 and 1915 he was employed by the 
India O f f i c e disseminating war news t o India and, i n 1919 he 
became President of the Royal Geographical Society.He was Organiser 
of the World Congress of Faiths u n t i l h i s death i n 1942. 
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72. YUAF SHIH KAI CHIFESE RULER 
A f t e r f a i l i n g t o enter the C i v i l Service Yuan decided upon a 
m i l i t a r y career and obtained h i s f i r s t post i n the Maritime 
Defence Unit i n Shantung. I n 1882 he played a key r o l e i n the 
m i l i t a r y campaign i n Korea and became Commisioner of Commerce 
and Chinese Resident there, gaining a r e p u t a t i o n as a shrewd 
p o l i t i c i a n . During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 he commanded 
the 'the Fewly Created Army' which, helped by German o f f i c e r s , 
employed western p r i n c i p l e s of m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g and organisation. 
These men stayed l o y a l t o Yuan and probably saved h i s l i f e during 
the Hundred Days C r i s i s of 1898 when he was accused of betraying 
h i s Emperor. I n December 1899 Yuan was made Governor of Shantung 
and, under the guise of t r a i n i n g and equipping troops t o cope 
w i t h the Boxer r e b e l l i o n , he b u i l t up the most powerful army i n 
China. I n 1907 he was forced out of o f f i c e but returned I n October 
1911 t o take f u l l advantage of the Manchu collapse, o f f e r i n g t o 
act as honest broker between the Manchu Court and the Revolutionaries. 
When the l a s t Manchu Emperor, Pu-Yl, abdicated i n 1912, Sun Yat Sen 
appointed Yuan P r o v i s i o n a l President of the new Chinese Republic 
and, i n March 1912, he became i t s f i r s t President.His attempts t o 
make himself Emporer created a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s i s and, i n 
June 1916,he died suddenly i n mysterious circumstances,leaving 
h i s country on the b r i n k of c i v i l war. Throughout h i s period 
i n power Yuan faced severe f i n a n c i a l shortages and c i v i l unrest, 
which made i t v i r t u a l l y impossible f o r him t o govern e f f e c t i v e l y . 
73. YU T'AI CHIFESE OFFICAL 
Appointed Amban i n Lhasa i n 1903, he took months t o take up h i s 
post but was there t o greet Younghusband i n 1904, where h i s 
s o p h i s t i c a t i o n and helpfulness endeared him t o the Expedition 
members. He was a r r e s t e d i n 1907 on the orders of Chang Yin Tang 
(Fo.lO),and he returned t o Peking i n chains, accused by Chang 
of being too co-operative w i t h the B r i t i s h . 
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